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Abstract
On September 27, 2017, the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) arrested ten individuals
connected to National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I men’s basketball for
charges, including bribery, wire fraud, and money laundering. In response to the public release of
this investigation, the NCAA formed the Commission on College Basketball (CCB) to address
“fairness and opportunity for college athletes, coupled with the enforcement capability to hold
accountable those who undermine the standards of our community” (Emmert, 2017). Ultimately,
the purpose of this study is to analyze the NCAA’s response to the FBI investigation into men’s
college basketball. The creation of the CCB as a direct result of the FBI investigations, coupled
with the recommendations for reform, suggest the NCAA is more concerned with protecting
their ideological hegemony than improving the quality of life of and professional development
opportunities for collegiate athletes. Additionally, college sport reform groups and public media
responses to the investigation, as critical of the NCAA (Medcalf, 2018; Wolken, 2018; The drake
group, n.d.; Knight commission, 2018). A critical discourse analysis (CDA) is utilized to reveal
how the responses by the NCAA reflect their escalating commitment (Staw, 1976) towards
amateurism as well as the role of the interest-convergence tenet of Critical Race Theory (CRT;
Bell, 1980, 1992).
Keywords: college sport, amateurism, escalation of commitment, interest convergence,
critical discourse analysis
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Louis Marty Blazer III, a financial planner for professional athletes, was caught by the
United States (U.S.) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) embezzling $2,350,000 from
five of his clients between 2010 and 2012 for “unauthorized risky investments,” including movie
projects (SEC v. Blazer III, 2016). Blazer approached one client with two movies in which he
had a financial interest, working titles "Mafia the Movie" and "Sibling," as investment
opportunities. When the client declined to invest, Blazer stole $550,000 from the client's account
to invest regardless. However, when the client discovered what Blazer had done, he or she
demanded to be repaid the embezzled money. In order to do this, Blazer stole the money from
another client’s account to make the repayment (SEC v. Blazer III, 2016). The SEC stated Blazer
was making “Ponzi-like payments and then lying to SEC examiners who uncovered the
unauthorized withdrawals” (SEC v. Blazer III, 2016). After the SEC caught him, Blazer was
charged with securities fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft, and making false
statements and documents. These four charges combined could carry a maximum prison
sentence of 67 years (Lavigne, 2018). In order to avoid prison, Blazer pled guilty to the securities
fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft charges and agreed to become an informant for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiry into corruption in men’s college basketball
(Schlabach, 2017).
The investigation resulted in the arrest of ten individuals connected to National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I men’s basketball on September 27, 2017, on financial
charges, including bribery, wire fraud, and money laundering. Those arrested were four assistant
coaches for men’s college basketball teams, Tony Bland (University of Southern
California), Lamont Evans (Oklahoma State University), Chuck Person (Auburn University)
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and Emanuel Richardson (University of Arizona); Adidas executive, James Gatto; Adidas
employee, Merl Code; recently fired National Basketball Association (NBA) agent, Christian
Dawkins; financial advisor, Munish Sood; program director of an Adidas-sponsored Amateur
Athletic Union (AAU) basketball team, Jonathan Brad Augustine; and custom clothier, Rashan
Michel (Schlabach, 2017). A few weeks following the public release of these arrests and
investigation, the NCAA formed an independent organization, the Commission on College
Basketball (CCB)1, to create reform recommendations. Specifically, as stated by NCAA
President Mark Emmert, the CCB was designed to address “fairness and opportunity for college
athletes, coupled with the enforcement capability to hold accountable those who undermine the
standards of our community” (2017).
The CCB, chaired by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, released its
recommendations on April 25, 2018 (Associated Press, 2018; Wallace, 2018). However, these
recommendations mostly focused on issues within the control of the NBA, the shoe companies
(e.g., Adidas, Nike, Under Armour), and the AAU, which governs the most significant travel
high school basketball in terms of collegiate recruiting. Further, the recommendations that
focused on what the NCAA could realistically accomplish include only incremental changes,
while not discussing the rights of collegiate athletes (Chapter 4 discusses these changes in greater
detail) (The drake group, n.d.; Knight commission, 2018). Five months later, on September 20,
2018, the NCAA officially released their reforms, some of which were in effect immediately,
while others were to be enacted later in 2018 or in 2019 (NCAA committed, n.d.). Similar to the
CCB report, these reforms shifted responsibility to other organizations. They ignored the rights
of collegiate athletes, including reforms that called for heavy involvement from United States of

It is critical to mention, the CCB mostly addresses men’s basketball. Issues that impact women’s basketball players
include the lack of worker rights, creating NCAA youth basketball programs, and affiliations with USA basketball.
1
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America Basketball (USA Basketball) while they were never consulted and would later refuse
involvement, and widespread focus on enforcement with little focus on improving the athletes’
experiences (Medcalf, 2018; Wolken, 2018; The drake group, n.d., Knight commission, 2018).
Meanwhile, the FBI investigation expanded, utilizing further means of surveillance such
as wiretaps and implicating more players for accepting payouts to attend specific universities,
while coaches were aware of the payments. The full-scale investigation led to three court cases,
with the first case decided on October 24, 2018. All individuals, in this case, were found guilty
on the basis the universities were being defrauded because they were providing scholarships to
ineligible athletes, based on NCAA rules (Hobson & Armstrong, 2018). This case is
representative of the more significant issue of exploitation of collegiate athletes, with the
universities being considered victims regardless of their generated revenue and the fact that
athletes cannot monetize their skills and market value (McCormick & McCormick, 2010).
Throughout this process, the NCAA created reform recommendations and enacted
reforms to address the negative public perception (as opposed to the actual issues present) of
corruption that is associated with the FBI investigation, while solidifying their central tenet of
amateurism. This response is reflective of NCAA practices that established amateurism as an
attempt to uphold the integrity of collegiate athletics due to the pervasive belief that not paying
athletes meant there was no corruption, and the purity of the sport was maintained (Byers &
Hammer, 1995). The universities were greatly profiting as the athletes were not compensated
equitably. As described by the first president of the NCAA, Walter Byers, in his book with
Charles Hammer (1995), “I was charged with the dual mission of keeping intercollegiate sports
clean while generating millions of dollars each year as income for colleges… We proved barely
adequate in the first instance, but enormously successful in our second mission” (p. 5). While the
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tenet of amateurism has been tested through various legal battles and waves of reform and has
been criticized mainly in the academic community as exploitation of collegiate athletes, the
NCAA has continued to uphold this value (Edelman, 2014b; McCormick & McCormick, 2006;
Sack 2009; Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). This first began with the
creation of the term student-athlete as a way to avoid the liability that exists when defining
collegiate athletes as employees following the death of Ray Dennison, a football player from
Fort Lewis A&M College, in 1955 (Byers & Hammer, 1995), and has continued through the
current reforms centered around men’s college basketball. This issue is essential for collegiate
athletes as their images and likenesses are used for profit by the NCAA, their respective
universities, and sponsors, while they are not allowed to accrue wealth based on their discernable
skills and value provided.
Additionally, there exists an underlying issue of the profit being generated from men’s
college basketball, in which Black2 athletes comprise the notable majority compared to the
majority White male NCAA executive body, university presidents, and university athletic
directors (Lapchick, Marfatia, Bloom, & Sylverain, 2017a; et al., 2017b; Harper, 2018). This
exploitation can be considered oppressive through a traditional belief which views oppression as
the domination of one social group over another along with an explanation of oppression as less
overt and existing primarily as a result of long-standing, restrictive, and unquestioned social
norms (Young, 2004; Sartore-Baldwin, McCullough, & Quatman-Yates, 2017). Ultimately, this
study will show that recent developments associated with men’s college basketball highlight the

2

The terms Black and African American will be used interchangeably based on the source to refer to the racial
group within the U.S. that has been subjected to historical oppression and marginalization as a result of this
designation and descendants of African people before chattel slavery in the U.S.
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NCAA has continued to avoid creating actual reform, while still exploiting collegiate athletes
and generating significant profit.
Statement of Problem
There has been an abundance of research on amateurism, including two seminal books on
the landscapes of amateurism in college sport by Byers and Hammer (1995) and Sack and
Staurowsky (1998). Additional research has discussed the overall myth of amateurism (Davis
1994; McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Schwarz, 2011; Schwarz & Trahan, 2017; Sheetz, 2016;
Southall & Staurowsky, 2013; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005; Wheeler, 2004), regulations on
collegiate athletes (Smith, 2000; Rush, 1989; Schwarz & Belzer, 2012), and collegiate athletes’
right of publicity (Afshar, 2014; Gerrie, 2018). However, none of these studies have addressed
the NCAA response when the public threatens their amateurism values. Additionally, while there
is some research about the NCAA discourse and institutional logics (Southall & Staurowsky,
2013; Southall & Nagel, 2008; Southall, Nagel, Amis, & Southall, 2008; Southall, Southall, &
Dwyer, 2009) these studies also do not examine the NCAA when the collegiate model is facing
negative public pressure. Additionally, race and college sport research discusses topics such as
athletes experience (Singer, 2016; Carter-Francique, Hart, & Steward, 2013; Yearwood, 2018),
racism in media and fans (Gill, Jr., 2011; Eastman & Billings, 2001; Love & Hughey, 2015), and
implications for policy considering race (Cooper, Nwadike, & Macaulay, 2017; Nwadike, Baker,
Brackebusch, & Hawkins, 2016). When a racial discrepancy of this level between a governing
body and the people they govern exists, the dominant racial ideology of a given society is
operating explicitly and implicitly. In the U.S., the dominant racial ideology asserts that White
individuals are superior to Black individuals, which has impacted the country since its
establishment through the present day (Coakley, 2015). Amateurism, as the NCAA’s operating
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model, and the role of race at the macro-level of American society and micro-level of collegiate
basketball, are the primary influencers that will be utilized to assess the NCAA response to the
FBI investigation critically. Within previous research, there is also a dearth of literature
addressing NCAA discourse through the dual lens of amateurism and race. Ultimately, the study
seeks to fill gaps in the literature related to the NCAA response under crisis as well as the
intersection of amateurism in college sport and race. Combining research on amateurism and
race in college sport is significant because the majority of athletes in the revenue-generating
sports of football and men’s basketball are Black, while the majority of those who profit (e.g.,
coaches, athletic directors, NCAA executives) are White (Lapchick et al., 2017a; Lapchick et al.,
2017b; Harper, 2018). Further, the persistent racial gaps in graduation rates have also intensified
the critiques of the NCAA being a racially exploitative cartel that devalues the overall well-being
of college athletes in general and Black college athletes more specifically (Harper, 2018).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study was to analyze the NCAA’s response to the FBI investigation
into men’s college basketball and will analyze two primary issues. Firstly, the upholding and
further solidifying of amateurism when it is this model that led to the need for the investigation.
The NCAA’s amateurism model that prohibits athletes from generating income while enrolled in
college is a likely explanation for these payments occurring covertly. Although the legal issues,
in this case, could be discussed at length, this study was concerned with addressing the role of
collegiate amateurism model in the NCAA response to the federal investigation. The second
issue was the role of race in the response leading to reform recommendations and reforms that do
not improve the athlete experience. Race had a significant role in this study because of the
discrepancy between the demographic breakdown of majority Black Division I men’s basketball
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players compared to majority White NCAA executive body, university presidents, and university
athletic directors, as explained in the previous section. In order to accomplish the purpose of this
study, there were three key objectives. The first was to analyze how the amateurism model was
used and impacted by the NCAA response. The second was to assess how race impacted this
response, both explicitly and implicitly. The third and final objective was to compare the NCAA
response to the response by non-NCAA entities, in this case, referring to collegiate sport reform
groups and public media. Below is a set of questions, each seeking to accomplish one objective.
Research Questions
1) How does the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into men’s college basketball
solidify or alter the current collegiate model?
2) How does the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into men’s college basketball
reflect and reinforce the dominant racial ideology in the United States?
3) What are the responses from non-NCAA entities regarding the FBI investigation
compared to the NCAA response?
Significance of Study
This study will explore and analyze the NCAA response to the 2017-2018 FBI
investigation into men’s college basketball. While other studies have explored other ways in
which the NCAA has upheld amateurism, there is a gap in addressing their specific response to
this event in the academic community. This study builds upon previous work around collegiate
athletics that has examined the system as a whole and is additionally informed by scholarship
that discusses the experiences of individuals in collegiate athletics. Both of these areas of study,
as well as others, will be expounded upon further in Chapter 2. Examining the messaging and
ideologies present in the NCAA and non-NCAA entity discourse will hopefully lead to
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comprehensive reform practices that promote racial equity. Analyzing the NCAA response using
the dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse rooted in escalation of commitment (Staw,
1976) as well as the interest convergence tenet of critical race theory (Bell 1980, 1992) provides
the critical lens necessary to understanding how the NCAA upholds the amateurism model and
the influence of race.
Definition of Terms
•

Amateurism: A practice used by the NCAA which prohibits collegiate athletes from
receiving compensation in order for them to be distinct from professional athletes.

•

Athletic scholarship: A scholarship which covers all of or part of college tuition given to
collegiate athletes based on athletic ability.

•

Collegiate athlete: While the term utilized by the NCAA is student-athlete, this study
uses collegiate athlete to describe an athlete who is participating in varsity athletics while
enrolled in college (Staurowsky & Sack, 2005).

•

Collegiate model: A model the NCAA utilizes to continue to uphold amateurism while
benefitting from the commercial aspects of college sport.

•

De jure elicit payments: Payments received by collegiate athletes or prospective
collegiate athletes that are deemed elicit based on NCAA amateurism rules but would
otherwise be considered acceptable. Where de jure practices are recognized, regardless of
whether the practice exists in reality (Rothstein, 2017).

•

Division I (NCAA Division I): The highest level of the NCAA, which is divided into
Division I, II, and III based on financial commitment to athletics.
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Dominant racial ideology: The classifying of human beings into racial groups, in the
United States, White individuals are considered superior to Black/African American
individuals.

•

Exploitation: The action or fact of the NCAA using collegiate athletes as a means to
create a benefit while the athletes limited in their possible benefits. Although monetary
benefits may be the most common, they are not the only benefits the NCAA inequitably
receives in this system.

•

National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA): The primary governing body for
collegiate athletics in the United States and a vital focus of this study.

•

NCAA response: The response of the NCAA to the FBI investigation, including reform
recommendations, actual reforms passed, and statements made by NCAA President Mark
Emmert.

•

Non-NCAA entities: Collegiate sport reform groups and public media; In this study, the
collegiate sport reform groups refer to academic reform groups the Knight Commission
on Intercollegiate Athletics, or the Knight Commission, and the Drake Group. Public
media consists of sport-based (ESPN, Sports Illustrated, The Athletic) and non-sport
based media (The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Atlantic).

•

Professional sport: Governing sport bodies that compensate athletes based on market
value and include employee benefits such as CBAs, unions, and sponsorships.

•

Prospective collegiate athlete: An athlete recruited to play in college or committed to
play in college but has yet to enroll in the university.

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA
•

Race: Although race is a socially constructed concept and differences in individuals
based on race, such as intellectual and academic ability, are false, the issues individuals
face as a result of race and racism are genuine (Smedley & Smedley, 2005).

10
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Historical Context of Amateurism and the NCAA
The conflict between commercialization and amateurism in intercollegiate athletics traces
back to the first intercollegiate athletic competition in 1852, 58 years before the creation of the
NCAA in 1910. This competition was a rowing match between Harvard University and Yale
University, known as the Harvard–Yale Regatta, which has occurred nearly annually since 1859,
with the 153rd regatta occurring on June 9, 2018. While college sport has undergone many
changes since 1852, the main similarity that exists between the first intercollegiate athletics
competition and modern-day college sport is the athletes do not receive compensation while the
universities generate a profit. The first Harvard–Yale Regatta was sponsored by Elkins Railroad
Line (Otto & Otto, 2013; Smith, 2000), while the NCAA currently has a multi-billion dollar
contract for their Division I men’s basketball championship, also known as March Madness. In
2016, the NCAA signed an eight-year contract extension with CBS and Turner, worth $8.8
billion on top of an existing $10.8 billion 15-year contract. This contract means the NCAA will
have generated total revenues of $19.6 billion from 2010-2032, valued at $770 million per year
until 2024 and $1.1 billion per year from 2025-2032, for this tournament alone (Battaglio, 2016).
While this contract reflects the fact that college sport is undeniably commercial, the NCAA has
continued to maintain its belief in amateurism.
Although amateurism has been present in college sport since 1852, its roots are in ancient
Greece. The amateur ideal of the Olympic Games of ancient Greece created a high barrier to
entry through which only wealthy Greek athletes could afford travel and training expenses while
not being compensated (Rush, 1989). Restricting participation to the wealthy through the façade
of amateurism continued with the modern Olympic in 1896 (Rush, 1989). Amateurism in the
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U.S. has historically restricted participation to White, upper-class males who could afford to be
amateur as well. This restriction was present in the first American Olympic teams, which were
composed of athletes from two primary sport backgrounds, which utilized amateurism: sport
clubs, such as the New York Athletic Club and the Boston Athletic Association, and Ivy League
universities (Rush, 1989). While the tenet of amateurism has historically been used to restrict
participation to the wealthy, it is currently used by the NCAA to restrict revenue-generating
opportunities to wealthy while the athletes participate in commercialized sport for no discernable
compensation.
While the first collegiate sport event occurred 58 years before the founding of the NCAA,
it was the violence of intercollegiate football that led to needing a regulating body. As football
was growing increasingly violent, with 330 collegiate football players dying between 1890 and
1905 (Root, 2009), President Theodore Roosevelt called for college football reform. This led to a
gathering of the leading universities in collegiate football at the time, including Harvard, Yale,
and New York University, and the creation of the first governing body of men’s intercollegiate
athletics, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) (Byers &
Hammer, 1995; Sack and Staurowsky, 1998). In 1910, shortly after the creation of the IAAUS, it
took on its current name, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Since its
founding, the NCAA explicitly began with an amateurism model in their 1906 bylaws, with
Article VI requiring each member university to enforce amateurism principles and Article VII
requiring potential collegiate athletes to complete an eligibility card regarding financial
compensation and academic work completed (Sack and Staurowsky, 1998).
Although, in its early years, the primary role of the NCAA was rule-making for specific
sports, in 1948, they further affirmed their stance on amateurism by adopting the “Sanity Code.”
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The Sanity Code resulted from a shift in competitive balance that occurred because of conflicting
practices between Southern universities who favored athletic scholarships and Ivy League
universities who preferred restricting scholarships to athletes based only on financial need (Byers
& Hammer, 1995; Sack and Staurowsky, 1998). The Sanity Code was unsuccessful, and the
NCAA repealed it in 1951. The repealing of the Sanity Code led to the official permitting of
scholarships based purely on athletics and the creation of the Committee on Infractions to govern
recruiting and scholarship rules (Smith, 2000). Two significant factors undergirded these
changes: first, Walter Byers became executive director of the NCAA, and enforcement was one
of his primary goals, and second, the NCAA negotiated their first television contract over $1
million (Smith, 2000). When the NCAA repealed the Sanity Code in 1951, they officially
abandoned amateurism, as the rewarding of an athletic scholarship is compensation for athletic
ability.
In the 1970s, college athletics expanded rapidly, and not all universities wanted to place
the same emphasis on athletics, leading to the splitting of NCAA member institutions into three
different legislative and competitive divisions, I, II, and III. Five years later, in 1978, Division I
members voted to create subdivisions based on the emphasis placed on football, I-A and I-AA,
(renamed the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision
(FCS) in 2006). While the NCAA was the governing body for men’s intercollegiate athletics,
they did not offer women’s athletics until the early 1980s. The governing body for women’s
intercollegiate athletics instead was the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women
(AIAW). When the NCAA decided to offer the opportunity for women's intercollegiate athletics
in 1981, the AIAW began to struggle with the NCAA, as a much more economically substantial
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and much older institution, poaching members and revenue opportunities, and by 1983 the
AIAW ceased operations (Sack & Staurowsky, 1998).
In addition to the inclusion of women’s athletics into the NCAA, the 1980s included
rapid growth of televised college football – see Nelson (1994) for more on the connection
between the rise of women’s sport and the increased popularity of sports that have been
historically viewed as masculine, like football. The NCAA television contract with CBS and
ABC did not allow individual universities to negotiate television rights to their games outside of
this contract, resulting in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1984), a
case that reached the Supreme Court on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
lower courts, stating the NCAA television contract limited open competition and trade, therefore
violating the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts (Nagy, 2005). Current college sport television
contracts are still shaped by this legislation, as collegiate sport conferences now have primary
control over television contracts for regular games. Further, some conferences have even created
their own television networks (Schlabach, 2019).
Additionally, the “Power Five” conferences (Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big 10,
Big 12, Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), and Southeastern Conference (SEC)) control the
College Football Playoff (CFP). Aside from the CFP, the NCAA maintains control over the
rights for all other national championship events (Ridpath, 2017). However, while the television
contract was ruled to violate antitrust law, the amateurism rules were determined to be valid, as
the court stated “in order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not
be paid" (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984). Over a decade later, another court case proved
monumental in shaping the NCAA. Renee M. Smith, a volleyball player from St. Bonaventure
University, attempted to continue her eligibility while enrolled in graduate degree programs at

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

15

Hofstra University and the University of Pittsburgh, but she was ruled ineligible. She then sued
the NCAA for discriminating against female athletes under Title IX for systematically giving
male athletes more opportunity by providing them more graduate waivers than women to
continue their college sport eligibility. As the case reached the Supreme Court, NCAA v. Smith
(1999), was overturned from the lower court opinion with the NCAA not subject to a lawsuit
under Title IX (Greene, 2000). Although the case was a Title IX issue, as a nonprofit, private
organization, the NCAA was not subject to Title IX legislation, even though the majority of the
NCAA member institutions are subject to this legislation. This case highlights the trend of the
NCAA, avoiding significant adverse outcomes from numerous legal challenges.
Challenges to Amateurism
Jeremy Bloom challenged amateurism, beginning in 2002, as a multi-sport athlete who
additionally had opportunities to earn money outside of sport, through modeling contracts (Table
1). Bloom was awarded a scholarship to play football for the University of Colorado in 2001, and
in 2002 he recorded the longest touchdown reception in school history, completed a punt return
touchdown in the Big 12 championship games, and participated in the 2002 Winter Olympics as
a skier (Freedman, 2003; Gouveia, 2003). Following the Olympic Games, Bloom accepted his
admission in order to continue his education play football at the University of Colorado.
However, he declined the scholarship offer in order to continue receiving sponsorship money
from Dynastar, Oakley, and Under Armour for his skiing as well as a modeling contract with
Tommy Hilfiger. However, the NCAA denied a waiver request from the University of Colorado,
allowing Bloom to continue his receiving this outside income while playing collegiate football.
Bloom responded, with the support of the University of Colorado, by suing the NCAA and
seeking an injunction to play collegiate football while still accepting sponsorship money
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(Freedman, 2003; Gouveia, 2003). In the court case, the judge denied Bloom’s case for an
injunction on the basis that an injunction would harm the NCAA's ability to regulate studentathletes, and therefore, would not serve the public interest (Freedman, 2003; Gouveia, 2003). In
this case, the courts essentially aided in legislating NCAA rules and promoting amateurism.
While the case of Jeremy Bloom focused on amateurism principles related to
compensation, the case Andrew Oliver was focused agent representation. A few hours before
Andrew Oliver was scheduled to pitch in a postseason game for Oklahoma State University, he
was subjected to questioning and declared ineligible on the basis that he had a lawyer had been
present during previous negotiations with a Major League Baseball (MLB) team (Johnson, 2010;
Lockhart, 2010). In contrast to other sports, baseball players can be drafted out of high school,
yet instead, play college if they do not sign a professional contract. Oliver provides an example
of this case, as the Minnesota Twins drafted him out of high school in the seventeenth round of
the 2006 MLB amateur draft. As a result of the confusing negotiation process, Oliver retained a
lawyer to serve as a sport advisor, who was present at one meeting with a Twins representative.
Oliver decided not to sign a professional contract with the Twins and enrolled at Oklahoma State
University; however, this lawyer being present at one meeting was enough for him to be ruled
ineligible (Johnson, 2010; Lockhart, 2010). While it became increasingly likely the NCAA was
going to lose the case, they settled with Oliver out of court for $750,000 just before the trial date
(Johnson, 2010; Lockhart, 2010). The Oliver case had two meaningful outcomes, the first of
which has evolved into allowing baseball players to have representation during their negotiations
with professional teams (NCAA, 2018a). The second outcome was the end of the restitution rule,
through which the NCAA threatened schools with sanctions if they abided by a temporary court
order benefiting a college athlete if that order was later modified or removed. While the Oliver
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case marked significant wins in the fight against amateurism that struck down the restitution rule
and now allows baseball players to have agent representation, the positive outcomes have not
been able to spread across other sports or other issues with amateurism.
Another related issue that athletes have challenged in the courts is the rights of publicity
for college athletes (matters concerning the distribution of personal images), which was raised by
former University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) basketball player, Ed O’Bannon (Table
1). A friend showed O’Bannon the EA Sports video game “NCAA Basketball 09,” which in
addition to 2008-09 NCAA basketball teams, contained previous top teams, including the 199495 UCLA team. During the 1994-95 college basketball season, UCLA won the national
championship with O’Bannon winning awards as the best player in the NCAA during the regular
season and the postseason. The 1994-95 UCLA team in the video game contained a player
exactly resembling O’Bannon on look, height, weight, dexterity, and number. Thus, this video
game, and others like it (e.g., EA Sports NCAA Football (1993-2014), EA Sports NCAA
Basketball (1998-2010), and EA Sports MVP: NCAA Baseball (2006-2007)) used exactly player
images for profit, while the individuals represented in the game were not compensated. In July
2009, O'Bannon responded by filing a lawsuit against the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing
Company, citing violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which deprived him of his right of
publicity (Wong, 2010; Edelman, 2014a). Five years later, in 2014, O'Bannon won the case, as
Judge Claudia Wilken ruled an amateurism model that barres payments to collegiate athletes
violate antitrust laws. She further ordered schools should be allowed to offer full cost-ofattendance (COA) checks to athletes (i.e., living expenses), which were not previously part of the
NCAA scholarship system (Edelman, 2014a). As a direct result of this case, NCAA video games
are no longer in operation, and athletes are now able to receive small COA checks to help with

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

18

daily living expenses. However, while the video games are no longer in operation, the NCAA
still owns the right of publicity of its scholarship athletes in all sports by forcing them to sign
away the ownership of their name, image, and likeness in order to participate in collegiate
athletics (Wong, 2010; Lush, 2015).
While other athletes later joined Ed O’Bannon in creating a class-action lawsuit, he,
Andrew Oliver, and Jeremy Bloom all challenged NCAA as the only athletes involved in their
cases. In contrast, many Northwestern football players took on the NCAA and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) seeking unionization (Table 1). Ramogi Huma, a former UCLA
football player, became a collegiate athlete advocate while still participating by creating the
National College Players Association (NCPA), a nonprofit advocacy group for collegiate
athletes. A few years later, in 2014, Huma and co-founder Luke Bonner (former University of
Massachusetts, Amherst basketball player) created the College Athletes Players Association
(CAPA) as the first collegiate athlete union geared towards football and men’s basketball
players. Shortly after that quarterback, Northwestern University quarterback Kain Colter led his
team in seeking unionization under CAPA when he and Huma formally asked Northwestern
football players to sign their union cards (Edelman, 2017). The NLRB Regional Director ruled in
favor of CAPA and the Northwestern football players, stating that college athletes are employees
with the right to unionize. The NCAA immediately came out against collegiate athlete
unionization, and it was soon formally challenged by Northwestern University. As the case
reached the NLRB, the outcomes were two-fold. First, the NLRB ruled that Northwestern
University football players were indeed employees by the Director of Region 13 (Staurowsky,
2014a; Edelman, 2017; D’Aquila & Rudolph, 2014) and the NLRB board. Second, the
Northwestern football players’ union bid was rejected on the basis that they were the only group
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seeking unionization in the Big 10 conference and the NCAA (Edelman, 2017). Ultimately, this
marked an official recognition of Northwestern football players as employees, something that
could additionally be applied across universities and sports, and left the possibility of
unionization open on a larger scale.

Table 1: Summary of Challenges to Amateurism
Amateurism Issue
Individual
Challenged

Major Outcomes
•

Jeremy Bloom
(2002-2004)

Compensation

Andrew Oliver
(2008-2009)

Agent Representation

Ed O’Bannon
(2009-2014)

Right of Publicity

Northwestern Football
Players (led by Ramogi
Huma and Kain Colter)
(2014-2015)

Unionization

Bloom’s injunction
denied
• Ruled that injunction
against NCAA would
harm their ability to
regulate student-athletes
• Oliver settled for
$750,000
• Baseball players can now
be represented during
contract negotiations
• End of restitution rule
• O’Bannon wins case,
NCAA is violating
antitrust laws
• COA checks now allowed
• NCAA video games stop,
by they still own athletes’
names, images, and
likenesses
• Northwestern football
players recognized as
employees by NLRB
• Unionization denied on
basis they are only team
• Possibility for
unionization still open

“Clashing Models” of College Sport Reform
Beginning with the creation of the NCAA resulting from the violence of intercollegiate
football (Byers & Hammer, 1995; Sack & Staurowsky, 1998), individuals have been looking to
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reform efforts to address the different issues with college sport. College sport reform efforts have
addressed issues including academic, eligibility, recruiting, enforcement, commercialization, and
professionalization. Historically, most reform attempts have failed (for an extensive discussion
on the history of college sport reform see Smith, 2011). In modern-day college sport, Sack
(2009) has outlined the three models for addressing college sport reform. These three “clashing
models” have unique approaches to addressing reform and akin to Sack (2009), they are not
being mentioned for evaluation, but to explain the notable differences in how individuals view
college sport reform. The three models for college sport reform are academic capitalism,
intellectual elitism, and athletes’ rights (Sack, 2009).
Academic Capitalism. Academic capitalism refers to a model often embraced by the
NCAA, its member institutions, and university presidents and athletic directors, is primarily
concerned with profit. Myles Brand, NCAA president from 2002-2009, notably embraced the
academic capitalist model with his belief that college sport is dependent on commercialism
(Sack, 2009; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). The academic capitalist movement is additionally
rooted in the idea that collegiate athletes are inherently amateurs participating in sport as a
hobby, while the athletic scholarship merely is in effect to further their education. As the goal of
this model is commercialism, many NCAA member institutions have lowered initial eligibility
requirements while spending more on academic support for collegiate athletes (Sack, 2009).
Lastly, the research agenda of academic capitalists is focused on the academic progress of
athletes, brand equity, and how to increase in-person and broadcast consumption (Sack, 2009).
Intellectual Elitism. The next model, intellectual elitism, differs from the academic
capitalism model in viewing the increased commercialization of college sport as having a
primarily negative impact on the American education system. Intellectual elitists are grounded in
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high importance on education (Sack, 2009). Many intellectual elitists view athletic scholarships
as marketing towards students who place athletics over education and argue that coaches having
control over awarding scholarships, as opposed to professors, places further emphasis on sport
and lowers the importance of education (Sack, 2009). College sport reform groups based in the
intellectual elitist model include Rutgers 1000, the Drake Group, the Knight Commission, and
the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA). Reforms from the model include shifting
athletic scholarships to be need-based, increasing initial eligibility requirements for athletes to
that of other students, and increasing the importance of education by allowing athletes to choose
their majors and ensuring athletic competitions do not conflict with class (Sack, 2009). Research
under the intellectual elitist address role conflict for athletes, if athletes are being educated or
kept eligible, and academic clustering, the placing of many athletes in few majors (Sack, 2009).
Athletes’ Rights. The third and final model, athletes’ rights, is primarily concerned with
advocating to improve quality of life for collegiate athletes (Sack, 2009). Athletes’ rights
supporters view amateurism as a myth, with athletic scholarships functioning as contracts for
hire and athletes being denied fundamental employee rights (Sack, 2009). They additionally
critique how everyone within the college sport system, except athletes, can benefit financially
from their position. This model views athletes’ as students and employees, who should be given
the same opportunities as both other university students and university employees (Sack, 2009).
An example of an athletes’ rights advocate is former collegiate athlete Ramogi Huma, who
founded the NCPA and CAPA to pursue improved compensation and unionization efforts.
Reforms under the athletes’ rights model are mainly concentrated with more equitable
compensation for collegiate athletes and fixing the antitrust violations by the NCAA (Sack,
2009). Athletes’ rights research has commonly been in law journals, examining courts’ and the
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NCAA’s handling of issues such as compensation, antitrust, and Title IX. Additional athletes’
rights research has focused on collegiate athlete experiences, although more research could be
done in this area (Sack, 2009). These three “clashing models” differ significantly, but provide the
context for reform and statements from the NCAA (academic capitalist) and the statements from
the Drake Group and Knight Commission (intellectual elitist) that will be analyzed in this study,
as well as how I will complete the analysis (athletes’ rights).
NCAA Amateurism Research
The first of two primary issues present in the current study is amateurism. Byers and
Hammer (1995) and Sack and Staurowsky (1998) headline the literature critiquing amateurism.
In 1951, Walter Byers became the first executive director of the NCAA, and he held this position
until 1988. Under Byers, the NCAA experienced massive financial growth from television and
advertising contracts. Additionally, their enforcement over recruiting practices and player
compensation expanded as well. Towards the end of his tenure as executive director, Byers
began to shift his opinion on the direction of the NCAA, and in 1995, he, along with Charles
Hammer wrote Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes. Byers and Hammer
(1995) detail the invention of the term "student-athlete" as a “mandate substitute” for other
similar terms, such that the NCAA and its member institutions would not have to provide long
term disability payments to players injured while playing their sport and making money for their
university and the NCAA (p. 69). Furthermore, Byers and Hammer (1995) detail how college
sport has become "a nationwide money-laundering scheme" by disallowing boosters to provide
money directly to players and instead going to the university without the players receiving any
compensation (p. 73). Byers and Hammer (1995) suggest that Congress enact legislation for the
deregulation of the NCAA as a monopoly operated by nonprofit universities. As stated by Byers
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and Hammer (1995), "collegiate amateurism is not a moral issue; it is an economic camouflage
for monopoly practice” (p. 376).
In addition to Byers and Hammer (1995), College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and
Legacy of the NCAA's Amateur Myth by Sack and Staurowsky (1998) represents another seminal
critique of amateurism. Sack and Staurowsky (1998) address two primary topics, the
professionalization and commercialization of college sports and the eventual inclusion of
women's athletics in the NCAA. Sack and Staurowsky (1998) argue that the NCAA and Division
I member institutions value the financial gain made from athletes as opposed to providing them
with an education. Sack and Staurowsky (1998) discuss the creation of athletic scholarships in
1956, ended amateurism, and turned collegiate athletes into employees. Furthermore, in 1973,
the length of scholarship was reduced from four years to one, and the continuation of the
scholarship through one’s time in college became dependent on athletic contributions. Since this
scholarship functions as a contract and athletes are university employees, Sack and Staurowsky
(1998) believe they should be eligible for workers’ compensation, highlighting multiple workers'
compensation cases involving injured collegiate athletes who were subject to employeremployee control by their respective universities. In addition to their examination of the
amateurism myth, Sack and Staurowsky (1998) discuss the patriarchal values of the late 1800s
that dominated higher education and posited that female athletes should be students first and
athletes second, while their male counterparts had priority placed on their athletics. This practice
remained in place, as the NCAA did not include women’s athletics in their organization until the
early 1980s. Moreover, Sack and Staurowsky (1998) explain that while Title IX has increased
opportunities available to women in sport, it has also led to increased professionalization and
commercialization of women's sport. One outcome of this development is an increased number
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of men coaching women as a result of improved salaries, which follows the amateurism myth by
placing the financial outcomes for the university over the need of the collegiate athletes as
athletes, students, and individuals. Sack and Staurowsky (1998) conclude by proposing that the
NCAA become amateur by removing freshman eligibility and providing scholarships based on
need or end the amateurism myth and allow collegiate athletes to earn financially based on their
athletic ability through sponsorships and having ownership of their names, images, and
likenesses.
Additional research on amateurism has discussed the regulations on collegiate athletes
(Smith, 2000), a comparison of the regulations of collegiate athletes to the regulations of
surrogate mothers (Rush, 1989), and comparison of collegiate athletes to indentured servants of
the 18th century (Schwarz & Belzer, 2012). The commonality of this research on collegiate
athlete regulation is that the NCAA exploits athletes while limiting their ability to create a longterm, sustainable financial situation. Additional research on amateurism has discussed the
collegiate athletes’ right of publicity (Afshar, 2014; Gerrie, 2018) and the myth of amateurism in
varying capacities (Davis 1994; McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Schwarz, 2011; Schwarz &
Trahan, 2017; Sheetz, 2016; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005; Wheeler,
2004). Davis (1994) explains the growing impact of the commercial/education model in
collegiate sport compared to the previous amateur/education model, while McCormick and
McCormick (2006), Sheetz (2016), and Wheeler (2004) critique amateurism more broadly.
Schwarz (2011) and Schwarz and Trahan (2017) provide a comprehensive breakdown of
the myths preventing collegiate athletes from being compensated equitably based on fair market
value and how the NCAA, the public, and the courts have utilized these misnomers. These myths
purport that equitably paying college athletes would create competitive imbalance, decrease the
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popularity of the sport, and myths rooted in racism that paying collegiate football and basketball
players would not be able to manage money (Schwarz, 2011; Schwarz & Trahan, 2017).
Schwarz (2011) and Schwarz and Trahan (2017) debunk these myths and others. Staurowsky and
Sack (2005) argue against the use of the term student-athlete as it is not only a myth but a term
fabricated by the NCAA to avoid paying workers’ compensation (Byers & Hammer, 1995).
Based on their recommendation, I use the term collegiate athlete instead. Lastly, Southall and
Staurowsky (2013) provide a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the NCAA collegiate model
and their redefinition of amateurism to fit commercial practices. Furthermore, Southall and
Nagel (2008), Southall et al. (2008) and Southall, Southall, and Dwyer (2009) assess the
institutional logics of college sport from a particular event, the 2006 NCAA Division I men’s
basketball championship tournament and the 2009 NCAA Division I FBS football postseason
respectively using content and semiotic televisual analyses. These articles have expanded
amateurism research by focusing on specific events. As such, the current study takes a similar
approach by seeking to expand the literature conducting a critical discourse analysis of an event
that has triggered specific responses by the NCAA.
Race and College Sport Research
Although amateurism in sport has its roots in Ancient Greece, it was also present in the
U.S. before intercollegiate sporting competitions began. The history of amateurism in sport in the
U.S. has its roots in exploiting African Americans during chattel slavery with slaves and slave
owners competing in hunting and quarter horse racing competitions (Wiggins, 2014; Cooper,
2019). Horse racing became America’s first national spectator sport, with slaves who served as
horse trainers, groomers, and riders receiving elevated status, as slave owners wanted to ensure
their health in order to earn an exploitative profit (Wiggins, 2014). In addition to amateurism, the
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second of two primary issues present in the current study is race and college sport, specifically
the profit generation by predominately White NCAA executives, university athletic directors and
presidents, and men’s collegiate basketball coaches compared to the profit suppression of
predominately Black men’s collegiate basketball players (Lapchick et al., 2017a; Lapchick et al.,
2017b; Harper, 2018). Race and college sport is a complex topic that has been researched from
multiple viewpoints including experiences of athletes (Singer, 2016; Carter-Francique et al.,
2013; Yearwood, 2018), racism and stereotyping within college sport media and fan groups
(Gill, Jr., 2011; Eastman & Billings, 2001; Love & Hughey, 2015), and racism from an
institutional perspective (Hawkins 2010; Nwadike, et al., 2016; Williams Jr., 2015; Singer,
Harrison, & Bukstein, 2010). Singer (2016) conducted a narrative case study of three elite
African American male football athletes at a predominantly White institution of higher education
(PWIHE) with a major athletics department. This study explored these individuals’ secondary
schooling experience and how racism impacted their holistic development. Ultimately, it was the
participants in the study who first initiated a discussion of racism during the focus group, with
two participants' academic underperformance being directly impacted by culturally irrelevant
organizational practices. The third participant's academic success provides an example of a
counternarrative to the expectation of academic underperformance by African American male
athletes (Singer, 2016).
Similarly, Carter-Francique et al. (2013) conducted a study to understand Black college
athletes’ perceptions of academic success and the impact of social support at PWIHE using a
qualitative narrative interview approach. The majority of participants’ perceptions of academic
success were composed of noncognitive themes of personal effort, balancing with their role as
athletes, retaining information, applicability to life, compared to the cognitive themes of grades
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and graduation utilized by the NCAA. Additionally, social support served an indispensable role
in coping with stress, the participants’ cited academic advisers, tutors, peers, and teammates as
providing both informational and instrumental support, while they did not mention faculty or
nonathlete peers as providing support (Carter-Francique et al., 2013). In contrast to the
experiences of athletes, Eastman and Billings (2001) analyzed the commentary of men’s and
women’s college basketball. They found that “traditional prejudices” about Black athletes and
“concomitant flattering” about White athletes are pervasive across both men’s and women’s
college basketball (Eastman & Billings, 2001, p. 198).
Additionally, gender serotypes that favor men’s college basketball over women’s college
basketball were present as well (Eastman & Billings, 2001). Lastly, Nwadike et al. (2016)
approach the institutional impacts of NCAA Bylaws on Black male collegiate athletes through
the NCAA, moving the initial eligibility GPA requirement to 2.3 for the fall of 2016. In doing so,
the NCAA is disparately impacting more incoming African American male collegiate athletes
than any other population, as almost half of African American male collegiate athletes will now
struggle to maintain eligibility (Nwadike et al., 2016). Furthermore, the NCAA is ignoring the
Black male collegiate basketball and football players, who are the primary individuals exploited
for their profit potential by the NCAA and its member universities (Nwadike et al., 2016). The
current study seeks to build upon the study by Nwadike et al. (2016) in analyzing how NCAA
policies disproportionally impact Black male college athletes.
Theoretical Framework
The current study utilizes two primary theories to examine how both amateurism and
racism are present in the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into men’s college basketball.
While the case is continuing in the legal courts and the court of public opinion, the current study
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analyses several responses released by the NCAA through the lenses of escalation of
commitment and interest convergence. These theories provide the background necessary in order
to conduct a comprehensive and accurate critical discourse analysis.
Escalation of Commitment. As stated by Staw (1976) although, “intuitively, one would
expect individuals to reverse decisions or to change behaviors which result in negative
consequences… [it may occur that] when a person's behavior leads to negative consequences we
may find that the individual will, instead of changing his behavior, cognitively distort the
negative consequences to more positively valenced outcomes” (p. 27). Therefore, escalation of
commitment (Staw, 1976), refers to when individuals or organizations do not change behavior as
a result of disadvantageous outcomes and instead commit more forcefully to that initial behavior.
Participants in Staw’s (1976) study made decisions before and after receiving further
information. Half of the participants were provided with information that showed the success of
their chosen funds compared to unchosen funds, while the other half were given conflicting
information. Ultimately, when participants were provided with information that they made an
initial investment decision with a negative outcome, they still showed an exceedingly high
commitment to that initial decision making it again a second time (Staw, 1976). Staw (1976)
concludes that individuals who undergo escalation of commitment are engaging in selfjustification, by feeling the need to create a sense “of rationality to their own behavior” (Staw,
1976, p. 40).
Escalation of commitment has been studied further in business and management research
through commitment to a failing course of action (Staw, 1981), a theoretical analysis (Brockner,
1992), commitment towards software projects (Keil et al., 2000), and escalating commitment
during software development (Schmidt & Calantone, 2002). Brockner (1992) expands on the
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previous work of Staw (1976, 1981), by asserting that a comprehensive research base for
escalation of commitment goes beyond self-justification theory, towards understandings at the
individual, interpersonal, group, and organizational levels. While the context of the present study
cannot assess the NCAA’s escalation of commitment at the individual, interpersonal, and group
levels, it will provide an organizational level analysis. In sport management research, escalation
of commitment has been studied through determinants of commitment in university athletic
departments in the U.S. (Hutchinson, Nite, & Bouchet, 2015) and de-escalation of commitment
in university athletic departments in the U.S. (Hutchinson & Bouchet, 2014; Bouchet &
Hutchinson, 2012). Hutchinson et al. (2015) discuss how organizational status and organizational
status attainment as an influential athletic program can escalate commitment for university
athletic departments. In contrast, Hutchinson and Bouchet (2014) and Bouchet and Hutchinson
(2012) explore factors that can lead to a de-escalation of commitment, such as a reframing of the
issue, a change in executive staff, and shifting organizational vision. While escalation of
commitment in sport research is focused on university athletic departments, it applies to the
NCAA's escalating commitment towards amateurism. This is because the NCAA is committing
to a system that has directly led to them losing money through the legal process and losing
athletes who choose not to attend college or leave with college early in order to pursue better
financial opportunities.
Interest Convergence. Interest convergence, as posited by Bell (1980), refers to a
phenomenon through which White individuals seek to create an illusion of racial equity when
there is a direct benefit to them (the White dominant group) while marginally benefitting a
subordinate group (i.e., Blacks). Thus, the interest of Whites and Blacks/African Americans
converge, and social change can more easily occur. However, when White individuals do not see
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a direct benefit to racial equity, the interests of Whites and Blacks diverge and change moves
slowly or does not occur (Bell, 1980). Bell (1980) explains that Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) was not the first challenge to school segregation; however, it marked a time in which
interest convergence occurred, and Whites saw a benefit towards ending legalized segregation
for three reasons. First, the Brown v. Board of Education decision improves the perception of the
U.S. in developing centuries in the fight against Communism. Next, it “offered much needed
reassurance to American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during
World War II might yet be given meaning at home” (Bell, 1980, p. 524). Lastly, Whites realized
legalized segregation was a significant barrier towards profit potential in the South. As a result of
this analysis, interest convergence has become a vital tenet within critical race theory (CRT)
(Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1996; Delgado & Stefancic, 2017).
Interest convergence has been studied in sport as tenet of a CRT examination of Black
sport experiences in the U.S. (Hawkins, Carter-Francique, & Cooper, 2017), its implications for
culturally responsive and racially-conscious policy in college sport (Cooper et al., 2017), its role
in college sport more broadly (McCormick & McCormick, 2012), its impact on collegiate
athletes (Donnor, 2005; Harper, 2009), and as part of the integration of MLB (DeLorme &
Singer, 2010). As McCormick and McCormick (2012) discuss that, in line with Bell (1980), the
racial integration of NCAA football and men’s basketball occurred when Whites’ interest
converged with the interests of African Americans. Although some northern universities were
legitimately seeking to be more racially equitable, the primary motivation was to make athletic
teams more competitive against southern rivals with the integration of Black athletes, because of
the economic possibilities. Before this racial integration, northern universities were limiting
athletic opportunities to a significant percentage of eligible participants and thus limiting their

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

31

potential for athletic success. Thus, the interest of these universities to integrate their athletic
teams converged with the interests of Black athletes to participate on these teams (McCormick &
McCormick, 2012).
Additionally, while the increased racial integration of NCAA teams has led to increased
opportunities for African American athletes to attend college, these athletes are subject to the
exploitation of amateurism, as their work still benefit mainly White NCAA and universities
executives and coaches (McCormick & McCormick, 2012). Further, Donnor (2005) argued for
the use of legal cases to expand on the understanding of interest convergence. While Donnor
(2005) focused on the educational experiences of Black college football players, he argued that
the inclusion of the legal literature facilitated a deeper understanding of racial issues in society.
Building on the recommendations of Donnor (2005) and institutional interest convergence of the
college sport by McCormick and McCormick (2012), the current study relied heavily on legal
articles to shape the context around race, and thus, sought to explain how the interest
convergence was present in the NCAA to the FBI investigation into men’s college basketball.
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Chapter 3: Methods
While not all discourse analysis is critical, the difference between the two is that a
noncritical approach to discourse analysis “tend[s] to treat social practices solely in terms of
patterns of social interaction,” compared to a critical approach to discourse analysis that “go[es]
further and treat[s] social practices not just in terms of social relationships… also [as] social
practices in terms of their implications for things like status, solidarity, distribution of social
goods, and power (Gee, 2004, p. 32-33). CDA makes sense for this study, because it requires a
critical approach and because it is situated multidisciplinary in both sport and education. This
study used the dialectal-relational approach to critical discourse analysis by Fairclough (2013,
2016), which is explained further in the Data Analysis section. This study required a critical
approach because of the NCAA’s dominant position over collegiate athletes and how this
position affords them the power to control the values of collegiate sport and the distribution of
social and economic goods. Rogers (2004) explains that CDA is useful in educational research
because it can be used to “describe, interpret, and explain relationships among language and
important educational issues” (p. 1). Critical discourse analysis has been used in sport research to
assess the NCAA collegiate model (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013), media representations of
women’s exercise (McGannon & Spence, 2012), and youth sport policies in Turkey (Açıkgöz,
Haudenhuyse, & Aşçı, 2019). As it pertains to the current study, a critical discourse analysis
provides a critical approach in analyzing power and race relations in sport (McDonald & Birrell,
1999; Birrell, 1989).
Critical discourse analysis is rooted in “rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology,
philosophy, social psychology, cognitive science, literary studies and sociolinguistics, as well as
in applied linguistics and pragmatics” (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 2). While these disciplines are
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broad, CDA is naturally heterogeneous in its use across academic disciplines and with diverse
theoretical applications (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Fairclough and Wodak (1997) offer eight
foundational principles of CDA: 1) CDA addresses social problems, 2) power relations are
discursive, 3) discourse constitutes society and culture, 4) discourse does ideological work, 5)
discourse is historical, 6) a sociocognitive approach is needed to comprehend how relations
between texts and society are mediated, 7) discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory and
utilizes systematic methodology, and 8) CDA is a socially committed scientific paradigm.
Further, Gee (1996) explains the difference between lowercase “d” and capital “D” discourse.
Little “d,” discourse refers to the language part of what is said (e.g., grammar, vocabulary,
sentence structure), whereas, “D,” Discourse refers to the values, beliefs, and ideologies
represented within that language (Gee, 1996).
Sampling and Data Collection
The study utilized a four-pronged sampling criteria for documents chosen: 1) they must
have been related to FBI investigation into men’s college basketball, 2) they must have been able
to aide in answering the research questions, 3) they must have been a document from the NCAA,
the selected college sport reform groups, or the selected public media outlets, and 4) they must
have been available to the public. This sampling criterion ensured the documents selected moved
the research forward and were be available to me as the researcher. In terms of sampling
methods, this study used purposeful and convenience methods in order to gather the required
documents for analysis. As purposeful sampling involves sampling based on what the researcher
is seeking to investigate (Patton, 2015; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016), this sampling method allowed
for the selection of specific documents that fit the research purpose and help answer the research
questions. Moreover, purposeful sampling is an appropriate sampling method for studies that
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emphasize creating an in-depth understanding (Patton, 2015). The research questions and critical
discourse analysis used in this study demand an in-depth understanding of the response by the
NCAA and the response by non-NCAA entities. More specifically, the type of purposeful
sampling used is convivence sampling. Convivence sampling involves creating a sample that is
convenient for research based on time, location, availability, or a variety of other factors
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). For this research project, the central aspect of convenience was
public availability and accessibility of reports, statements, and journalistic articles.
The documents collected were divided into three categories: 1) documents from the
NCAA, 2) documents from college sport reform groups, and 3) articles from journalistic sources
(See Table 2). The documents from the NCAA were composed of the CCB official report,
charter, remarks by the chair, and a recruiting and college choice study, as well as webpages
detailing the enacted reforms (six webpages3), and official statements from the NCAA (seven
statements). I collected these documents from the NCAA official website in order to understand
the full scope of the NCAA response to the FBI investigation. The CCB report showed the
reform recommendations suggested by that commission, the enacted reforms showed what the
NCAA put in to practice, and the statements from Emmert showed how the head of the NCAA
personally responded. Next, two academic reform groups for college sports, the Knight
Commission (six statements) and the Drake Group (three statements), provided their response
through their websites as well. The statements and suggestions by these groups provided the first
aspect in creating a comparison to the NCAA response in order to answer the second research
question. Additional reform groups, the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA) and the
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA) that focus more on college athletes’ rights, were

3

The homepage for this set of webpages can be found at (NCAA committed, n.d.). The individual webpages can be
found at (NCAA, 2018b; NCAA, 2018c; NCAA, 2018d; NCAA, 2018e; NCAA, 2018f; NCAA, 2018g).
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researched as well, but they did not provide publicly available statements. The third and final
category of documents came from journalistic articles (five articles from each outlet) to aide in
understanding the response of non-NCAA entities and analyze what the public has been
consuming related to the topic. There were two sport-based (ESPN and Sports Illustrated) and
two non-sport-based journalistic outlets (The New York Times and The Washington Post)
selected. I believe that these three categories and the respective selection of documents provided
the saturation and redundancy necessary to achieving the appropriate sample size in collection
and analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).

Table 2: Data Types and Sources
NCAA
Response/NonData Category
NCAA
Response
NCAA
Documents

NCAA
Response

College Sport
Reform Group
Documents

Non-NCAA
Response

Sport-Based
Journalistic
Articles

Non-NCAA
Response

Non-Sport-Based
Journalistic
Articles

Non-NCAA
Response

Data Source

NCAA

Knight
Commission
The Drake Group
ESPN
Sports Illustrated
The New York
Times
The Washington
Post

Data Type
CCB Official
Documents
CCB Webpages
Official
Statements
Official
Statements
Official
Statements
Journalistic
Articles
Journalistic
Articles
Journalistic
Articles
Journalistic
Articles

Item Number

4
6
7
6
3
5
5
5
5
Total Items of
Discourse: 46

Data Analysis
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The data analysis occurred through the dialectal-relational approach to critical discourse
analysis (Fairclough, 2013, 2016). This approach to critical discourse analysis breaks the
analysis into three stages: the textual analysis, the discursive analysis, and the social analysis
(Fairclough 2013, 2016). The textual analysis is concerned with the actual text and linguistic
tendencies, such as vocabulary, grammar, and sentence structure (Fairclough 2013, 2016). This
analysis provided a foundational overview of the syntax used for each document. The textual
analysis was used to help refine codes for the second and third round of coding and does not
have any results presented. Next, the discursive analysis, during which the documents were
interpreted based on the purpose behind the statements, the level consistency in the discourse,
and the explicit and implicit meanings of the text (Fairclough 2013, 2016). This stage marks a
necessary separator for interpretation between the three categories of documents. The NCAA
documents were analyzed concerning the first and second research questions, whereas the nonNCAA entity documents were analyzed in comparison to the NCAA documents and answering
the third research question.
I conducted the discursive analysis, both inductively and deductively. The first round of
discursive analysis coding was conducted inductively using line-by-line coding and constant
comparison techniques in order to identify similar themes that were present in the discourse
(Fairhurst & Putnam, 2018). Fairhurst and Putnam (2018) suggest an integrative methodology
that combines Organizational Discourse Analysis (ODA) and Grounded Theory (GT). While this
method was not used, the present study has elements of grounded theory present that are
considered commonalities between GT and ODA:
1) Emergent and unfolding from coding and abstracting to categories, 2) Relies on rich,
thick details and descriptions (e.g., ethnography, interview transcriptions, archive), 3)
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Stays close to the data (i.e., “in-vivo” coding in early stages), and 4) Iterates between data
and analysis (links coding to developing categories (Fairhurst & Putnam, 2018, p. 3).
Following the initial round of discursive analysis coding, the themes were grouped into seven
major categories, with assistance from a peer debriefer, referred to as the seven dialectical
techniques of intercollegiate athletic stakeholders. The seven dialectical techniques are
ambiguity, avoidance, credibility, deontological ethics, emotional appeal, explanatory, and
grandstanding. Definitions for the seven dialectical techniques are in Table 3. As Lietz, Langer,
and Furman (2006) state, “Peer debriefing involves the process of engaging in dialog with
colleagues outside of a research project who have experience with the topic, population or
methods being utilized” (p. 451). During this peer debriefing process, the critical discussion
between myself and my peer debriefer (an English Ph.D. student) grouped the themes during the
inductive round of coding. This debriefing led to the creation of the concept, terms, and
definitions of the seven dietetical techniques of intercollegiate athletic stakeholders. After these
techniques were identified, a second round of discursive analysis was conducted deductively to
code each item of discourse concerning the seven dialectical techniques. Lastly, the social
analysis seeks to understand how the interpretation of the discourse relates to dominant
ideologies and power. For this study, ideology and power referred to the racial ideology that
exploits majority Black/African American athletes, and the upholding of amateurism and
benefitting majority White, male NCAA executives and collegiate presidents and athletic
directors. The social analysis was conducted deductively during the third round of coding to
address three key principles, each relating to one of the three research questions: escalation of
commitment, interest convergence, and checks and balances. These codes are explained in detail
in Chapter 4.
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Table 3: The Seven Dialectical Techniques of Intercollegiate Athletic Stakeholders
Technique
Definition
Ambiguity
Avoidance
Credibility

Deontological Ethics

Emotional Appeal
Explanation
Grandstanding

The use of vague language to evade
unpleasant details
The deferring of blame to another entity or
organization
The use of language that attempts to convince
readers through an appeal to status as a
trusted authority
An ethical grounding that places morality
under a series of defined rules (DeSensi &
Rosenberg, 2010)
The use of language that evokes emotion in
order to sway the reader
Either the statement of facts or the use of
institutional logics to provide an argument
The use of language that asserts an
organization as trustworthy through selfpromotion

Limitations
The first limitation is that discourse analyzed only reflects the intellectual elitist and
academic capitalist model from Sack (2009). The reason for this is because the NCAA falls
under the academic capitalist model, and the college sport reform groups in this study (The
Knight Commission and The Drake Group) fall under the intellectual elitist model. Documents
from the college sport reform groups under the athletes’ rights model were not publicly
available. Although the athletes’ rights model is not examined to the same extent as the academic
capitalist and intellectual elitist models, my subjectivity aligns with athletes’ rights advocates, so
I wrote this study from that perspective. As an athletes’ rights advocate, I believe the NCAA and
its member institutions are exploiting collegiate athletes for profit while they do not have basic
employee rights (see Appendix A: Subjectivity Statement for a more in-depth explanation of my
subjectivity relating to this study). Further, the documents that were publicly available to analyze
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do not comprise the entirety of the discourse on this topic. Although the full scope of the
discourse is not able to be analyzed, the scope of the study still provides the rich and thick data
and data saturation necessary in qualitative research (Tracy, 2010; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016).
Delimitations
The first delimitation is that I alone conducted the critical discourse analysis, and it may
lack the objectivity some desire. In order to diminish this delimitation, peer debriefing was
utilized to confirm or change the results of the analysis (Lietz et al., 2006; Morse, 2015; Patton,
2015). Peer debriefing was specifically utilized during the discursive analysis rounds of coding
and the creation of the seven dialectical techniques, as discussed in the “Data Analysis” section.
Additionally, I provide a full subjectivity statement with my biases related to the study
(Appendix A). Further, the goal of this study is to provide a critical analysis, which requires an
inherently critical view. The next delimitation is that I chose to utilize only documents, without
interviews or observations. Although interviews and observations would create additional
discourse that could be beneficial to the study, the breadth of the documents used provides the
rich and thick data necessary for external validity in qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985;
Tracy, 2010; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). The last delimitation is my ability as a researcher,
which is restricted to my research-experience level. Thus, I conducted the critical discourse
analysis at the level of a master’s student and not an experienced researcher.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Three key principles utilized in the social analysis round of coding, the discourse
concerning the dominant ideologies and power of this specific context, each align with a research
question. These principles are referred to as the three key principles of intercollegiate athletic
stakeholders. Therefore, this chapter has been organized to address the three categories of
documents and answer the research questions stated above. The three principles are 1) the
NCAA’s escalation of commitment towards amateurism, 2) reforms occurring as a result of
interest convergence, and 3) the checks and balances provided by reform groups and public
media. Following the theoretical framework, escalation of commitment is used to examine the
first principle, and interest convergence is used to examine the second principle. A theoretical
perspective is not used to examine the third principle, but instead, it serves as a comparison to
the principles one and two. There was no theoretical perspective used to examine the third
principle because it is used as a supplemental principle to refine the understanding of how
escalation of commitment and interest convergence are utilized in the discourse. Coding results
for the NCAA and non-NCAA entity discourses are in Tables 6, 7, and 8. While Tables 6 and 8
display the exact coding results, Table 7 displays the magnitude of the usage of each code. I
calculated the magnitudes by finding the lower quartile, middle quartile or median, and upper
quartile for the set of codes. Additionally, the full coding is in the codebook in Appendix B.
NCAA Response
As stated in Chapter 3, the NCAA documents analyzed refer to seven official NCAA
statements, the enacted reforms, and the CCB official report, charter, remarks by the chair, and
recruiting and college choice study. Within the set of NCAA documents, all seven dialectical
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techniques were used to varying degrees. Illustrative examples of NCAA use of each dialectical
technique are provided in Table 4 and are expanded upon in the following table.

Table 4: NCAA Use of the Seven Dialectical Techniques
Technique
Example
Ambiguity

Avoidance

Credibility

Deontological Ethics

Emotional Appeal
Explanation

Grandstanding

“Creating the right relationship between the
universities and colleges of the NCAA and its
national ofﬁce to promote transparency and
accountability” (Emmert, 2017)
“The Commission calls on the National
Basketball Association (NBA) and the
National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA) again to make 18-year-olds eligible
for the NBA draft, so that high school players
who are drafted may proceed to the NBA”
(Commission on college basketball, 2018)
“Dr. Rice [the CCB chair] and the members
of the commission were clear. The collegiate
model should be strengthened and preserved”
(Emmert, Peterson, & Kaler, 2018a)
“University of Kansas men’s basketball
student-athlete Silvio De Sousa must sit out
the remainder of the 2018-19 season and the
2019-20 season because his guardian received
payment from a university booster and agent
and agreed to receive additional funds from
the same person” (NCAA, 2019)
“We need to do right by student-athletes”
(Emmert, 2017)
“We thus offer these recommendations to try
and get back on course. Some may disagree
with the recommendations made here. Our
focus has been to strengthen the collegiate
model – not to move toward one that brings
aspects of professionalism into the game.”
(Rice, 2018)
“This week, we delivered on a promise made
just months ago to make profound and
meaningful changes to college basketball”
(Emmert, Peterson, & Kaler, 2018b)
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The first dialectical technique, ambiguity, was coded 58 times across 11 of the 17
documents. The use of ambiguous language by the NCAA helped to assert their response to the
FBI investigation into men’s college basketball as prompt and impactful. However, these
ambiguous statements contain little to no detail. The example provided in Table 4 helps provide
the illusion that the NCAA is seeking to create significant change following the investigation.
That said, further reading shows that no explanation or definition is provided on the meaning of
the phrase “the right relationship” or how to reach this relationship. Ambiguous language
allowed the NCAA to use persuasive words to create the appearance of a proactive and detailed
response, while in reality, the response is reactive and equivocal. Similar to ambiguity, the
NCAA utilized avoidance 149 times across 13 of the 17 documents. The use of avoidant
language by the NCAA helped them deflect blame for the issues that resulted in the FBI
investigation and arrests to the other entities such as the NBA, shoe companies (primarily Nike,
Under Armour, and Adidas), and the AAU. In doing so, the NCAA was also failing to take
accountability for their policies that disallow additional compensation beyond a scholarship and
COA check that led to the de jure elicit payments. Avoidance was ubiquitously used in the CCB
official report, as illustrated in Table 4. The end to the so-called “one-and-done rule” that
requires individuals to be 19-years-old to be eligible for the NBA draft has led to a pervasive
trend of athletes playing one year in college before leaving for the NBA draft (Billings, 2012).
Academic capitalists, intellectual elitists, and athletes' rights advocates widely agree upon the
end of this rule. However, the heavy reliance on ending this rule by the CCB and NCAA shows
avoidant language by attempting to maintain the NBA is responsible for an issue created by
outdated NCAA rules.
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In contrast to ambiguity and avoidance, the NCAA relies on credibility, as coded 208
times across 15 of the 17 documents. The credibility language used in the NCAA documents
allowed them to uphold their position as the authority and governing body for college sport.
They did this by reaffirming their authority through implicit meanings of language. As shown by
the example in Table 4, the NCAA used implicit credibility language in a joint statement on the
formation of the CCB by Emmert, NCAA Board of Governors chair, G. P. “Bud” Peterson, and
Division I Board of Directors chair, Eric W. Kaler. In this statement, the NCAA is promoting its
credibility by stating that an independent commission is dedicated to upholding the model for
collegiate athletics they created. The use of the credibility dialectal technique allowed the NCAA
to promote its effectiveness as the governing body for college sport. Relatedly, the NCAA
depends on deontological ethics, as utilized 163 times across all 17 documents. The NCAA used
the dialectical technique of deontological ethics to create an ethical stance with their policies as
the moral governor. For example, the NCAA used deontological ethics in determining the
eligibility of Silvio De Sousa, a collegiate basketball player for the University of Kansas, as
stated in Table 4. The facts of the case go on to explain that De Sousa’s guardian received $2,500
and agreed to receive an additional $20,000. Ultimately, Silvio De Sousa was suspended for two
seasons because his guardian received $2,500, while Bill Self, University of Kansas head men’s
basketball coach, was proven to know about this payment and was not suspended (Wetzel,
2018). De Sousa was suspended for two seasons because NCAA rules disallow athletes from
receiving compensation for their athletic ability, regardless of whether the punishment is
considered appropriate for the de jure crime. The reliance on deontological ethics means the
NCAA pays little attention to particular contexts and uses their policies as the deciding factor in
their legislating practices.
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Comparatively, the NCAA used an emotional appeal, as referenced 35 times across 9 of
the 17 documents. Although used the least often of the seven dialectical techniques, the purpose
of emotional appeal by the NCAA was to foster strong emotions from the reader in order to
create an agreement. The primary emotions created were empathy and anger. Empathy was
utilized when Emmert spoke about the creation of the CCB, as quoted in Table 4. This excerpt
draws the reader to feel empathy towards the NCAA as an organization that is doing everything
they can for the athletes. In contrast, anger was utilized when Emmert asserted that the
allegations present in the investigation “suggest an extraordinary and despicable breach of that
trust.” In this case, the goal of evoking anger is to rile up the emotions of the reader to gain
unwavering support. While used less often than the other dialectical techniques, the use of
emotional appeal by the NCAA has the most-directed goal of fostering an intense reaction from
the reader.
Differentiating from the emotional appeal, the NCAA depended on the explanation
dialectal technique, as coded 264 times across 14 of the 17 documents. The explanatory language
used in the NCAA documents served the dual purpose of stating facts and explaining intent
through their institutional logics. Remarks by CCB chair Dr. Condoleezza Rice are shown in
Table 4 to provide one instance in which the NCAA discourse used explanatory language.
Firstly, this statement shows the use of explaining facts such as the facts that they are offering
the recommendations and that some may disagree with them. Comparatively, institutional logics
refer to the set of practices, values, and beliefs which govern individuals and organizations
(Alford & Friedland, 1985; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Southall & Nagel, 2008; Southall et al.,
2008; Southall et al., 2009; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury,
2012). In following the institutional logics of the NCAA’s collegiate model, the CCB states they
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are shaping their recommendations to align with NCAA practices. The NCAA uses the
explanation dialectical technique allows for non-controversial, honest discourse in addition to the
use of what they consider to be logical. Lastly, the NCAA used the grandstanding dialectical
technique 158 times across 13 of the 17 documents. The grandstanding language used by the
NCAA allowed them to expand upon their credibility by promoting their accomplishments.
Another joint statement from Emmert, Peterson, and Kaler, this time following the enacted
reforms, is quoted in Table 4. This statement touts its accomplishments in order to increase
support from the reader. However, the enacted reforms will not make the promised “profound
and meaningful changes to college basketball” (Emmert, Peterson, & Kaler, 2018b). This
concept is explored further in answering the first and second research questions.
Research Question #1: The Collegiate Model. The first research question was: How
does the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into men’s college basketball solidify or alter
the current collegiate model? Although the collegiate model recognizes that collegiate athletes
earn scholarships as compensation for their athletic skill, amateurism is still maintained through
the limiting of equitable compensation and athletes’ rights (Byers & Hammer, 1995; Sack &
Staurowsky, 1998). A critical discourse analysis of the NCAA documents shows the NCAA
utilized the seven dialectical techniques to solidify the collegiate model. Although reforms were
enacted, the collegiate model was not altered. Ultimately, the NCAA’s commitment towards
amateurism was coded through explicit or implicit discourse 156 times across 16 of the 17
documents. As discussed in the literature review, the NCAA has a long history of promoting
ideals of amateurism while benefitting commercially, most notably from football and men’s
basketball. While the commercialization is most present in these sports, creating the most
accessible argument for compensating these athletes more equitably, the classification of
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collegiate athletes as students and not employees has allowed the NCAA to avoid providing
legitimate employee rights (e.g., workers’ compensation, right of publicity) to all collegiate
athletes. In the NCAA documents that were analyzed in this study, the NCAA solidified the
collegiate model by affirming their stance that collegiate athletes are students by rarely
discussing employment in favor of enforcement and outside entities.
The discourse present in the NCAA documents solidifies the collegiate model through the
inclusion of increased enforcement and the reliance on outside entities. Firstly, within the
recommendations from the CCB and the enacted reforms, the NCAA showed their desire to
create a more effective enforcement plan. For example, the NCAA now mandates that “as a term
of employment, school presidents and athletics staff must commit contractually to full
cooperation in the investigations and infractions process” (NCAA, 2018f). While enacting and
enforcing policies such as this will be notably difficult, stronger enforcement policies reinforce
the collegiate model by ignoring compensation and employee rights. Instead, choosing to focus
on enforcement and pay little attention to classifying athletes as employees further solidifies the
NCAA’s commitment to amateurism. Next, the NCAA showed reliance on other organizations
such as “agreements with apparel companies on expectations for accountability and transparency
regarding their involvement in youth basketball…. [including] annual disclosures… NCAA
certification[s]… and report[ing] potential NCAA rule violations” (NCAA, 2018e). While the
apparel companies’ involvement in youth basketball has undoubtedly increased
professionalization and played a significant role in the FBI investigation, NCAA policies can do
little to change this. In youth basketball, the NCAA has no power to determine the role of the
apparel companies. Instead, the NCAA could have focused on adjusting their involvement in
youth basketball that increases professionalization of minors and leads to the de jure elicit
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payments and subsequent investigation. The discourse utilized by the NCAA in response to the
FBI investigation into men’s college basketball reaffirms the collegiate model by focusing
heavily on enforcement policy and relying on outside entities to enact change.
In applying escalation of commitment, it first needs to be stated that the NCAA
amateurism rules have been directly responsible for a number of negative consequences for the
organization such as lawsuits that have directly challenged these principles and contributed to
negative public relations (Freedman, 2003; Gouveia, 2003; Johnson, 2010; Lockhart, 2010;
Wong, 2010; Edelman, 2014a; Staurowsky, 2014a; Edelman, 2017; D’Aquila & Rudolph, 2014;
Pierce, 2018; Windsor, 2018). This case provided the NCAA with an opportunity to shift their
loyalty away from amateurism because of its damaging impacts. Instead, their commitment to
amateurism escalated. For example, while discussing the creation of the CCB, Emmert, Peterson,
and Kaler (2018a) stated that the provided “recommendations will ensure integrity in the game,
strengthen accountability in college sports and demonstrate a commitment to the well-being of
student-athletes.” While the integrity of and accountability by the NCAA were certainly
questioned publicly as a result of this investigation, focusing on these tenets as opposed to athlete
rights’ strengthens the collegiate model, which resulted in the de jure elicit payments in the first
place. Ultimately, the NCAA used this case as an opportunity to escalate their commitment
towards a failing model because this model is part of their deontological ethics.
Research Question #2: Dominant Racial Ideology. The second research question was:
How does the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into men’s college basketball reflect and
reinforce the dominant racial ideology in the United States? The dominant racial ideology in the
U.S. and NCAA Division I men’s basketball is one the promotes White racism/capitalism,
asserting White superiority and Black inferiority. One tactic that is commonly present in
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American history and the current NCAA discourse is the abstract liberalism frame of color-blind
racism. Abstract liberalism refers to the framing of race-related issues through tenets of
liberalism, such as “equal opportunity” and “individual choice.” In practice in the U.S., this
means that policies may not be explicitly racist, but the ignoring of race results in policies that
negatively impact Blacks/African Americans (Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Cooper et al., 2017).
Dominant racial ideology has been present in the fabric of the U.S., with policies systematically
providing long-term wealth generation opportunities for Whites, while drastically disadvantaging
Blacks (Rothstein, 2017; Baradaran, 2017; Coakley, 2015). As discussed in the literature review,
the history of amateurism in the U.S. dates back to Black athletes during chattel slavery, while
White slave owners enjoyed commercial benefits. This racism has continued through amateurism
in college sport, as primarily White NCAA executives, university athletic directors and
presidents, and men’s collegiate basketball coaches profit from the work of primarily Black
men’s collegiate basketball players (Lapchick et al., 2017a; Lapchick et al., 2017b; Harper,
2018). A critical discourse analysis of the NCAA documents shows that the NCAA utilized the
seven dialectical techniques to reflect and reinforce dominant racial ideology implicitly. The
NCAA’s reflecting and reinforcing of dominant racial ideology was coded through implicit
discourse that was present 121 times across all 17 of the documents. In contrast to the solidifying
of the collegiate model, which utilized explicit and implicit meanings to assert collegiate
athletes’ position as amateurs, the presence of dominant racial ideology occurs solely implicitly.
The discourse present in the NCAA documents reflects and reinforces the dominant racial
ideology in the U.S. by creating caveats for possible empowerment within the current system and
asserting that collegiate athletes cannot be defined as employees. Firstly, there was potential for
the slight altering of the collegiate model and subsequent empowering of men’s collegiate
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basketball players, but all those possibilities came with caveats. For example, a new reform
states that agent agreements for prospective collegiate athletes and collegiate athletes must be
“terminated when the student enrolls in or returns to college” (NCAA, 2018c). While allowing
agents during NBA draft evaluation is a step, agent representation for active collegiate athletes is
still prohibited. This prohibition limits the athletes’ ability to gain valuable advice, which may
lead to a higher rate of collegiate athletes transferring or playing professionally overseas. As the
NCAA is against these two options, which create the appearance of chaos and may diminish their
profitability, respectively (Ketchings, 2015; Heekin & Burton, 2014), the empowering of athletes
through agent representation is restricted to only the NBA draft evaluation process.
Further, the NCAA continued to promote the idea the collegiate athletes cannot be
employees as the CCB official report states, “transformative changes are necessary, but the goal
should not be to turn college basketball into another professional league” (Commission on
college basketball, 2018). This statement shows ignorance to and distorts the fact that the NCAA
has a television contract for their men’s basketball championship tournament valued at $19.6
billion from 2010-2032 (Battaglio, 2016), a contract that is akin to professional sports if nothing
else. However, stating that NCAA Division I basketball is not a professional league that allows
the NCAA to continue the illusion that these athletes are not employees. The word “employee” is
not used in any of the NCAA documents about athletes, not even to mention they are not
employees. By ignoring the fact that collegiate athletes function as employees, the NCAA and its
member institutions can avoid providing employee rights, further limiting athlete empowerment.
In the context of men’s college basketball, the collegiate athletes whose employee rights are
ignored are predominately Black (Lapchick et al., 2017a; Harper, 2018). In summation, the
discourse utilized by the NCAA in response to the FBI investigation into men’s college
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basketball reflects and reinforces dominant racial ideology by limiting Black athlete
empowerment through creating caveats to potential helpful reforms and ignoring the issue of
classifying collegiate athletes as employees.
Applying interest convergence to the NCAA response will supplement the findings for
the second research question. Such as Bell (1980) explains how the interests of Whites and
Blacks converged in the passing of Brown v. Board of Education, the interests of predominately
White NCAA executives, university presidents, and university athletic directors converged with
the interests of predominately Black men’s collegiate basketball players. While the interest in
college sport reform is more evident for Black men’s collegiate basketball players, the White
individuals profiting from their work converged with this interest when there was a threat to their
profit because of the investigation. Thus, the NCAA responded by creating an independent
commission and enacting a series of basic rules changes instead of genuine reforms. However,
the rule changes passed are also explained by interest convergence as they are likely to be
ineffective in providing legitimate rights to men’s collegiate basketball players. This response
shows interest convergence because these reforms will not shift the earning potential of the
mostly White individuals profiting from the work of mostly Black men’s basketball players.
Although the creation of rules changes or reforms show converging interests between the
predominantly Black athletes and the predominantly White individuals profiting, the reality is
that the ineffectiveness of these rule changes still follow dominant racial ideology by still
allowing for the exploitation of primarily Black men’s collegiate basketball players.
Non-NCAA Entity Response
As stated in Chapter 1, non-NCAA entities are operationally defined as intellectual elitist
reform groups the Knight Commission and the Drake Group as well as sport-based (ESPN and
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Sports Illustrated) and non-sport-based (The New York Times and The Washington Post) public
media. Furthermore, the documents analyzed for non-NCAA entities were composed of six
Knight Commission statements, three Drake Group statements, and five articles for each public
media organization, for a total of 29 documents. While there were differences between the
reform groups and public media discourse, this combines them both under the umbrella term
“non-NCAA entity,” and thus, the results will be discussed mostly through their similarities.
Unlike the NCAA documents, not all seven dialectical techniques were used by the non-NCAA
entities. Again, the exact results of the coding are shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8 and can be viewed
further in the codebook in Appendix B. Examples of non-NCAA entity use of each dialectical
technique is provided in Table 5 and are expanded upon following the table.

Table 5: Non-NCAA Entity Use of the Seven Dialectical Techniques
Technique
Example
Ambiguity
Avoidance
Credibility

Deontological Ethics

Emotional Appeal

N/A
N/A
“The Drake Group (TDG), whose mission is
to defend academic integrity in higher
education from the corrosive aspects of
commercialized college sports, found, in
response to the recently released report by the
Independent Commission on College
Basketball chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice,
that the Commission got some things right,
but missed the mark on several key issues
regarding reform in college sports” (The
drake group, n.d.)
“The second broad recommendation is for the
NCAA, conferences and/or institutions to
develop standards to emphasize coaches’
responsibilities as educators” (Cartwright &
Duncan, 2018) (Knight Commission)
“The post-verdict scene was a somber one,
with Gatto sharing a long embrace with his
wife, both appearing to heave with emotion.
The 25-year-old Dawkins pressed his head

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

Explanation

Grandstanding

52
into his father’s chest during an enduring hug,
the father comfortingly rubbing the back of
his son’s neck while visibly wrestling with
the news himself” (Greene, 2018) (Sports
Illustrated)
“There’s so much money involved,
someone’s going to get it. And unless and
until players receive some sort of
compensation that’s commensurate with their
value to the school, there is going to be
corruption. Sometimes it will violate NCAA
rules. Sometimes it will violate the law”
(Svrluga, 2017) (The Washington Post)
“The Rice Commission adopted a
longstanding recommendation of the Knight
Commission to add independent directors to
the NCAA Board of Governors, the
organization’s highest-ranking governing
body” (Knight commission, 2018)

Firstly, and notably, non-NCAA entities did not use the dialectical techniques of
ambiguity and avoidance. There are two main reasons for this. One, unlike the NCAA, the ethics
and behavior of college sport reform groups and public media are not receiving public scrutiny
as a result of this investigation. This fact means they can write without needing to consciously or
subconsciously remind the public they operate ethically. Two, also unlike the NCAA, their
actions did not directly lead to the de jure elicit payments and the subsequent investigation.
Therefore, they do not need to use vague language or deflect the responsibility to another entity.
While ambiguity and avoidance, were not present in the non-NCAA entity discourse,
credibility was coded 91 times across 24 of the 29 documents. The credibility language used in
the non-NCAA entity allowed both reform groups and public media to affirm their position as
trustworthy sources to speak on college sport. Compared to the NCAA’s use of implicit language
in this instance, non-NCAA entities were more explicit in their use of credibility language. For
example, the quote in Table 5, shows The Drake Group exhibiting transparency by stating their
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organizational mission concerning the CCB recommendations. The use of the credibility
dialectal technique allowed the non-NCAA entities to assert their position as reliable sources that
are critiquing a complex topic. Comparatively, non-NCAA entities had minor usage of
deontological ethics, as referenced 53 times across 15 of the 29 documents. Similar to the
NCAA, non-NCAA entities used the dialectical technique of deontological ethics to emphasize
their organizational policies. For example, deontological ethics were used by the Knight
Commission in the recommendation made to Dr. Condoleezza Rice, the CCB chair, stated in
Table 5. This specific recommendation pays special attention to improving the educational
aspects of collegiate basketball, which aligns with the Knight Commission’s alignment with
Sack’s (2009) “clashing models” as intellectual elitist. This discourse falls within deontological
ethics; improving higher education is a significant purpose of the Knight Commission. While
non-NCAA entities use deontological ethics in a similar way to the NCAA, they are not
dependent on it, as shown through their minor use.
In contrast, non-NCAA entities used the emotional appeal dialectical technique 94 times
across 21 of the 29 documents. Non-NCAA entities used emotional appeal much more often than
the NCAA, primarily because this is a common technique in journalism (Stephens, 2014), which
is present in the non-NCAA entity analysis through public media. Where the NCAA employed
more even use of empathy and anger, non-NCAA entities utilized empathy far more often, an
example of which is shown in Table 5. This passage from Sports Illustrated goes beyond
empathy, painting a picture in the mind of the reader. The imagery used by non-NCAA entities
increases the effectiveness of the emotional appeal by creating an experience for the reader that
goes beyond reading. In stark contrast from the emotional appeal, non-NCAA entities depended
heavily on the explanation dialectal technique, as coded 465 times across all 29 documents. The
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explanatory language used in the non-NCAA entity documents, akin to the NCAA documents,
both stated facts and explained intent through institutional logics. The example in Table 5, from
The Washington Post, explains fact through the mention of the money involved in Division I
men’s collegiate basketball. Furthermore, the institutional logics are evident in the explanation
that de jure elicit payments are an unavoidable consequence of this money. This concept marks a
distinction between the reform groups and the public media, where the institutional logics of the
reform groups are organizational, and the institutional logics of public media are based
individually depending on the author.
To conclude, non-NCAA entities used the grandstanding dialectical technique 44 times
across only 10 of the 29 documents. This usage marks another distinction between reform groups
and public media, with reform groups utilizing grandstanding far more than public media.
However, when used, both groups in the non-NCAA entity category used grandstanding in the
same way as the NCAA. The example shown in Table 5, from the Knight Commission for
college sport reform following the CCB official report, shows grandstanding by their mentioning
that adding independent directors has been a “longstanding recommendation” (Knight
commission, 2018). This statement serves the purpose of promoting their accomplishments to
amplify their authority with the reader and the NCAA. The other uses of grandstanding by nonNCAA entities follow this path of reveling in accomplishments to increase trustworthiness.
Research Question #3: Non-NCAA Entity Comparison. The third research question
was: What are the responses from non-NCAA entities regarding the FBI investigation compared
to the NCAA response? From a discursive perspective, while the non-NCAA entities’ use of
dialectal tools has similarities with NCAA use, there are more differences (Table 6). The
similarities lie in the use of credibility and grandstanding. Both the NCAA and non-NCAA
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entities employ these two techniques throughout their documents in similar frequency and with
the same purpose of increasing trustworthiness. However, the similarities end there. The first,
and most notable difference, is that non-NCAA entities have no use of ambiguity or avoidance,
compared to moderate use by the NCAA. The reason for this is because, unlike the NCAA, nonNCAA entities do not need to circumvent or deflect blame in their responses to the FBI
investigation into men’s college basketball.
Further, non-NCAA entities have minimal use of deontological ethics, while the NCAA
relied more heavily on this dialectical technique. When used, this tool was used similarly, but the
NCAA’s need to justify their discourse in response to the investigation resulted in more frequent
usage. Next emotional appeal was used far more often and far more efficiently by non-NCAA
entitles because of the public media’s inclusion in this category and the usage of this technique in
journalism (Stephens, 2014). Lastly, explanation was utilized considerably more often by nonNCAA entities compared to the NCAA. This discourse allowed for greater transparency in terms
of both factual information and institutional logics. In conclusion, non-NCAA entities’ frequency
and purpose of usage of the seven dialectical techniques varied from the NCAA because they did
not create the environment that led to de jure elicit payments and the ensuing FBI investigation
into corruption in Division I men’s collegiate basketball.

Table 6: Seven Dialectical Techniques Coding Results
Dialectical
NCAA (Total
NCAA
Non-NCAA
Technique
Codes)
(Number of
Entities (Total
Documents, out Codes)
of 17)
Ambiguity

58

11

0

Non-NCAA
Entities
(Number of
Documents, out
of 29)
0

Avoidance

149

13

0

0

Credibility

208

15

91

24
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Deontological
Ethics
Emotional
Appeal
Explanation

163

17

53

15

35

9

94

21

264

14

465

29

Grandstanding

156

13

44

10

1,035

N/A

747

N/A

Total

Table 7: Seven Dialectical Techniques Coding Magnitude
Document Category
Code Range
0-58
58-156
NCAA
156-208
208+
0
0-53
Non-NCAA
53-94
94+

Use Descriptor
Infrequent
Moderate
Frequent
Very Frequent
Infrequent
Moderate
Frequent
Very Frequent

In addition to the use of the seven dialectical techniques, non-NCAA entities employed
contrasting usage of the three key principles of intercollegiate athletic stakeholders compared to
the NCAA (Table 8). The NCAA usage of the first and second principles are explained in greater
detail earlier in this chapter. Further, while the NCAA used escalation of commitment and
interest convergence pervasively, they did not employ checks and balances. Comparatively, nonNCAA entities primarily used checks and balances coupled with minimal usage of escalation of
commitment and interest convergence. While only using the first and second principles sparsely,
it is worth recognizing that the pervasive ideals of amateurism and racism that undergird
escalation of commitment and interest convergence were still present in the non-NCAA entity
response, albeit far less often than the NCAA response. In contrast, both reform groups and
public media engaged in frequent usage of checks and balances on the NCAA response. The
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non-NCAA entities were able to provide a checks and balance of the NCAA response through
critiques and recommendations provided in responses of their own.

Table 8: The Three Key Principles of Intercollegiate Athletic Stakeholders Coding Results
Principle
NCAA (Total
NCAA
Non-NCAA
Non-NCAA
Codes)
(Number of
Entities (Total
Entities
Documents, out Codes)
(Number of
of 17)
Documents, out
of 29)
Escalation of
156
16
34
8
Commitment
Interest
121
17
3
2
Convergence
Checks and
0
0
212
29
Balances
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The purpose of this study was to critically analyze the NCAA’s response to the FBI
investigation into men’s college basketball through the solidifying of amateurism and the role of
race. The findings analyzed the explicit and implicit meaning of NCAA discourse in this context
and how that discourse relates to the key principles of escalation of commitment towards
amateurism and interest convergence leading to and shaping the NCAA response. The critical
discourse analysis showed that NCAA has attempted to avoid blame while affirming its
organization as a credible manager of intercollegiate athletics through the seven dialectical
techniques of intercollegiate athletic stakeholders. Again, I created these dialectical techniques
with a peer debriefer (an English Ph.D. student) following an inductive round of coding.
Subsequently, these techniques were used deductively for the second round of coding. By using
these techniques, the NCAA discourse showed circumvention of accountability by deflecting
blame onto other entities such as the NBA, AAU, and apparel companies. Furthermore, they
affirmed their role as the primary governing body for intercollegiate athletics by using discourse
to promote their accomplishments and institutional logics.
This study adds another layer to college sport research analyzing amateurism principles
and the presence of racism in college sport. Additionally, I believe this study adds to the sport
management research at large by providing a critical analysis of organizational response with the
dual-layers of institutional logics and dominant racial ideology. In terms of amateurism research,
more generally, previous literature has examined NCAA discourse and how they have achieved
“spontaneous consent” for their collegiate model through their hegemonic influence, which
creates the tacit agreement from the masses (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). The present study
expands upon this outcome, as the NCAA discourse utilized the seven dialectical techniques as a
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way to generate reader and public support. Further previous work on NCAA institutional logics
at specific commercial events have shown the existence of a dominant logic that is responsible
for creating particular outcomes (Southall & Nagel, 2008; Southall et al., 2008; Southall et al.,
2009). This study is consistent with this finding, whereby the dominant logic present in the
NCAA discourse is their commitment to amateurism and the commercial model. Moreover, it
expands by providing a critical analysis of how this dominant logic is present within the
NCAA’s organizational response. Lastly, concerning amateurism, the current study explains how
the NCAA discourse has been used to ignore the fact that collegiate athletes function as
employees. This outcome adds to legal literature that has outlined how collegiate athletes are
employees from a legal perspective (McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Afshar, 2014; Gerrie,
2018).
The first research question was: How does the NCAA response to the FBI investigation
into men’s college basketball solidify or alter the current collegiate model? Related to their
escalation of commitment towards amateurism and the current collegiate model, the NCAA
showed their willingness to commit to a failing collegiate model that was directly responsible for
the de jure elicit payments. While the commercial model is failing the athletes and creating a
system where corruption is ubiquitous, it has also led to massive profit for the NCAA and its
member institutions (Kahn, 2007; Van Rheenen, 2012; Berkowitz, 2018). This study found that
as a result, even with the negative public relations and potential legal issues surrounding an FBI
investigation, the NCAA was steadfast in their commitment towards amateurism.
The outcomes from this research question expand on research using escalation of
commitment in sport. Firstly, escalation of commitment research in sport has primarily discussed
escalation of commitment within specific athletic departments (Bouchet & Hutchinson, 2012;

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

60

Hutchinson & Bouchet, 2014; Hutchinson et al., 2015). The present study expands on this
literature by utilizing escalation of commitment to analyze the organizational practice of the
NCAA as a whole. Secondly, Hutchinson et al. (2015) studied determinants of commitment in
university athletic departments in the U.S. One significant finding from Hutchinson et al. (2015),
was the “emergence of organizational status as a social determinant of escalating commitment”
(p. 64). Before this study, organizational status was not discussed in terms of its effect on
escalation of commitment (Hutchinson et al., 2015). However, all ten athletic departments
examined by Hutchinson et al. (2015) acknowledged the importance of organizational status
towards increasing their commitment to intercollegiate athletics. The present study is consistent
with these findings, as the NCAA’s belief in their organizational status as the authority on
college athletics had a significant role in their response to the FBI investigation through the use
of the credibility and deontological ethics dialectic techniques. As a result, the NCAA’s public
reputation and organizational status were essential to their escalating commitment towards
amateurism.
Lastly, Bouchet and Hutchinson (2012) and Hutchinson and Bouchet (2014) explore deescalation of commitment. Bouchet and Hutchison (2012) found four primary reasons for the
University of Chicago de-escalating their commitment to athletics: change in presidents, shifting
academic visions, the financial condition of the athletic department, and change in coaches. For
the NCAA, although the FBI investigation created a crisis, none of these same reasons discussed
by Bouchet and Hutchison (2012) were present. There has not been a change in leadership, with
Mark Emmert serving as NCAA president since 2010 (NCAA president, n.d.), the NCAA is in
excellent financial health (Battaglio, 2016; Berkowitz, 2018), and as the study found, their
organizational vision did not change, with further escalating commitment towards the collegiate
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model. Analyzing eight athletic departments de-escalation of commitment towards athletics,
Hutchinson and Bouchet (2014) found that “in clarifying the magnitude of the problem, each
institution reframed the problem regarding their current athletic commitment” (p. 158). This
finding would help explain how the NCAA reaffirmed their commitment to the collegiate model
by reframing the problems that arose from the FBI investigation in terms of their current level of
commitment to upholding amateurism.
Additionally, the NCAA discourse revealed the use of reinforcing dominant racial
ideology in terms of abstract liberalism, through interest convergence. The second research
question, which was: How does the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into men's college
basketball reflect and reinforce the dominant racial ideology in the United States? The interest in
creating reform in intercollegiate basketball for primarily Black collegiate men’s basketball
players and primarily White individuals profiting from their work converged in the public release
of this investigation threatening the financial potential of the NCAA and its member institutions.
While the interests of these two groups in creating reform converged at this moment, the NCAA
response showed that reform would limit the benefits provided to the mostly Black men’s
collegiate basketball players. These reforms are likely to be mostly ineffective, while restricting
the power provided to athletes by ignoring the question of employee status (Medcalf, 2018;
Wolken, 2018; The drake group, n.d., Knight commission, 2018).
These findings show that within their discourse, the NCAA is unwilling to take
accountability, will uphold the virtue of amateurism for as long as possible, and created the
reforms under color-blind racism by creating a negative and disproportional impact on a
primarily Black community. The NCAA reflected and reinforced of dominant racial ideology in
their response through implicit discourse that was present 121 times across all 17 of the NCAA
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documents. The NCAA mainly did this by using abstract liberalism and framing race-related
issues as color-blind and operating within meritocratic values such as “equal opportunity” and
“individual choice” (Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Cooper et al., 2017). However, when considering the
racial demographic disparity between majority Black men’s college basketball players and
majority White coaches, athletic directors, and NCAA executives (Lapchick et al., 2017a;
Lapchick et al., 2017b; Harper, 2018), and the economic imbalance between these diverging
groups that have been discussed through the study, the issues present are inherently race-related.
The NCAA discourse in their response to the FBI investigation limits Black athlete
empowerment under the guise of this color-blind approach by qualifying potentially significant
reforms and ignoring collegiate athlete employee status.
Further, the study expands the literature on race and college sport. Previous literature has
examined racism and racial implications of NCAA initial eligibility policy for incoming
collegiate athletes (Nwadike et al., 2016). Nwadike et al. (2016) found that race was explicitly
discussed in creating this policy. The current study adds to the literature because although race
was not explicitly discussed, it is implicitly present in the NCAA response to the FBI
investigation. As stated prior, the NCAA discourse had 121 implicit references to interest
convergence and race across all 17 of the NCAA documents. The NCAA’s reflecting and
reinforcing of dominant racial ideology was coded through implicit discourse that was present
121 times across all 17 of the documents. Interest convergence and the upholding of dominant
racial ideology are implicitly present in this discourse, because as discussed, these reforms do not
improve the empowerment, livelihood, or earning potential of the primarily Black men’s
collegiate basketball players. This analysis of racism in the NCAA discourse adds to sport
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management literature by addressing the implicit presence of dominant ideologies that exist
within an organizational discourse.
Further, this study expands upon the use of the interest convergence tenet of critical race
theory for implications for culturally responsive, race-conscious, and racially equitable
leadership in college sport (Cooper et al., 2017). In Cooper et al. (2017), “the authors call for a
shift from abstract liberalism and color-blind racism towards a culturally responsive and raceconscious leadership approach whereby race is centralized” (p. 227). In this call, Cooper et al.
(2017) explain that the current discourse by the NCAA has been mostly empty rhetoric, as
opposed to legitimately valuing racial diversity. This present study supports this outcome, as the
NCAA discourse was found to reflect and reinforce dominant racial ideology through interest
convergence. Relatedly, in conducting a narrative case study of three elite Black male football
athletes at a PWIHE, Singer (2016) found two participants’ academic underperformance being
directly impacted by culturally irrelevant organizational practices. While this study does not
address athlete perception or experience related to the NCAA response, it does explore how the
NCAA had a culturally irrelevant organizational response. The outcomes from Singer (2016) and
other related studies on culturally irrelevant (Hawkins 2010; Nwadike, et al., 2016; Williams Jr.,
2015; Singer, Harrison, & Bukstein, 2010) and culturally relevant (Carter-Francique, 2013;
Cooper, 2013; Bimper, Harrison, & Clark, 2012) organizational practices in college sport further
emphasize the disadvantageous outcomes that can occur as a result of the implicit racism present
in the culturally irrelevant NCAA discourse. This study adds to this literature by examining how
the NCAA’s response in organizational crisis took a color-blind approach and was culturally
irrelevant for the athletes that comprise the organization.
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The findings analyzed another layer, which is the response of non-NCAA entities
compared to the NCAA. This analysis helped answer the third research question, which was:
What are the responses from non-NCAA entities regarding the FBI investigation compared to the
NCAA response? Again, non-NCAA entities refer to intellectual elitist college sport reform
groups The Drake Group and The Knight Commission as well as sport-based public media
organizations ESPN and Sports Illustrated and non-sport-based public media organizations The
New York Times and The Washington Post. Non-NCAA entities employed similar use of the
seven dialectical techniques to the NCAA only in terms of establishing credibility. However,
non-NCAA entities did not attempt to avoid blame and showed considerably more transparency
in their institutional logics with more explicit language.
While not pervasive, the use of escalating commitment towards amateurism and interest
convergence was still present in the non-NCAA entity response. I posit that escalating
commitment towards amateurism and interest convergence was still present in the non-NCAA
response, specifically in the reform organization, because opposition to this is not part of the
intellectual elitist practice. Intellectual elitists are grounded in improving education systems, and
their reforms include need-based athletic scholarships and increased initial eligibility
requirements for athletes (Sack, 2009). As a result, intellectual elitists are not actively against the
collegiate model and do not discuss issues racial inequity in the same way as athletes’ rights
advocate, leading to a slight presence of escalating commitment towards amateurism and interest
convergence. Lastly, differentiating entirely from the NCAA, the non-NCAA entities showed a
willingness to provide checks and balances by criticizing the NCAA response and offering their
recommendations. The principle of checks and balances serves an essential purpose in explaining
the role of non-NCAA entities in the context of this study. In terms of non-NCAA entities,
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checks and balances are representative of both the college sport reform groups and their goal to
change the current model and journalistic outlets. In democratic countries, such as the U.S.,
journalism serves a vital role in providing transparency through checks and balances (Christians,
Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White, 2009; Wilkins & Christians, 2009; Karlsson, 2010),
such as those provided by the discourse of the journalistic outlets analyzed in this study.
Morse (2015) highlights four concepts that increase rigor in qualitative research:
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. This study utilized techniques
Morse (2015) suggests to achieving credibility, including prolonged and peer debriefing. In
critical discourse analysis, “the overarching objective… is to understand how a discourse
performs its various functions and effects to construct a certain reality” (Greckhamer & Cilesiz,
2014, p. 425). I felt that following three rounds of coding, I had engaged enough with the
discourse to understand the reality constructed by the NCAA and non-NCAA entities. Further, I
engaged in a peer debriefing process with an English Ph.D. student to assess my interpretations
create the concept, terms, and definitions of the seven dietetical techniques of intercollegiate
athletic stakeholders. As noted by Morse (2015) and Tracy (2010), qualitative research relies on
transferability. The seven dialectical techniques outlined in this study are transferable in
analyzing future discourse from the NCAA or other sport organizations. Specific to college
sport, these findings can be compared to NCAA discourse across sport and topics. I believe this
study offers a thick description (Morse, 2015) that makes the seven dialectical techniques of
intercollegiate athletic stakeholders transferable to future critical discourse analyses. In terms of
dependability and confirmability, the study used data triangulation (Morse, 2015) with data
sources from the NCAA, college sport reform groups, and journalistic outlets.
Conclusion
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This study offers a critical analysis of the NCAA response to the FBI investigation into
men’s college basketball. As the critical discourse analysis revealed, the NCAA shaped their
discourse using the seven dialectical techniques of intercollegiate athletic stakeholders to avoid
accountability, deflect blame, and promote credibility. Further, their escalation of commitment
towards amateurism and response because of interest convergence highlights how they solidified
the current collegiate model and implicitly promoted dominant racial ideology. More
specifically, the NCAA response solidified the collegiate model through the heavy use of
discourse related to enforcement and relying on outside entities to enact change. Moreover, this
response reflected and reinforced dominant racial ideology implicitly through abstract liberalism
and color-blind racism, which ignored the inclusion of race when addressing race-related issues.
Lastly, to address the third research question, non-NCAA entities were far more transparent and
provided checks and balances for the NCAA response. Non-NCAA entities primarily used the
seven dialectical techniques of intercollegiate athletic stakeholders differently from the NCAA,
by being more explicit with their positionality.
Implications for Policy and Research
I provide policy recommendations in order to address the policy issues the NCAA missed
in their response and enacted reforms. First, I provide recommendations for what the present
missed in addressing each research question. Answering the first research found the NCAA
solidified the current collegiate model by escalating their commitment towards amateurism
because of their deontological ethics and organizational status. However, as the newly enacted
reforms continue to take effect, follow up studies can determine the long-term impact of this
response on the collegiate model. Subsequently, answering the second research found that the
NCAA’s response implicitly included racism through limiting athlete empowerment and
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ignoring employee status of athletes. The coding in answering this question found the influence
of interest convergence and abstract liberalism in the framing of the NCAA response. That said, I
think the "White racial frame," which is a White-generated view through which Whites are
considered superior and honorable compared to racial non-Whites considered inferior and
dishonorable (Feagin, 2013), would be influential in further analyzing dominant racial ideology
in the NCAA response. Utilizing the “White racial frame” as a follow-up to this study would
allow for an even richer analysis of the implicit racism present in the NCAA discourse. Lastly,
answering the third research question found non-NCAA entities provided checks and balances
for the NCAA, the non-NCAA entity response could be analyzed more critically. Since the
college sport reform groups in the study represent the intellectual elitist model, these responses
could be further critiqued for their shortcomings in attempting to create the best environment for
the athletes.
In terms of policy, I recommend that the NCAA officially classify all collegiate athletes
as employees. This recommendation is based on the fact that the de jure elicit payments occurred
because men’s collegiate basketball players are not compensated equitability and do not have
employee rights. As opposed to focusing on compensating collegiate athletes, the classification
of all collegiate athletes as employees focuses more on employee rights. Providing employee
rights such as workers’ compensation and a grievance process will allow collegiate athletes to be
treated more fairly by their respective institutions. Edelman (2014c, 2017), Staurowsky (2014b),
and Zielinski (2015) have discussed these examples of employee rights. Further, previous studies
have outlined how collegiate athletes are considered employees from a legal perspective
(McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Afshar, 2014; Gerrie, 2018) and how the NLRB affirmed this
in recognizing Northwestern football players as employees (Staurowsky, 2014a; Edelman, 2017;
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D’Aquila & Rudolph, 2014). In the present study, the NCAA continued to promote their belief
that college athletics are inherently amateur and not professional. While the multi-billion dollar
NCAA Division I men’s basketball tournament contract shows that the NCAA as an amateur
sport organization is a myth, the court cases that resulted from the FBI investigation are
principally legislation of NCAA rules (Hobson & Armstrong, 2018).
Along with the above possibilities for further answering the research questions and policy
recommendations, recommendations for additional future research are provided. The seven
dialectical techniques outlined in this study are transferable in analyzing discourse from sport
organization responding to a crisis. In this study, these techniques arose from the NCAA
discourse in their response to an organizational crisis. Specific to college sport, NCAA discourse
should be analyzed across sport and across topics to address issues of racial and gender equity.
For example, the NCAA discourse on Title IX and issues of gender equity in coaching, the
discourse on female representation within media coverage of college athletics, and the discourse
on lack of both racial and gender equity in leadership positions (e.g., athletic directors and
conference commissioners). Research that focuses on discourse relating to racial and gender
equity can help provide insights and recommendations to make college sport more equitable.
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Appendix A: Subjectivity Statement
My interest in sport research began as a result of the ethical dilemmas I faced while
interning for a sport agency, scouting at events for elite-level youth baseball players attended by
hundreds of professional scouts, agents, college coaches, and corporate sponsor representatives.
This experience not only launched my interest in research, but my belief that athletes are often
treated as profitable commodities, not human beings. I became interested in understanding the
factors that led to the systematic commodification of athletes, specifically within Major League
Baseball (MLB). Additionally, my coursework as an undergraduate and graduate sport
management student, studying social, legal, and organizational issues in sport, has led to my
inherently critical view of sport entities as related to their treatment of athletes and social
responsibility. Following the public announcement of the arrest of ten individuals connected to
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I men’s basketball by Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on charges financial charges including bribery, wire fraud, and
money laundering, the NCAA had several responses to create reform. However, these reforms do
not enact change.
I was raised with and still experience multiple forms of privilege as a White, uppermiddle-class male with parents who are supportive personally, professionally, and economically.
These forms of privilege allowed me to pursue an out-of-state higher education and secure two
internships in the sport industry without a formal interview. Although my economic privilege is
more apparent, my racial and gender privilege meant my ability to succeed and my level of
knowledge were never questioned. However, I did not examine this privilege until I began my
training as a researcher from an advisor specializing in sport sociology, shaping my
epistemological and theoretical perspectives. In my position as a novice researcher, I bring a
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constructivist epistemology, with the understanding that knowledge and phenomena are
constructed based on their respective social contexts. Furthermore, I take a critical theorist
perspective with the belief that this social construction occurs through power. Specifically, I
have a critical race and feminist theorist worldview in believing that race and gender heavily
influence power.
This topic is important to me because I am an avid consumer of and former employee in
collegiate athletics. I have been able to experience firsthand how power influences the socially
understood notions of collegiate athletics and amateurism. As a result of this experience, in
alignment with Sack’s (2009) “clashing models” for college sport reform, I consider myself an
athlete advocate. As such, the goal of this study and my research, in general, is to benefit the
athletes. My background, coupled with my epistemological and theoretical worldview impact my
subjectivity on this study, because I will be viewing the NCAA investigation response through a
critical lens that posits the White males in power in the NCAA have socially constructed the
collegiate sport environment to firstly provide themselves with benefits. Additionally, I will be
viewing the NCAA response to this investigation with the lens that those who most need reform
to provide support, the collegiate athletes, are effectively ignored. This subjectivity statement, in
which I have explained my approach to how the world is socially constructed through power,
will help maintain credibility has I have allowed the reader to understand my biases.
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Appendix B: Codebook
Ambiguity
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 4 references coded [ 10.23% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.98% Coverage
The Commission is strongly encouraged to identify bold legislative, policy and structural
modiﬁcations to improve the integrity of our processes and the well-being of our student athletes.
Reference 2 - 1.12% Coverage
Further, the boards stand ready and are committed to implement appropriate meaningful and
lasting changes.
Reference 3 - 2.24% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Reference 4 - 4.89% Coverage
Creating the right relationship between the universities and colleges of the NCAA and its
national ofﬁce to promote transparency and accountability. The commission will be asked to
evaluate whether the appropriate degree of authority is vested in the current enforcement and
eligibility processes, and if the collaborative model provides the investigative tools, cultural
incentives and structures to ensure exploitation and corruption cannot hide in college sports.
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 4 references
coded [ 3.44% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.08% Coverage
First, we must separate the collegiate track from the professional track by ending oneand-done.
We call on the NBA and the NBPA, who exclusively have the power here, to once again make
18-year-olds eligible for the NBA draft so that high school players who are drafted may proceed
directly to the NBA. Should the NBA and NBPA decide not to do so – the Commission will
reconvene and consider other measures, including freshman ineligibility and/or the “lock-up” of
scholarships for a specified period of time.
Reference 2 - 0.65% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their professional prospects.
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should deprive studentathletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue in college while playing
basketball.
Reference 3 - 0.23% Coverage
The Commission also believes in the provision of resources to make the promise of a college
education real.
Reference 4 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

91

taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 33 references coded [ 5.42% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage
goal should not be to turn college basketball into another professional league. Rather, we must
change fundamentally the current culture and rules to address the effect that money has had on
college basketball, the NCAA and its member institutions.
Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage
We must emphasize that only the NBA and the NBPA can change the one-anddone rule. If they choose not to do so by the end of 2018, the NCAA must still find a way to
address this situation.
Reference 3 - 0.09% Coverage
In sum, student-athletes should have more information about their professional
prospects and more flexibility to test those prospects and return to school. This change and other
related changes should make it easier for them to do so without losing their collegiate eligibility.
Reference 4 - 0.15% Coverage
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic basketball, the
Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players about their professional
and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health and more. Student-athletes must
have the information they need to understand their real choices and be better positioned to take
advantage of either the collegiate or the professional path they choose.
Reference 5 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 6 - 0.04% Coverage
The NCAA will have to incur substantial costs for several of these recommendations. But it will
be money well spent.
Reference 7 - 0.12% Coverage
In addition, these and all NCAA investigators must exercise reasonable prosecutorial discretion
and common sense so that resources are focused on serious infractions and punishment is
appropriately calibrated and consistently administered. There are multiple examples of minor
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infractions that are not worth the time and effort that the NCAA now spends on them.
Reference 8 - 0.17% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual
accountability for rules violations for coaches, athletic directors and college presidents. The
NCAA must amend its rules to require colleges to include in contracts with administrators and
coaches individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including
financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA enforcement proceedings,
decisions and discipline, up to and including discharge.
Reference 9 - 0.08% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA
Reference 10 - 0.11% Coverage
Coaches are the public focus of blame for NCAA violations. For too long, college
presidents and administrators have not been viewed as accountable for the conduct of their
athletic programs. That will have to change. College presidents and highlevel administrators
cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the infractions in those programs.
Reference 11 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 12 - 0.19% Coverage
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have educational
components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that requirement more
effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families, including travel, meals,
accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must be disclosed to the NCAA, along
with the source of their provision. The NCAA must enforce the requirement that such benefits be
reasonable and appropriate and assure that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying
the timing or providing the benefits to another.
Reference 13 - 0.23% Coverage
It appears, however, that they do not have effective controls in place in their spending in nonscholastic basketball. The Commission calls on the boards of these companies to publicly
support and implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own
investments in non-scholastic basketball. Particularly in light of the facts uncovered in the recent
FBI investigation, these public companies should be concerned about how their money is used in
non-scholastic basketball. We expect that these companies will insist that all employees provide
detailed accountability about such expenditures and cooperate with new NCAA rules about
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financial transparency and accountability.
Reference 14 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 15 - 0.27% Coverage
On September 26, 2017, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York announced the arrest of ten persons for involvement in fraud and
corruption schemes related to college basketball – four NCAA Division I college basketball
coaches, the head of Global Sports Marketing – Basketball and two individuals affiliated with a
major athletic apparel company, and three athlete advisors. The first scheme involved allegations
that college coaches took cash payments from athlete advisors to steer players and their families
to the advisors making the payments. The second scheme involved allegations that a senior
executive at a sports apparel company worked with athlete advisors to funnel payments to highschool players and their families to obtain their commitment to attend universities sponsored by
the apparel company.
Reference 16 - 0.16% Coverage
However, the Commission recognizes that some humility is required in light of past failures and
the size of the challenge. Stakeholders do not agree about either the causes or the potential
solutions to the current challenges that face pre-professional basketball. The Commission
believes that these challenges will persist unless all stakeholders accept responsibility for the
credibility of the game, the reputations of the schools who field teams and the integrity of the
athletes who compete.
Reference 17 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, many high school and collegiate student-athletes do not receive the
information and assistance they need to accurately determine whether and when to pursue
professional basketball.
Reference 18 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
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community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 19 - 0.20% Coverage
Indeed, Division I coaches complain that they are dependent on non-scholastic coaches, leagues
and events for opportunities to view players, giving those third parties even more leverage over
high school players. In the interim, high school players are playing non-scholastic basketball
sponsored by apparel companies who provide those high school players with gear, travel and
experiences. Division I coaches seek to increase their direct contact with high school players at
critical junctures, and to limit their dependence on non-scholastic coaches, leagues and apparel
companies for access to high school players.
Reference 20 - 0.17% Coverage
Currently, the NCAA “certifies” some non-scholastic or non-scholastic basketball
events and leagues. NCAA Division I Bylaws 13.18 (Basketball Event Certification); 17.31.4.1
(Summer Basketball Leagues). Coaches at NCAA member institutions can attend these summer
events only if the NCAA certifies them. Unfortunately, however, the requirements for NCAA
certification are minimal, to be generous; and some of the requirements are poorly implemented
while others are not enforced. Non-scholastic basketball is largely unregulated.
Reference 21 - 0.16% Coverage
In the context described above, however, a player may be strongly tempted to break NCAA rules
and enter into a relationship with an agent or attend a particular college in order to be paid.
Similarly, coaches and other college representatives may be strongly tempted to pay players,
family members and others who can influence players to attend particular schools. As illustrated
by the recent charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, this possibility is not merely
theoretical.
Reference 22 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 23 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission is not naïve. It understands that implementation of this
recommendation will not eliminate the problems described above, most notably thirdparty
payments to athletes to attend particular colleges and the resulting potential for corruption of
collegiate programs.
Reference 24 - 0.28% Coverage
As stated above, both high school and college students misjudge – that is, over rate – their
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chances of a professional basketball career. Very few high school players will play professional
basketball. Yet, many high school student-athletes believe they have professional prospects, and
they work hard in high school to maintain eligibility to play that one-and-done year in college.
The concern is that, with the end of one-and-done, misguided high school players will assume
that their NBA careers will start at 18 without a backup plan to attend college. College students,
too, misunderstand their prospects. In addition, the families of players lack objective, credible
sources of information about the professional and collegiate paths. All of these students need
timely, reliable and trusted sources of information about their likelihood of professional success.
Reference 25 - 0.11% Coverage
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with agents,
sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA should bring these
conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their prospects with agents whom it
certifies under NCAA-approved standards.
Reference 26 - 0.24% Coverage
The Commission understands that contact with agents can lead to illicit payments and other rule
violations. It thus recommends serious consequences for NCAAcertified agents who participate
in violations of NCAA rules. For example, such agents should lose their NCAA certification and
be barred from non-scholastic basketball events certified by the NCAA (see Section 3, infra). In
addition, agents who the NCAA decertifies may not pass along representation of their studentathlete clients to other agents at the same agency. Such agents should also be reported to the
NBPA. Finally, a student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter
into an agreement, with a non-certified agent should lose his eligibility.
Reference 27 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that the NCAA work with the NBA and the
NBPA to establish additional venues for representatives of those entities to meet with collegiate
players and provide information about professional status and opportunities. The NBA and the
NBPA have unique credibility with collegiate athletes. Players would make more informed
choices about college if they had additional opportunities to hear from the NBA and its players.
Reference 28 - 0.19% Coverage
The NCAA is certainly not blameless for its failure to address the corruption in college
basketball that led to the recent prosecutions, but the primary failures belong to the individuals at
colleges and universities who allowed their programs to be corrupted, averting their eyes to keep
the money flowing. With enhanced individual accountability, the Commission believes that more
college presidents and athletic directors will find it beneficial to adopt and enforce
comprehensive compliance programs. See also NCAA Constitution 2.1 (Principle of Institutional
Control and Responsibility).
Reference 29 - 0.06% Coverage
However, the Commission also heard from many that because non-scholastic basketball is
unregulated, some teams, events and tournaments have damaging consequences for college
basketball.
Reference 30 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
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requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 31 - 0.09% Coverage
While the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA should work out the details, the
Commission believes that there is a role for each organization to play at each of the three
Levels—although the degree to which each organization takes a leadership role should naturally
vary by level.
Reference 32 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 33 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 3 references coded [
4.94% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.59% Coverage
“We tend to say, ‘No it’s not me; it’s that other school,’” Emmert said. “But the fact is that’s just
a little too convenient for all of us. It’s a little too easy. … When we have issues like those, we
have to stand up together and say, ‘We have to ﬁx that.’”
Reference 2 - 1.73% Coverage
Standing behind college sports’ stated values should not be looked at as being out of touch with
modern-day realities, he said. Rather, it’s about leading college sports ahead through the
foundation that has provided its respected position within higher education.
Reference 3 - 1.62% Coverage
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“People don’t want words; they want to see action,” Emmert said. “We’ve got to ﬁx it together.
Nobody thinks it’s going to be easy. In fact, I think it’s going to be really hard. But we’ve got to
get on with it. We’ve got to put our actions where our words are.”
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 4 references coded
[ 6.78% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.70% Coverage
Today, the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors unanimously endorsed
a series of recommendations from the Commission on College Basketball. These
recommendations will ensure integrity in the game, strengthen accountability in college sports
and demonstrate a commitment to the well-being of student-athletes.
Reference 2 - 1.12% Coverage
Division I Council members will forward impactful ﬁnal changes to the DI Board and the Board
of Governors for approval by our August meetings
Reference 3 - 1.07% Coverage
Independent Investigation and Adjudication of Complex Cases. NCAA to establish independent
investigative and adjudicative body.
Reference 4 - 1.89% Coverage
Enlist Apparel Companies in Transparency and Accountability Efforts. Boards of public apparel
companies should implement ﬁnancial transparency and accountability with respect to their
investments in non-scholastic basketball.
Files\\NCAA4 - NCAA Statement from Mark Emmert on Federal Investigation - § 2
references coded [ 6.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.12% Coverage
"The nature of the charges brought by the federal government are deeply disturbing
Reference 2 - 2.00% Coverage
and these bribery allegations, if true,
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 1 reference coded [ 2.57% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.57% Coverage
Add fresh perspective and independent judgment to NCAA decision-making at the highest level
of policymaking and in investigations and case resolution.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 2 references coded [ 4.85% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.87% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA, and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Reference 2 - 1.98% Coverage
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Creating the right relationship between the universities and colleges of the NCAA and its
national ofﬁce to promote transparency and accountability.
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 3 references coded [
9.14% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.41% Coverage
Depending upon future action by the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association to
permit high school students to enter the draft, high school basketball players can be represented
by an agent beginning July 1 before their senior year in high school, provided they have been
identiﬁed as an elite senior prospect.
Reference 2 - 4.81% Coverage
Division I schools will be required to pay for tuition, fees and books for basketball players who
leave school and return later to the same school to earn their degree. Former student-athletes will
be eligible for ﬁnancial assistance to complete their ﬁrst degree if they were on scholarship and
fewer than 10 years have passed since they left school. Additionally, students must have been in
school for two years before leaving. Former student-athletes also must meet all the school’s
admissions and ﬁnancial aid requirements and must have exhausted all other funding options to
be eligible, as well as meet all NCAA academic requirements.
Reference 3 - 1.92% Coverage
The NCAA is establishing a fund for schools that are otherwise unable to provide ﬁnancial aid
for basketball players to return to school. The fund will be available to schools deﬁned as
limited-resource by the NCAA Division I Academic Performance Program.
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 1 reference coded [
7.80% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 7.80% Coverage
Changes to the investigations and infractions process create independent groups to prevent
conﬂicts of interest. Cases deemed complex will be eligible for this independent process.
Examples of complex cases include alleged violations of core NCAA values, such as prioritizing
academics and the well-being of studentathletes; the possibility of major penalties; or adversarial
behavior. Multiple parties will be able to request a case be deemed complex: school
representatives, NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions members or NCAA enforcement
staff.
Files\\Reforms5 - Stronger Accountability, Penalties - § 1 reference coded [ 12.08% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 12.08% Coverage
University presidents and chancellors will be personally accountable for their athletics program
following the rules. Presidents and chancellors join all athletics staff members in afﬁrming the
athletics program meets obligations for monitoring rules compliance, which is required to be
eligible for the postseason. Also, schools are required to cooperate fully during NCAA
investigations and take appropriate corrective action.
Avoidance
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 3 references coded [ 5.96% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 1.38% Coverage
The relationship of the NCAA national ofﬁce, member institutions, student-athletes and coaches
with outside entities, including:
Reference 2 - 2.34% Coverage
Apparel companies and other commercial entities, to establish an environment where they can
support programs in a transparent way but not become an inappropriate or distorting inﬂuence on
the game, recruits or their families.
Reference 3 - 2.24% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 15 references
coded [ 11.28% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.41% Coverage
The Commission found that talking to the stakeholders was, at times, like watching a circular
firing squad – the problem, the issue, and ultimately the fault was always that of someone else.
Reference 2 - 1.08% Coverage
First, we must separate the collegiate track from the professional track by ending oneand-done.
We call on the NBA and the NBPA, who exclusively have the power here, to once again make
18-year-olds eligible for the NBA draft so that high school players who are drafted may proceed
directly to the NBA. Should the NBA and NBPA decide not to do so – the Commission will
reconvene and consider other measures, including freshman ineligibility and/or the “lock-up” of
scholarships for a specified period of time.
Reference 3 - 0.65% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their professional prospects.
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should deprive studentathletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue in college while playing
basketball.
Reference 4 - 0.95% Coverage
We can’t, however, do this alone. The NBA and NBPA must act in order to make this
recommendation work. Players today who enter the draft and are not drafted are free agents
under the NBA’s current rules and can sign with an NBA team at any time. The Commission is
now requesting that the NBA and NBPA agree that players who are not drafted, and then return
to school, lose their eligibility to play in the NBA until they re-enter through the next draft.
Reference 5 - 0.24% Coverage
again call on the NBPA to work with the NCAA to report to each other agents’ violations of their
respective rules.
Reference 6 - 1.05% Coverage
I want to take a moment to address the issue of allowing student athletes to earn some financial

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

100

benefit from the marketing of their name, image, and likeness. I know this is an issue on the
minds of many, and the Commission thought long and hard about this. In the end, we respected
the fact that the legal ramifications of NCAA action on name, image, and likeness are currently
before the courts. We don’t believe that the NCAA can legislate in this area until the legal
parameters become clearer.
Reference 7 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Reference 8 - 0.71% Coverage
The NCAA must have jurisdiction to address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent that it
affects student-athletes’ eligibility. Member institutions can no longer be permitted to defend a
fraud or misconduct case on the ground that all students, not just athletes, were permitted to
“benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Reference 9 - 0.50% Coverage
The corruption we observed in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. Put frankly,
youth basketball in this country is ungoverned space. There are good programs – but there are
too many that condone illicit behavior.
Reference 10 - 0.78% Coverage
The Commission recommends the NCAA take short and long-term actions to reform
nonscholastic basketball and disassociate itself and its member institutions from the aspects of
non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical behavior cannot be assured. We believe
non-scholastic basketball must be reformed by making its finances transparent.
Reference 11 - 0.50% Coverage
Turning to the apparel companies, it is time that the money flowing from apparel companies and
other third parties into non-scholastic basketball be disclosed and accounted for in order to
address the corruption we see in the sport.
Reference 12 - 1.02% Coverage
The Commission today calls on the apparel companies to significantly increase their
transparency and accountability efforts. These are public companies. It appears to us, however,
that apparel companies may not have effective controls in place for their spending in nonscholastic basketball. These public companies should be concerned about how their money is
being used. I have served on quite a few public boards, and I can tell you, this should be an area
of concern.
Reference 13 - 0.69% Coverage
Today the Commission is sending letters to the boards of directors of the major apparel
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companies calling on their boards to publicly support and implement financial transparency and
accountability for all of their employees – and those who seek to act on behalf of the apparel
companies in non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 14 - 0.45% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that, with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to establish and administer
new youth basketball programs.
Reference 15 - 0.80% Coverage
When those institutions and those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and
norms in order to achieve on-court success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these
individuals hide behind “Indianapolis” when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded
state of intercollegiate athletics, in general, and college basketball in particular.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 100 references coded [ 17.81% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage
We the commissioners believe that this is a final opportunity to turn the course of college
basketball in the right direction. Every stakeholder will have to accept responsibility for what has
happened in the past and commit to a new future if we are to succeed.
Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage
Future stars and their families know their value – and can be tempted to monetize their worth as
soon as possible since they will not be compensated in college. Some agents, summer coaches
and other third parties act as intermediaries and facilitators. In other words, the environment
surrounding college basketball is a toxic mix of perverse incentives to cheat.
Reference 3 - 0.16% Coverage
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement functions were designed for a simpler time, when
rule violations did not put so much at stake. As a result, the NCAA, as an enforcement entity, has
little credibility with the public and its members, and what it has continues to dwindle. There are
multiple cases of compromised academic standards and institutional integrity to keep the money
and talent flowing. The NCAA and its member institutions have been unable to adequately deter
or punish bad behavior.
Reference 4 - 0.08% Coverage
goal should not be to turn college basketball into another professional league. Rather, we must
change fundamentally the current culture and rules to address the effect that money has had on
college basketball, the NCAA and its member institutions.
Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission calls on the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National
Basketball Players Association (NBPA) again to make 18-year-olds eligible for the NBA draft,
so that high school players who are drafted may proceed to the NBA.
Reference 6 - 0.04% Coverage
The NCAA lacks the legal power to change one-and-done on its own; the power to make this
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change lies exclusively with the NBA and the NBPA.
Reference 7 - 0.13% Coverage
The one-and-done regime may have provided some benefits for the NBA and the NCAA in the
past, but all stakeholders agree that the downsides now outweigh any benefits. One-and-done has
played a significant role in corrupting and destabilizing college basketball, restricting the
freedom of choice of players, and undermining the relationship of college basketball to the
mission of higher education.
Reference 8 - 0.15% Coverage
Elite high school players with NBA prospects and no interest in a college degree should not be
“forced” to attend college, often for less than a year. These uniquely talented players are the
focus of agents, apparel companies, investment advisors, college coaches and others seeking to
profit from their skills and offering them cash and other benefits in hope of future gain. If they
are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the collegiate model will be reduced.
Reference 9 - 0.06% Coverage
Moreover, the recent commitment of the NBA to improve the G League may enhance its appeal
as a professional option for elite players who are 18 and do not wish to attend college.
Reference 10 - 0.12% Coverage
We fear that, should the NBA and the NBPA make 18 the minimum age for entry into the NBA,
the growing trend of reclassification will accelerate, creating a new generation of 17-year-old
one-and-done players. The Commission urges the NCAA to monitor this situation and to enact
appropriate rule changes if that potential abuse occurs with the end of one-and-done.
Reference 11 - 0.06% Coverage
We must emphasize that only the NBA and the NBPA can change the one-anddone rule. If they choose not to do so by the end of 2018, the NCAA must still find a way to
address this situation.
Reference 12 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission also recommends imposing two additional conditions on this retention of
eligibility: The player must return to the same school, and the player must request an evaluation
from the NBA’s Undergraduate Advisory Committee before entering the draft. The NBA has
unique credibility with elite players who should have the benefit of the NBA evaluation in
deciding whether to enter the draft.
Reference 13 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission again seeks assistance from the NBA and NBPA to make this
recommendation work. Players who enter the draft and are not drafted are free agents under the
NBA’s current rules, and can sign with an NBA team at any time. To avoid this outcome, the
Commission requests that the NBA and NBPA agree that players who are not drafted, and then
return to school, lose their eligibility to play in the NBA until they re-enter through the next
draft.
Reference 14 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA incentivize better behavior
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from agents. This can be done through making clear the benefits of certification and the cost of
the loss of certification. An agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation must lose his or
her certification.
Reference 15 - 0.10% Coverage
The NCAA is frequently criticized for not permitting payment to student-athletes,
on the ground that these young people are engaged in an activity that generates billions of dollars
and yet they do not benefit. The debate is longstanding; views are entrenched; and both sides
make important points.
Reference 16 - 0.32% Coverage
The Commission is familiar with the related debate about whether studentathletes should earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, images and
likenesses (NIL). Many argue that allowing these payments would be analogous to the receipt of
funds by collegiate Olympians and thus consistent with the collegiate model, particularly if
students did not receive the funds until after college. The NCAA is a defendant in litigation
involving such payments, which appears to raise fundamental questions about whether these and
similar payments are consistent with the collegiate model. The court stated that “[t]he difference
between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums
untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed,
we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon
v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
Reference 17 - 0.14% Coverage
If a college or university is using a student-athlete’s NIL for commercial purposes, the school
must ask that student-athlete for consent, which must be voluntarily given. See also NCAA
Bylaw 12.5 (Promotional Activities) (describing permissible and nonpermissible uses). When the
legal parameters relevant to this issue are clearer,12
the
Commission also believes that the NCAA should reconsider its treatment of studentathletes’
NIL.
Reference 18 - 0.17% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual
accountability for rules violations for coaches, athletic directors and college presidents. The
NCAA must amend its rules to require colleges to include in contracts with administrators and
coaches individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including
financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA enforcement proceedings,
decisions and discipline, up to and including discharge.
Reference 19 - 0.08% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA
Reference 20 - 0.11% Coverage
Coaches are the public focus of blame for NCAA violations. For too long, college
presidents and administrators have not been viewed as accountable for the conduct of their
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athletic programs. That will have to change. College presidents and highlevel administrators
cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the infractions in those programs.
Reference 21 - 0.26% Coverage
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
Reference 22 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 23 - 0.34% Coverage
In the near term, the Commission recommends that the NCAA promptly adopt
and enforce rigorous criteria for certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches
attend. In order for the NCAA to certify a non-scholastic basketball event, the owners, event
operators, sponsors, and coaches for the event must agree to financial transparency about all
events they run, including those that are not certified by the NCAA. This requirement includes
agreement (i) to be subject to audit and to provide all required IRS and other tax filings upon
request; (ii) to disclose all sources of financing and other payments and the recipients of all funds
provided for or collected in relation to the event; and (iii) to disclose any financial relationship
between the event sponsors and coaches with any administrator, coach or booster at any NCAA
school. The money flowing from apparel companies and other third parties into non-scholastic
basketball must be disclosed and accounted for, in order to address the corruption arising from
non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 24 - 0.30% Coverage
Currently, non-scholastic basketball is an ungoverned space with coaches, players and their
families, agents and sponsors exchanging money and goods in the hope of future benefits and
without accountability. Of particular importance to the Commission are the cases in which nonscholastic basketball event operators and coaches seek benefits from colleges and college
coaches in exchange for influencing their players’ college choices. To recruit effectively, many
NCAA coaches need to attend non-scholastic basketball events in which large numbers of elite
players participate. In turn, these events, leagues and teams attract high school players by giving
them the opportunity to be seen and evaluated annually by college coaches. Thus, using its
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certification requirement, the NCAA has some leverage to impose the financial transparency
requirements and other reforms that the Commission recommends above.
Reference 25 - 0.23% Coverage
It appears, however, that they do not have effective controls in place in their spending in nonscholastic basketball. The Commission calls on the boards of these companies to publicly
support and implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own
investments in non-scholastic basketball. Particularly in light of the facts uncovered in the recent
FBI investigation, these public companies should be concerned about how their money is used in
non-scholastic basketball. We expect that these companies will insist that all employees provide
detailed accountability about such expenditures and cooperate with new NCAA rules about
financial transparency and accountability.
Reference 26 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 27 - 0.22% Coverage
In sum, the NCAA and NCAA coaches may no longer associate with nonscholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. Moreover, in light of the recommendation that players be
permitted to choose a professional pathway at an earlier time, the NCAA and others should
devote significant resources to earlier development, including education, for players in youth
basketball. The corruption we observe in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. The
reforms recommended by the Commission will be fruitless unless the NCAA gives serious
attention to regulating summer programs.
Reference 28 - 0.28% Coverage
The NCAA has often failed to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). But, the NCAA is
not really Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions. When those institutions and
those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and norms in order to achieve oncourt success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these individuals hide behind the NCAA
when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded state of intercollegiate athletics, in
general, and college basketball in particular. The Commission makes these recommendations to
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support fulfillment of the NCAA’s purposes and to impose accountability on institutions and
individuals undermining their achievement.
Reference 29 - 0.27% Coverage
On September 26, 2017, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York announced the arrest of ten persons for involvement in fraud and
corruption schemes related to college basketball – four NCAA Division I college basketball
coaches, the head of Global Sports Marketing – Basketball and two individuals affiliated with a
major athletic apparel company, and three athlete advisors. The first scheme involved allegations
that college coaches took cash payments from athlete advisors to steer players and their families
to the advisors making the payments. The second scheme involved allegations that a senior
executive at a sports apparel company worked with athlete advisors to funnel payments to highschool players and their families to obtain their commitment to attend universities sponsored by
the apparel company.
Reference 30 - 0.45% Coverage
After the announcement of these charges, the NCAA’s President, Mark Emmert, stated that it is
“very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so
quickly.” Statement from Pres. Mark Emmert, Oct. 11, 2017. He continued: “[w]hile I believe
the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the culture of silence in college basketball enables
bad actors, and we need them out of the game. We must take decisive action. This is not a time
for half-measures or incremental change.” As a first step, he announced that the NCAA Board of
Governors, the Division I Board of Directors and the NCAA President had established an
independent Commission on College Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. The
Commission was to “examin[e] critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working” and focus
on three areas:
•
The relationship between the NCAA national office, its members, their studentathletes and
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, nonscholastic basketball and athlete
agents and advisors.
•
The relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the challenging effect of the
NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one-and-done phenomenon in men’s college
basketball.
•
The creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and its national
office to promote transparency and accountability.
Reference 31 - 0.26% Coverage
Before going further, however, the Commission believes it is important to
confront the uncomfortable fact that the challenges identified in this report have been part of the
landscape of pre-professional basketball for many years, and that others have previously made
serious efforts to address them with only limited success. To be sure, these challenges have
become more prominent in the past decade as elite basketball – pre-college, in-college and postcollege – has become exponentially more lucrative. The fact remains, however, that today’s
issues have been around a long time, and their existence is widely acknowledged. Virtually all
stakeholders and others providing information to the Commission at some point uttered the
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discouraging phrase: “Everyone knows what’s been going on.”
Reference 32 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission now recommends that the NCAA seeks changes from other
organizations, such as the NBA and the NBPA, and that it make significant internal changes,
including fundamental changes to the process, rules and penalties related to compliance.
Reference 33 - 0.16% Coverage
However, the Commission recognizes that some humility is required in light of past failures and
the size of the challenge. Stakeholders do not agree about either the causes or the potential
solutions to the current challenges that face pre-professional basketball. The Commission
believes that these challenges will persist unless all stakeholders accept responsibility for the
credibility of the game, the reputations of the schools who field teams and the integrity of the
athletes who compete.
Reference 34 - 0.31% Coverage
Many who number among elite players while in high school believe and expect
that they will play professional basketball. See Executive Summary (ES) Section 1.B. Many third
parties – e.g., agents, apparel companies and other athlete advisors – see some high school
players’ potential for a professional career, and the potential for earnings for themselves, and are
willing to invest in a significant number of players in the hope that some will be drafted and
yield returns. Thus, the incentives for third parties to make improper payments to players and
others with influence over players exist beyond the small group of players who may be one-anddone, and extend into the slightly larger group of players who will play additional years of
college basketball before playing professionally. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that substantial
third-party attention, including financial attention, will focus on one-and-done players and a
relatively small additional group.
Reference 35 - 0.24% Coverage
For a subset of these players who have no intention of spending more than a year or two in
college or whose time is fully consumed by basketball, maintaining academic eligibility to play
may be a challenge. If that player is good enough, however, the school may be strongly
motivated to assist that student-athlete in maintaining his eligibility. This situation creates
another opening for corruption – the manipulation and dilution of academic standards by school
officials, along with other academic misconduct. A series of recent cases involve this
phenomenon. Other cases illustrate the lack of clarity about the NCAA’s rules and the likely
punishment for academic misconduct, as well as inconsistency in the NCAA’s application of the
rules
Reference 36 - 0.23% Coverage
The one-and-done phenomenon has provided some benefits to colleges and universities and to
elite high school basketball players. Schools achieve national notice and prominence with
athletic success and championships due to the presence of these players, with associated financial
and reputational benefits. As for players, many believe that they will have the opportunity to play
professional basketball if they can draw the attention of professional coaches and scouts. Playing
Division I men’s basketball allows players to make a name for themselves among professional
leagues and teams. Further, these players receive some of the educational and other benefits
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associated with a year in college.
Reference 37 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, many high school and collegiate student-athletes do not receive the
information and assistance they need to accurately determine whether and when to pursue
professional basketball.
Reference 38 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 39 - 0.14% Coverage
Stakeholders further suggested that the Commission consider whether the substantive content of
certain NCAA rules is contributing to the problems identified above. Stakeholders identified
numerous issues with the NCAA’s current rules governing eligibility, amateurism and recruiting.
As noted above, they also expressed the view that the consequences for rule violators were
insufficient in many instances and excessive in others.
Reference 40 - 0.24% Coverage
Still other stakeholders, including a number of agents, took the position that allowing agents to
have contact with high school students will result in even earlier agent involvement in studentathletes’ decision making, including their selection of a grassroots or non-scholastic basketball
coach, a high school, a college, etc. These stakeholders maintain that the barriers to entry for
professional agents should be higher (while recognizing that the NBPA has recently taken
important steps to improve the quality of the agent cadre), and that the penalties for agents who
violate NCAA rules should be higher (either through enforcement of state laws or through
reporting of violations to the NBPA or other unspecified rule changes).
Reference 41 - 0.16% Coverage
Recruiting. In the view of many Division I coaches, the NCAA rules hamstring college coaches
and allow non-scholastic coaches and other third parties to become the primary influences over
elite high school players. For example, Division I coaches have limited opportunities to evaluate
high school players in both scholastic and nonscholastic settings, and those players cannot
officially visit colleges and universities until late in their junior year. See generally NCAA
Division I Bylaws, Art. 13.
Reference 42 - 0.20% Coverage
Indeed, Division I coaches complain that they are dependent on non-scholastic coaches, leagues
and events for opportunities to view players, giving those third parties even more leverage over
high school players. In the interim, high school players are playing non-scholastic basketball
sponsored by apparel companies who provide those high school players with gear, travel and
experiences. Division I coaches seek to increase their direct contact with high school players at
critical junctures, and to limit their dependence on non-scholastic coaches, leagues and apparel
companies for access to high school players.
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Reference 43 - 0.17% Coverage
Currently, the NCAA “certifies” some non-scholastic or non-scholastic basketball
events and leagues. NCAA Division I Bylaws 13.18 (Basketball Event Certification); 17.31.4.1
(Summer Basketball Leagues). Coaches at NCAA member institutions can attend these summer
events only if the NCAA certifies them. Unfortunately, however, the requirements for NCAA
certification are minimal, to be generous; and some of the requirements are poorly implemented
while others are not enforced. Non-scholastic basketball is largely unregulated.
Reference 44 - 0.35% Coverage
While an elite basketball player is in high school, he will virtually always develop
a relationship with a non-scholastic basketball team and coach and with an apparel company –
most likely one of Nike, Adidas or Under Armour. Specifically, apparel companies sponsor elite
high school teams that participate in NCAA-certified and other events around the country,
including all-star games, camps, and other so-called elite experiences. In addition, Nike sponsors
the USA Basketball Men’s Developmental National Team. By funding non-scholastic basketball,
the apparel companies receive valuable input about their products, important exposure and
credibility through their products’ use, and an opportunity to form early relationships with future
college and professional athletes. In connection with participating in these events and
experiences, elite players (and their families) may receive luxury travel, gear and other benefits.
Sometimes the apparel companies pay the non-scholastic basketball coaches for working with
these teams and/or participating in their events.
Reference 45 - 0.18% Coverage
In addition to coaching, experience, gear and travel, these non-scholastic basketball teams and
events offer players exposure, including to Division I coaches. For example, Division I coaches
attend and recruit at the NCAA-certified events which are held in April and July each year.
Many summer coaches have ongoing relationships with Division I coaches. They can thus bring
“their” players to the attention of Division I coaches and potentially influence players to attend
particular schools, including schools where “their” apparel company is a sponsor.
Reference 46 - 0.25% Coverage
That said, virtually all stakeholders expressed the view that currently, nonscholastic basketball
lacks sufficient regulation, with detrimental effects on college basketball. For example,
significant money flows into summer ball from apparel companies, agents, investment advisers
and other sources, and there is little accountability or transparency about many of the sources and
expenditures of those funds. Many state that it is well known that student-athletes are paid –
either directly or indirectly (through family members or otherwise) – to play for particular
summer teams. Almost all elite basketball players participate in non-scholastic basketball. Thus,
as noted above, many players and their families are accustomed to being paid before they attend
college.
Reference 47 - 0.21% Coverage
Many stakeholders further observed that non-scholastic event operators and
coaches are sometimes paid to influence student-athletes on their teams to attend particular
schools or to work with particular agents and advisors. Players and their families often are not
aware of these relationships, and thus not aware that the coach has a financial interest in the
player’s decisions about school or representation. Further, college coaches seeking to recruit a
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player with a relationship to a non-scholastic basketball event operator or coach may have to pay
or provide benefits to that operator or coach to be successful in recruiting that player.
Reference 48 - 0.19% Coverage
Even putting non-scholastic basketball aside, an elite high school player will
develop relationships with a variety of other third parties who may affect his college eligibility
and career. Most notably, as already discussed, many of these players will have relationships
with agents, often through a “runner” for an agent who is hoping (and perhaps paying) to secure
the player as a future client. Sometimes a player’s family members have substantial influence
with the player; and they, too, may be paid by agents or other third parties hoping to develop
relationships with a future professional.
Reference 49 - 0.11% Coverage
The player will also be on a team associated with and loyal to a particular apparel company, and
be at the center of a web of other influences and loyalties beyond family and friends, often
including an agent. Of course, the college coach too may have a contract with an agent or apparel
company. This context makes college recruiting complex and challenging.
Reference 50 - 0.16% Coverage
In the context described above, however, a player may be strongly tempted to break NCAA rules
and enter into a relationship with an agent or attend a particular college in order to be paid.
Similarly, coaches and other college representatives may be strongly tempted to pay players,
family members and others who can influence players to attend particular schools. As illustrated
by the recent charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, this possibility is not merely
theoretical.
Reference 51 - 0.12% Coverage
This situation is exacerbated for elite players who have solid professional
prospects in the NBA, and thus potential future earnings in the tens or hundreds of millions.
Apparel companies and agents will be highly motivated to start paying a player (and those who
may influence the player) even before he attends college to develop as deep a relationship as
possible.
Reference 52 - 0.15% Coverage
Many of these incentives for third-party conduct are present not only when high school players
enter college, but also when college players consider transferring to another institution. As noted
above, roughly 40% of freshmen in Division I men’s basketball depart the institution they choose
to attend by the end of their sophomore year. Third parties influence many of these transfers. The
question of improper influence, accordingly, clearly extends to transfers.
Reference 53 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
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offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 54 - 0.18% Coverage
The Commission recognizes that Division I men’s college basketball is just one
part of a much larger ecosystem that includes Youth, High School, Non-Scholastic and
Professional Basketball. Stakeholders include student-athletes, parents and extended families,
coaches, trainers, agents and other advisers, apparel companies, colleges and universities,
professional leagues and players’ associations and others. In making its recommendations, the
Commission sought to take into account these other parts of the basketball ecosystem.
Reference 55 - 0.21% Coverage
The Commission concludes that requiring elite high school players whom the NBA would draft
to attend college contributes significantly to the corruption of college basketball and higher
educational institutions generally. Holding college players with professional prospects captive,
and depriving them of the opportunity to earn professional salaries, also fuels the firestorm of
complaints that the NCAA and its member institutions are exploiting college players. Only the
NBA and the NBPA can change this rule. Thus, the Commission calls on the NBA and the
NBPA promptly to negotiate NBA eligibility for players who are 18 years old.
Reference 56 - 0.31% Coverage
Before 2006, extraordinary high school graduates such as Kevin Garnett, Kobe
Bryant and LeBron James bypassed college and went directly to the NBA. Numerous other high
school players, however, were drafted and struggled. The NBA began to push for a minimum age
requirement – to provide teams with more time to evaluate developing young talent – and this
effort succeeded in 2006. Starting with the 2006 draft, elite basketball players graduating from
high school who are capable of playing in the NBA have not been eligible to do so because they
are not 19 years old. Thus, to complete at a high level, these players must either attend a Division
I school with a high quality basketball program or play professional basketball overseas. The
vast majority do not view the international professional option as viable and choose to attend
college. The Commission concludes that elite high school athletes should be able to choose a
professional pathway if one is available.
Reference 57 - 0.22% Coverage
In the Commission’s view, preventing young athletes capable of and preferring to
play in the NBA from doing so, and pushing them into enrolling in college for a single year (or
less), is doing more harm than good for college basketball and college. The potential earning
power of marquee college players who can win championships for their schools is an irresistible
draw for third-party attention and money, most notably from athlete advisors. Their gamechanging potential for a college team creates the strongest motivation for improper payments
from third parties and violations of NCAA rules by school administrators, coaches and other
persons associated with member institutions.
Reference 58 - 0.30% Coverage
negotiating the NBA, shoe and apparel, and other endorsement contracts of professional players.
Financial advisers earn significant commissions for investing professional players’ funds.
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Competition to sign potential professional players is cutthroat. Agents and other advisers seek to
enter into relationships with potential professionals when those players are in high school and in
college, and they do so by paying the players and those with influence over the players, including
family members and coaches, in violation of NCAA rules. Agents and other advisers also appear
to have (and many actually have) valuable information and access to opportunities, such as
coaching, training and exposure to college coaches. Agents and other advisers thus form early
relationships with potential professional players and their “influencers,” and players and their
“influencers” become accustomed to being paid.
Reference 59 - 0.11% Coverage
Eliminating one-and-done players from college basketball will remove the group
of most likely future professionals, and the associated potential for corrupt payments from
agents. Allowing collegiate players who become clear professional prospects to depart when they
choose to do so should similarly lessen the temptation to cheat while in college.
Reference 60 - 0.19% Coverage
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can also corrupt
the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special benefits to these
athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all students. Finally, the
matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short time primarily to play
Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain student-athletes will not, as a
practical matter, be college students.
Reference 61 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission is not naïve. It understands that implementation of this
recommendation will not eliminate the problems described above, most notably thirdparty
payments to athletes to attend particular colleges and the resulting potential for corruption of
collegiate programs.
Reference 62 - 0.20% Coverage
opportunity for individuals and significantly reduces the incentives for improper payments, and
is thus one important part of an overall effort to limit corruption in college basketball and to
support the collegiate model. The Commission recognizes that this change will be most effective
in combination with the other recommendations it is making, including reformed and improved
NCAA investigative and adjudicative processes, higher penalties for infractions, and new
requirements for financial transparency and accountability in member institutions’ athletic
programs and in non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 63 - 0.20% Coverage
If the NBA and the NBPA were to adopt the “baseball rule,” we believe that the
challenges created by the presence of one-and-done players would simply migrate to older future
NBA players unhappily captive in their second and third collegiate years. Holding players with
NBA opportunities hostage also feeds the narrative of collegiate player exploitation, putting
pressure on the NCAA’s commitment to the collegiate model. Players with professional earning
power should have the freedom to choose a professional path. The Commission believes that
student-athletes should be encouraged but not forced to remain in college.
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Reference 64 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is optimistic that the NBA and the NBPA will agree with its
assessment. If the NBA and the NBPA are unable to negotiate an end to one-and-done by the end
of 2018, however, the Commission will reconvene and reassess the viability of some of these
alternative tools. The current situation is unacceptable.
Reference 65 - 0.14% Coverage
We recognize that this regime has some downsides. Under current collectively
bargained rules, a player who declares for the draft, but is not drafted, is a free agent and may
sign with any NBA team at any time, including the middle of the next college season. To address
this problem, the Commission requests that the NBA and the NBPA agree that players who are
not drafted become ineligible for the NBA until they enter the draft again.
Reference 66 - 0.24% Coverage
In addition, if players remain in the draft until it occurs, college coaches will not know until June
which players are eligible for, or remain on, their rosters for the next season. However, the NBA
draft is two rounds and involves only 60 players. Data show that international players will take
approximately 40% of these slots. Thus, this uncertainty implicates very few players (around 36),
and we believe that college coaches are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to
accurately predict whether a young player is, in fact, likely to be drafted. Student-athletes may
make some decisions that cost them collegiate eligibility, but the Commission recommends that
these points of no return be modified in light of current realities.
Reference 67 - 0.28% Coverage
As stated above, both high school and college students misjudge – that is, over rate – their
chances of a professional basketball career. Very few high school players will play professional
basketball. Yet, many high school student-athletes believe they have professional prospects, and
they work hard in high school to maintain eligibility to play that one-and-done year in college.
The concern is that, with the end of one-and-done, misguided high school players will assume
that their NBA careers will start at 18 without a backup plan to attend college. College students,
too, misunderstand their prospects. In addition, the families of players lack objective, credible
sources of information about the professional and collegiate paths. All of these students need
timely, reliable and trusted sources of information about their likelihood of professional success.
Reference 68 - 0.11% Coverage
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with agents,
sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA should bring these
conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their prospects with agents whom it
certifies under NCAA-approved standards.
Reference 69 - 0.24% Coverage
The Commission understands that contact with agents can lead to illicit payments and other rule
violations. It thus recommends serious consequences for NCAAcertified agents who participate
in violations of NCAA rules. For example, such agents should lose their NCAA certification and
be barred from non-scholastic basketball events certified by the NCAA (see Section 3, infra). In
addition, agents who the NCAA decertifies may not pass along representation of their studentathlete clients to other agents at the same agency. Such agents should also be reported to the

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

114

NBPA. Finally, a student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter
into an agreement, with a non-certified agent should lose his eligibility.
Reference 70 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that the NCAA work with the NBA and the
NBPA to establish additional venues for representatives of those entities to meet with collegiate
players and provide information about professional status and opportunities. The NBA and the
NBPA have unique credibility with collegiate athletes. Players would make more informed
choices about college if they had additional opportunities to hear from the NBA and its players.
Reference 71 - 0.32% Coverage
The Commission has already expressed its view that student-athletes receive valuable benefits by
pursuing a degree and participating in intercollegiate sports. In addition to the economic benefits
detailed above, college sports is a valuable part of a college education, as illustrated by numerous
student-athletes who study, train and compete with no thought or possibility of “going pro.” But
the Commission shares the concerns of those who believe that the athletes generating these
billions in revenues for NCAA colleges and universities and their coaches and administrators
often are not receiving the benefit of the college education that they are promised. This problem
is compounded when players with professional options are not permitted to leave college and
play professionally. The Commission likewise believes that the large sums of money and the
prestige that accompany college basketball championships can corrupt colleges’ admission
standards, academic offerings and integrity.
Reference 72 - 0.13% Coverage
Finally, the Commission is also aware of many voices suggesting that allowing student athletes
to earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, image and likenesses (NIL) is
consistent with the collegiate model, particularly if students do not receive those funds until after
college. Notably, the NCAA is a defendant in litigation involving the NCAA’s refusal to allow
students to do so.
Reference 73 - 0.12% Coverage
The court stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is
a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
Reference 74 - 0.13% Coverage
A number of members of the Commission were drawn to the idea of reforms
in this arena. However, given the lack of legal clarity on this matter, the Commission was
concerned about the unintended consequences of such changes. See ES Section 1.D. The
Commission recommends that if the legal context changes or clarifies, the NCAA should remain
open to rule changes addressing student-athletes and NIL.
Reference 75 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
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the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 76 - 0.05% Coverage
Colleges with comprehensive, effective compliance programs should see their penalties
mitigated; those without such programs may see their penalties enhanced.
Reference 77 - 0.10% Coverage
In its current enforcement structure, the NCAA addresses individuals who participate in rules
violations through punishments imposed on member institutions. The Commission recommends
a significant expansion in individual accountability for rules violations for presidents,
administrators and coaches:
Reference 78 - 0.09% Coverage
As noted, the NCAA must require member institutions’ contracts with their coaches, athletic
directors and other administrators associated with the athletic department to provide that these
individuals must cooperate with NCAA investigations and enforcement proceedings.
Reference 79 - 0.07% Coverage
The NCAA must require member institutions’ contracts with these individuals to include
agreement to be subject to NCAA enforcement investigations and infractions decisions and
discipline, up to and including discharge.
Reference 80 - 0.10% Coverage
certify annually that they have conducted due diligence and that their athletic programs comply
with NCAA rules. The NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals
if they knew or should have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including
termination.
Reference 81 - 0.19% Coverage
The NCAA is certainly not blameless for its failure to address the corruption in college
basketball that led to the recent prosecutions, but the primary failures belong to the individuals at
colleges and universities who allowed their programs to be corrupted, averting their eyes to keep
the money flowing. With enhanced individual accountability, the Commission believes that more
college presidents and athletic directors will find it beneficial to adopt and enforce
comprehensive compliance programs. See also NCAA Constitution 2.1 (Principle of Institutional
Control and Responsibility).
Reference 82 - 0.34% Coverage
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified non-
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scholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 83 - 0.25% Coverage
Finally, the Commission is aware of the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“RUAAA”)
developed by the Uniform Law Commission, in response to an NCAA request that state law
address agents’ provision of cash and other economic benefits to studentathletes. Forty-two
states, DC, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act and eight have adopted the RUAAA. The Uniform Law Commission provided useful input
to the Commission and sought its support in encouraging states to adopt the RUAAA.
Unfortunately, while a number of states have enacted state laws regulating sports agents, the
Commission is not aware of any significant number of enforcement actions. The Commission
encourages States to both enact and enforce state laws regulating sports agents.
Reference 84 - 0.06% Coverage
However, the Commission also heard from many that because non-scholastic basketball is
unregulated, some teams, events and tournaments have damaging consequences for college
basketball.
Reference 85 - 0.05% Coverage
At the elite levels, apparel companies, agents and other sponsors finance leagues, events and
teams, without accounting for the expenditure of the funds.
Reference 86 - 0.26% Coverage
The Commission spoke with several apparel companies that sponsor substantial non-scholastic
basketball events and leagues as part of their community partnerships and brand marketing. It did
not appear to the Commission that any of these entities carefully followed the money or sought a
complete understanding of the financial arrangements of the event operators and coaches of nonscholastic basketball for elite players. The Commission learned that non-scholastic basketball
event operators and coaches steer elite players to the agents and advisors who pay them or
otherwise provide “favors,” and to the collegiate programs with which they develop
relationships. In turn, players (and those who influence them) may be paid or receive excessive
travel and other benefits to select particular teams or leagues.
Reference 87 - 0.10% Coverage
More specifically, while NCAA coaches are forbidden to attend non-scholastic basketball events
not certified by the NCAA, the NCAA’s current criteria for certification are plainly insufficient.
The new criteria for certification must include detailed requirements for financial transparency.
Reference 88 - 0.15% Coverage
The Commission notes that during its meetings with representatives of
several apparel companies with high profiles in professional and college basketball, all expressed
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a commitment to a culture of compliance at their companies. This commitment included respect
for and adherence to NCAA rules and a willingness to be transparent about their relationships
with college coaches and professional agents and about their expenditures in non-scholastic
basketball.
Reference 89 - 0.25% Coverage
While these statements were welcome, the Commission does not believe that
the apparel companies have always delivered on this promise. In fact, it was difficult to ascertain
how closely these companies track funding for non-scholastic basketball and associated
activities. The Commission will formally ask the boards and leadership in these companies to
make a commitment to transparency and accountability for the expenditure of company funds in
college and non-scholastic basketball, particularly in light of the recent indictments in the
Southern District of New York. Indeed, the Commission looks forward to statements but more
importantly actions by these public companies that demonstrate their commitment to integrity
and accountability in this space.
Reference 90 - 0.44% Coverage
In this section, the Commission recommends significant changes to the resources
and programs available for the development of young, pre-collegiate players, ideally by the
summer of 2019. Allowing players to enter the professional ranks earlier brings with it the
responsibility to provide appropriate resources for earlier development. We acknowledge that
institutional influence—by USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA and the NBPA—has been
largely missing in this space for the past 20 years and that nonscholastic basketball has been
largely ungoverned. We strongly recommend that the named institutions lend their expertise and,
wherever possible, work together to provide an alternative to the individual and corporate
influences which currently dominate precollegiate youth basketball particularly in the summer.
In the Commission’s view, the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA all have
significant institutional interests in developing prominent roles in non-scholastic basketball,
particularly in the areas of player identification, development and evaluation. There is a great
deal of work to be done in the development of pre-collegiate players, and the three institutions
should also welcome partners and sponsors willing to work within the standards, disciplines, and
accountability these institutions will bring to youth development.
Reference 91 - 0.10% Coverage
It is important to note that the Commission believes developing players at each
level will require a collaboration among USA Basketball, the NCAA, the NBA and the NBPA.
The absence of any one of these stakeholders in the youth development space will exacerbate the
current problems with recruiting and development.
Reference 92 - 0.09% Coverage
While the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA should work out the details, the
Commission believes that there is a role for each organization to play at each of the three
Levels—although the degree to which each organization takes a leadership role should naturally
vary by level.
Reference 93 - 0.27% Coverage
Player identification. USA Basketball will be primarily responsible for the identification of those
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players with the highest potential for Level 1 (Junior National Teams). The NCAA will be
primarily responsible for identification of those players with the highest potential for Levels 2
and 3. The Commission understands that college coaches annually identify the prospects they
seek to recruit using electronic databases and recruiting services. Based on these systems, players
can be assigned to an appropriate level based on the interest shown in them. As a further step to
ensure that players are properly identified, the Commission recommends that USA Basketball,
the NCAA, and the NBA and NBPA establish a “collaborative advisory group” to annually
review and validate the player identification and player evaluation processes.
Reference 94 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that events organized and implemented under this youth
development initiative be required to adhere to USA Basketball licensing requirements for
coaches and the October 2016 Youth Development Guidelines for safe play published by the
USA Basketball and the NBA.
Reference 95 - 0.14% Coverage
Player evaluation. The most important outcome of player evaluation is a realistic assessment of a
player’s potential. The Commission recommends that a “collaborative advisory group” among
the NCAA, USA Basketball and the NBA and NBPA be established to provide a realistic
assessment of professional potential to players in Levels 1 and 2. Importantly, the Commission
believes these evaluations must be transparent and accessible.
Reference 96 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that working with USA Basketball, the NBA,
the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA, as appropriate, the NCAA also consider creating
analogous programs and initiatives for the development of young women basketball players for
the collegiate and professional levels.
Reference 97 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 98 - 0.14% Coverage
Finally, to establish additional points of interaction between college coaches and studentathletes, the Commission supports the recommendation that video operators and other “staff’ be
permitted to coach their teams. The Commission was informed that NCAA schools are not doing
enough to develop the next generation of coaches; in any event, this restriction sets artificial
limits on relationships between coaching staffs and team members.
Reference 99 - 0.03% Coverage
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Some call
for action by third parties, such as the NBA, the NBPA, apparel companies and member
institutions.
Reference 100 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\CCB4 - Recruiting and College Choice Study - § 4 references coded [ 2.58% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.56% Coverage
Elite players are more likely to have played on an AAU team affiliated with an apparel company
(84%, versus 56% for non-elite players).
Reference 2 - 0.70% Coverage
Student-athletes who played on an AAU/Club team affiliated with Adidas or Nike are slightly
more likely to play on college teams sponsored by the same apparel company.
Reference 3 - 0.70% Coverage
AAU/Club Adidas and Nike athletes are slightly more likely to play on college teams sponsored
by the same apparel company (statistically significant at p<.05 level).
Reference 4 - 0.62% Coverage
Under half of the sample reported having access to accurate information about their chances of
playing professionally (43% non-elite, 52% elite).
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 1 reference coded [
1.61% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.61% Coverage
He closed by challenging the NCAA’s colleges and universities to take ownership of the issues
regardless of whether they feel responsible for them and to turn the resolve demonstrated by the
Commission on College Basketball into their own resolve.
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 11 references
coded [ 14.82% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.56% Coverage
The Board of Governors will begin to implement Association-wide actions and Division I
members now will begin the task of applying the recommendations to Division I rules, policy
and structure.
Reference 2 - 0.30% Coverage
Change will not end with NCAA actions.
Reference 3 - 1.65% Coverage
The NCAA will work with other organizations – including USA Basketball, apparel companies,
the NBA and the NBPA – to make meaningful and lasting changes that will support the
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commission’s recommendations.
Reference 4 - 1.04% Coverage
This is about more than basketball. This is about the culture and future of college sports. We all
will work together to get it right.
Reference 5 - 0.75% Coverage
End One-and-Done. Separate the collegiate track from professional by ending one-and-done.
Reference 6 - 1.23% Coverage
Section 2: Establish Professional Neutral Investigation and Adjudication of Serious Infractions
and Hold Institutions and Individuals Accountable
Reference 7 - 1.77% Coverage
NCAA to amend rules to require colleges to include in contracts with administrators and
coaches’ contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA investigations and agree to submission
to NCAA enforcement proceedings.
Reference 8 - 1.08% Coverage
Require coaches, athletic directors and college presidents to certify annually that their athletic
programs comply with NCAA rules.
Reference 9 - 0.75% Coverage
Section 3: Mitigating Non-Scholastic Basketball’s Harmful Inﬂuence on College Basketball
Reference 10 - 1.89% Coverage
In Cooperation with Partners, Establish NCAA Youth Basketball Programs. With a goal of 2019,
we recommend that the NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others
to establish and administer new youth basketball programs.
Reference 11 - 2.79% Coverage
Enact Changes in Rules Governing Recruiting and Coaches’ Interaction with Recruits and
Student-Athletes. Reduce the inﬂuence of third parties and increase the ability of college coaches
to interact with recruits and current players. We endorse adoption of a number of rule changes
recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches.
Files\\NCAA4 - NCAA Statement from Mark Emmert on Federal Investigation - § 1 reference
coded [ 2.00% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage
We learned of these charges this morning
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 2 references coded [ 5.54% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.50% Coverage
Minimize the leverage of outside inﬂuences on high school recruits and college athletes.
Reference 2 - 4.03% Coverage
Change doesn’t end here. We will continue to work in all of these areas and continue to pursue
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collaboration with outside organizations, including the NBA, the National Basketball Players
Association, apparel companies and USA Basketball.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 5 references coded [ 9.78% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.99% Coverage
The recent news of a federal investigation into fraud in college basketball
Reference 2 - 1.58% Coverage
The relationship of the NCAA national ofﬁce, member institutions, student-athletes and coaches
with outside entities
Reference 3 - 2.99% Coverage
Apparel companies and other commercial entities, to establish an environment where they can
support programs in a transparent way, but not become an inappropriate or distorting inﬂuence
on the game, recruits or their families.
Reference 4 - 1.35% Coverage
Nonscholastic basketball, with a focus on the appropriate involvement of college coaches and
others.
Reference 5 - 2.87% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA, and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 2 references coded [
4.19% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.41% Coverage
Depending upon future action by the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association to
permit high school students to enter the draft, high school basketball players can be represented
by an agent beginning July 1 before their senior year in high school, provided they have been
identiﬁed as an elite senior prospect.
Reference 2 - 1.78% Coverage
This change is effective if/when the NBA and NBPA make an expected rule change, which
would make undrafted student-athletes who return to college after the draft ineligible for the
NBA until the end of the next college basketball season.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 3 references coded [ 14.85%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.50% Coverage
New rules reduce the leverage of harmful outside inﬂuences on high school recruits and college
studentathletes.
Reference 2 - 6.46% Coverage
Basketball-related events for high school students will be subject to more rigorous certiﬁcation
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requirements to ensure transparency in operations and ﬁnances. This will address issues of
corruption and help support student-athletes as they make decisions about their future. The
certiﬁcation criteria will be overseen by the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Oversight
Committee, and the NCAA Enforcement Certiﬁcation and Approvals Group will administer the
certiﬁcation program.
Reference 3 - 6.88% Coverage
The NCAA is pursuing agreements with apparel companies on expectations for accountability
and transparency regarding their involvement in youth basketball. The NCAA Board of
Governors seeks to develop agreements that require apparel companies to make annual
disclosures, obtain NCAA certiﬁcation for all youth basketball activities and report potential
NCAA rule violations. Additionally, parties should formalize relationships in areas where
interests overlap, such as playing rules and equipment standards.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 1 reference coded [ 2.96%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.96% Coverage
As a term of employment, school presidents and athletics staff must commit contractually to full
cooperation in the investigations and infractions process.
Files\\Reforms5 - Stronger Accountability, Penalties - § 1 reference coded [ 12.08% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 12.08% Coverage
University presidents and chancellors will be personally accountable for their athletics program
following the rules. Presidents and chancellors join all athletics staff members in afﬁrming the
athletics program meets obligations for monitoring rules compliance, which is required to be
eligible for the postseason. Also, schools are required to cooperate fully during NCAA
investigations and take appropriate corrective action.
Credibility
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 1 reference coded [ 0.98% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.98% Coverage
Composition. The Commission on College Basketball will be composed of the following
members:
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 16 references
coded [ 12.21% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.82% Coverage
This morning, the independent Commission on College Basketball led by Dr. Condoleezza Rice
presented its recommendations to address the issues facing men’s collegiate basketball. Dr. Rice
and members of the Commission presented their findings to the NCAA’s Board of Governors,
Division I Board and Presidential Forum, and Division II and III Presidents’ Councils of the
NCAA.
Reference 2 - 0.79% Coverage
Established by the NCAA Board of Governors, the Division I Board of Directors, and the NCAA
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President in October 2017, the Commission was tasked with assessing the state of the enterprise
and recommending transformational changes to address multiple issues and challenges facing
men’s college basketball. Commission members include the following individuals:
Reference 3 - 0.42% Coverage
The Commission has made a number of recommendations that are intended to revive and
strengthen the collegiate model and give young men the opportunity to pursue both athletic and
academic success.
Reference 4 - 0.96% Coverage
It has been a pleasure to work with the members of this Commission, and I want to thank each of
you for your fine service. I can tell you that the hours and hours of work and travel have been,
for all of us, a labor of love. Each and every one of us loves the game. We love the dedication
and the effort of the young men who play it. We marvel at their talents and skill – their
perseverance and their commitment. We believe in the educational value of college sports.
Reference 5 - 1.08% Coverage
The members of this commission come from a wide variety of backgrounds. Some among us
played the game at the highest levels; others coached or led programs; others come from the
realm of public service; and some of us are educators --- dedicated to teaching and learning as a
way of life. That is why it has been painful for us to hear the testimony from multiple
constituencies stating that the trust that is intercollegiate athletics in general – and college
basketball in particular – has often been violated.
Reference 6 - 0.79% Coverage
Given that only 1.2% of college basketball players go on to play in the NBA and that the average
NBA career is 4.5 years – the college degree is the real ticket to financial security for most
student-athletes. For the exceptionally talented – a professional track may be the best choice –
and the choice is always there for those who are fortunate enough to succeed in the NBA.
Reference 7 - 0.72% Coverage
Our recommendations are detailed because the problems in college basketball are complex and
the resolution of them requires precise remedies. This Commission has worked hard to devise
these recommendations. You can be sure that we will continue to be involved as key regulatory
bodies undertake their work to implement these changes.
Reference 8 - 0.89% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA and its member institutions develop strict standards for
certifying agents and allow only those NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at
an appropriate point in their high school careers as determined by the NCAA. The NCAA should
appoint a Vice-President level executive who, among other responsibilities, would develop these
standards and administer this program.
Reference 9 - 0.23% Coverage
The Commission also believes in the provision of resources to make the promise of a college
education real.
Reference 10 - 1.47% Coverage
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That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Reference 11 - 1.25% Coverage
First, the NCAA should create independent investigative and adjudicative arms to address and
resolve complex and serious cases involving violation of NCAA rules. As of now, volunteers
who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions resolve these cases, and during our
Commission testimony not a single stakeholder supported the current system for handling highstakes infractions. Today’s current state where an entire community knows of significant rule
breaking and yet the governance body lacks the power or will to investigate and act breeds
cynicism and contempt.
Reference 12 - 0.90% Coverage
To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement and resolution of high stakes
cases must be placed in the hands of independent professionals. A panel of professional
adjudicators, appointed for a term of years, must make final and binding decisions and must have
the authority to impose substantial punishments, including the loss of post-season play and the
revenues from post-season play.
Reference 13 - 0.50% Coverage
The corruption we observed in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. Put frankly,
youth basketball in this country is ungoverned space. There are good programs – but there are
too many that condone illicit behavior.
Reference 14 - 0.69% Coverage
Today the Commission is sending letters to the boards of directors of the major apparel
companies calling on their boards to publicly support and implement financial transparency and
accountability for all of their employees – and those who seek to act on behalf of the apparel
companies in non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 15 - 0.45% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that, with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to establish and administer
new youth basketball programs.
Reference 16 - 0.25% Coverage
The people who can truly solve these problems are right here in this room. And we, as a
Commission, call upon you to do so.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 129 references coded [ 22.85% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage
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The Independent Commission on College Basketball was established on October 11, 2017, to
assess the state of the enterprise and to recommend transformational changes to address multiple
issues and challenges.
Reference 2 - 0.08% Coverage
We the commissioners believe that this is a final opportunity to turn the course of college
basketball in the right direction. Every stakeholder will have to accept responsibility for what has
happened in the past and commit to a new future if we are to succeed.
Reference 3 - 0.05% Coverage
The lifetime financial benefit of a baccalaureate degree can approach $1 million, and can change
the recipient’s family for generations. See Section 1.D.
Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage
There is debate about how to measure the graduation rate for college students, including studentathletes. There is, however, general agreement that the graduation rate for men’s Division I
basketball players lags behind that of other student-athletes, perhaps significantly.1
NCAA schools must take seriously
the obligation to help all student-athletes obtain the education they are promised.
Reference 5 - 0.15% Coverage
To this end, the Commission makes a number of recommendations set forth
below. To ensure that we take advantage of the current momentum for change, the Commission
further calls on the NCAA to draw up its plan to implement the Commission’s recommendations,
including draft legislation, by early August 2018. The Commission will promptly reconvene and
review the NCAA’s plans to provide its input for the NCAA’s concrete measures to renew
college basketball.
Reference 6 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s and
NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make student-athletes who
attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years.
Reference 7 - 0.19% Coverage
requiring students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their
education, the baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn
degrees. However, it would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against
their will, where they will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the
undermining of the collegiate model. Players with professional earning power should be able to
choose a professional path. The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier
for them to return and complete their degrees.
Reference 8 - 0.09% Coverage
Yet, an NCAA Survey we commissioned showed that 59% of Division I players believe that they
will play professionally,3
and NCAA research suggests that 76% of Division I
players, 48% of Division II players and 21% of Division III players believe that they have a
chance to play at the next level.4
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Reference 9 - 0.12% Coverage
A player chagrined to discover that he lacks an NBA future may grow into his collegiate
experience and adopt a different plan for the future. This change, along with several others
recommended, will demonstrate that the NCAA is serious about the value and importance of
college for student-athletes, and committed to helping them attend and work towards a degree.
Reference 10 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission also discussed the graduate transfer rule. The NCAA enacted the rule in 2006
to assist academically high-achieving students who had graduated from college with remaining
athletic eligibility by allowing them to transfer in order to pursue a graduate degree. In recent
years, graduating student-athletes, including in men’s basketball, increasingly appear to make
transfer decisions for reasons other than academics. In 2011, there were 15 men’s basketball
graduate transfers; in 2016, there were 87.7
Only 34% of these transfers graduate from their graduate school programs.8 We heard that
recruiting and tampering related to potential graduate transfers is rising.
Reference 11 - 0.14% Coverage
We understand that the NCAA’s Transfer Working Group is currently considering this issue and
potential responses, including “locking down” scholarships for the period of a degree program
and imposing an enhanced penalty on a team’s Academic Progress Rate if the recipient leaves
before completing his graduate program. We ask the NCAA to monitor this issue and develop
appropriate legislation to ensure that the rule is serving its intent.
Reference 12 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for certifying agents and allow NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at an appropriate point in their high school careers to be determined by the NCAA.
Reference 13 - 0.12% Coverage
The NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive to develop meaningful standards for
NCAA certification and administer the program. Among other requirements, the rules should
mandate that agents notify colleges when they are retained by a matriculating student-athlete.
The program should also educate studentathletes about eligibility rules and requirements.
Reference 14 - 0.09% Coverage
Elite high school and college players need earlier professional advice, including
whether to declare for the draft or whether college basketball offers a superior pathway. If
NCAA rules do not allow them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 15 - 0.05% Coverage
The NCAA rules should provide that student-athletes may meet and contract with NCAAcertified agents and that they will not lose their eligibility by doing so.
Reference 16 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA incentivize better behavior
from agents. This can be done through making clear the benefits of certification and the cost of
the loss of certification. An agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation must lose his or
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her certification.
Reference 17 - 0.10% Coverage
A student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter into an
agreement, with a non-certified agent will lose his eligibility. In addition, the NCAA and the
NBPA should report to each other agents’ violations of their respective rules, increasing the
potential costs of violating NCAA rules.
Reference 18 - 0.21% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who
leave member institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Colleges and
universities must fulfill their commitments to student-athletes to provide not just a venue for
athletic competition, but also an education. They must promise student-athletes that the option to
receive an education will be there, even after the athlete is finished with his athletic career. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 19 - 0.13% Coverage
Many NCAA member institutions already provide Degree Completion Programs. NCAA rules
should standardize this offering. The NCAA must also define a category of relatively
disadvantaged schools for which this requirement would impose a substantial burden, and create
a fund to provide the benefit for students at those institutions, using the revenues of the NCAA
Basketball tournament.
Reference 20 - 0.11% Coverage
One significant counter to that argument is that many Division I student-athletes benefit
enormously from engaging in intercollegiate sports. In addition to receiving full scholarships up
to the cost of attendance (ranging from $13,392 to $71,585 for in-state students and from
$18,125$71,585 for out-of-state students depending on the institution),
Reference 21 - 0.15% Coverage
receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career advice and
more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars annually.10
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11
As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced Again, the Commission
agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to assist
student-athletes in earning their degrees.
Reference 22 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 23 - 0.05% Coverage
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significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must receive an
education that is valuable, not a pretense.
Reference 24 - 0.04% Coverage
The NCAA will have to incur substantial costs for several of these recommendations. But it will
be money well spent.
Reference 25 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA create independent investigative
and adjudicative arms to address and resolve complex and serious cases (hereafter “complex
cases”) involving violations of NCAA rules.
Reference 26 - 0.14% Coverage
No stakeholder supported the current system for handling high-stakes infractions. Many
informed us that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that led to this
Commission, the reaction was that “everyone knows” that these payments occur. That state of
affairs – where the entire community knows of significant rule breaking and yet the governance
body lacks the power or will to investigate and act – breeds cynicism and contempt.
Reference 27 - 0.15% Coverage
Complex cases must be thoroughly investigated, and resolved by neutral professional
adjudicators, with authority to impose punishment that will have a significant deterrent effect.
The investigative arm must be independent and empowered to require the cooperation of
witnesses and the production of documents, including financial information, from NCAA
member institutions and their employees and contractors, with significant penalties for noncooperation.
Reference 28 - 0.12% Coverage
In addition, these and all NCAA investigators must exercise reasonable prosecutorial discretion
and common sense so that resources are focused on serious infractions and punishment is
appropriately calibrated and consistently administered. There are multiple examples of minor
infractions that are not worth the time and effort that the NCAA now spends on them.
Reference 29 - 0.07% Coverage
Volunteers who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions should not
resolve cases. Instead, a panel of professional adjudicators, appointed for a term of years, must
make final and binding decisions and must have the authority
Reference 30 - 0.06% Coverage
To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement and resolution of high stakes
cases must be placed in the hands of independent professionals and neutrals.
Reference 31 - 0.11% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA enact significant increases in the penalties
imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of NCAA rules. Currently, the rewards for
violating the rules far outweigh the risks. To reverse this calculation, the Commission
recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
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Reference 32 - 0.21% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue
sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire period of the ban;
(iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv) increase the
penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than one season; and (v) increase the
penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans.
Reference 33 - 0.17% Coverage
In addition, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a coach or
athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA rules be subject to
significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program reoffends, up to and including a ban
of up to five years from post-season tournaments, including the NCAA tournament, and a loss of
revenues from those tournaments for that same period. There must be significant risk associated
with employing an individual who is under a show cause order.
Reference 34 - 0.08% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA
Reference 35 - 0.19% Coverage
These individuals will find it much easier to do so if they enact comprehensive
compliance programs at their institutions. The costs of compliance may be significant, but they
should be small by comparison to the costs of being found in violation of NCAA rules. The
NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals if they knew or should
have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including termination. These
penalties should be mitigated or enhanced depending up the presence and effectiveness of the
institution’s compliance program.
Reference 36 - 0.11% Coverage
Coaches are the public focus of blame for NCAA violations. For too long, college
presidents and administrators have not been viewed as accountable for the conduct of their
athletic programs. That will have to change. College presidents and highlevel administrators
cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the infractions in those programs.
Reference 37 - 0.26% Coverage
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
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Reference 38 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 39 - 0.34% Coverage
In the near term, the Commission recommends that the NCAA promptly adopt
and enforce rigorous criteria for certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches
attend. In order for the NCAA to certify a non-scholastic basketball event, the owners, event
operators, sponsors, and coaches for the event must agree to financial transparency about all
events they run, including those that are not certified by the NCAA. This requirement includes
agreement (i) to be subject to audit and to provide all required IRS and other tax filings upon
request; (ii) to disclose all sources of financing and other payments and the recipients of all funds
provided for or collected in relation to the event; and (iii) to disclose any financial relationship
between the event sponsors and coaches with any administrator, coach or booster at any NCAA
school. The money flowing from apparel companies and other third parties into non-scholastic
basketball must be disclosed and accounted for, in order to address the corruption arising from
non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 40 - 0.19% Coverage
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have educational
components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that requirement more
effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families, including travel, meals,
accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must be disclosed to the NCAA, along
with the source of their provision. The NCAA must enforce the requirement that such benefits be
reasonable and appropriate and assure that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying
the timing or providing the benefits to another.
Reference 41 - 0.23% Coverage
It appears, however, that they do not have effective controls in place in their spending in nonscholastic basketball. The Commission calls on the boards of these companies to publicly
support and implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own
investments in non-scholastic basketball. Particularly in light of the facts uncovered in the recent
FBI investigation, these public companies should be concerned about how their money is used in
non-scholastic basketball. We expect that these companies will insist that all employees provide
detailed accountability about such expenditures and cooperate with new NCAA rules about
financial transparency and accountability.
Reference 42 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
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resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 43 - 0.22% Coverage
In sum, the NCAA and NCAA coaches may no longer associate with nonscholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. Moreover, in light of the recommendation that players be
permitted to choose a professional pathway at an earlier time, the NCAA and others should
devote significant resources to earlier development, including education, for players in youth
basketball. The corruption we observe in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. The
reforms recommended by the Commission will be fruitless unless the NCAA gives serious
attention to regulating summer programs.
Reference 44 - 0.07% Coverage
changes recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches and other
organizations to reduce the influence of third parties and increase the ability of college coaches
to interact with recruits and current players.
Reference 45 - 0.40% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA restructure its highest governance
body, the Board of Governors, to include at least five public members with the experience,
stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA in re-establishing itself as an effective and respected
leader and regulator of college sports. One of these public members should also serve on the
NCAA’s Executive Board. The current Board of Governors includes 16 institutional presidents
or chancellors, the chairs of the Division I Council and the Division II and III Management
Councils, and the NCAA president. NCAA Constitution 4.1.1 (Composition). Like public
companies, major non-profit associations usually include outside board members to provide
objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom. Board members with those qualities
will provide valuable insight to the NCAA generally, and as it works towards the restoration of
college basketball. The NCAA should promptly identify candidates with the appropriate stature
and characteristics, and change its rules to require public voting members on its highest
governing body. The Commission will make independent board member recommendations to the
NCAA to assist it in assembling a first-rate list of candidates.
Reference 46 - 0.28% Coverage
The NCAA has often failed to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). But, the NCAA is
not really Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions. When those institutions and
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those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and norms in order to achieve oncourt success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these individuals hide behind the NCAA
when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded state of intercollegiate athletics, in
general, and college basketball in particular. The Commission makes these recommendations to
support fulfillment of the NCAA’s purposes and to impose accountability on institutions and
individuals undermining their achievement.
Reference 47 - 0.45% Coverage
After the announcement of these charges, the NCAA’s President, Mark Emmert, stated that it is
“very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so
quickly.” Statement from Pres. Mark Emmert, Oct. 11, 2017. He continued: “[w]hile I believe
the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the culture of silence in college basketball enables
bad actors, and we need them out of the game. We must take decisive action. This is not a time
for half-measures or incremental change.” As a first step, he announced that the NCAA Board of
Governors, the Division I Board of Directors and the NCAA President had established an
independent Commission on College Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. The
Commission was to “examin[e] critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working” and focus
on three areas:
•
The relationship between the NCAA national office, its members, their studentathletes and
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, nonscholastic basketball and athlete
agents and advisors.
•
The relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the challenging effect of the
NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one-and-done phenomenon in men’s college
basketball.
•
The creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and its national
office to promote transparency and accountability.
Reference 48 - 0.02% Coverage
The NCAA appointed the following additional members of the Commission:
Reference 49 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission was charged with gathering information and expert opinions
for making “transformative recommendations” to the Division I Board of Directors and NCAA
Board of Governors on “legislation, policies, actions and structure(s) to protect the integrity of
college sports, with a focus on Division I men’s basketball.” Members of the Commission were
appointed for an initial six-month term. The Commission’s goal was the completion of its work
and a report to the NCAA Boards for action at their April 2018 meetings. This document is that
report, and it contains the Commission’s recommendations with respect to the challenges
currently facing college basketball.
Reference 50 - 0.26% Coverage
Before going further, however, the Commission believes it is important to
confront the uncomfortable fact that the challenges identified in this report have been part of the
landscape of pre-professional basketball for many years, and that others have previously made
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serious efforts to address them with only limited success. To be sure, these challenges have
become more prominent in the past decade as elite basketball – pre-college, in-college and postcollege – has become exponentially more lucrative. The fact remains, however, that today’s
issues have been around a long time, and their existence is widely acknowledged. Virtually all
stakeholders and others providing information to the Commission at some point uttered the
discouraging phrase: “Everyone knows what’s been going on.”
Reference 51 - 0.16% Coverage
However, the Commission recognizes that some humility is required in light of past failures and
the size of the challenge. Stakeholders do not agree about either the causes or the potential
solutions to the current challenges that face pre-professional basketball. The Commission
believes that these challenges will persist unless all stakeholders accept responsibility for the
credibility of the game, the reputations of the schools who field teams and the integrity of the
athletes who compete.
Reference 52 - 0.25% Coverage
From mid-October 2017 through early April 2018, the Commission sought the views of
stakeholders. In meetings, the Commission directly heard the views of a number of parties. In
addition, the Commission opened a portal and solicited public comment on its work, receiving
numerous helpful written responses. The Commission heard directly from the NBA, the NBPA,
USA Basketball, numerous NCAA offices and departments, multiple athletic conferences,
several apparel companies and agents, college and high school coaches associations, student and
faculty associations, athletic directors’ associations, other interested associations and groups, the
Uniform Law Commission, athletes and other individuals. The Commission appreciates all of
this helpful input into its work.
Reference 53 - 0.02% Coverage
The Commission also benefited from the following briefings:
Reference 54 - 0.30% Coverage
In its meetings, the Commission spent close to 70% of its time in executive session to discuss its
dialogue with stakeholders and the materials and presentations it had received. The
Commission’s discussions were enhanced by the varied and deep experience of its members,
including former student-athletes, former professional athletes, coaches, athletic directors,
university presidents and provosts and NBA owners. The Commission also benefited from the
insights, experience and expertise of its members who are “outsiders,” and brought to bear their
unique perspectives from government and the military on the current problems of men’s Division
I basketball. Through executive session discussions, the Commission was able to assess how the
information it received and the perspectives of stakeholders might affect potential NCAA actions
to address the issues identified for the Commission’s consideration.
Reference 55 - 0.29% Coverage
Both Division I men’s basketball and the NBA are multi-billion dollar enterprises. Many
individuals and entities earn a living and more by direct and indirect association with these
entities. Thus, the financial stakes are high for elite players, 14
coaches, athletic
directors, colleges and universities, apparel companies, agents and athlete advisors of all stripes.
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Where this much money is at stake, the incentives to break rules are high. To identify issues and
craft potential recommended responses, the Commission was asked to focus on three categories
of relationships in college basketball: (1) the relationships between college basketball and the
NBA and NBPA; (2) the relationships between the NCAA and its member institutions; and (3)
the relationships between college basketball and apparel companies, non-scholastic basketball
(coaches and leagues), agents and other third parties.
Reference 56 - 0.24% Coverage
For a subset of these players who have no intention of spending more than a year or two in
college or whose time is fully consumed by basketball, maintaining academic eligibility to play
may be a challenge. If that player is good enough, however, the school may be strongly
motivated to assist that student-athlete in maintaining his eligibility. This situation creates
another opening for corruption – the manipulation and dilution of academic standards by school
officials, along with other academic misconduct. A series of recent cases involve this
phenomenon. Other cases illustrate the lack of clarity about the NCAA’s rules and the likely
punishment for academic misconduct, as well as inconsistency in the NCAA’s application of the
rules
Reference 57 - 0.23% Coverage
The one-and-done phenomenon has provided some benefits to colleges and universities and to
elite high school basketball players. Schools achieve national notice and prominence with
athletic success and championships due to the presence of these players, with associated financial
and reputational benefits. As for players, many believe that they will have the opportunity to play
professional basketball if they can draw the attention of professional coaches and scouts. Playing
Division I men’s basketball allows players to make a name for themselves among professional
leagues and teams. Further, these players receive some of the educational and other benefits
associated with a year in college.
Reference 58 - 0.22% Coverage
In addition, elite high school players currently understand that in order to play Division I
basketball, they must meet the eligibility requirements to attend a Division I school. See NCAA
Division I Bylaw 14.3 (Freshman Academic Requirements). Because numerous players who will
not play professional basketball nonetheless believe that they will, these players gain the benefit
of educational levels and opportunities that they might otherwise have forgone. The Commission
takes these benefits seriously and, in particular, does not underestimate the transformative
possibilities in attaining academic eligibility for college or in spending a year or more in college.
Reference 59 - 0.10% Coverage
The NCAA’s current rules on amateurism place limits on the ability of those players to test the
professional market for their services and to obtain assistance from an agent in assessing their
potential value. This, in turn, may prevent student-athletes from taking full advantage of their
collegiate opportunities.
Reference 60 - 0.11% Coverage
Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are limited and often appear
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations. The Commission did not hear from a single stakeholder who supported
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the current system in addressing high-stakes infractions.
Reference 61 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 62 - 0.19% Coverage
Virtually all stakeholders, including NCAA staff, expressed the view that the current model for
adjudication of NCAA rules violations should not continue. Representatives of member
institutions that have crosscutting and potentially self-interested incentives with respect to
punishment administer the NCAA’s current adjudication process. While many stakeholders
expressed gratitude and respect for the hard work of the volunteers who administer the current
infractions process, all expressed the belief that the current system is not working in cases
involving serious violations.
Reference 63 - 0.14% Coverage
Stakeholders further suggested that the Commission consider whether the substantive content of
certain NCAA rules is contributing to the problems identified above. Stakeholders identified
numerous issues with the NCAA’s current rules governing eligibility, amateurism and recruiting.
As noted above, they also expressed the view that the consequences for rule violators were
insufficient in many instances and excessive in others.
Reference 64 - 0.33% Coverage
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules
regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams qualify as
“amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years. Although there are
exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to receive compensation in any
form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a contract or commitment to play
professional athletics, to receive consideration from a professional sports organization, to
compete on a professional team and to enter into an agreement with an agent. In addition, a
student-athlete cannot receive preferential treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic
reputation or skill, unless specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws
12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or
Competition), 12.1.2 (Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
Reference 65 - 0.16% Coverage
Some stakeholders note that many elite players receive some form of payment to
play basketball before attending college; that student-athletes are bringing substantial sums into
NCAA and collegiate coffers; and that playing Division I men’s college basketball is essentially
a full time job that does not leave room for a normal college experience. They conclude for some
or all of these reasons that players should receive some recompense (beyond the full value of
their education) for playing basketball.
Reference 66 - 0.24% Coverage
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Still others believe that the NCAA rules are so focused on pre-professional sports that the NCAA
has failed to create a system that makes sense for the majority of studentathletes who will not
make a living at their sports. Under these rules, stakeholders assert, student-athletes who accept
any “benefit,” no matter how small, risk losing their eligibility to compete. The NCAA’s
administration of the “no benefit” rule, see NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2 (Nonpermissible), was
criticized as penalizing student-athletes and preventing them from engaging in normal
interactions with friends and mentors. Those holding this view suggest that the NCAA should
engage in common sense calibration of the “no benefit” rule for particular contexts.
Reference 67 - 0.28% Coverage
Agents. NCAA rules further forbid collegiate athletes to enter into any agreement (oral or
written) with agents for purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial
gain, even if that agreement is limited to future representation. Prohibited marketing includes
negotiations with professional teams, seeking product endorsements and efforts to place an
athlete at a particular school. The rules likewise forbid family members or other representatives
to enter into such an agreement on behalf of an athlete. In addition, athletes may not accept
benefits from agents even if those benefits do not have strings visibly attached. NCAA Division I
Bylaws 12.3.1 (General Rule); 12.3.1.2 (Representation for Future Negotiations); 12.02.1
(Agent); 12.3.3 (Athletics Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1.3 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).18
Reference 68 - 0.07% Coverage
It would be better, stakeholders argue, if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by
restricting contact to specific times and places.
Reference 69 - 0.16% Coverage
Recruiting. In the view of many Division I coaches, the NCAA rules hamstring college coaches
and allow non-scholastic coaches and other third parties to become the primary influences over
elite high school players. For example, Division I coaches have limited opportunities to evaluate
high school players in both scholastic and nonscholastic settings, and those players cannot
officially visit colleges and universities until late in their junior year. See generally NCAA
Division I Bylaws, Art. 13.
Reference 70 - 0.20% Coverage
Indeed, Division I coaches complain that they are dependent on non-scholastic coaches, leagues
and events for opportunities to view players, giving those third parties even more leverage over
high school players. In the interim, high school players are playing non-scholastic basketball
sponsored by apparel companies who provide those high school players with gear, travel and
experiences. Division I coaches seek to increase their direct contact with high school players at
critical junctures, and to limit their dependence on non-scholastic coaches, leagues and apparel
companies for access to high school players.
Reference 71 - 0.34% Coverage
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to impose
harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents) who violate the
rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate with NCAA
investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the ability to impose loss
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of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of revenue from post-season play
on those who commit serious infractions and those who decline to cooperate with NCAA
investigations. They believe that the availability – and utilization – of these penalties would get
presidential and board-level attention at colleges. These persons further note that administrators,
athletic directors and coaches who violate the rules often move on to other member institutions,
and do not pay a significant price for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the
institutions that hire individuals who have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking
the risk of hiring past offenders.
Reference 72 - 0.17% Coverage
Currently, the NCAA “certifies” some non-scholastic or non-scholastic basketball
events and leagues. NCAA Division I Bylaws 13.18 (Basketball Event Certification); 17.31.4.1
(Summer Basketball Leagues). Coaches at NCAA member institutions can attend these summer
events only if the NCAA certifies them. Unfortunately, however, the requirements for NCAA
certification are minimal, to be generous; and some of the requirements are poorly implemented
while others are not enforced. Non-scholastic basketball is largely unregulated.
Reference 73 - 0.18% Coverage
In addition to coaching, experience, gear and travel, these non-scholastic basketball teams and
events offer players exposure, including to Division I coaches. For example, Division I coaches
attend and recruit at the NCAA-certified events which are held in April and July each year.
Many summer coaches have ongoing relationships with Division I coaches. They can thus bring
“their” players to the attention of Division I coaches and potentially influence players to attend
particular schools, including schools where “their” apparel company is a sponsor.
Reference 74 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission heard varying views on whether the NCAA should be more or
less or differently involved in non-scholastic basketball. All stakeholders agreed that nonscholastic basketball has provided substantial benefits to many student-athletes – competition,
gear, travel and similar enriching experiences, coaching, exposure to college coaches and an
opportunity to receive a college scholarship, among other things. In addition, many college
coaches use the events at which significant numbers of high school players gather to evaluate
potential recruits efficiently and economically. Coaches at less advantaged schools rely on these
large gatherings to scout
Reference 75 - 0.25% Coverage
That said, virtually all stakeholders expressed the view that currently, nonscholastic basketball
lacks sufficient regulation, with detrimental effects on college basketball. For example,
significant money flows into summer ball from apparel companies, agents, investment advisers
and other sources, and there is little accountability or transparency about many of the sources and
expenditures of those funds. Many state that it is well known that student-athletes are paid –
either directly or indirectly (through family members or otherwise) – to play for particular
summer teams. Almost all elite basketball players participate in non-scholastic basketball. Thus,
as noted above, many players and their families are accustomed to being paid before they attend
college.
Reference 76 - 0.15% Coverage
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A number of stakeholders expressed the view that one way to lessen the negative influence of
non-scholastic basketball event operators and coaches would be for the NCAA to administer its
own regional non-scholastic basketball camps in July and to restrict NCAA coaches to those
NCAA camps for July. Coaches would be able to see numerous elite high school players in one
location, in theory without the need for an advance blessing from a non-scholastic basketball
coach.
Reference 77 - 0.16% Coverage
In the context described above, however, a player may be strongly tempted to break NCAA rules
and enter into a relationship with an agent or attend a particular college in order to be paid.
Similarly, coaches and other college representatives may be strongly tempted to pay players,
family members and others who can influence players to attend particular schools. As illustrated
by the recent charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, this possibility is not merely
theoretical.
Reference 78 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 79 - 0.12% Coverage
As it gathered information and listened to stakeholders, the Commission heard
numerous recommendations for specific reforms to address the issues in Division I men’s
basketball described above. In assessing both the challenges and the potential reforms, the
Commission accepted as its foundational principle the collegiate model of athletic competition.
Reference 80 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling
their intercollegiate athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the
NCAA. NCAA Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s
activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its members’
acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
Reference 81 - 0.12% Coverage
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The issues currently confronting the NCAA and Division I men’s college basketball
are long standing and complex. The Commission believes, however, that implementing the
recommendations below will support the integrity of the collegiate game and the NCAA’s
member institutions without unduly limiting the individual opportunities of student-athletes.
Reference 82 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission heard from many stakeholders that agents and associated
advisers are the primary source of money used for direct and indirect payments to players and
their families and for payments to coaches and other persons of influence with players.
Reference 83 - 0.19% Coverage
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can also corrupt
the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special benefits to these
athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all students. Finally, the
matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short time primarily to play
Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain student-athletes will not, as a
practical matter, be college students.
Reference 84 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission is not naïve. It understands that implementation of this
recommendation will not eliminate the problems described above, most notably thirdparty
payments to athletes to attend particular colleges and the resulting potential for corruption of
collegiate programs.
Reference 85 - 0.20% Coverage
opportunity for individuals and significantly reduces the incentives for improper payments, and
is thus one important part of an overall effort to limit corruption in college basketball and to
support the collegiate model. The Commission recognizes that this change will be most effective
in combination with the other recommendations it is making, including reformed and improved
NCAA investigative and adjudicative processes, higher penalties for infractions, and new
requirements for financial transparency and accountability in member institutions’ athletic
programs and in non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 86 - 0.37% Coverage
The NCAA should provide high school and college players with additional
flexibility in retaining collegiate eligibility while assessing their professional prospects. Under
current NCAA rules, players may apply for an NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee
evaluation and participate in the NBA Combine, but players lose their collegiate eligibility if
they do not remove their names from the draft within ten days after the NBA Combine. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 12.2.4.2.1 (Exception – Basketball). It is easy to say that young players should
know that they will not be drafted and that they “make their own beds” when they fail to
withdraw from the draft. But, this kind of misjudgment is widespread, and the penalty for it
should not be so high, if we are serious about the value and importance of college. The quality
and value of the college experience increases with the amount of time a student-athlete spends on
campus. With the completion of each academic year, a student will face a lower hurdle to
earning a degree. Student-athletes who are wrong about their professional prospects should retain
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the opportunity to work toward the degree they were promised.
Reference 87 - 0.31% Coverage
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a season before
returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.1 (Residence
Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious disadvantages in
completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this issue, over the last few years,
hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is upward.22
Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be in a better
“basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover, third parties influence
many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best interests of the player in mind.
Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence requirement” of the transfer rule remain
in place, whatever other changes are made in the NCAA’s transfer rules.
Reference 88 - 0.07% Coverage
he Commission believes that this and other rule changes will provide studentathletes with better
information about their likely professional careers and a greater likelihood of ultimately
achieving a college degree.
Reference 89 - 0.20% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for the certification of agents, and authorize and make opportunities for those
certified agents to engage with student-athletes at school at specific times during the calendar
year. To implement this requirement, the NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive
to develop detailed standards for NCAA certification and administer the program. The NCAA’s
program should also educate elite student-athletes at member institutions about NCAA eligibility
rules and requirements and professional prospects.
Reference 90 - 0.20% Coverage
The NCAA’s rules already allow student-athletes to retain lawyers and advisors to
provide professional advice at market value, provided the lawyer or advisor does not engage in
the representational activities of agents. NCAA-certified agents should also be permitted to
provide such advice. Further, high school players considering entering the draft should be
allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors just as high school baseball players may
engage agents for advice about the draft. Cf. NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.3.1 (Exception –
Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey – Prior to Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment).
Reference 91 - 0.33% Coverage
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA rules
define as “agents”24
Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met or their employees. However, the
Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid, either
directly or indirectly.25
advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into agreements
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with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought that this would
simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age. Instead, agents
recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with high school and collegiate
players and make their cases so that players would have all available options before they enter
the professional market. The Commission intends NCAA-certification to provide these
opportunities for “good” agents.
Reference 92 - 0.11% Coverage
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with agents,
sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA should bring these
conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their prospects with agents whom it
certifies under NCAA-approved standards.
Reference 93 - 0.19% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for degree completion for student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave
college after progress of two years towards a degree. The NCAA must require Division I
programs to establish a Degree Completion Program to support degree completion by studentathletes who compete and complete two years of college and then leave school, but later seek to
return to college to finish their education. The NCAA and its member institutions must keep
focused on the prize here – a college degree.
Reference 94 - 0.23% Coverage
But, in the current legal circumstances, the Commission decided to address the charge of
exploitation by providing individual student-athletes with access to professional opportunities,
and ensuring that the student portion of student-athlete is real. Specifically, the Commission
recommends allowing student-athletes with a professional pathway to make the choice to leave
college every year, creating resources so that they can make an informed choice whether to do
so, welcoming back student-athletes whom the NBA does not draft, making a serious financial
commitment to degree completion and severely punishing those who undermine the premise that
student-athletes must receive a valuable – not a sham – education.
Reference 95 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 96 - 0.29% Coverage
Most significantly, the Commission recommends that the Committee on Infractions appoint a
panel of paid independent decision makers, such as lawyers, arbitrators and retired judges. These
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decision makers would form a pool from which three adjudicators would be randomly selected to
resolve each complex case. Members of the panel would serve for a term of five years (with
some shorter and longer terms initially so that the entire panel does not turn over
simultaneously). The panel would operate under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association or analogous rules; its decisions would be final and binding, subject to review only
under the Federal Arbitration Act. Volunteers and members should not decide whether fellow
member institutions have violated NCAA rules, nor the appropriate punishment for those
violations. It is time for independent adjudication of the NCAA’s complex cases.
Reference 97 - 0.11% Coverage
First, the NCAA should adopt rules authorizing the independent panel of adjudicators to grant
preliminary injunctive relief – that is, to forbid or require certain action while the adjudication is
taking place – against institutions and individuals where the NCAA’s investigator and advocate
demonstrates a substantial likelihood
Reference 98 - 0.06% Coverage
Second, the NCAA should establish reasonable time limits for submission and decision of a case,
which must be enforced except in extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the panel.
Reference 99 - 0.16% Coverage
Second, the Commission recommends that the NCAA ensure professional
investigation and prosecution of serious violations. There are at least two ways to do so. After its
appointment, the independent adjudication panel could create a panel of outside counsel (not the
NCAA’s usual counsel who would be in a conflict of interest) to investigate and advocate in
complex cases. In the alternative, the NCAA could establish a separate investigation and
advocacy office, with rules guaranteeing its independence.
Reference 100 - 0.27% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that the newly formed investigative office
(or appointed law firm) and, indeed, all relevant NCAA investigative bodies, be instructed to
exercise appropriate enforcement discretion and common sense – that is, to set appropriate
priorities for enforcement, to make reasonable decisions about punishment, and not to expend
excessive resources on violations that are de minimis. This investigative entity should give
serious infractions substantial attention and seek punishments that will deter future violations.
But it should also recognize that certain kinds of minor violations should be handled differently,
both in terms of resources expended and punishment recommended. In the exercise of such
discretion, plainly self-reporting and other indicia of cooperation should be considered.
Reference 101 - 0.44% Coverage
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes to cooperate in
NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can consider in assessing penalties. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The
NCAA also must adopt rules that require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate
with NCAA investigations, with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing
significant consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically, to
participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents, administrators, and
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coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including by providing documents
and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators. In addition, while the NCAA does not have
subpoena power, it can adopt rules requiring as a condition of membership, that member
institutions enter into contractual agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member
institutions contractually impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents,
administrators and coaches. NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report
and provide evidence of violations.
Reference 102 - 0.13% Coverage
In a related point, the NCAA must authorize its investigators and advocates to
submit and rely on the evidence admitted in judicial and administrative tribunals and on the
decisions of those tribunals. There is no reason to require the NCAA to redo the work of other
tribunals. The independent panel of adjudicators can determine the reliability of the evidence and
the preclusive effect of other decisions.
Reference 103 - 0.23% Coverage
Current core penalties for violations of NCAA rules are set out in the Division I Manual, Article
19, Figure 19.1. The NCAA adopted these penalties in October 2012, effective August 2013.
Due to the length of the NCAA’s adjudication process, the first cases in which the current
penalty matrix applies have only recently been resolved. (The penalty matrix in effect at the time
of a violation applies to that violation without regard to subsequent amendments.) The matrix
provides appropriate types of penalties for violations by institutions – i.e., probation, fines,
suspensions, scholarship reductions, forfeitures, post-season bans, head-coach restrictions,
recruiting visit restrictions.
Reference 104 - 0.12% Coverage
The Commission considered whether the core institutional penalties are sufficiently
severe to have the desired deterrent effect. The Commission believes that many at NCAA
member institutions consider the rewards of NCAA rule violations to outweigh the risks, and
thus it recommends the following changes in the NCAA’s institutional penalties and penalty
structure:
Reference 105 - 0.12% Coverage
Second, the Commission recommends that the NCAA inform members that past penalties
imposed for particular violations have no precedential value, and that the independent panel shall
conduct a de novo assessment of the appropriate penalties for violations with the need for
deterrence in mind. The panel must be free to calibrate punishment without regard to past
practice.
Reference 106 - 0.34% Coverage
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified nonscholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
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NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 107 - 0.28% Coverage
Putting to one side agents paying large sums of money to players, the
Commission heard comments that collegiate players or their families may receive from agents a
meal or minor travel expenses or some other small benefit that those with limited financial
means are strongly tempted to accept. The Commission concludes that the NCAA and its
member institutions must enhance the resources of Student Assistance Funds and educate
student-athletes about the benefits that it can provide to address the legitimate school-related
needs of student-athletes. NCAA Division I Bylaws 15.01.6.1, 16.11.1.8 (Student Assistance
Fund). Specifically, the Commission believes that the Fund should be increased and used for
additional purposes, such as providing Division I schools with the resources to assist parents and
families to travel to student-athletes’ games, subject to means testing
Reference 108 - 0.25% Coverage
Finally, the Commission is aware of the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“RUAAA”)
developed by the Uniform Law Commission, in response to an NCAA request that state law
address agents’ provision of cash and other economic benefits to studentathletes. Forty-two
states, DC, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act and eight have adopted the RUAAA. The Uniform Law Commission provided useful input
to the Commission and sought its support in encouraging states to adopt the RUAAA.
Unfortunately, while a number of states have enacted state laws regulating sports agents, the
Commission is not aware of any significant number of enforcement actions. The Commission
encourages States to both enact and enforce state laws regulating sports agents.
Reference 109 - 0.20% Coverage
The NCAA must adopt rules that will reform non-scholastic basketball or disassociate college
basketball from the corrupt aspects of non-scholastic basketball. The Commission recommends
that the NCAA take both short and long-term action. In the short term, the NCAA must adopt
rigorous certification criteria for non-scholastic basketball events its coaches may attend,
including significant measures to ensure financial transparency and accountability. In the long
term, the NCAA should administer its own regional camps for high school players in the group
subject to college recruiting in July of each year.
Reference 110 - 0.13% Coverage
non-scholastic basketball needs NCAA coaches, and NCAA coaches need non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission’s guiding principle in this area is that the NCAA should not certify,
and NCAA coaches should not participate in, non-scholastic basketball events involving
coaches, leagues or sponsors who are not fully transparent about the sources and amounts of their
financial support.
Reference 111 - 0.10% Coverage
More specifically, while NCAA coaches are forbidden to attend non-scholastic basketball events
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not certified by the NCAA, the NCAA’s current criteria for certification are plainly insufficient.
The new criteria for certification must include detailed requirements for financial transparency.
Reference 112 - 0.24% Coverage
Any person or entity that sponsors a summer league, team or event must disclose any payments
made to or received from any coach, event operator, owner or any other entity associated with
that league, team or event. Any coach, event operator, owner or other entity associated with that
summer league, team or event must disclose any payment received that is related to the event and
how the payments will be expended. The Commission leaves to the NCAA the design of the
disclosure forms and the details of the requirements, but it must require the provision of any nonprofit organization’s financial filings with the government and full financial transparency – going
both ways – for non-scholastic basketball sponsors, event operators and coaches.
Reference 113 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 114 - 0.44% Coverage
In this section, the Commission recommends significant changes to the resources
and programs available for the development of young, pre-collegiate players, ideally by the
summer of 2019. Allowing players to enter the professional ranks earlier brings with it the
responsibility to provide appropriate resources for earlier development. We acknowledge that
institutional influence—by USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA and the NBPA—has been
largely missing in this space for the past 20 years and that nonscholastic basketball has been
largely ungoverned. We strongly recommend that the named institutions lend their expertise and,
wherever possible, work together to provide an alternative to the individual and corporate
influences which currently dominate precollegiate youth basketball particularly in the summer.
In the Commission’s view, the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA all have
significant institutional interests in developing prominent roles in non-scholastic basketball,
particularly in the areas of player identification, development and evaluation. There is a great
deal of work to be done in the development of pre-collegiate players, and the three institutions
should also welcome partners and sponsors willing to work within the standards, disciplines, and
accountability these institutions will bring to youth development.
Reference 115 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission makes distinctions among three levels of players in addressing
pre-collegiate youth development: Level 1 for those players across the four high school years
with identified National Team Potential, Level 2 for those players across the four high school
years with identified Highest Collegiate Potential, and Level 3 for those players across the four
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high school years with identified Collegiate Potential.
Reference 116 - 0.10% Coverage
It is important to note that the Commission believes developing players at each
level will require a collaboration among USA Basketball, the NCAA, the NBA and the NBPA.
The absence of any one of these stakeholders in the youth development space will exacerbate the
current problems with recruiting and development.
Reference 117 - 0.27% Coverage
Player identification. USA Basketball will be primarily responsible for the identification of those
players with the highest potential for Level 1 (Junior National Teams). The NCAA will be
primarily responsible for identification of those players with the highest potential for Levels 2
and 3. The Commission understands that college coaches annually identify the prospects they
seek to recruit using electronic databases and recruiting services. Based on these systems, players
can be assigned to an appropriate level based on the interest shown in them. As a further step to
ensure that players are properly identified, the Commission recommends that USA Basketball,
the NCAA, and the NBA and NBPA establish a “collaborative advisory group” to annually
review and validate the player identification and player evaluation processes.
Reference 118 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission recommends that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional
camps each summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during that
time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted to account for these
events.
Reference 119 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 120 - 0.14% Coverage
Player evaluation. The most important outcome of player evaluation is a realistic assessment of a
player’s potential. The Commission recommends that a “collaborative advisory group” among
the NCAA, USA Basketball and the NBA and NBPA be established to provide a realistic
assessment of professional potential to players in Levels 1 and 2. Importantly, the Commission
believes these evaluations must be transparent and accessible.
Reference 121 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
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Reference 122 - 0.19% Coverage
First, the Commission supports the NABC’s recommendation that the summer
recruiting calendar for evaluating college prospects be modified to allow college coaches to
attend two weekends of scholastic-sponsored events in June and to attend three weekends of
NCAA-sponsored events in July (once established). The Commission further supports the
requirement that once NCAA-sponsored events for July are established, NCAA coaches be
limited to recruiting at those events during that time. Many of the problems associated with nonscholastic basketball occur in the summer.
Reference 123 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission believes that additional recommendations of the NABC and
others are worthy of NCAA study. It also supports the NABC’s intent to reinvigorate its Code of
Ethics and disciplinary rules and enforcement.
Reference 124 - 0.12% Coverage
The NCAA administers what is effectively a public trust in the United States — athletic
competition among college athletes. Public members of boards serve important functions. They
provide objectivity, fresh perspectives and independent viewpoints and judgments. Many nonprofit associations utilize public board members for precisely these reasons.
Reference 125 - 0.15% Coverage
The NCAA Board needs excellent public members, with the benefits that such members provide.
The NCAA should promptly amend its Constitution to restructure the Board to include public
voting members, while simultaneously creating a slate of candidates with the appropriate stature
and characteristics. The Commission will provide recommendations to assist the NCAA in
ensuring compilation of a high-quality slate of potential public board members.
Reference 126 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission calls on the NCAA to draw up draft legislation and plans to
implement its recommendations for Commission review by early August 2018. The Commission
will promptly reconvene and provide its input.
Reference 127 - 0.02% Coverage
The Commission has made a number of important recommendations.
Reference 128 - 0.15% Coverage
Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not in execution — such
as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems. Others should be easy to execute
— specific changes in the available punishments under Article 19 and in the recruiting rules.
Some do not require rules changes, but instead the devotion of financial and administrative
resource to planning, for example, the creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps.
Reference 129 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
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Files\\CCB4 - Recruiting and College Choice Study - § 8 references coded [ 9.26% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.00% Coverage
Survey examining men’s basketball student-athletes’ youth sport, recruiting, college choice
experiences and professional aspirations was designed by the Commission on College Basketball
in collaboration with NCAA research staff.
Reference 2 - 0.58% Coverage
Seven-minute survey administered online through QuestionPro survey software. Designed to be
taken via cell phone, tablet or computer.
Reference 3 - 1.76% Coverage
A snowball sampling technique was used. The Commission forwarded the link through the
National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC) to Division I men’s basketball coaches,
who then distributed the survey link to the student-athletes on their squads. Directors of athletics,
conference staff, and senior compliance officers were made aware of the survey and asked to
encourage student-athletes to participate.
Reference 4 - 1.24% Coverage
Responses were received from 2,635 Division I men’s basketball student-athletes. This
represents 48% of all Division I men’s basketball student-athletes.
Response rates varied by conference, ranging from 65% (America East) to 13% (SWAC). Within
autonomy conferences, participation was 41%.
Reference 5 - 1.71% Coverage
To examine the representativeness of the sample, demographic items were compared with
NCAA GOALS survey data and Division I academic data specific to men’s basketball. The
sample appears to be representative in terms of scholarship status, transfer status, year in school
and international status. There is a slight variation in Pell Grant status and roster status between
the GOALS and Commission samples.
Reference 6 - 1.55% Coverage
The survey also attempted to identify “elite” student-athletes. This includes those who were
ranked in the ESPN, Rivals or Scout Top 100, those named Max Prep All-Americans, or those
who played in either the McDonalds All-American Game or the Jordan Brand Classic. 21% of
student-athletes in the sample (N=522) have been classified as “elite” in the following analyses.
Reference 7 - 0.70% Coverage
AAU/Club Adidas and Nike athletes are slightly more likely to play on college teams sponsored
by the same apparel company (statistically significant at p<.05 level).
Reference 8 - 0.73% Coverage
Three-quarters of elite players indicated that the rules regarding “testing the waters” while
remaining eligible are clear to them, as compared to 59% of non-elite players.
Files\\ESPN2 - NCAA announces new college basketball policy, including agents for players
and longer postseason bans - § 2 references coded [ 1.05% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.49% Coverage
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A USA Basketball official told ESPN that his group hadn’t yet approved some of the changes
announced by the NCAA on Wednesday.
Reference 2 - 0.56% Coverage
Several NBA officials have also told ESPN that they didn’t think the league’s age requirement
would be lowered to 18 until 2021 at the earliest.
Files\\ESPN3 - NCAA’s new proposed rules blindside NBA, USA Basketball officials - § 5
references coded [ 8.62% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.48% Coverage
Top officials with the NBA and USA Basketball were blindsided by the NCAA’s announcement
of future rules changes regarding pro basketball prospects, as well as the timing of it, sources
told ESPN.
Reference 2 - 3.22% Coverage
The NCAA launched a commission and set of subcommittees to address the fallout from the
recent FBI investigation into the college basketball industry, resulting in several policy shifts,
including the assigning of responsibility to USA Basketball for something the organization had
already told the NCAA it wanted no part of: selecting elite senior high school prospects who will
be allowed to sign with registered agents.
Reference 3 - 2.11% Coverage
USA Basketball doesn’t have the infrastructure or interest in accepting the role of evaluating the
nation’s top prospects for selecting a yet-to-be-determined number of players who will annually
be allowed to sign with agents at the end of their junior years, sources told ESPN.
Reference 4 - 0.55% Coverage
USA Basketball prefers that the NBA make those decisions, sources said.
Reference 5 - 1.26% Coverage
While that appears to be the direction the league and union are headed, discussions are centered
on the 2022 draft as the earliest date for that change to go into effect.
Files\\ESPN4 - Commission on College Basketball calls for sweeping reforms by NCAA - § 1
reference coded [ 0.61% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.61% Coverage
NBA commissioner Adam Silver and NBPA executive director Michele Roberts released a joint
statement Wednesday saying they will "continue to assess" the commission’s suggestions on
draft eligibility rules.
Files\\ESPN5 - Why the NCAA hoops scandal will likely spread as trial starts - § 2 references
coded [ 2.01% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.60% Coverage
ESPN reported in February that defendant Christian Dawkins and Arizona coach Sean Miller had
discussions about a $100,000 payment to ensure that star center DeAndre Ayton, the No. 1 pick
in June’s NBA draft, signed with the Wildcats. Arizona’s outside counsel, Paul Kelly of Boston,
said Ayton denied receiving money to influence his decision in multiple interviews with the FBI
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and NCAA.
Reference 2 - 0.42% Coverage
LSU recruited Little and Koprivica, who might decide to skip college altogether, sources told
ESPN.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 12 references coded [
17.87% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.79% Coverage
With two of the NCAA’s highest-ranking committees committing to take swift action to correct
issues facing college basketball, NCAA leaders called upon their members Thursday to own the
challenges facing them and to set college sports on a path guided by its long-held values.
Reference 2 - 2.41% Coverage
In a packed room at the Indiana Convention Center, NCAA Board of Governors Chair G.P.
“Bud” Peterson and NCAA President Mark Emmert challenged members gathered for the 2018
NCAA Convention to act consistently with their commitments to academics, fairness and
student-athlete well-being and use them to clean up the problems undermining the foundation of
college sports.
Reference 3 - 1.42% Coverage
The Board of Governors, the highest-ranking Association-wide governance group, and the
Division I Board of Directors — that division’s top committee — promised this week to take
quick action on those recommendations.
Reference 4 - 1.18% Coverage
The Board of Governors on Wednesday committed $10 million this year and an additional $2.5
million annually starting in 2019-20 to help implement the commission’s recommendations.
Reference 5 - 0.86% Coverage
In addition, the Board of Directors on Thursday promised to act on the recommendations by the
start of the 2018-19 basketball season.
Reference 6 - 0.38% Coverage
Emmert urged school representatives to follow that lead.
Reference 7 - 0.77% Coverage
“We can’t run away from change,” Emmert said. “We need to be the leaders in managing
change, not getting whipsawed by it.
Reference 8 - 0.98% Coverage
To emphasize that importance, Emmert introduced Alaina Woo, the chair of the Board of
Governors’ newly formed Student-Athlete Engagement Committee
Reference 9 - 1.37% Coverage
That committee, composed of members of some of the key NCAA committees and each
division’s Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, was formed to help better connect studentathletes with national policymaking.
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Reference 10 - 2.05% Coverage
Woo, a former student-athlete at Pomona-Pitzer and an assistant basketball coach at Tufts,
described how important she and her peers feel about their identities as student-athletes, and that
it’s important to them to have their concerns recognized and understood by their professors,
coaches and administrators.
Reference 11 - 1.45% Coverage
“Our identities as student-athletes are incredibly important to us,” Woo said. “Feeling like the
professors and the NCAA understand that is important. And that’s the intent of the StudentAthlete Engagement Committee.”
Reference 12 - 3.21% Coverage
“I’d like to use this process as a time to reestablish how we think, how we feel about this thing
we call the NCAA, to elevate the conversation around it,” Jones said. “If you look at the issues
of the day, they didn’t exist 14 years ago. All these things have come on the horizon, and they’ve
resulted in putting the NCAA on the defensive. I’d like to use this process to propel us into a role
of a leader. I think it’s a great opportunity. I think society is looking for a leader, and I think
that’s what we do best.”
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 12 references
coded [ 19.26% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.45% Coverage
By the time the 2018-19 season tips off, the NCAA will adopt a series of bold legislative, policy
and structures changes that will profoundly alter the college basketball landscape.
Reference 2 - 2.70% Coverage
Today, the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors unanimously endorsed
a series of recommendations from the Commission on College Basketball. These
recommendations will ensure integrity in the game, strengthen accountability in college sports
and demonstrate a commitment to the well-being of student-athletes.
Reference 3 - 0.63% Coverage
We are fully committed to restoring the trust and conﬁdence in college sports.
Reference 4 - 0.91% Coverage
Dr. Rice and the members of the commission were clear. The collegiate model should be
strengthened and preserved.
Reference 5 - 1.65% Coverage
The NCAA will work with other organizations – including USA Basketball, apparel companies,
the NBA and the NBPA – to make meaningful and lasting changes that will support the
commission’s recommendations.
Reference 6 - 1.04% Coverage
This is about more than basketball. This is about the culture and future of college sports. We all
will work together to get it right.
Reference 7 - 1.66% Coverage
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NCAA-Certiﬁed Agents to Provide Student-Athletes with Assessment of Professional Prospects.
Permit students to receive meaningful assessment of their professional prospects earlier, with
assistance
Reference 8 - 1.77% Coverage
NCAA to amend rules to require colleges to include in contracts with administrators and
coaches’ contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA investigations and agree to submission
to NCAA enforcement proceedings.
Reference 9 - 1.08% Coverage
Require coaches, athletic directors and college presidents to certify annually that their athletic
programs comply with NCAA rules.
Reference 10 - 2.90% Coverage
Reform Non-Scholastic Basketball and Make its Finances Transparent. NCAA should enforce
rigorous certiﬁcation criteria for non-scholastic basketball events that coaches attend. Events
should be subject to ﬁnancial disclosure, an audit of all ﬁnancial relationships and payments,
IRS, and other tax ﬁlings. Events must also have educational components.
Reference 11 - 2.79% Coverage
Enact Changes in Rules Governing Recruiting and Coaches’ Interaction with Recruits and
Student-Athletes. Reduce the inﬂuence of third parties and increase the ability of college coaches
to interact with recruits and current players. We endorse adoption of a number of rule changes
recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches.
Reference 12 - 0.67% Coverage
Section Four: Add Five Independent Public Members to The NCAA’s Board of Governors.
Files\\NCAA3 - NCAA Provides Reinstatement Decision for Kansas’ Silvio De Sousa - § 2
references coded [ 13.24% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.33% Coverage
Membership guidelines state the starting point for these violations is permanent ineligibility, but
the NCAA staff recognized mitigation based on the speciﬁc circumstances of this case when
making its decision.
Reference 2 - 8.91% Coverage
When a school discovers an NCAA rules violation has occurred, it must declare the studentathlete ineligible and may request the student-athlete’s eligibility be reinstated. The NCAA staff
reviews each student-athlete reinstatement request individually based on its own speciﬁc facts.
This decision may be appealed to the Division I Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee,
which is comprised of representatives from NCAA schools.
Files\\NCAA5 - NCAA to Help Certify June Basketball Events - § 11 references coded [
29.60% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.94% Coverage
“The new June scholastic events initiative is an important and ambitious effort to support the
increased engagement of high school coaches with college coaches in the recruiting experience
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for young players and their families,” said Dan Gavitt, NCAA senior vice president of
basketball. “Our members made clear that this needed to be an inclusive process so that
eventually as many players and schools as possible have the opportunity to participate. This step
opens that door wider and provides the foundation to grow June over time into a beneﬁcial
period to help the next generation of college basketball players develop their skills and be
recognized by coaches in a positive, educational environment.”
Reference 2 - 3.48% Coverage
The NCAA’s announcement complements criteria already established in partnership with the
NFHS for setting standards and certifying events. The NFHS has member associations in all 50
states and the District of Columbia and represents more than 19,000 high schools. The criteria
provide guidelines for high school associations and members of the National High School
Basketball Coaches Association interested in hosting events at educational institutions during the
last two weekends in June.
Reference 3 - 2.15% Coverage
“The support of the NCAA for the criteria has underscored the importance of maintaining an
education-based focus on event formats and in the selection of host sites. We appreciate the
positive collaboration that we have shared with the NCAA and look forward to the
implementation of successful June events.”
Reference 4 - 1.97% Coverage
“We so appreciate the time and effort that has been put in by the National Federation of State
High School Associations, the National High School Basketball Coaches Association and the
NCAA for taking the time to address, in a short time period, the launch of June scholastic
events,”
Reference 5 - 3.00% Coverage
“It’s a big undertaking, but an important undertaking. We want every respective student-athlete
in our sport to have the opportunity to participate in these events. We appreciate the work that’s
being done to broaden that access and believe, as time allows people to adapt to these
opportunities, that we’ll see greater and greater participation from high school prospects, as well
as junior college prospects, in these events.”
Reference 6 - 1.82% Coverage
Dave Archer, the senior director of basketball operations for the National High School
Basketball Coaches Association, said the collaboration between the high school coaches, the
NCAA and the NFHS will improve the recruiting environment for young players.
Reference 7 - 1.29% Coverage
The NHSBCA helped inform the NCAA working group that developed the June scholastic
events model, played an advisory role during its implementation and will help administer the
events.
Reference 8 - 3.72% Coverage
“The National High School Basketball Coaches Association is pleased with the action the NCAA
is taking to allow an alternative path for approval of June Division I men’s basketball scholastic
recruiting events,” Archer said. “This will allow hundreds and hundreds of additional high
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school players with the potential to play college basketball to be evaluated by college coaches in
an educational environment. This is another important step as we continue to move forward to
improve the recruiting culture throughout the nation.”
Reference 9 - 2.86% Coverage
The NCAA criteria address fundamental requirements for applicants to meet before they can be
certiﬁed to host an event. Among the requirements, schools and coaches must be in good
standing with the host high school association and the host coaches associations, events must
ensure their staffs and coaches pass background checks, and players must be currently eligible to
compete for their high school teams.
Reference 10 - 2.54% Coverage
The criteria also require host applicants to be members of the National High School Basketball
Coaches Association or, where there is no state high school basketball coaches association,
members of the recognized state high school coaches association. Non-NFHS high school
associations also may apply to host events, provided they meet certain requirements.
Reference 11 - 1.82% Coverage
High schools participating in the June events also are required to have existed for a full academic
year, be governed by a high school association that has been in existence for a full academic
year, and have an appropriate status with the NCAA Eligibility Center.
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 2 references coded [ 6.96% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.37% Coverage
We remain committed to promoting fairness in college sports and creating an environment that
will champion the success of student-athletes.
Reference 2 - 4.59% Coverage
If they are unwilling or unable to act, we will consider additional changes that will support the
success of student-athletes. It’s on us to restore the integrity of college basketball and continue to
improve the interests of all student-athletes. They deserve nothing less.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 6 references coded [ 17.44% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.29% Coverage
made it very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way we operate, and do
so quickly
Reference 2 - 3.64% Coverage
Therefore, I have secured endorsement from the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I
Board of Directors to form a Commission on College Basketball, which Dr. Condoleezza Rice
has agreed to chair, to work with me in examining critical aspects of a system that clearly is not
working
Reference 3 - 2.22% Coverage
The commission will be composed of leaders from higher education, college sports, government
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and the business world, as well as accomplished former student-athletes.
Reference 4 - 4.31% Coverage
The commission will be asked to evaluate whether the appropriate degree of authority is vested
in the current enforcement and eligibility processes, and whether the collaborative model
provides the investigative tools, cultural incentives and structures to ensure exploitation and
corruption cannot hide in college sports.
Reference 5 - 2.34% Coverage
The commission will begin its work in November and will deliver its recommendations on
legislative, policy and structural changes to the boards for action at their April meetings
Reference 6 - 3.64% Coverage
I believe we can — and we must — ﬁnd a way to protect the integrity of college sports by
addressing both sides of the coin: fairness and opportunity for college athletes, coupled with the
enforcement capability to hold accountable those who undermine the standards of our
community.
Files\\NYT1 - In College Basketball Scandal, Follow the Money ... and the Shoes - § 9
references coded [ 12.94% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.83% Coverage
The plan, prosecutors said, was that the teenage athletes would play for a university that had a
sponsorship deal with Adidas and then sign sponsorship deals of their own with the company
once they turned pro and potentially earned millions of dollars in the N.B.A. In other words,
investing in athletes at a young age could yield huge returns later.
Reference 2 - 1.63% Coverage
Shoe company involvement in college sports dates to 1977, when Sonny Vaccaro — a longtime
basketball hand and then shoe-company executive — signed several coaches he knew, including
Jerry Tarkanian of Nevada-Las Vegas, to contracts with Nike. For a fee, the coaches were sent
shoes to have their players wear.
Reference 3 - 1.26% Coverage
“My theory was if you had coaches with good teams with personalities, you would sell shoes,”
said Vaccaro, who is often credited with urging Nike to sign Michael Jordan before he reached
the N.B.A. “I said, Put the shoes on the college kids.”
Reference 4 - 0.84% Coverage
Vaccaro said that “the world changed” in 1987, when Nike signed its ﬁrst all-school deal,
agreeing to sponsor all the athletic teams at the University of Miami.
Reference 5 - 2.08% Coverage
“Now all the major schools are all-school deals with one shoe company,” he said. “That gives
them control over everything. You do an all-school deal, the president signs off, the athletic
director, the coach — you own everything in that school.” “That shoe company is now your
business partner,” he added. “It wasn’t in ’77. It behooves everybody for the school to win
games. That’s the marriage.”
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Reference 6 - 1.07% Coverage
“That’s where kids get seen,” said Tom Konchalski, the longtime New York City-based scout.
“If you’re not on the shoe company circuit, it’s hard to get recruited at the highest level. It’s very
difﬁcult.”
Reference 7 - 1.36% Coverage
“You might think it’s unhealthy,” he added, “for the shoe companies to have such inﬂuence in
the recruiting process — it has sort of replaced high school in spring and summer, and taken
power out of the hands of the high school coaches — but that’s the way it goes.”
Reference 8 - 0.59% Coverage
Though the company name is redacted in the documents, the coach himself added, “all my kids
will be Adidas kids.”
Reference 9 - 2.27% Coverage
The criminal complaints describe rampant under-the-table payments that were commonly
inspired by a young athlete’s future earning potential. One player agent, in a recorded
conversation, urged that an offer to a player be increased because a rival company was “coming
in with a higher number,” and an Adidas ofﬁcial discussed masking payments from apparel
companies to high school athletes as though it were business as usual.
Files\\NYT2 - The Corruption at the Heart of March Madness - § 1 reference coded [ 2.67%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.67% Coverage
“For these men, bribing coaches was a business investment,” declared Joon Kim, acting United
States attorney for the Southern District of New York, in disclosing a continuing investigation
into academia and sports entertainment.
Files\\NYT3 - Amid Scandal, N.C.A.A. Forms Commission to Reform Men’s Basketball - § 3
references coded [ 5.02% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.24% Coverage
Responding to federal charges last month that depicted a corrupt black market for high school
and college basketball players, the N.C.A.A. on Wednesday said that it would create a college
basketball commission to investigate changes for “a system that clearly is not working.”
Reference 2 - 1.62% Coverage
Emmert, who will sit on the commission alongside the former N.B.A. stars David Robinson and
Grant Hill, said that in his personal view prospects should be able to go straight from high school
to the N.B.A.
Reference 3 - 1.17% Coverage
But he drew the line at changes to the amateur model, which prevents colleges from
compensating athletes beyond scholarships and related costs.
Files\\NYT4 - N.C.A.A. Panel Proposes Reforms, Including End to ‘One and Done’ - § 10
references coded [ 12.03% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.05% Coverage
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Many of the proposed changes could become a part of the N.C.A.A. legislative code in August.
Mr. Emmert, who is relying on Ms. Rice’s stature to boost the credibility of the N.C.A.A., has
said he is aiming for results “by tip-off 2018.”
Reference 2 - 0.80% Coverage
It recommended overhauling summer basketball, requiring the shoe and apparel companies that
run the showcase events to assume far more “transparency and accountability.”
Reference 3 - 1.03% Coverage
In an interview at N.C.A.A. headquarters here, Ms. Rice described the proposals as essential to
rescuing the most popular college sport other than football and the one that provides the vast
majority of the N.C.A.A.’s revenue.
Reference 4 - 0.74% Coverage
But Ramogi Huma, the president of the College Athletes Players Association, an advocate for
more rights for athletes, said the commission dodged the main issues.
Reference 5 - 1.83% Coverage
The federal charges, which were followed by indictments, introduced the risk of criminal
prosecution into a well-known part of college basketball. The allegations made a mockery of
N.C.A.A. amateurism rules and painted a black mark on several of the most prominent basketball
programs. Documents obtained by Yahoo Sports in February seemed to implicate players at a
dozen other blue-chip programs.
Reference 6 - 2.44% Coverage
The commission, which included former players (Grant Hill, David Robinson), former coaches,
university presidents, the heads of the Association of American Universities and U.S.A.
Basketball, and others, called on the N.C.A.A. to establish a new system for summer basketball,
so central to the recruitment process, that could diminish the inﬂuence of the three main apparel
companies. Adidas, Nike and Under Armour sponsor not only summer basketball but also most
of the college teams that high school prospects aspire to play for.
Reference 7 - 0.61% Coverage
In fact, many of the commissioners endorsed providing athletes with a cut of the revenue they
helped generate, according to Ms. Rice.
Reference 8 - 1.55% Coverage
She said the commission declined to address this topic because of pending litigation. Plaintiffs in
the so-called Jenkins case want a federal court to strike down the N.C.A.A. ban on player
compensation on antitrust grounds.
A lawyer representing the Jenkins plaintiffs, Jeffrey Kessler, said that his case concerned a
different nuance.
Reference 9 - 0.80% Coverage
Seasoned observers dismissed both the notion that the proposals would solve all of college
basketball’s problems and the notion they would accomplish essentially nothing.
Reference 10 - 1.18% Coverage
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Gabe Feldman, director of Tulane’s sports law program, said allowing contact with agents was
provocative. “That was completely taboo for a very, very long time,” he said, adding that any
major changes to N.C.A.A. rules would take time. “It’s a big ship to move.”
Files\\NYT5 - N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corruption
Scandal - § 5 references coded [ 16.40% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.10% Coverage
And the boards proposed changes to the N.C.A.A.’s governance and penalty structure, some of
which need to be ratiﬁed at its annual convention in January: increasing penalties; making
university presidents and chancellors accountable for violations; adding the ﬁrst independent
members to the N.C.A.A. board of governors; and permitting N.C.A.A. inquiries to use
information found by other investigative bodies. This last change could allow the N.C.A.A. to
rely on the work currently being done by federal prosecutors, who have tools like subpoenas and
the threat of jail time at their disposal during investigations.
Reference 2 - 4.10% Coverage
That group’s most eye-catching suggestion was the elimination of the so-called “oneand-done”
rule, the requirement that N.B.A. draftees be 19 years old or a year removed from high school.
That rule, created for the 2006 draft, birthed a system in which the most talented college players
competed in college during their freshman seasons and then left to play professionally. Change
on that front will have to wait for action from the N.B.A. and its players’ union; it is not expected
before at least 2020.
Reference 3 - 2.83% Coverage
Several complaints have implicated prominent basketball teams in Adidas’s stable: Kansas,
Louisville (whose former head coach, the Hall of Famer Rick Pitino, lost his job amid the
charges) and Miami. Documents and bank records from the investigation, obtained in February
by Yahoo Sports, implicated at least 20 top men’s basketball programs.
Reference 4 - 2.50% Coverage
The federal investigation has brought attention to open secrets in men’s college basketball,
including the involvement of agents and the power the gigantic apparel companies exert over the
system by showering many millions of dollars every year on both college teams and precollege
grass-roots leagues.
Reference 5 - 1.86% Coverage
While Rice’s group, and Rice personally, suggested such fundamental reform made sense, it
declined to make any suggestions in this area, citing pending antitrust cases targeting the
N.C.A.A.’s restrictions on compensation.
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 4 references coded [
10.84% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.29% Coverage
To work with a high school or college athlete, agents must be certiﬁed by an NCAA program
with standards for behavior and consequences for violations. Family members of the high school
recruit or college athlete or those who act solely on behalf of a professional sports team aren’t
required to be certiﬁed.
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Reference 2 - 1.82% Coverage
Now, students who wish to enter the draft also must request an evaluation from the NBA
Undergraduate Advisory Committee, which will provide valuable information to assist studentathletes in making the decision to turn pro or stay in school.
Reference 3 - 4.81% Coverage
Division I schools will be required to pay for tuition, fees and books for basketball players who
leave school and return later to the same school to earn their degree. Former student-athletes will
be eligible for ﬁnancial assistance to complete their ﬁrst degree if they were on scholarship and
fewer than 10 years have passed since they left school. Additionally, students must have been in
school for two years before leaving. Former student-athletes also must meet all the school’s
admissions and ﬁnancial aid requirements and must have exhausted all other funding options to
be eligible, as well as meet all NCAA academic requirements.
Reference 4 - 1.92% Coverage
The NCAA is establishing a fund for schools that are otherwise unable to provide ﬁnancial aid
for basketball players to return to school. The fund will be available to schools deﬁned as
limited-resource by the NCAA Division I Academic Performance Program.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 1 reference coded [ 6.46%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.46% Coverage
Basketball-related events for high school students will be subject to more rigorous certiﬁcation
requirements to ensure transparency in operations and ﬁnances. This will address issues of
corruption and help support student-athletes as they make decisions about their future. The
certiﬁcation criteria will be overseen by the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Oversight
Committee, and the NCAA Enforcement Certiﬁcation and Approvals Group will administer the
certiﬁcation program.
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 2 references coded [
8.25% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 3.07% Coverage
This committee, composed of three public members of the NCAA Board of Governors and the
chair and vice chair of the Division I Board of Directors, will oversee the entire independent
enforcement and infractions processes.
Reference 2 - 5.17% Coverage
This group will review the ﬁndings from the Complex Case Unit and the school’s response to
those ﬁndings, and then oversee the case hearing and decide penalties. The panel will consist of
15 members with legal, higher education and/or sports backgrounds who are not afﬁliated with
NCAA member schools or conferences. Each case will be handled by a panel of ﬁve of the 15
members.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 1 reference coded [ 1.75%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.75% Coverage
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New responsibilities and obligations solidify effective and fair enforcement of NCAA rules
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 21.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 21.12% Coverage
Pending adoption at the NCAA Convention in January, ﬁve independent members will be added
to the NCAA Board of Governors, which is responsible for oversight of the entire Association.
Each member will be nominated by the Board of Governors Executive Committee, approved by
the full board and serve a threeyear term, which can be renewed once. The terms of the
independent board members are longer than those served by school representatives. One
member, voted on annually by all the independent members, will serve as a lead independent
member and can serve in that role for no more than three years.
Files\\SI2 - NCAA Announces Undrafted Players May Return To School, Relaxed Agent
Rules - § 2 references coded [ 3.97% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.53% Coverage
The NCAA clarified that this rule would only apply after the NBA and NBPA begin allowing
players to be drafted out of high school, meaning 2021 at the earliest.
Reference 2 - 2.44% Coverage
USA Basketball has not had any substantive conversations with the NCAA or given their
approval for these changes yet, ESPN’s Jonathan Givony reports. It is unclear how this decision
will impact high school players who are not USA Basketball eligible.
Files\\SI4 - Despite the Judge’s View, the College Hoops Trial Was Always About the
NCAA’s Archaic Rules - § 1 reference coded [ 1.82% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.82% Coverage
Time and time again Kaplan made clear that the case’s central question was not whether the
individuals standing trial had violated these regulations, but if they had undertaken criminal
actions in doing so and hiding it from the colleges these recruits planned to attend.
Files\\SI5 - Why the Prosecution Won in the College Hoops Corruption Trial and What’s Next
- § 1 reference coded [ 1.08% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.08% Coverage
Michael McCann is SI’s legal analyst. He is also Associate Dean of the University of New
Hampshire School of Law and editor and co-author of The Oxford Handbook of American
Sports Law and Court Justice: The Inside Story of My Battle Against the NCAA.
Files\\TDG1 - Drake Group Blames Outdated NCAA Amateur Status Rules for Criminalizing
Outside Athlete Compensation - § 3 references coded [ 9.26% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.60% Coverage
Following the announcement of FBI indictments for under-the-table athlete payments, B. David
Ridpath, President of The Drake Group, issued the following statement highly critical of the
NCAA and its member institutions:
Reference 2 - 3.63% Coverage
Although the latest scandal that has enveloped college sports is not surprising, it was stunning to
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see the federal government getting involved in policing college sports. Despite everything
reported in the last week being only allegations, The Drake Group believes it is only right for the
FBI to pursue any allegation concerning those who do not declare compensation for criminal tax
evasion and to go after public companies that conceal payments to college athletes and avoid
paying payroll and other taxes.
Reference 3 - 4.03% Coverage
The NCAA should throw out its ingenuous use of “amateur” which really has not represented
reality since the association’s beginnings in 1905, remove restrictions on agents and outside
employment and treat athletes like other students. It is time for higher education to get back to its
business of education by making sure athletic scholarships are guaranteed four-to-ﬁve-year
grants for a college education rather than treating athletes as indentured servants so that others
can get rich while denying college athletes basic rights afforded all other students.
Files\\TDG2 - The Drake Group Finds that the Independent Commission on College
Basketball Missed an Opportunity to Recommend Comprehensive Reform - § 4 references
coded [ 6.58% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
The Drake Group (TDG), whose mission is to defend academic integrity in higher education
from the corrosive aspects of commercialized college sports, found, in response to the recently
released report by the Independent Commission on College Basketball chaired by Dr.
Condoleezza Rice, that the Commission got some things right, but missed the mark on several
key issues regarding reform in college sports.
Reference 2 - 2.19% Coverage
TDG strongly believes that elite development opportunities should exist outside of
intercollegiate athletics and that professional leagues have an
obligation not to impede that effort. Should athletes be good enough to go professional, they
should be allowed to do so at a time that is best for them. Also, if athletes want to attend college
they should be allowed to do that for as long or short a time as they desire just as other nonathlete students have such options.
Reference 3 - 1.01% Coverage
TDG also believes the Commission was on point asking for a complete overhaul of the broken
NCAA enforcement and infractions system along with advocating penalties that actually punish
and deter future bad behavior.
Reference 4 - 1.45% Coverage
TDG and other groups have long critiqued the insular and limited NCAA enforcement and
adjudication process as a facade of governance rather than a process in which unbiased
investigators and adjudicators execute real enforcement and
effective penalties. TDG has long supported the overhauling of this area.
Files\\TKC1 - Knight Commission Sees Integrity of College Sports at Risk - § 3 references
coded [ 6.09% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
“The Commission is deeply troubled by mounting evidence that the NCAA is unable to ensure a

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

162

level of integrity that must be a priority in the education and treatment of college athletes,” said
Commission co-chair Arne Duncan, former U.S. Secretary of Education, “These threats to the
integrity of college sports are an urgent call to reform, if ever there was one.”
Reference 2 - 0.93% Coverage
“It’s clear that we need a new approach that can provide more fairness to student-athletes, while
giving more teeth to the NCAA to ensure academic integrity in college sports,”
Reference 3 - 3.24% Coverage
The Knight Commission was formed by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation in October
1989 to promote reforms that support and strengthen the educational mission of college sports.
Over the years, the NCAA has adopted a number of the Commission’s recommendations,
including the rule that requires teams to be on track to graduate at least 50 percent of their
players to be eligible for postseason competition. The Commission’s Athletic and Academic
Spending Database provides ﬁnancial data for more than 220 public Division I institutions,
creating greater ﬁnancial transparency on athletics spending.
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 5 references coded [ 15.45% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage
Over our more than 25-year history, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics has
established a legacy of promoting reforms that support and strengthen the educational mission of
college sports.
Reference 2 - 1.74% Coverage
Early efforts called on presidents themselves to govern college sports with tougher academic
standards that ultimately helped lead to improved graduation success for athletes.
Reference 3 - 3.13% Coverage
Collectively, these reforms made significant improvements to Division I intercollegiate athletics
by placing greater value on the “college” in college sports. However, further change still is
needed and men’s college basketball, in particular, needs a far more radical overhaul than what
has taken place in recent years.
Reference 4 - 3.28% Coverage
These recommendations grew out of research conducted for the Knight Commission with
university presidents and higher education leaders in 2009 and again in 2012, and from the many
public meetings the Commission has held over the years with university presidents, faculty,
athletics administrators, coaches, athletes and other experts.
Reference 5 - 5.30% Coverage
A few coaches’ associations have implemented successful programs for coaches to achieve
various levels of coaching licenses but the associations for men’s basketball and football have
not. It is telling, we think, that the only competency or training requirement for any NCAA
Division I coach is passing an open-book NCAA recruiting rules test. Some institutions and
conferences are doing more in this area than others, but college sports would be helped with
incentives or requirements that place a greater emphasis on coaches’ roles as educators.
Files\\TKC3 - Statements in Response to the Report by the Commission on College Basketball
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- § 1 reference coded [ 3.19% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 3.19% Coverage
“We applaud the far-reaching reforms recommended by the Commission on College Basketball,
which we will examine at the Knight Commission public meeting May 7 in Washington, D.C.,”
Files\\TKC4 - Knight Commission Urges Tougher NCAA Reforms to Regain Public
Confidence in College Sports - § 1 reference coded [ 1.56% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.56% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball concluded that “NCAA schools are not doing enough to
develop the next generation of coaches.” The Knight Commission agrees with that conclusion
and recommends the development of minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches must
meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles in the education and development of studentathletes. Such standards could require the completion of diﬀerent levels of coaching licenses or
professional certiﬁcates to redress the profession’s lax — and in some cases nonexistent —
certiﬁcation and licensure standards.
Files\\TKC5 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations - § 4 references coded [ 10.32%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.74% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics met on May 7, 2018 and proposed the
following recommendations for the NCAA to consider as complementary reforms to those
advanced by the Commission on College Basketball. The roster of Knight Commission members
involved in these deliberations is attached.
Reference 2 - 2.73% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new financial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
affiliated with the NCAA.
Reference 3 - 1.48% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball concluded that “NCAA schools are not doing enough to
develop the next generation of coaches.” The Knight Commission agrees with that conclusion
and makes its recommendation to address this critical shortcoming in all sports.
Reference 4 - 4.38% Coverage
Concerning basketball, USA Basketball currently provides a coaching certification program for
youth basketball coaches. Coaches of youth teams playing in NCAA-certified basketball events
for recruiting purposes are required to have a USA Basketball coaching license, which requires a
background check and completion of a “SafeSport” course. More than 23,000 youth basketball
coaches were certified by USA Basketball last year and 19,000 of those certifications were
connected to coaches who completed the certification to have their teams play in NCAAcertified events. While USA Basketball has a similar requirement for the 10 or so college
coaches annually who coach their national teams, the NCAA does not require any minimal
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standard for coaches of NCAA basketball teams
Files\\TKC6 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations Cover Letter - § 2 references coded [
7.38% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage
Thank you for the opportunity to submit information to you and the NCAA working groups.
Reference 2 - 5.39% Coverage
We are glad to answer any questions you or members of the working groups might have. Knight
Commission CEO Amy Perko can arrange any follow-up conversation with us. She can be
reached at 910-551-6809 or at perko@knightcommission.org.
Files\\WP2 - College basketball commission calls for rules changes, but sticks with
amateurism - § 4 references coded [ 6.99% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.49% Coverage
In an effort to solve the “crisis of accountability” in college basketball, a commission chaired by
former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice on Wednesday issued substantive, far-reaching
recommendations that called for tougher penalties for NCAA rules violations, financial
transparency by apparel companies and an end to the NBA’s “one-and-done” rule.
Reference 2 - 2.10% Coverage
The relationship between shoe companies and college basketball has long bedeviled NCAA and
college officials. In their quests to gain advantages on signing NBA prospects, Nike, Adidas and
Under Armour all sponsor extensive grass-roots leagues for teenagers across the country. And
observers of the game have wondered whether there is a quid-pro-quo in cases in which Nike’s
grass-roots stars sign with Nikesponsored college teams and top Adidas grass-roots stars sign
with Adidas-sponsored college teams.
Reference 3 - 1.50% Coverage
With members of the panel seated on either side, Rice called on every stakeholder in college
basketball — coaches, athletic directors, university presidents, boards of trustees, the NCAA,
apparel companies, athletes and their parents — to “accept their culpability in getting us to where
we are today.” And where we are, Rice made plain at the outset, is a “crisis.”
Reference 4 - 1.90% Coverage
ESPN analyst Jay Bilas said he believes the commission “got a lot right” — particularly in
calling for athletes to be able to confer with licensed agents and declare for the draft without
losing their college eligibility. Bilas also favors the idea of an independent entity to investigate
NCAA infractions, as well as the addition of outside professionals to the NCAA governing board
to get away from the college sports “echo chamber” in which nothing ever changes.
Files\\WP3 - Breaking down the NCAA basketball report - The key word is
‘recommendations’ - § 2 references coded [ 2.89% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.91% Coverage
It’s important to remember that the commission’s recommendations are just that:
recommendations of an independent group. When and how any rule changes will be adopted or
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implemented is up to the NCAA member schools. As the report read, “the NCAA is not really
Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions.” For the NCAA to implement any
change, even those it can control, its member schools have to be on board.
Reference 2 - 0.98% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? No. That’s up to the NBA and its players’ union, which require that
players be at least 19 years old or at least one year removed from the graduation of their high
school class before entering the draft.
Files\\WP4 - Whites oppose — and blacks support — paying NCAA athletes, especially when
they’re thinking about race - § 11 references coded [ 26.86% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.88% Coverage
Last Monday, Kylia Carter, the mother of former Duke basketball star Wendell Carter, gave a
passionate speech arguing that today’s college basketball system is equivalent to slavery. Carter
was reacting to the April 25 release of the Commission on College Basketball’s long-awaited
report on corruption in the NCAA. Created after bribery scandals involving highly prized
basketball recruits, the commission offered a host of recommendations, including imposing harsh
penalties on athletic programs that knowingly violate NCAA rules.
Reference 2 - 1.65% Coverage
Conspicuously absent, however, was any suggestion that college athletes should be paid a salary.
As former secretary of state and commission chair Condoleezza Rice explained, “Our focus has
been to strengthen the collegiate model — not to move toward one that brings aspects of
professionalism into the game.”
Reference 3 - 1.86% Coverage
That infuriated more people than Kylia Carter. “Pay for play,” as it’s called, is championed by an
increasingly vocal group of journalists, broadcasters, economists, former players and their
families. They argue that because the NCAA brings in billions of dollars in annual revenue from
college athletics, college athletes should receive a share.
Reference 4 - 2.29% Coverage
The NCAA has refused, claiming that “pay for play” will lead college sports fans to stay home
and tune out. NCAA President Mark Emmert argues that “one of the biggest reasons fans like
college sports is that they believe the athletes are really students who play for a love of the sport.
… To convert college sports into professional sports would [lead to a product that is not]
successful either for fan support or for the fan experience.”
Reference 5 - 0.97% Coverage
A number of recent commentators have tried to make this explicit, with arguments such as, “The
NCAA isn’t just perpetuating a financial injustice. It’s also committing a racial one.”
Reference 6 - 3.10% Coverage
Studies of intergroup relations show that people have “deep-seated psychological predispositions
that partition the world into in-groups and out-groups — into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ ” Decades of
research on the influence of these group attachments suggests that even the most “minimal”
group identities can lead people to exhibit favoritism toward in-group members and bias toward
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out-group members. In earlier research, we showed that the “racialization” of “pay for play”
leads racially resentful whites to oppose changes to the NCAA’s current policy. But that’s only
half the story.
Reference 7 - 2.36% Coverage
Using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we conducted a survey
experiment on a nationally representative sample of 1,013 Americans. Of those respondents, 164
identified as African American. We presented each African American respondent with a list of
fictional college athletes and asked them to “indicate which of the college athletes you are
familiar with and which of the college athletes you are unfamiliar with.”
Reference 8 - 2.30% Coverage
One group of respondents saw a list of stereotypically white names (e.g., Connor Woods, Brady
White and Cody Myers). Another group saw a list of stereotypically African American names
(e.g., Darnell Booker, D’Andre Walker and Donte Jackson). This technique, used in numerous
studies of discrimination, primed respondents to think about the racial identities of the college
athletes who might benefit from a change to “pay for play.”
Reference 9 - 5.65% Coverage
Immediately after reading this experimental treatment, respondents were asked:
Some people believe that college athletes should receive salaries in addition to their scholarships.
Others disagree with this position and believe that college athletes should only receive
scholarships. Do you agree or disagree that college athletes should receive a salary in addition to
their scholarships?
To see whether African Americans who felt especially strongly attached to their racial group
responded differently from those who didn’t, we also asked a number of questions designed to
measure what social scientists call “linked fate” and “ethnocentrism.”
We assessed their perceptions of “linked fate” with the question, “Do you think what happens
generally to African Americans in this country will have something to do with what happens in
your life?” In line with previous work on ethnocentrism, we classified African American
respondents as ethnocentric when they scored African Americans more positively on a “feeling
thermometer” than they scored whites.
Reference 10 - 1.69% Coverage
It’s important to note that our study was relatively small, involving just 164 African American
respondents. That’s a perennial challenge in diving into nationally representative samples to
study subgroups of racial minorities. So, we should be cautious in drawing too firm a conclusion
until more studies are done.
Reference 11 - 2.11% Coverage
But the findings are consistent with the large body of literature showing that group dynamics —
often characterized as “us vs. them” — strongly influence attitudes among racially resentful
whites and African Americans. If the debate about compensating college athletes continues to
implicitly and explicitly invoke race, our research suggests that the black-white divide is likely to
persist.
Files\\WP5 - College sports programs aren’t victims of fraud. They’re participants - § 9
references coded [ 20.31% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 3.21% Coverage
Invoking organized crime is not a stretch here. U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan did it the
other day during the trial of Adidas executives Jim Gatto and Merl Code and aspiring agent
Christian Dawkins for wire fraud. Kaplan, quite rightly, forbade defense
attorneys from arguing their clients should be acquitted because “everyone is doing it.” Such
arguments don’t hold up in cases of insider trading or mafia cases, either, Kaplan pointed out.
“The guys in the Five Families are just doing their jobs, too, I suppose,” he said.
Reference 2 - 2.15% Coverage
A year ago, the feds boasted that this investigation, which included arrests of 10 minor figures,
would roll up the corruption in college athletics. “We have your playbook,” FBI assistant
director William Sweeney Jr. boasted to all those engaging in corrupt practices.
But in fact, they don’t have the playbook at all. That, or they are hopelessly naive.
Reference 3 - 2.63% Coverage
Instead of headline-hunting, prosecutors could have charted the real structure of illegal activity.
Just as they do with any other racket, they would build a triangle. They’d start low and move
upward to indictments of the kingpins. That hasn’t happened here. On Monday, T.J. Gassnola,
the former Adidas bagman, continued his testimony, in which he has done a fine job of
undercutting the prosecutors’ case that schools are victims.
Reference 4 - 2.20% Coverage
Defense attorneys presented text messages between Gassnola and Kansas Coach Bill Self that
showed the coach was well aware of Adidas’s efforts to steer recruits to him, if not the method.
Gassnola assured Self that Adidas was “here to help” in getting players for the school, which was
finalizing a 12-year, $191 million sponsorship deal with the sneaker company.
Reference 5 - 1.21% Coverage
Gassnola also testified that he agreed to pay $20,000 to Fenny Falmagne, the guardian of power
forward Silvio De Sousa, to get the big kid out from under an alleged cash deal with a large
Maryland donor.
Reference 6 - 2.05% Coverage
What Gassnola is describing is a conspiracy. A racket.
And let’s be perfectly clear on who the real victims and perpetrators of it are. The real victims
are not school officials who lunged at huge financial arrangements with shoe companies and
boosters, then tried to isolate themselves from shady dealings with implausible deniability.
Reference 7 - 1.42% Coverage
Six months ago, a report issued by the Condoleezza Rice-led NCAA Commission on College
Basketball did a better job of delineating this conspiracy than professional prosecutors. The Rice
report
contained two important statements.
Reference 8 - 2.58% Coverage
First of all, Rice averred, “Everybody knows.” The commission was told time and again that all
parties, from the top down, were aware of these financial arrangements. Rice also stated this:
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“Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise; athletes play for their school and receive a
realistic chance to complete a college degree in return.” The continual violations of that trust and
the promise are the real crimes.
Reference 9 - 2.87% Coverage
The cases that the Southern District should be bringing, if any, are RICO cases against
universities. In RICO language, athletic
departments, shoe companies and high-dollar donors have had an “association in fact.” They
have operated as loosely joined enterprises, engaged in a common purpose with an underlying
pattern of fraud.
If prosecutors want to call recruiting schemes criminal, then roll up the whole networks. Go after
the Five Families of college athletics.
Deontological Ethics
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 2 references coded [ 6.72% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.83% Coverage
Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 2 - 4.89% Coverage
Creating the right relationship between the universities and colleges of the NCAA and its
national ofﬁce to promote transparency and accountability. The commission will be asked to
evaluate whether the appropriate degree of authority is vested in the current enforcement and
eligibility processes, and if the collaborative model provides the investigative tools, cultural
incentives and structures to ensure exploitation and corruption cannot hide in college sports.
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 17 references
coded [ 15.04% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.96% Coverage
It has been a pleasure to work with the members of this Commission, and I want to thank each of
you for your fine service. I can tell you that the hours and hours of work and travel have been,
for all of us, a labor of love. Each and every one of us loves the game. We love the dedication
and the effort of the young men who play it. We marvel at their talents and skill – their
perseverance and their commitment. We believe in the educational value of college sports.
Reference 2 - 1.08% Coverage
The members of this commission come from a wide variety of backgrounds. Some among us
played the game at the highest levels; others coached or led programs; others come from the
realm of public service; and some of us are educators --- dedicated to teaching and learning as a
way of life. That is why it has been painful for us to hear the testimony from multiple
constituencies stating that the trust that is intercollegiate athletics in general – and college
basketball in particular – has often been violated.
Reference 3 - 0.72% Coverage
Our recommendations are detailed because the problems in college basketball are complex and
the resolution of them requires precise remedies. This Commission has worked hard to devise
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these recommendations. You can be sure that we will continue to be involved as key regulatory
bodies undertake their work to implement these changes.
Reference 4 - 0.41% Coverage
This work will not be easy, but we need to make a start – and a bold one -- to turn the ship in the
right direction. For the good of all involved, we need to put the “college” back in college
basketball.
Reference 5 - 0.24% Coverage
If these players are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the collegiate model
will be reduced.
Reference 6 - 1.86% Coverage
I want to note that the Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s
and NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make studentathletes who
attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years. By requiring
students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their education, the
baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn degrees. However, it
would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against their will, where they
will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the undermining of the collegiate
model. Players with professional earning power should be able to choose a professional path.
The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier for them to return and
complete their degrees.
Reference 7 - 0.54% Coverage
We further recommend that the NCAA incentivize better behavior from agents by decertifying
any agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation and also deeming any student-athlete
who enters into an agreement with a non-certified agent ineligible.
Reference 8 - 1.05% Coverage
I want to take a moment to address the issue of allowing student athletes to earn some financial
benefit from the marketing of their name, image, and likeness. I know this is an issue on the
minds of many, and the Commission thought long and hard about this. In the end, we respected
the fact that the legal ramifications of NCAA action on name, image, and likeness are currently
before the courts. We don’t believe that the NCAA can legislate in this area until the legal
parameters become clearer.
Reference 9 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Reference 10 - 1.25% Coverage
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First, the NCAA should create independent investigative and adjudicative arms to address and
resolve complex and serious cases involving violation of NCAA rules. As of now, volunteers
who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions resolve these cases, and during our
Commission testimony not a single stakeholder supported the current system for handling highstakes infractions. Today’s current state where an entire community knows of significant rule
breaking and yet the governance body lacks the power or will to investigate and act breeds
cynicism and contempt.
Reference 11 - 0.90% Coverage
To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement and resolution of high stakes
cases must be placed in the hands of independent professionals. A panel of professional
adjudicators, appointed for a term of years, must make final and binding decisions and must have
the authority to impose substantial punishments, including the loss of post-season play and the
revenues from post-season play.
Reference 12 - 0.49% Coverage
Currently, the rewards for violating the rules far outweigh the risks, and we recommend
significant increases in the penalties imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of
NCAA rules to reverse this calculation.
Reference 13 - 0.81% Coverage
To address this weakness, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a
coach or athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA rules be
subject to significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program reoffends, up to an
including a ban of up to five years from post-season tournaments, including the NCAA
tournament.
Reference 14 - 0.56% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring college and
university presidents, coaches, and athletic directors to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA rules.
Reference 15 - 0.71% Coverage
The NCAA must have jurisdiction to address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent that it
affects student-athletes’ eligibility. Member institutions can no longer be permitted to defend a
fraud or misconduct case on the ground that all students, not just athletes, were permitted to
“benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Reference 16 - 0.69% Coverage
That development would include not only basketball, but also academic and life skills, health and
collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program would be NCAAadministered regional
non-scholastic basketball events in July that would be the only ones that NCAA coaches attend
in that crucial recruiting month.
Reference 17 - 1.27% Coverage
But the NCAA and NCAA coaches should no longer associate with non-scholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. The Commission also endorses and recommends adoption of a
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number of rule changes recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches and
other organizations to reduce the influence of third parties and increase the ability of college
coaches to interact with recruits and current players. These rule changes can we found in the full
report we are releasing today.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 101 references coded [ 17.79% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage
In brief, it is the overwhelming assessment of the Commission that the state of
men’s college basketball is deeply troubled. The levels of corruption and deception are now at a
point that they threaten the very survival of the college game as we know it. It has taken some
time to get here, and it will take time to change course.
Reference 2 - 0.04% Coverage
Lost in the talk of big money and corruption is colleges’ central mission to provide higher
education to students.
Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage
There is debate about how to measure the graduation rate for college students, including studentathletes. There is, however, general agreement that the graduation rate for men’s Division I
basketball players lags behind that of other student-athletes, perhaps significantly.1
NCAA schools must take seriously
the obligation to help all student-athletes obtain the education they are promised.
Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission believes that the answer to many of college basketball’s
problems lies in a renewed commitment to the college degree as the centerpiece of intercollegiate
athletics. Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise: athletes play for their schools and
receive a realistic chance to complete a college degree in return. Any policy or action that
violates that trust is morally wrong.
Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage
College basketball, like college sports generally, is to be played by studentathletes who are members of the collegiate community, not paid professionals.
Reference 6 - 0.10% Coverage
Given the undeniable impact of “big money” on the college game, it is fair to ask whether the
ideal of college basketball played by student-athletes who are part of the academic community –
not hired guns for a season or two – is still viable. The answer is yes, and the effort is worth
making. Transformative changes are necessary,
Reference 7 - 0.13% Coverage
The one-and-done regime may have provided some benefits for the NBA and the NCAA in the
past, but all stakeholders agree that the downsides now outweigh any benefits. One-and-done has
played a significant role in corrupting and destabilizing college basketball, restricting the
freedom of choice of players, and undermining the relationship of college basketball to the
mission of higher education.
Reference 8 - 0.11% Coverage
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The Commission is concerned about one unintended consequence of ending one-and-done,
specifically the potential abuse of the NCAA’s current practice of granting immediate collegiate
eligibility to high school players who “reclassify”— i.e., those who make themselves eligible to
enter college prior to the graduation date of their high school class.
Reference 9 - 0.12% Coverage
We fear that, should the NBA and the NBPA make 18 the minimum age for entry into the NBA,
the growing trend of reclassification will accelerate, creating a new generation of 17-year-old
one-and-done players. The Commission urges the NCAA to monitor this situation and to enact
appropriate rule changes if that potential abuse occurs with the end of one-and-done.
Reference 10 - 0.13% Coverage
In that circumstance, the Commission will reconvene and consider the other tools at its disposal.
These could range from the baseball rule, to freshman ineligibility, to “locking up” scholarships
for three or four years if the recipient leaves the program for the NBA after a single year. That
would be a disincentive to recruit an athlete for a one-year run at the title. In short, the current
situation is untenable.
Reference 11 - 0.11% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their
professional prospects. Players who think they are surefire professionals are often mistaken. The
numbers tell this story: Only a very small percentage of NCAA men’s basketball players make it
to the NBA (around 1.2%), let alone have successful careers.2
Reference 12 - 0.15% Coverage
For similar reasons, the Commission also has concluded that one aspect of the
current transfer rule – the requirement that a player who transfers sit out for a year – remain in
place. Even under the current rule, an astounding 600-plus Division I men’s basketball players
transferred this year, in the hope of greener basketball pastures. Forty percent of players who
enter Division I basketball from high school leave their original schools by sophomore year.
Reference 13 - 0.11% Coverage
Players who transfer are less likely to complete their
Third parties often influence transfer decisions for their own purposes and without thought to the
impact of transfer on the student-athlete. The detrimental effect of transfer on a student-athlete’s
education means that transferring should not be made easier for basketball’s sake.
Reference 14 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for certifying agents and allow NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at an appropriate point in their high school careers to be determined by the NCAA.
Reference 15 - 0.12% Coverage
The NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive to develop meaningful standards for
NCAA certification and administer the program. Among other requirements, the rules should
mandate that agents notify colleges when they are retained by a matriculating student-athlete.
The program should also educate studentathletes about eligibility rules and requirements.
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Reference 16 - 0.09% Coverage
Elite high school and college players need earlier professional advice, including
whether to declare for the draft or whether college basketball offers a superior pathway. If
NCAA rules do not allow them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 17 - 0.05% Coverage
The NCAA rules should provide that student-athletes may meet and contract with NCAAcertified agents and that they will not lose their eligibility by doing so.
Reference 18 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA incentivize better behavior
from agents. This can be done through making clear the benefits of certification and the cost of
the loss of certification. An agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation must lose his or
her certification.
Reference 19 - 0.10% Coverage
A student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter into an
agreement, with a non-certified agent will lose his eligibility. In addition, the NCAA and the
NBPA should report to each other agents’ violations of their respective rules, increasing the
potential costs of violating NCAA rules.
Reference 20 - 0.15% Coverage
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic basketball, the
Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players about their professional
and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health and more. Student-athletes must
have the information they need to understand their real choices and be better positioned to take
advantage of either the collegiate or the professional path they choose.
Reference 21 - 0.11% Coverage
One significant counter to that argument is that many Division I student-athletes benefit
enormously from engaging in intercollegiate sports. In addition to receiving full scholarships up
to the cost of attendance (ranging from $13,392 to $71,585 for in-state students and from
$18,125$71,585 for out-of-state students depending on the institution),
Reference 22 - 0.15% Coverage
receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career advice and
more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars annually.10
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11
As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced Again, the Commission
agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to assist
student-athletes in earning their degrees.
Reference 23 - 0.32% Coverage
The Commission is familiar with the related debate about whether studentathletes should earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, images and
likenesses (NIL). Many argue that allowing these payments would be analogous to the receipt of
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funds by collegiate Olympians and thus consistent with the collegiate model, particularly if
students did not receive the funds until after college. The NCAA is a defendant in litigation
involving such payments, which appears to raise fundamental questions about whether these and
similar payments are consistent with the collegiate model. The court stated that “[t]he difference
between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums
untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed,
we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon
v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
Reference 24 - 0.14% Coverage
If a college or university is using a student-athlete’s NIL for commercial purposes, the school
must ask that student-athlete for consent, which must be voluntarily given. See also NCAA
Bylaw 12.5 (Promotional Activities) (describing permissible and nonpermissible uses). When the
legal parameters relevant to this issue are clearer,12
the
Commission also believes that the NCAA should reconsider its treatment of studentathletes’
NIL.
Reference 25 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 26 - 0.05% Coverage
significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must receive an
education that is valuable, not a pretense.
Reference 27 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA create independent investigative
and adjudicative arms to address and resolve complex and serious cases (hereafter “complex
cases”) involving violations of NCAA rules.
Reference 28 - 0.12% Coverage
Stakeholders informed the Commission that when the stakes are high, colleges
are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles and NCAA
rules often are not enforced. Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations.
Reference 29 - 0.14% Coverage
No stakeholder supported the current system for handling high-stakes infractions. Many
informed us that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that led to this
Commission, the reaction was that “everyone knows” that these payments occur. That state of
affairs – where the entire community knows of significant rule breaking and yet the governance
body lacks the power or will to investigate and act – breeds cynicism and contempt.

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

175

Reference 30 - 0.03% Coverage
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement processes require a complete overhaul.
Reference 31 - 0.15% Coverage
Complex cases must be thoroughly investigated, and resolved by neutral professional
adjudicators, with authority to impose punishment that will have a significant deterrent effect.
The investigative arm must be independent and empowered to require the cooperation of
witnesses and the production of documents, including financial information, from NCAA
member institutions and their employees and contractors, with significant penalties for noncooperation.
Reference 32 - 0.12% Coverage
In addition, these and all NCAA investigators must exercise reasonable prosecutorial discretion
and common sense so that resources are focused on serious infractions and punishment is
appropriately calibrated and consistently administered. There are multiple examples of minor
infractions that are not worth the time and effort that the NCAA now spends on them.
Reference 33 - 0.11% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA enact significant increases in the penalties
imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of NCAA rules. Currently, the rewards for
violating the rules far outweigh the risks. To reverse this calculation, the Commission
recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
Reference 34 - 0.21% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue
sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire period of the ban;
(iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv) increase the
penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than one season; and (v) increase the
penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans.
Reference 35 - 0.17% Coverage
In addition, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a coach or
athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA rules be subject to
significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program reoffends, up to and including a ban
of up to five years from post-season tournaments, including the NCAA tournament, and a loss of
revenues from those tournaments for that same period. There must be significant risk associated
with employing an individual who is under a show cause order.
Reference 36 - 0.17% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual
accountability for rules violations for coaches, athletic directors and college presidents. The
NCAA must amend its rules to require colleges to include in contracts with administrators and
coaches individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including
financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA enforcement proceedings,
decisions and discipline, up to and including discharge.
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Reference 37 - 0.08% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA
Reference 38 - 0.19% Coverage
These individuals will find it much easier to do so if they enact comprehensive
compliance programs at their institutions. The costs of compliance may be significant, but they
should be small by comparison to the costs of being found in violation of NCAA rules. The
NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals if they knew or should
have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including termination. These
penalties should be mitigated or enhanced depending up the presence and effectiveness of the
institution’s compliance program.
Reference 39 - 0.11% Coverage
Coaches are the public focus of blame for NCAA violations. For too long, college
presidents and administrators have not been viewed as accountable for the conduct of their
athletic programs. That will have to change. College presidents and highlevel administrators
cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the infractions in those programs.
Reference 40 - 0.26% Coverage
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
Reference 41 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 42 - 0.34% Coverage
In the near term, the Commission recommends that the NCAA promptly adopt
and enforce rigorous criteria for certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches
attend. In order for the NCAA to certify a non-scholastic basketball event, the owners, event
operators, sponsors, and coaches for the event must agree to financial transparency about all
events they run, including those that are not certified by the NCAA. This requirement includes
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agreement (i) to be subject to audit and to provide all required IRS and other tax filings upon
request; (ii) to disclose all sources of financing and other payments and the recipients of all funds
provided for or collected in relation to the event; and (iii) to disclose any financial relationship
between the event sponsors and coaches with any administrator, coach or booster at any NCAA
school. The money flowing from apparel companies and other third parties into non-scholastic
basketball must be disclosed and accounted for, in order to address the corruption arising from
non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 43 - 0.19% Coverage
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have educational
components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that requirement more
effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families, including travel, meals,
accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must be disclosed to the NCAA, along
with the source of their provision. The NCAA must enforce the requirement that such benefits be
reasonable and appropriate and assure that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying
the timing or providing the benefits to another.
Reference 44 - 0.30% Coverage
Currently, non-scholastic basketball is an ungoverned space with coaches, players and their
families, agents and sponsors exchanging money and goods in the hope of future benefits and
without accountability. Of particular importance to the Commission are the cases in which nonscholastic basketball event operators and coaches seek benefits from colleges and college
coaches in exchange for influencing their players’ college choices. To recruit effectively, many
NCAA coaches need to attend non-scholastic basketball events in which large numbers of elite
players participate. In turn, these events, leagues and teams attract high school players by giving
them the opportunity to be seen and evaluated annually by college coaches. Thus, using its
certification requirement, the NCAA has some leverage to impose the financial transparency
requirements and other reforms that the Commission recommends above.
Reference 45 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 46 - 0.22% Coverage
In sum, the NCAA and NCAA coaches may no longer associate with nonscholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
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regardless of when they are held. Moreover, in light of the recommendation that players be
permitted to choose a professional pathway at an earlier time, the NCAA and others should
devote significant resources to earlier development, including education, for players in youth
basketball. The corruption we observe in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. The
reforms recommended by the Commission will be fruitless unless the NCAA gives serious
attention to regulating summer programs.
Reference 47 - 0.28% Coverage
The NCAA has often failed to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). But, the NCAA is
not really Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions. When those institutions and
those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and norms in order to achieve oncourt success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these individuals hide behind the NCAA
when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded state of intercollegiate athletics, in
general, and college basketball in particular. The Commission makes these recommendations to
support fulfillment of the NCAA’s purposes and to impose accountability on institutions and
individuals undermining their achievement.
Reference 48 - 0.10% Coverage
Since 2006, NBA teams have drafted an average of eight college freshman each year. Most of
these one-and-done players attended one of six schools.15
However, the
small numbers mask a large issue with respect to third-party influence and corruption, as well as
the corruption of academic standards.
Reference 49 - 0.24% Coverage
For a subset of these players who have no intention of spending more than a year or two in
college or whose time is fully consumed by basketball, maintaining academic eligibility to play
may be a challenge. If that player is good enough, however, the school may be strongly
motivated to assist that student-athlete in maintaining his eligibility. This situation creates
another opening for corruption – the manipulation and dilution of academic standards by school
officials, along with other academic misconduct. A series of recent cases involve this
phenomenon. Other cases illustrate the lack of clarity about the NCAA’s rules and the likely
punishment for academic misconduct, as well as inconsistency in the NCAA’s application of the
rules
Reference 50 - 0.22% Coverage
In addition, elite high school players currently understand that in order to play Division I
basketball, they must meet the eligibility requirements to attend a Division I school. See NCAA
Division I Bylaw 14.3 (Freshman Academic Requirements). Because numerous players who will
not play professional basketball nonetheless believe that they will, these players gain the benefit
of educational levels and opportunities that they might otherwise have forgone. The Commission
takes these benefits seriously and, in particular, does not underestimate the transformative
possibilities in attaining academic eligibility for college or in spending a year or more in college.
Reference 51 - 0.10% Coverage
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The NCAA’s current rules on amateurism place limits on the ability of those players to test the
professional market for their services and to obtain assistance from an agent in assessing their
potential value. This, in turn, may prevent student-athletes from taking full advantage of their
collegiate opportunities.
Reference 52 - 0.10% Coverage
There appears to be a strong consensus that when the stakes are high – i.e.,
when violations are serious and the potential penalties are substantial – the NCAA’s member
institutions are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles
and NCAA rules are not being effectively enforced.
Reference 53 - 0.11% Coverage
Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are limited and often appear
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations. The Commission did not hear from a single stakeholder who supported
the current system in addressing high-stakes infractions.
Reference 54 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 55 - 0.19% Coverage
Virtually all stakeholders, including NCAA staff, expressed the view that the current model for
adjudication of NCAA rules violations should not continue. Representatives of member
institutions that have crosscutting and potentially self-interested incentives with respect to
punishment administer the NCAA’s current adjudication process. While many stakeholders
expressed gratitude and respect for the hard work of the volunteers who administer the current
infractions process, all expressed the belief that the current system is not working in cases
involving serious violations.
Reference 56 - 0.14% Coverage
Stakeholders further suggested that the Commission consider whether the substantive content of
certain NCAA rules is contributing to the problems identified above. Stakeholders identified
numerous issues with the NCAA’s current rules governing eligibility, amateurism and recruiting.
As noted above, they also expressed the view that the consequences for rule violators were
insufficient in many instances and excessive in others.
Reference 57 - 0.08% Coverage
Some stakeholders believe that the NCAA should not be in the business of
enforcing academic standards. However, many others assert that the NCAA’s current rules with
respect to academic standards undermine the integrity of the collegiate experience and game.
Reference 58 - 0.33% Coverage
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

180

regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams qualify as
“amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years. Although there are
exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to receive compensation in any
form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a contract or commitment to play
professional athletics, to receive consideration from a professional sports organization, to
compete on a professional team and to enter into an agreement with an agent. In addition, a
student-athlete cannot receive preferential treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic
reputation or skill, unless specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws
12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or
Competition), 12.1.2 (Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
Reference 59 - 0.18% Coverage
Others recognize the validity of some of these points, but contend the studentathletes receive significant benefits from their college experiences, including the value of the
scholarship (the full cost of a college education), the associated training, coaching and benefits of
being on a collegiate team, and the lifelong incremental increase in earning power resulting from
a college degree. See ES Section 1.D. Many believe that paying players is not financially or
legally feasible and that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the collegiate game.
Reference 60 - 0.10% Coverage
They support a variety of means – other than payment – to address the economic circumstances
and equities of student-athletes in high-revenue sports, and to ensure that they receive the
education that the college promises. In addition, they support continued enforcement of the
amateurism rules.
Reference 61 - 0.24% Coverage
Still others believe that the NCAA rules are so focused on pre-professional sports that the NCAA
has failed to create a system that makes sense for the majority of studentathletes who will not
make a living at their sports. Under these rules, stakeholders assert, student-athletes who accept
any “benefit,” no matter how small, risk losing their eligibility to compete. The NCAA’s
administration of the “no benefit” rule, see NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2 (Nonpermissible), was
criticized as penalizing student-athletes and preventing them from engaging in normal
interactions with friends and mentors. Those holding this view suggest that the NCAA should
engage in common sense calibration of the “no benefit” rule for particular contexts.
Reference 62 - 0.28% Coverage
Agents. NCAA rules further forbid collegiate athletes to enter into any agreement (oral or
written) with agents for purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial
gain, even if that agreement is limited to future representation. Prohibited marketing includes
negotiations with professional teams, seeking product endorsements and efforts to place an
athlete at a particular school. The rules likewise forbid family members or other representatives
to enter into such an agreement on behalf of an athlete. In addition, athletes may not accept
benefits from agents even if those benefits do not have strings visibly attached. NCAA Division I
Bylaws 12.3.1 (General Rule); 12.3.1.2 (Representation for Future Negotiations); 12.02.1
(Agent); 12.3.3 (Athletics Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1.3 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).18
Reference 63 - 0.07% Coverage
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It would be better, stakeholders argue, if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by
restricting contact to specific times and places.
Reference 64 - 0.24% Coverage
Still other stakeholders, including a number of agents, took the position that allowing agents to
have contact with high school students will result in even earlier agent involvement in studentathletes’ decision making, including their selection of a grassroots or non-scholastic basketball
coach, a high school, a college, etc. These stakeholders maintain that the barriers to entry for
professional agents should be higher (while recognizing that the NBPA has recently taken
important steps to improve the quality of the agent cadre), and that the penalties for agents who
violate NCAA rules should be higher (either through enforcement of state laws or through
reporting of violations to the NBPA or other unspecified rule changes).
Reference 65 - 0.16% Coverage
Recruiting. In the view of many Division I coaches, the NCAA rules hamstring college coaches
and allow non-scholastic coaches and other third parties to become the primary influences over
elite high school players. For example, Division I coaches have limited opportunities to evaluate
high school players in both scholastic and nonscholastic settings, and those players cannot
officially visit colleges and universities until late in their junior year. See generally NCAA
Division I Bylaws, Art. 13.
Reference 66 - 0.34% Coverage
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to impose
harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents) who violate the
rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate with NCAA
investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the ability to impose loss
of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of revenue from post-season play
on those who commit serious infractions and those who decline to cooperate with NCAA
investigations. They believe that the availability – and utilization – of these penalties would get
presidential and board-level attention at colleges. These persons further note that administrators,
athletic directors and coaches who violate the rules often move on to other member institutions,
and do not pay a significant price for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the
institutions that hire individuals who have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking
the risk of hiring past offenders.
Reference 67 - 0.25% Coverage
That said, virtually all stakeholders expressed the view that currently, nonscholastic basketball
lacks sufficient regulation, with detrimental effects on college basketball. For example,
significant money flows into summer ball from apparel companies, agents, investment advisers
and other sources, and there is little accountability or transparency about many of the sources and
expenditures of those funds. Many state that it is well known that student-athletes are paid –
either directly or indirectly (through family members or otherwise) – to play for particular
summer teams. Almost all elite basketball players participate in non-scholastic basketball. Thus,
as noted above, many players and their families are accustomed to being paid before they attend
college.
Reference 68 - 0.07% Coverage
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Under the current system, Division I men’s basketball players are amateurs (student-athletes) and
may receive a scholarship to matriculate and play basketball for their institution, but may not be
paid for doing so.
Reference 69 - 0.16% Coverage
In the context described above, however, a player may be strongly tempted to break NCAA rules
and enter into a relationship with an agent or attend a particular college in order to be paid.
Similarly, coaches and other college representatives may be strongly tempted to pay players,
family members and others who can influence players to attend particular schools. As illustrated
by the recent charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, this possibility is not merely
theoretical.
Reference 70 - 0.15% Coverage
Many of these incentives for third-party conduct are present not only when high school players
enter college, but also when college players consider transferring to another institution. As noted
above, roughly 40% of freshmen in Division I men’s basketball depart the institution they choose
to attend by the end of their sophomore year. Third parties influence many of these transfers. The
question of improper influence, accordingly, clearly extends to transfers.
Reference 71 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 72 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling
their intercollegiate athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the
NCAA. NCAA Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s
activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its members’
acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
Reference 73 - 0.22% Coverage
In the Commission’s view, preventing young athletes capable of and preferring to
play in the NBA from doing so, and pushing them into enrolling in college for a single year (or
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less), is doing more harm than good for college basketball and college. The potential earning
power of marquee college players who can win championships for their schools is an irresistible
draw for third-party attention and money, most notably from athlete advisors. Their gamechanging potential for a college team creates the strongest motivation for improper payments
from third parties and violations of NCAA rules by school administrators, coaches and other
persons associated with member institutions.
Reference 74 - 0.19% Coverage
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can also corrupt
the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special benefits to these
athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all students. Finally, the
matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short time primarily to play
Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain student-athletes will not, as a
practical matter, be college students.
Reference 75 - 0.20% Coverage
If the NBA and the NBPA were to adopt the “baseball rule,” we believe that the
challenges created by the presence of one-and-done players would simply migrate to older future
NBA players unhappily captive in their second and third collegiate years. Holding players with
NBA opportunities hostage also feeds the narrative of collegiate player exploitation, putting
pressure on the NCAA’s commitment to the collegiate model. Players with professional earning
power should have the freedom to choose a professional path. The Commission believes that
student-athletes should be encouraged but not forced to remain in college.
Reference 76 - 0.31% Coverage
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a season before
returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.1 (Residence
Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious disadvantages in
completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this issue, over the last few years,
hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is upward.22
Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be in a better
“basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover, third parties influence
many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best interests of the player in mind.
Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence requirement” of the transfer rule remain
in place, whatever other changes are made in the NCAA’s transfer rules.
Reference 77 - 0.20% Coverage
The NCAA’s rules already allow student-athletes to retain lawyers and advisors to
provide professional advice at market value, provided the lawyer or advisor does not engage in
the representational activities of agents. NCAA-certified agents should also be permitted to
provide such advice. Further, high school players considering entering the draft should be
allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors just as high school baseball players may
engage agents for advice about the draft. Cf. NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.3.1 (Exception –
Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey – Prior to Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment).
Reference 78 - 0.24% Coverage
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The Commission understands that contact with agents can lead to illicit payments and other rule
violations. It thus recommends serious consequences for NCAAcertified agents who participate
in violations of NCAA rules. For example, such agents should lose their NCAA certification and
be barred from non-scholastic basketball events certified by the NCAA (see Section 3, infra). In
addition, agents who the NCAA decertifies may not pass along representation of their studentathlete clients to other agents at the same agency. Such agents should also be reported to the
NBPA. Finally, a student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter
into an agreement, with a non-certified agent should lose his eligibility.
Reference 79 - 0.19% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for degree completion for student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave
college after progress of two years towards a degree. The NCAA must require Division I
programs to establish a Degree Completion Program to support degree completion by studentathletes who compete and complete two years of college and then leave school, but later seek to
return to college to finish their education. The NCAA and its member institutions must keep
focused on the prize here – a college degree.
Reference 80 - 0.12% Coverage
As described above, the Commission starts from the premise that students
who are athletes – not paid professionals – play college sports. It is worth noting that studentathletes choose the collegiate path, and we want to enhance their ability to decide whether to do
so. But they are making a choice; if it is not the right choice and a professional path is more
desirable, they should take it.
Reference 81 - 0.32% Coverage
Opponents of pay-for-play strongly believe that college basketball should remain a game played
by student-athletes that has unique value and appeal. They also strongly resist the argument that
student-athletes do not benefit from attending college and participating in intercollegiate
basketball. Their counter is simple. Student-athletes in fact benefit enormously. They receive full
scholarships up to the cost of attendance, see ES Section 1.D. Students with demonstrated
financial need are also eligible for Pell grants of $5,800 annually. Student-athletes often receive
benefits such as meals, special academic support, travel expenses, coaching, training and
nutritional advice, career guidance and more, worth tens of thousands of dollars annually.
Obviously, studentathletes who remain in school for four years receive four times this value,
along with the increased earning power of a college degree, which is roughly $1 million over a
lifetime. See ES Section 1.D.
Reference 82 - 0.28% Coverage
One aspect of this debate is particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate. Paying modest
salaries to Division I basketball players will not address the particular corruption the
Commission confronts; nor will providing student-athletes a modest post-graduation trust fund
based on licensing of names, images and likenesses. None of the contemplated payments would
be sufficient to reduce the corrupt incentives of third parties who pay certain uniquely talented
players in the hope of latching onto their professional futures, of coaches and boosters seeking to
secure the success of their programs, or of colleges willing to undermine their education mission
to ensure the eligibility of players. One would have to adopt a full-scale professional model to
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forestall that corruption or, as the Commission recommends, try instead to revitalize the college
model.
Reference 83 - 0.12% Coverage
The court stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is
a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
Reference 84 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 85 - 0.35% Coverage
The consensus view – including within the NCAA – is that the NCAA investigative
and enforcement process is broken. The NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles
do not work in situations when large sums of money and serious reputational damage is at stake.
Schools and individuals “lawyer up” to protect their financial and reputational interests. The
current NCAA system does not provide its personnel with the tools and authority necessary to
investigate complex cases and effectively prosecute violators of the rules. Decision makers are
volunteers and NCAA members; they face perceived conflicts of interest in adjudicating
complex cases with adverse consequences for the credibility of the process. Punishment is often
unpredictable and inadequate to deter violations. In many cases, the process takes years, and the
NCAA imposes punishment long after the departure of bad actors. Prominent coaches and
administrators escape accountability for what they knew or should have known was occurring in
their programs. A significant institutional overhaul is required.
Reference 86 - 0.44% Coverage
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes to cooperate in
NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can consider in assessing penalties. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The
NCAA also must adopt rules that require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate
with NCAA investigations, with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing
significant consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically, to
participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents, administrators, and
coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including by providing documents
and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators. In addition, while the NCAA does not have
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subpoena power, it can adopt rules requiring as a condition of membership, that member
institutions enter into contractual agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member
institutions contractually impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents,
administrators and coaches. NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report
and provide evidence of violations.
Reference 87 - 0.12% Coverage
Third, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a
coach, athletic director or other administrator under a show cause order for a previous violation
of NCAA rules must receive enhanced penalties if that individual’s program reoffends.
Institutions that hire an individual under a show cause order must be aware that
they are taking a significant risk.
Reference 88 - 0.20% Coverage
Fourth, the Commission recommends that the NCAA highlight the availability
of a five-year ban from the NCAA tournament and the loss of all revenues from the tournament
for that same period for member institutions’ programs found to have engaged in systematic,
severe and repeated violations of NCAA rules. The Commission acknowledges that imposing
this penalty will result in significant punishment of innocent members of the college community
and beyond, and that it must be limited to the extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, the NCAA
should use this punishment where necessary to address sufficiently grave patterns of misconduct.
Reference 89 - 0.07% Coverage
The NCAA must require member institutions’ contracts with these individuals to include
agreement to be subject to NCAA enforcement investigations and infractions decisions and
discipline, up to and including discharge.
Reference 90 - 0.10% Coverage
certify annually that they have conducted due diligence and that their athletic programs comply
with NCAA rules. The NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals
if they knew or should have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including
termination.
Reference 91 - 0.36% Coverage
In terms of substantive rules changes, the NCAA’s jurisdiction with respect to academic issues
must be clarified, stated in amended rules and communicated to member institutions. The rules
must be amended to allow the NCAA to address all academic fraud and cheating to the extent it
is used to corrupt athletic eligibility. Member institutions should not be able to shield academic
fraud to ensure athletic eligibility by extending that fraud to the entire student body. In addition,
the NCAA’s imposition of discipline for academic fraud and misconduct has been inconsistent
and untimely. The relationship between punishment and the school’s involvement, including its
self-reporting, is unclear. Member institutions do not fulfill their commitment to student-athletes
when they allow them to maintain eligibility through academic fraud or misconduct. The NCAA
must also amend its rules to clarify the standard for academic fraud and misconduct and to
establish consistent punishments for the violations of these rules. Going forward, the NCAA
must apply a revised standard consistently across member institutions.
Reference 92 - 0.34% Coverage
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Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified nonscholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 93 - 0.28% Coverage
Putting to one side agents paying large sums of money to players, the
Commission heard comments that collegiate players or their families may receive from agents a
meal or minor travel expenses or some other small benefit that those with limited financial
means are strongly tempted to accept. The Commission concludes that the NCAA and its
member institutions must enhance the resources of Student Assistance Funds and educate
student-athletes about the benefits that it can provide to address the legitimate school-related
needs of student-athletes. NCAA Division I Bylaws 15.01.6.1, 16.11.1.8 (Student Assistance
Fund). Specifically, the Commission believes that the Fund should be increased and used for
additional purposes, such as providing Division I schools with the resources to assist parents and
families to travel to student-athletes’ games, subject to means testing
Reference 94 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 95 - 0.15% Coverage
The Commission notes that during its meetings with representatives of
several apparel companies with high profiles in professional and college basketball, all expressed
a commitment to a culture of compliance at their companies. This commitment included respect
for and adherence to NCAA rules and a willingness to be transparent about their relationships
with college coaches and professional agents and about their expenditures in non-scholastic
basketball.
Reference 96 - 0.25% Coverage
While these statements were welcome, the Commission does not believe that
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the apparel companies have always delivered on this promise. In fact, it was difficult to ascertain
how closely these companies track funding for non-scholastic basketball and associated
activities. The Commission will formally ask the boards and leadership in these companies to
make a commitment to transparency and accountability for the expenditure of company funds in
college and non-scholastic basketball, particularly in light of the recent indictments in the
Southern District of New York. Indeed, the Commission looks forward to statements but more
importantly actions by these public companies that demonstrate their commitment to integrity
and accountability in this space.
Reference 97 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission recommends that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional
camps each summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during that
time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted to account for these
events.
Reference 98 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 99 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 100 - 0.15% Coverage
Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not in execution — such
as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems. Others should be easy to execute
— specific changes in the available punishments under Article 19 and in the recruiting rules.
Some do not require rules changes, but instead the devotion of financial and administrative
resource to planning, for example, the creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps.
Reference 101 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\CCB4 - Recruiting and College Choice Study - § 1 reference coded [ 0.73% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.73% Coverage
Three-quarters of elite players indicated that the rules regarding “testing the waters” while
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remaining eligible are clear to them, as compared to 59% of non-elite players.
Files\\ESPN1 - Why the college basketball scandal won’t get fixed until the NCAA pays
athletes - § 2 references coded [ 1.33% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.47% Coverage
We have seen big scandals before, and as long as we maintain the current corrupt system and
rules, we will be here again.
Reference 2 - 0.85% Coverage
Why do you suppose we don’t see such scandals in Division II or Division III sports? Money. In
Divisions II and III, the salaries, revenues and expenditures are in line with the stated missions of
the institutions.
Files\\ESPN5 - Why the NCAA hoops scandal will likely spread as trial starts - § 3 references
coded [ 3.47% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.39% Coverage
Arizona officials have denied multiple openrecords requests from ESPN for any subpoenas the
university received from the federal government for information and grand jury testimony related
to the investigation. They repeatedly cited "the balancing test established by the Arizona courts
to protect the best interests of the state."
Reference 2 - 0.24% Coverage
It’s not yet clear how the NCAA will react toward any schools
Reference 3 - 1.84% Coverage
change that took effect immediately was allowing people investigating NCAA cases to accept
information established by another administrative body, including a court of law, government
agency, accrediting body or a commission authorized by a school. For example, the NCAA could
accept evidence and findings from the federal government’s investigation and punish those found
guilty of wrongdoing -- without conducting its own investigation.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 4 references coded [
6.68% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.79% Coverage
With two of the NCAA’s highest-ranking committees committing to take swift action to correct
issues facing college basketball, NCAA leaders called upon their members Thursday to own the
challenges facing them and to set college sports on a path guided by its long-held values.
Reference 2 - 2.41% Coverage
In a packed room at the Indiana Convention Center, NCAA Board of Governors Chair G.P.
“Bud” Peterson and NCAA President Mark Emmert challenged members gathered for the 2018
NCAA Convention to act consistently with their commitments to academics, fairness and
student-athlete well-being and use them to clean up the problems undermining the foundation of
college sports.
Reference 3 - 0.93% Coverage
to create new opportunities to express the Association’s values, and to establish college sports as
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a leader in the day’s most pressing issues.
Reference 4 - 1.54% Coverage
But as Emmert agreed with the vision Jones displayed, he also stressed that the work points back
to the values upon which college sports is built and illustrates the positive outcomes that result
from making decisions based on those values.
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 5 references coded
[ 8.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.91% Coverage
Dr. Rice and the members of the commission were clear. The collegiate model should be
strengthened and preserved.
Reference 2 - 1.56% Coverage
The Board of Governors will begin to implement Association-wide actions and Division I
members now will begin the task of applying the recommendations to Division I rules, policy
and structure.
Reference 3 - 1.23% Coverage
Section 2: Establish Professional Neutral Investigation and Adjudication of Serious Infractions
and Hold Institutions and Individuals Accountable
Reference 4 - 3.34% Coverage
Enact and Impose Core Punishments with Signiﬁcant Deterrent Effect. Core penalties should be
increased to allow 1) 5-yr postseason ban for Level I violations; 2) loss of all revenue sharing in
postseason play for the entire ban; 3) lifetime bans for a show-cause order; 4) allow bans of more
than one season for head coach violations; 5) increase penalties to allow full-year visit bans for
recruiting visit violations.
Reference 5 - 1.08% Coverage
Require coaches, athletic directors and college presidents to certify annually that their athletic
programs comply with NCAA rules.
Files\\NCAA3 - NCAA Provides Reinstatement Decision for Kansas’ Silvio De Sousa - § 4
references coded [ 27.95% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.60% Coverage
University of Kansas men’s basketball student-athlete Silvio De Sousa must sit out the remainder
of the 2018-19 season and the 2019-20 season because his guardian received payment from a
university booster and agent and agreed to receive additional funds from the same person.
Reference 2 - 6.18% Coverage
According to the facts provided for purposes of the reinstatement request, De Sousa’s guardian
received payment of $2,500 from an agent and booster of the school. He agreed to accept
additional payment of $20,000 from the same individual and an Adidas employee for securing
De Sousa’s enrollment at Kansas.
Reference 3 - 7.26% Coverage
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According to the guidelines adopted by the NCAA Division I membership, when a prospective
studentathlete allows a third party to involve himself in the recruitment process, the prospective
student-athlete is then responsible for the actions of that person, regardless of whether the
prospective student-athlete had knowledge or if beneﬁts were received.
Reference 4 - 8.91% Coverage
When a school discovers an NCAA rules violation has occurred, it must declare the studentathlete ineligible and may request the student-athlete’s eligibility be reinstated. The NCAA staff
reviews each student-athlete reinstatement request individually based on its own speciﬁc facts.
This decision may be appealed to the Division I Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee,
which is comprised of representatives from NCAA schools.
Files\\NCAA4 - NCAA Statement from Mark Emmert on Federal Investigation - § 5
references coded [ 17.73% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.12% Coverage
"The nature of the charges brought by the federal government are deeply disturbing
Reference 2 - 2.89% Coverage
e have no tolerance whatsoever for this alleged behavior.
Reference 3 - 4.06% Coverage
Coaches hold a unique position of trust with student-athletes and their families
Reference 4 - 3.06% Coverage
suggest an extraordinary and despicable breach of that trust
Reference 5 - 3.59% Coverage
and of course will support the ongoing criminal federal investigation.
Files\\NCAA5 - NCAA to Help Certify June Basketball Events - § 4 references coded [ 9.37%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.15% Coverage
“The support of the NCAA for the criteria has underscored the importance of maintaining an
education-based focus on event formats and in the selection of host sites. We appreciate the
positive collaboration that we have shared with the NCAA and look forward to the
implementation of successful June events.”
Reference 2 - 2.86% Coverage
The NCAA criteria address fundamental requirements for applicants to meet before they can be
certiﬁed to host an event. Among the requirements, schools and coaches must be in good
standing with the host high school association and the host coaches associations, events must
ensure their staffs and coaches pass background checks, and players must be currently eligible to
compete for their high school teams.
Reference 3 - 2.54% Coverage
The criteria also require host applicants to be members of the National High School Basketball
Coaches Association or, where there is no state high school basketball coaches association,
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members of the recognized state high school coaches association. Non-NFHS high school
associations also may apply to host events, provided they meet certain requirements.
Reference 4 - 1.82% Coverage
High schools participating in the June events also are required to have existed for a full academic
year, be governed by a high school association that has been in existence for a full academic
year, and have an appropriate status with the NCAA Eligibility Center.
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 2 references coded [ 4.47% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.57% Coverage
Add fresh perspective and independent judgment to NCAA decision-making at the highest level
of policymaking and in investigations and case resolution.
Reference 2 - 1.90% Coverage
Strengthen accountability and deter future rule-breaking with harsher penalties for those who
break the rules.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 3 references coded [ 7.05% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.08% Coverage
Individuals who break the trust on which college sports is based have no place here.
Reference 2 - 2.32% Coverage
Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 3 - 3.64% Coverage
I believe we can — and we must — ﬁnd a way to protect the integrity of college sports by
addressing both sides of the coin: fairness and opportunity for college athletes, coupled with the
enforcement capability to hold accountable those who undermine the standards of our
community.
Files\\NYT2 - The Corruption at the Heart of March Madness - § 3 references coded [ 9.78%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.18% Coverage
Other N.C.A.A. practices are in need of reform, like the “one-and-done” phenomenon, in which
high school stars play at universities for just a year before moving on to professional careers.
Reference 2 - 4.27% Coverage
This situation arose after the National Basketball Association and its players’ union agreed to bar
players before they have turned 19 or until a year after high school graduation. Previously, high
school players could sign on and earn full professional salaries — safe from the no-income
college rules and ﬁctions that invite the sort of abuses laid bare in the complaints.
Reference 3 - 3.33% Coverage
College basketball programs unscrupulously compete for top players to earn more from the
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immense pot of proﬁt from television. The complaints cast a spotlight on that greed and
hypocrisy, which is infesting what is supposed to be, but hasn’t been for some time, an innocent
and amateur sport.
Files\\NYT3 - Amid Scandal, N.C.A.A. Forms Commission to Reform Men’s Basketball - § 1
reference coded [ 1.17% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.17% Coverage
But he drew the line at changes to the amateur model, which prevents colleges from
compensating athletes beyond scholarships and related costs.
Files\\NYT4 - N.C.A.A. Panel Proposes Reforms, Including End to ‘One and Done’ - § 6
references coded [ 8.24% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.17% Coverage
But while the proposed changes would alter the texture of the sport, they stopped well short of
challenging the longtime requirement that the college athletes remain amateurs, uncompensated
beyond a scholarship and a stipend for their talents and efforts.
Reference 2 - 2.07% Coverage
Eliminating one-and-done would produce a noticeable difference in how the sport has operated
for more than a decade. The most talented players play only their freshman season, attend
college for less than a year and mainly congregate at a few programs, notably Kentucky and
Duke. The commission said that if the N.B.A. and its players’ union did not change the rule, it
would reconvene to consider unilateral alternatives such as freshman ineligibility.
Reference 3 - 1.66% Coverage
And yet throughout the report the commission performed a delicate dance — acknowledging that
the very corruption it sought to eliminate arose in part because players generate substantial sums
for high school teams, agents, money managers, college teams, coaches and shoe companies but
can’t take money beyond a scholarship and related costs of attending school.
Reference 4 - 0.61% Coverage
In fact, many of the commissioners endorsed providing athletes with a cut of the revenue they
helped generate, according to Ms. Rice.
Reference 5 - 1.55% Coverage
She said the commission declined to address this topic because of pending litigation. Plaintiffs in
the so-called Jenkins case want a federal court to strike down the N.C.A.A. ban on player
compensation on antitrust grounds.
A lawyer representing the Jenkins plaintiffs, Jeffrey Kessler, said that his case concerned a
different nuance.
Reference 6 - 1.18% Coverage
Gabe Feldman, director of Tulane’s sports law program, said allowing contact with agents was
provocative. “That was completely taboo for a very, very long time,” he said, adding that any
major changes to N.C.A.A. rules would take time. “It’s a big ship to move.”
Files\\NYT5 - N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corruption
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Scandal - § 3 references coded [ 4.78% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.01% Coverage
But the governing body stopped short of making the more fundamental changes to the amateur
model that some have long sought.
Reference 2 - 2.50% Coverage
The federal investigation has brought attention to open secrets in men’s college basketball,
including the involvement of agents and the power the gigantic apparel companies exert over the
system by showering many millions of dollars every year on both college teams and precollege
grass-roots leagues.
Reference 3 - 1.26% Coverage
The accusations also raised anew the question of whether to allow some athletes to collect
compensation beyond a scholarship and an educational stipend.
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 5 references coded [
6.80% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.32% Coverage
College basketball players can be represented by an agent beginning after any basketball season
if they request an evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee.
Reference 2 - 0.81% Coverage
Agents can pay for meals and transportation for players and their families if the expenses are
related to the
Reference 3 - 0.79% Coverage
Also, the student cannot miss class, and the money must be spent where the student lives or
attends school
Reference 4 - 1.92% Coverage
All agreements between agents and high school or college student-athletes must be:
In writing. Terminated when the student enrolls in or returns to college. Disclosed to the NCAA
(for high school students) or the school (for students already in college).
Reference 5 - 1.96% Coverage
College basketball players who request an Undergraduate Advisory Committee evaluation,
participate in the NBA combine and aren’t drafted can return to school as long as they notify
their athletics director of their intent by 5 p.m. the Monday after the draft.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 1 reference coded [ 6.46%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.46% Coverage
Basketball-related events for high school students will be subject to more rigorous certiﬁcation
requirements to ensure transparency in operations and ﬁnances. This will address issues of
corruption and help support student-athletes as they make decisions about their future. The
certiﬁcation criteria will be overseen by the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Oversight
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Committee, and the NCAA Enforcement Certiﬁcation and Approvals Group will administer the
certiﬁcation program.
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 3 references coded [
19.50% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 7.80% Coverage
Changes to the investigations and infractions process create independent groups to prevent
conﬂicts of interest. Cases deemed complex will be eligible for this independent process.
Examples of complex cases include alleged violations of core NCAA values, such as prioritizing
academics and the well-being of studentathletes; the possibility of major penalties; or adversarial
behavior. Multiple parties will be able to request a case be deemed complex: school
representatives, NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions members or NCAA enforcement
staff.
Reference 2 - 6.52% Coverage
When a school, the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions or NCAA enforcement staff
requests a case enter the new independent process, this committee reviews and makes decisions
on those requests. The committee’s ﬁve members will include one Independent Resolution Panel
member (see below), one Division I Committee on Infractions member, one Division I
Infractions Appeals Committee member, the Division I Council chair and the NCAA vice
president of enforcement.
Reference 3 - 5.17% Coverage
This group will review the ﬁndings from the Complex Case Unit and the school’s response to
those ﬁndings, and then oversee the case hearing and decide penalties. The panel will consist of
15 members with legal, higher education and/or sports backgrounds who are not afﬁliated with
NCAA member schools or conferences. Each case will be handled by a panel of ﬁve of the 15
members.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 3 references coded [
18.30% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.93% Coverage
The chair of the Division I Committee on Infractions or the Independent College Sports
Adjudication Panel can impose immediate penalties when schools or individuals do not
cooperate (including loss of revenue or postseason opportunities). These bodies can consider
lack of cooperation as admission of a violation.
Reference 2 - 6.42% Coverage
People charged with investigating and resolving NCAA cases can accept information established
by another administrative body, including a court of law, government agency, accrediting body
or a commission authorized by a school. This will save time and resources previously used to
conﬁrm information already adjudicated by another group.
Reference 3 - 5.95% Coverage
When schools and NCAA staff agree on the facts of a case, they can work together on a
resolution, including appropriate penalties, if any. This change will reduce legal fees and
minimize drawn-out adversarial situations. Agreed-upon resolutions are subject to approval by
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the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions.
Files\\Reforms5 - Stronger Accountability, Penalties - § 2 references coded [ 16.02%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.59% Coverage
To deter future violations, presidents, coaches and staff have stronger, clearer accountability
expectations and face increased penalties if they break the rules.
Reference 2 - 11.43% Coverage
Those who break the rules face stronger penalties, including longer postseason bans (up to ﬁve
years), longer head coach suspensions (could extend beyond one season), longer employment
limitations for coaches and staff who violate rules (potential for lifetime show-cause orders),
increased recruiting restrictions and the loss of all revenue associated with the Division I NCAA
Men’s Basketball Championship
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 21.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 21.12% Coverage
Pending adoption at the NCAA Convention in January, ﬁve independent members will be added
to the NCAA Board of Governors, which is responsible for oversight of the entire Association.
Each member will be nominated by the Board of Governors Executive Committee, approved by
the full board and serve a threeyear term, which can be renewed once. The terms of the
independent board members are longer than those served by school representatives. One
member, voted on annually by all the independent members, will serve as a lead independent
member and can serve in that role for no more than three years.
Files\\SI2 - NCAA Announces Undrafted Players May Return To School, Relaxed Agent
Rules - § 2 references coded [ 2.51% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.53% Coverage
The NCAA clarified that this rule would only apply after the NBA and NBPA begin allowing
players to be drafted out of high school, meaning 2021 at the earliest.
Reference 2 - 0.98% Coverage
The new policies were put in place to prevent further corruption and dissuade future rulebreakers.
Files\\SI3 - A Bust, and No Boom - One Year After the College Hoops Scandal Broke, What’s
Truly Changed~ - § 3 references coded [ 7.21% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.12% Coverage
But those eligible for this benefit are limited to 1) incoming freshmen who have been designated
“elite senior prospects” by USA Basketball and 2) underclassmen who declare for the draft and
get invited to the NBA’s combine but are not selected, which rarely happens.
Reference 2 - 2.34% Coverage
In the process, the NCAA excluded those not ticketed for the NBA but who want to gauge pro
opportunities overseas, as well as those not part of USA Basketball—a body reportedly rankled
by not having been consulted in the NCAA’s decision to bestow on it the power to determine
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who is agent-eligible.
Reference 3 - 2.75% Coverage
Still unaddressed are the core economic realities and motivations fueling the black market, so
simple any student-athlete being compensated with Economics 101 credits could explain it: The
players have a value to schools, coaches, boosters, communities and shoe companies that is
drastically out of line with what they can receive in return.
Files\\SI4 - Despite the Judge’s View, the College Hoops Trial Was Always About the
NCAA’s Archaic Rules - § 8 references coded [ 11.54% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.52% Coverage
It is important not to lose sight of this scene’s root cause: the NCAA’s rules.
Reference 2 - 0.79% Coverage
Which is why, regardless of Kaplan’s instructions to the jury, this case was indeed about the
NCAA rulebook all along.
Reference 3 - 1.25% Coverage
Blaming rules for rule-breaking is often seen as a bad-faith tactic for absolving blame, and
understandably so. But in this case it is the rules themselves that have been made in bad faith.
Reference 4 - 1.04% Coverage
These players, as has been argued by an increasing number of voices and as was thoroughly
demonstrated in this trial, have a value far exceeding this slice.
Reference 5 - 1.22% Coverage
The coaches are paid in part on the basis of being able to attract these players; the apparel
companies are partly inspired to enter contracts with the schools in order to be associated
Reference 6 - 0.92% Coverage
Yet the NCAA’s rules force the market for these players’ services into the shadows—the place
where the defendants and their ilk operate.
Reference 7 - 3.66% Coverage
These denials may set the stage for the defense’s case in appeals court, where it could find more
sympathetic ears. But in the meantime three men face potential prison time because they
included players and their families into the mutually beneficial financial relationship enjoyed by
the schools and companies that relies on said players’ talents— and the body in charge of the
sport decided it cannot stand as much, elevating what otherwise seems like natural market forces
into something the government could convince a jury is a federal crime.
Reference 8 - 2.15% Coverage
In their minds this trial, which was ostensibly not about NCAA rules, had sufficiently proven the
defendants’ guilt. To those not bound by the confines of a judge’s instructions and a trial’s scope,
a truer blame lay elsewhere, in the very rules whose violation were this crime’s original sin—and
constitute the NCAA’s too
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 2 references coded [ 6.84% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 1.54% Coverage
The second broad recommendation is for the NCAA, conferences and/or institutions to develop
standards to emphasize coaches’ responsibilities as educators.
Reference 2 - 5.30% Coverage
A few coaches’ associations have implemented successful programs for coaches to achieve
various levels of coaching licenses but the associations for men’s basketball and football have
not. It is telling, we think, that the only competency or training requirement for any NCAA
Division I coach is passing an open-book NCAA recruiting rules test. Some institutions and
conferences are doing more in this area than others, but college sports would be helped with
incentives or requirements that place a greater emphasis on coaches’ roles as educators.
Files\\TKC5 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations - § 2 references coded [ 5.01%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.63% Coverage
As a matter of guiding principle, independent directors should ultimately comprise majorities of
both boards.
Reference 2 - 4.38% Coverage
Concerning basketball, USA Basketball currently provides a coaching certification program for
youth basketball coaches. Coaches of youth teams playing in NCAA-certified basketball events
for recruiting purposes are required to have a USA Basketball coaching license, which requires a
background check and completion of a “SafeSport” course. More than 23,000 youth basketball
coaches were certified by USA Basketball last year and 19,000 of those certifications were
connected to coaches who completed the certification to have their teams play in NCAAcertified events. While USA Basketball has a similar requirement for the 10 or so college
coaches annually who coach their national teams, the NCAA does not require any minimal
standard for coaches of NCAA basketball teams
Files\\WP1 - After another NCAA basketball scandal, let’s be honest - This is how college
sports works - § 3 references coded [ 10.11% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.27% Coverage
The four assistant coaches arrested aren’t victims, for sure, because they surely knew what they
were doing was against rules, if not laws. But they are part of a machine that is powered by the
basic structure of college sports. When a system has billions of dollars flowing into it — and the
NCAA’s contract with CBS and Turner Sports for the NCAA tournament alone is worth $8.8
billion through 2032 — and yet has a major part of the workforce that is unpaid, well, then, how
is this not the end result?
Reference 2 - 2.40% Coverage
Six years ago, Michael Beasley laid out much of how this works. The Prince George’s County
kid was one of the most heralded recruits in the country back in 2006. He played one year at
Kansas State (yep, nothing strange going on there) and then became the second pick in the NBA
draft.
Reference 3 - 3.44% Coverage
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Either way, given the current structure of college sports, we’re only minutes away from the next
violation — whether it’s exposed or not. There is drama on Tuesday, for sure, and the more
details we learn, the more damning it will feel to those individual coaches, to those individual
programs. And yet, we know — despite the inevitable upcoming denials from all sorts of sources
— it’s not just them.
Files\\WP2 - College basketball commission calls for rules changes, but sticks with
amateurism - § 3 references coded [ 2.75% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.36% Coverage
But the panel consistently rejected remedies that would “professionalize” the sport.
Reference 2 - 1.59% Coverage
But he was disappointed that the report didn’t tackle college basketball’s commercialization head
on. College basketball is a multibillion dollar industry in which coaches and schools make
millions from shoe companies, Bilas noted, but paying players — or providing them anything
more than a cost-of-living stipend and chance at an education — is cast by the report as “morally
wrong.”
Reference 3 - 0.80% Coverage
While Emmert and the NCAA lauded the commission’s work, the National College Players
Association — a nonprofit that represents the interests of college athletes — panned the results
as a failure
Files\\WP3 - Breaking down the NCAA basketball report - The key word is
‘recommendations’ - § 5 references coded [ 9.74% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.98% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? No. That’s up to the NBA and its players’ union, which require that
players be at least 19 years old or at least one year removed from the graduation of their high
school class before entering the draft.
Reference 2 - 2.28% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, with some help. The idea behind this recommendation is that high
school and college players seeking professional advice — including whether to declare for the
draft — often do so illicitly because NCAA rules don’t allow players to openly speak with paid
advisers. Rice’s commission recommended the NCAA appoint a vice president-level executive
to develop standards for certifying agents, and to administer a program that enforces rules for
contact between agents and players.
Reference 3 - 2.41% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, but it will take big changes. The commission concluded that “the
NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are inadequate to effectively investigate and
address serious violations of NCAA rules in consequential situations” and called for “a complete
overhaul” of how infractions are handled. It recommended the creation of independent bodies to
investigate and impose punishment on member schools to commit violations, and that penalties
be given for schools that do not cooperate with investigator.
Reference 4 - 2.76% Coverage
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Can the NCAA do that? Definitely not on its own. The commission made three
recommendations meant to clean up college recruiting: certifying non-scholastic basketball
events attended by coaches of its member schools (for example, summer AAU tournaments);
calling for increased financial transparency from the apparel companies, who in addition to
sponsoring AAU tournaments and teams and have extensive relationships with colleges and
individual coaches; and finally, suggesting the NCAA administer its own youth basketball
programs and recruiting events, with support from the NBA and USA Basketball.
Reference 5 - 1.30% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, since coaches are employees of member schools. The commission
recommended a few things here, including allowing coaches to attend two weeks of scholasticsponsored events in June and three weekends of NCAA-sponsored events (once they’re
established) in July.
Files\\WP4 - Whites oppose — and blacks support — paying NCAA athletes, especially when
they’re thinking about race - § 3 references coded [ 5.79% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.65% Coverage
Conspicuously absent, however, was any suggestion that college athletes should be paid a salary.
As former secretary of state and commission chair Condoleezza Rice explained, “Our focus has
been to strengthen the collegiate model — not to move toward one that brings aspects of
professionalism into the game.”
Reference 2 - 1.86% Coverage
That infuriated more people than Kylia Carter. “Pay for play,” as it’s called, is championed by an
increasingly vocal group of journalists, broadcasters, economists, former players and their
families. They argue that because the NCAA brings in billions of dollars in annual revenue from
college athletics, college athletes should receive a share.
Reference 3 - 2.29% Coverage
The NCAA has refused, claiming that “pay for play” will lead college sports fans to stay home
and tune out. NCAA President Mark Emmert argues that “one of the biggest reasons fans like
college sports is that they believe the athletes are really students who play for a love of the sport.
… To convert college sports into professional sports would [lead to a product that is not]
successful either for fan support or for the fan experience.”
Files\\WP5 - College sports programs aren’t victims of fraud. They’re participants - § 4
references coded [ 11.28% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.91% Coverage
If federal prosecutors really want to clean up the muck in college basketball, then they should do
it right and bring a racketeering case against a major university. One that sweeps up the entire
operation: the big-donor trustee, the head coach, the athletic director, the college president and
any others who are complicit in a corrupt enterprise. But if the feds don’t care to target those
white collars for their fraudulent behavior, then they shouldn’t be bringing cases at all.
Reference 2 - 3.45% Coverage
That kind of prosecution would have real impact. Think about it: The next time a high-dollar
donor uses his influence to hijack a university and run it like a mafia town, when cash is
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laundryfunneled to blue-chip recruits in order to grab at prestige and a bigger share of $1 billion
in NCAA tournament revenue, slap a RICO case on him. And on the chancellor and coach who
tolerate academic frauds, and the athletic director who makes the backscratching, multimilliondollar financial deal with a sneaker company. That would fix the NCAA with one fell swoop of
indictments.
Reference 3 - 2.05% Coverage
What Gassnola is describing is a conspiracy. A racket.
And let’s be perfectly clear on who the real victims and perpetrators of it are. The real victims
are not school officials who lunged at huge financial arrangements with shoe companies and
boosters, then tried to isolate themselves from shady dealings with implausible deniability.
Reference 4 - 2.87% Coverage
The cases that the Southern District should be bringing, if any, are RICO cases against
universities. In RICO language, athletic
departments, shoe companies and high-dollar donors have had an “association in fact.” They
have operated as loosely joined enterprises, engaged in a common purpose with an underlying
pattern of fraud.
If prosecutors want to call recruiting schemes criminal, then roll up the whole networks. Go after
the Five Families of college athletics.
Emotional Appeal
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 7 references
coded [ 4.43% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.25% Coverage
The crisis in college basketball is first and foremost a problem of failed accountability and lax
responsibility.
Reference 2 - 0.41% Coverage
The Commission found that talking to the stakeholders was, at times, like watching a circular
firing squad – the problem, the issue, and ultimately the fault was always that of someone else.
Reference 3 - 0.58% Coverage
It is time for coaches, athletic directors, University Presidents, Boards of Trustees, the NCAA
leadership and staff, apparel companies, agents, pre-collegiate coaches – and yes – parents and
athletes -- to accept their culpability in getting us to where we are today.
Reference 4 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
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Reference 5 - 0.69% Coverage
That development would include not only basketball, but also academic and life skills, health and
collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program would be NCAAadministered regional
non-scholastic basketball events in July that would be the only ones that NCAA coaches attend
in that crucial recruiting month.
Reference 6 - 0.59% Coverage
When we assembled as a Commission, we knew our work would not be easy. But we also knew
this work was too important not to get it right. The problems facing college basketball can’t and
won’t be solved overnight. But future generations of student-athletes are counting on us all.
Reference 7 - 0.43% Coverage
On behalf of the Commission, let us all remember why we became educators. Let us all
remember why we became coaches and administrators. And let us never forget our duty to the
students we are here to serve.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 15 references coded [ 2.01% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage
The commissioners want to be very clear: There is much to admire about college basketball even
with its significant challenges. The commitment and hard work of student-athletes is seen on
basketball courts across the country.
Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage
At tournament time, underdogs rise up, defeat favorites, and become national darlings. The skill
and determination of these young student-athletes reminds all of us what it means to work hard,
prepare and perform under pressure.
Reference 3 - 0.07% Coverage
We experience deeply their triumphs and their failures. College communities – including
students, faculty, staff and alumni – are bound together in pride and excitement as they support,
cheer – live and die – with their teams.
Reference 4 - 0.07% Coverage
We know too that many young men who would otherwise have little chance of
attending college are able to take advantage of their talents to achieve something of great value
in our society and economy – a college degree.
Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage
The scholarships themselves are valuable, as students who finance their own education will
attest; the in-kind benefits are worth tens of thousands of dollars more.
Reference 6 - 0.05% Coverage
The lifetime financial benefit of a baccalaureate degree can approach $1 million, and can change
the recipient’s family for generations. See Section 1.D.
Reference 7 - 0.12% Coverage
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind
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of misjudgment that should deprive student-athletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college
or to continue in college while playing basketball. While this rule change may inconvenience
coaches seeking to set their rosters for the following season, we conclude that the studentathletes’ interest should govern here.
Reference 8 - 0.09% Coverage
In sum, student-athletes should have more information about their professional
prospects and more flexibility to test those prospects and return to school. This change and other
related changes should make it easier for them to do so without losing their collegiate eligibility.
Reference 9 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission heard from many commenters who identified both the NCAA’s
enforcement process and the substance of the NCAA’s rules as inadequate to deal with the
challenges presented by Division I men’s basketball.
Reference 10 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 11 - 0.33% Coverage
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA rules
define as “agents”24
Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met or their employees. However, the
Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid, either
directly or indirectly.25
advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into agreements
with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought that this would
simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age. Instead, agents
recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with high school and collegiate
players and make their cases so that players would have all available options before they enter
the professional market. The Commission intends NCAA-certification to provide these
opportunities for “good” agents.
Reference 12 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
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events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 13 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 14 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 15 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\ESPN1 - Why the college basketball scandal won’t get fixed until the NCAA pays
athletes - § 16 references coded [ 15.41% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.65% Coverage
It is an extraordinarily sad time in college sports. Ten people were arrested Tuesday and charged
with fraud and corruption after a two-year FBI investigation.
Reference 2 - 1.42% Coverage
Right now, as the sky seems to be falling in college basketball, some are suggesting that things
will really change going forward. Grassroots basketball is dead. Agents will no longer be able to
get their hooks into players. Coaches will not be able to pay players. Now, thanks to federal law
enforcement officials, college sports will be clean and moral.
Reference 3 - 1.35% Coverage
The same things were said about Wall Street after the 2008 financial crisis. Things were going to
change, and no longer would the big banks be allowed to do whatever they wanted and put the
world economy at risk with collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps. Yet, years
later, it is back to business as usual on Wall Street.
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Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage
In Division I, no reasonable person could claim the same.
Reference 5 - 1.10% Coverage
Let’s not pretend that Ed McMahon knocked on the NCAA’s door and surprised the organization
with a check for billions of dollars. The NCAA and its members carefully, thoughtfully and
purposefully built a multibillion-dollar industry. This was no accident. It was planned.
Reference 6 - 0.82% Coverage
In college sports, money will find a way. Money will always find a way, because the NCAA and
its member institutions are addicted to money and will continue to chase it. That seems beyond
reasonable dispute.
Reference 7 - 1.07% Coverage
The current NCAA system and rules are largely responsible for creating the underground blackmarket economy for players. There are contradictions everywhere, to the point of hypocrisy, and
business relationships with third parties that strain the imagination.
Reference 8 - 1.14% Coverage
Do you believe the shoe companies will go away based upon this scandal? No way. They are
partners with the NCAA and its member institutions. NCAA institutions accept hundreds of
millions of dollars annually to wear apparel and shoes and use the unpaid, amateur players as
billboards.
Reference 9 - 1.13% Coverage
Players will continue to play, and tournament operators will continue to make money off the
players and college recruiters who come to watch the players. If the NCAA attempted to affect
the grassroots culture, it would open itself up to legal action for anticompetitive practices.
Reference 10 - 1.04% Coverage
In addition, there is little chance that the NCAA can stop the flow of money in the grassroots
scene. There are so many 501(c)(3) nonprofits out there through which money is funneled, and
that will not stop even if the government was able to catch the dumb crooks.
Reference 11 - 1.30% Coverage
Do you believe that the NCAA will stop the influence of agents? No way. Because of NCAA
rules that disallow a player from having an agreement with an agent, the ethical agents are on the
sideline while the unethical and lesserqualified agents have full access and open-field running to
unpaid, amateur players and prospects.
Reference 12 - 0.43% Coverage
The NCAA states that it protects players from being exploited commercially. Does that ring true
to anyone?
Reference 13 - 0.58% Coverage
The NCAA uses the players as billboards for apparel deals and uses their names and likenesses
to sell the product, and to sell media-rights deals.
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Reference 14 - 0.80% Coverage
The NCAA continues benefiting from this multibilliondollar business, while the players get only
a scholarship, and the only ones exploiting the athletes are the NCAA and the member
institutions.
Reference 15 - 0.69% Coverage
When you use a person to make money while at the same time limiting that person from making
money, you exploit. Players are certainly not mistreated, but they are exploited.
Reference 16 - 1.67% Coverage
But in the absence of meaningful change regarding amateurism, there will be no meaningful
change at all. We will all shake our heads and our fingers at the current scandal, give our fullthroated speeches, and the NCAA will say "threat to integrity" and "antithetical to what college
sports is about" and act righteously indignant. Then, we will all go on to the next game, and the
NCAA will go on to the next big contract.
Files\\ESPN5 - Why the NCAA hoops scandal will likely spread as trial starts - § 5 references
coded [ 5.77% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.99% Coverage
AS THE FIRST federal trial begins Monday in a corruption scandal that threatens to engulf
college basketball, the coaches at four schools mentioned in the indictment -- Kansas, Louisville,
Miami and NC State -- are not the only ones nervous.
Reference 2 - 0.45% Coverage
At the time, Miller denied the allegations -- and adamantly insisted he had never willfully broken
NCAA rules.
Reference 3 - 0.66% Coverage
In March, Cal State Northridge hired Mark Gottfried, who was NC State’s coach when Dennis
Smith Jr., whose father is said to have received $40,000, played there.
Reference 4 - 1.96% Coverage
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTORS ARE taking some action to limit schools’ exposure in this
trial.
They have asked U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan to limit what defense attorneys can say
about the four victim schools’ past infractions, including the stripper parties that occurred inside
Louisville’s athletics dormitory and the actions of Ponzi schemer Nevin Shapiro, who alleged he
provided impermissible benefits to more than 70 Miami student-athletes between 2002 and 2010.
Reference 5 - 1.71% Coverage
Additionally, the federal government wants to prohibit defense attorneys from discussing cases
that involve non-victim schools. For example, the government might not want defense attorneys
talking about how former USC basketball star O.J. Mayo and football star Reggie Bush allegedly
received tens of thousands of dollars in impermissible benefits while playing for the Trojans and
yet no one was prosecuted.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 1 reference coded [
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0.81% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.81% Coverage
But we always have to do that by reminding ourselves that this is about providing our students
with opportunities to succeed.”
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 3 references coded
[ 3.57% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.04% Coverage
This is about more than basketball. This is about the culture and future of college sports. We all
will work together to get it right.
Reference 2 - 0.48% Coverage
Section 1: Realistic Pathways for Student-Athlete Success
Reference 3 - 2.04% Coverage
Provide Resources to Make the Promise of a College Education Real. NCAA to establish fund to
pay for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave member
institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree.
Files\\NCAA4 - NCAA Statement from Mark Emmert on Federal Investigation - § 1 reference
coded [ 3.06% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 3.06% Coverage
suggest an extraordinary and despicable breach of that trust
Files\\NCAA5 - NCAA to Help Certify June Basketball Events - § 1 reference coded [ 1.54%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.54% Coverage
The announcement clears a path for more schools to play an increased role in developing young
basketball players in the summer and providing them with additional opportunities to be seen and
recruited by college coaches.
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 3 references coded [ 7.75% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.68% Coverage
Ultimately, these decisions will support the success of student-athletes both on and off the court.
Reference 2 - 1.48% Coverage
Provide college basketball players more freedom and ﬂexibility to decide their future.
Reference 3 - 4.59% Coverage
If they are unwilling or unable to act, we will consider additional changes that will support the
success of student-athletes. It’s on us to restore the integrity of college basketball and continue to
improve the interests of all student-athletes. They deserve nothing less.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 3 references coded [ 4.88% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 2.05% Coverage
While I believe the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the culture of silence in college
basketball enables bad actors, and we need them out of the game
Reference 2 - 2.32% Coverage
Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 3 - 0.51% Coverage
We need to do right by student-athletes
Files\\NYT1 - In College Basketball Scandal, Follow the Money ... and the Shoes - § 7
references coded [ 11.18% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.38% Coverage
Nike contracted to pay $160 million for that deal — and the company paid an additional $40
million that was not reﬂected in the ofﬁcial agreement, federal authorities said. Nike brokered the
deal through a Brazilian businessman who pleaded guilty in the United States to an array of
corruption charges, admitting to having solicited and accepted hundreds of millions of dollars in
bribes from people seeking lucrative marketing and media contracts.
Reference 2 - 1.34% Coverage
The three companies have their own leagues — Nike’s E.Y.B.L., Adidas’s Gauntlet, Under
Armour Association — each with dozens of teams. The companies shower teams with money,
swag and perks. Parents of top prospects are commonly involved with the teams.
Reference 3 - 0.68% Coverage
During summer break, high school players compete in league tournaments that are honey pots
for college coaches and recruiters.
Reference 4 - 1.36% Coverage
“You might think it’s unhealthy,” he added, “for the shoe companies to have such inﬂuence in
the recruiting process — it has sort of replaced high school in spring and summer, and taken
power out of the hands of the high school coaches — but that’s the way it goes.”
Reference 5 - 2.27% Coverage
The criminal complaints describe rampant under-the-table payments that were commonly
inspired by a young athlete’s future earning potential. One player agent, in a recorded
conversation, urged that an offer to a player be increased because a rival company was “coming
in with a higher number,” and an Adidas ofﬁcial discussed masking payments from apparel
companies to high school athletes as though it were business as usual.
Reference 6 - 1.67% Coverage
In 2009, he confessed that he had an affair with the wife of the team’s equipment manager and
paid for her to have an abortion. In 2015, a former director of basketball operations was found to
have provided strippers and prostitutes to the Louisville team’s players and recruits in a campus
dormitory over several years.
Reference 7 - 1.48% Coverage
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But for many in Kentucky, he will remain a coaching legend. Long before winning a title with
Louisville, he resurrected Kentucky’s storied program and led the Wildcats to the 1996 national
title. That team, regarded as one of the best in college basketball history, wore Converse.
Files\\NYT2 - The Corruption at the Heart of March Madness - § 7 references coded [ 20.50%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.24% Coverage
College basketball has long made much of its money by sleazy recruitment and exploitation of
teenage stars.
Reference 2 - 2.00% Coverage
With a series of federal bribery and fraud charges announced this week, prosecutors are now
treating these shady dealings as what they are: corruption, not a rules violation.
Reference 3 - 2.24% Coverage
Coaches, the very people whom prized young athletes should be able to trust, were found to be
proﬁting from them and helping others — agents, ﬁnancial advisers, the Adidas shoe company
— proﬁt, too.
Reference 4 - 4.33% Coverage
The criminal complaints were rare in an area too often relegated to self-policing by universities
and the N.C.A.A. — the watchdog of college sports and the umbrella organization that runs the
popular, immensely proﬁtable basketball championship tournament dubbed March Madness,
where college stars compete before some of them go on to professional careers as millionaires.
Reference 5 - 3.09% Coverage
But the coach, the nation’s highest paid, at $7.7 million a year, has a reputation for cutting
ethical corners. He was suspended and his program were put on N.C.A.A. probation in June after
investigators found prostitutes were provided for players and teenage recruits.
Reference 6 - 4.27% Coverage
This situation arose after the National Basketball Association and its players’ union agreed to bar
players before they have turned 19 or until a year after high school graduation. Previously, high
school players could sign on and earn full professional salaries — safe from the no-income
college rules and ﬁctions that invite the sort of abuses laid bare in the complaints.
Reference 7 - 3.33% Coverage
College basketball programs unscrupulously compete for top players to earn more from the
immense pot of proﬁt from television. The complaints cast a spotlight on that greed and
hypocrisy, which is infesting what is supposed to be, but hasn’t been for some time, an innocent
and amateur sport.
Files\\NYT4 - N.C.A.A. Panel Proposes Reforms, Including End to ‘One and Done’ - § 3
references coded [ 4.48% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.17% Coverage
But while the proposed changes would alter the texture of the sport, they stopped well short of
challenging the longtime requirement that the college athletes remain amateurs, uncompensated

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

210

beyond a scholarship and a stipend for their talents and efforts.
Reference 2 - 2.12% Coverage
Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York have said that an Adidas executive and several
others with ties to the sneaker giant were central to schemes to bribe players’ families and
college basketball coaches to coax top prospects to commit to colleges that Adidas sponsored,
like Louisville, Miami and Kansas, and later sign with Adidas. Narratives outlined by
prosecutors strongly suggest that similar behavior is conducted in the name of Adidas’s rivals.
Reference 3 - 1.18% Coverage
Gabe Feldman, director of Tulane’s sports law program, said allowing contact with agents was
provocative. “That was completely taboo for a very, very long time,” he said, adding that any
major changes to N.C.A.A. rules would take time. “It’s a big ship to move.”
Files\\NYT5 - N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corruption
Scandal - § 2 references coded [ 4.97% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.47% Coverage
The changes, which also could apply to certain high school players if the N.B.A. changes its
draft rules, were made as the N.C.A.A. continues to grapple with the fallout of the federal
indictments last year that suggested extensive corruption in recruiting at the nexus of apparel
companies and agents.
Reference 2 - 2.50% Coverage
The federal investigation has brought attention to open secrets in men’s college basketball,
including the involvement of agents and the power the gigantic apparel companies exert over the
system by showering many millions of dollars every year on both college teams and precollege
grass-roots leagues.
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 5.44% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.44% Coverage
Public members not afﬁliated with the NCAA or member schools will join the NCAA Board of
Governors to bring fresh perspectives and independent judgment.
Files\\SI2 - NCAA Announces Undrafted Players May Return To School, Relaxed Agent
Rules - § 2 references coded [ 2.40% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.41% Coverage
Several coaches were indicted in a fraud and corruption scheme—which also included managers,
financial advisers and Adidas representatives.
Reference 2 - 0.98% Coverage
The new policies were put in place to prevent further corruption and dissuade future rulebreakers.
Files\\SI3 - A Bust, and No Boom - One Year After the College Hoops Scandal Broke, What’s
Truly Changed~ - § 12 references coded [ 21.01% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.46% Coverage
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A year has now passed since last Sept. 26, when the sports world awoke to unseasonably
consequential college basketball news. Early that morning the FBI arrested 10 individuals,
including four Division I assistant coaches, on charges of bribery and fraud related to cash
payments made to recruits’ families.
Reference 2 - 0.83% Coverage
The actions outlined in the charges weren’t terribly surprising—heck, Blue Chips came out 24
years ago.
Reference 3 - 1.77% Coverage
Still, fans steeled themselves for a season of further revelations and tumult. Many also speculated
that the divergent tugs of education and capitalism had finally torn the NCAA’s concept of the
student-athlete asunder.
Reference 4 - 2.11% Coverage
Many expected Arizona coach Sean Miller to be dismissed after a February ESPN report alleged
that he had been recorded in 2016 discussing a payment for forward Deandre Ayton, but Miller’s
contract was merely amended to dock him $1 million if he is criminally charged.
Reference 5 - 1.33% Coverage
Yet changes to the system that birthed all of this—one that can turn paying a teenager to play
basketball into a potential federal crime—have been merely incremental.
Reference 6 - 0.94% Coverage
And so we sit on the verge of a season with a game largely unchanged from the one that was
supposedly imploding a year ago.
Reference 7 - 2.75% Coverage
Still unaddressed are the core economic realities and motivations fueling the black market, so
simple any student-athlete being compensated with Economics 101 credits could explain it: The
players have a value to schools, coaches, boosters, communities and shoe companies that is
drastically out of line with what they can receive in return.
Reference 8 - 1.38% Coverage
Perhaps each of these changes is just a step in the inevitable march toward larger reform—a
continuation of the past decade’s gradual easing of various arcane restrictions.
Reference 9 - 0.71% Coverage
Serving cream cheese on bagels is now acceptable; blocking an athlete who wants to transf
Reference 10 - 2.13% Coverage
Alston and Hartman contend that the NCAA’s capping of scholarship value is equivalent to
suppressing market competition. There is a chance the outcome in this case will have more direct
and wide-ranging results than the headline-grabbing results from the FBI sting.
Reference 11 - 2.45% Coverage
As much as the NCAA has lobbied for the NBA to abolish its age minimum of 19 for draft
eligibility, the change would likely have less effect on illicit payments than many hope: The
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suitors for elite high school prospects would then include the NBA, increasing colleges’ needs to
offer financial benefits as well.
Reference 12 - 2.15% Coverage
Of course, it is worth keeping in mind that a year ago there was no inkling that college basketball
was on the brink of significant change. We may soon learn we’re not so much a year past one
bombshell than a short time away from another. Maybe that will be the true wake-up call.
Files\\SI4 - Despite the Judge’s View, the College Hoops Trial Was Always About the
NCAA’s Archaic Rules - § 9 references coded [ 18.43% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.15% Coverage
The post-verdict scene was a somber one, with Gatto sharing a long embrace with his wife, both
appearing to heave with emotion. The 25-year-old Dawkins pressed his head into his father’s
chest during an enduring hug, the father comfortingly rubbing the back of his son’s neck while
visibly wrestling with the news himself.
Reference 2 - 1.04% Coverage
The courtroom was nearly silent save the sounds of intermittent sniffling and sobbing and tissue
use in the rows of observers seated behind the defendants.
Reference 3 - 1.38% Coverage
That standard has yet again been shown to be completely detached from the realities of a market
that the NCAA and its member institutions are otherwise gladly willing to let freely seep into
their every pore.
Reference 4 - 1.25% Coverage
Blaming rules for rule-breaking is often seen as a bad-faith tactic for absolving blame, and
understandably so. But in this case it is the rules themselves that have been made in bad faith.
Reference 5 - 1.40% Coverage
Seven-figure coaching salaries, nine-figure apparel sponsorships, 11-figure TV deals—for
decades the college sports industrial complex has continually and exponentially engorged itself
at every turn.
Reference 6 - 1.58% Coverage
Still as the size of its financial pie has been stretched and stretched, it has steadfastly fought to
deny anything more than a scholarship-and-stipend-sized slice to the labor that performs its
essential product by playing the games.
Reference 7 - 3.82% Coverage
The trial’s illumination of this marketplace was as unseemly as it was telling, with testimony
referencing shady invoices, deceitful cover stories and clandestine “Bat phones.” Still, it was not
a complete reveal, as the defense’s attempts to admit evidence of similar dealmaking beyond the
charges —in order to portray their clients as simply players of a dirty game in which the
university’s basketball coaches were knowing participants—were denied by Judge Kaplan,
pointing jurors toward evaluating the defendants in isolation instead of their larger context.
Reference 8 - 3.66% Coverage
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These denials may set the stage for the defense’s case in appeals court, where it could find more
sympathetic ears. But in the meantime three men face potential prison time because they
included players and their families into the mutually beneficial financial relationship enjoyed by
the schools and companies that relies on said players’ talents— and the body in charge of the
sport decided it cannot stand as much, elevating what otherwise seems like natural market forces
into something the government could convince a jury is a federal crime.
Reference 9 - 2.15% Coverage
In their minds this trial, which was ostensibly not about NCAA rules, had sufficiently proven the
defendants’ guilt. To those not bound by the confines of a judge’s instructions and a trial’s scope,
a truer blame lay elsewhere, in the very rules whose violation were this crime’s original sin—and
constitute the NCAA’s too
Files\\SI5 - Why the Prosecution Won in the College Hoops Corruption Trial and What’s Next
- § 2 references coded [ 3.66% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.92% Coverage
In a decisive victory for federal prosecutors and a frightening warning to those involved in the
payment of college recruits, a New York jury has convicted Adidas director of global marketing
James Gatto, Adidas consultant basketball organizer Merl Code and client recruiter (a.k.a.
runner) Christian Dawkins of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud charges. U.S.
District Judge Lewis Kaplan will sentence the defendants on March 5, 2019. While a presentencing report will influence Judge Kaplan in determining appropriate prison sentences, it’s
expected that the three men will likely be sentenced to somewhere between two to five years in
prison.
Reference 2 - 0.74% Coverage
This deduction may seem illogical since those universities enrolled players who would helped
their basketball programs win games and generate accompanying revenue.
Files\\TDG1 - Drake Group Blames Outdated NCAA Amateur Status Rules for Criminalizing
Outside Athlete Compensation - § 1 reference coded [ 1.72% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.72% Coverage
However, the media and the public are missing the larger point. The NCAA and its member
institutions have virtually forced the commission of these crimes by imposing compensation
restrictions on athletes under the guise of “amateur status.”
Files\\TDG2 - The Drake Group Finds that the Independent Commission on College
Basketball Missed an Opportunity to Recommend Comprehensive Reform - § 1 reference
coded [ 1.48% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.48% Coverage
An important caveat is that colleges should enable athletes to be real students with access to a
quality education
rather delivering a sham alternative solely designed to maintain athletics eligibility and imposing
excessive athletics time demands that make it virtually impossible to fulﬁll academic demands.
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 2 references coded [ 4.98% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 2.66% Coverage
Like the Commission on College Basketball, our group recognizes that basketball-specific
changes should move forward in coming months. In response to your request for additional
input, we offer two broad suggestions on NCAA governance and the responsibilities of coaches.
Reference 2 - 2.32% Coverage
We believe that the appointment of your group, in fact, shows the value of having external and
independent perspectives on issues that often become bogged down when the interests of
individual conferences and institutions drive the agenda.
Files\\TKC3 - Statements in Response to the Report by the Commission on College Basketball
- § 1 reference coded [ 5.19% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.19% Coverage
“We still don’t know yet that the NCAA is capable of truly protecting and supporting the
education, health, safety, and well-being of student-athletes — and big challenges to the integrity
of college basketball persist. We look forward to addressing these challenges at our meeting next
month.”
Files\\TKC6 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations Cover Letter - § 1 reference coded [
5.55% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.55% Coverage
As we have stated previously, we believe this is a rare moment of opportunity to reform not only
men’s basketball but the NCAA itself to restore public faith in the organization’s ability to be an
effective steward of big-money college sports.
Files\\WP1 - After another NCAA basketball scandal, let’s be honest - This is how college
sports works - § 11 references coded [ 30.54% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.99% Coverage
So today, we have Auburn, Southern California, Oklahoma State and Arizona as the bad apples.
They’re the college basketball programs that have assistant coaches who have been charged by
federal authorities because they allegedly accepted bribes to push players toward a slew of
potential moneymakers — financial advisers, Adidas, on and on.
Reference 2 - 1.36% Coverage
To you Tigers and Trojans, you Cowboys and Wildcats — and, presumably, you Cardinals and
Hurricanes — we say, quite heartily: Tsk-tsk! No, really. Tsk-tsk!
Reference 3 - 2.74% Coverage
We can’t, and won’t, make light of the feds slapping cuffs on college basketball coaches and the
various hangerson and interlopers who profit from the sport. But with practice set to officially
open this week, anyone embracing the start of a new season must do so with his or her eyes wide
open. Or maybe completely shut.
Reference 4 - 3.18% Coverage
Tuesday’s developments are the essence of breaking news. On the face of them, they’re alarming
— not so much because of the programs or coaches involved or the specifics of the transactions
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(though, $100,000?!) — but because this comes from the FBI, adding weight and heft. The idea
of undercover videos in Las Vegas hotel rooms provides Hollywood intrigue, for sure.
Reference 5 - 3.00% Coverage
But we have to understand, by now, that this is how college sports works. If you are a fan of a
certain program, and you read these reports and scanned for violations by your precious Lions or
Tigers or Bears, and — finding none — breathed a sigh of relief or, worse, felt the least bit
sanctimonious, well, then, you’re in denial, and not a small bit of it.
Reference 6 - 2.72% Coverage
There are likely clean major college athletics programs out there. Likely. But it’s also likely
there were baseball players who didn’t take performance-enhancing drugs around the turn of this
century. Saying with absolute certainty that a particular entity, though, is or was clean — that’s
perilous, for sure.
Reference 7 - 2.01% Coverage
Being student-athletes, of course, they must have wedged these dalliances in between botany and
statistics. And Pitino, of course, didn’t know, wouldn’t stand for such an arrangement! He’s a
Hall of Famer, and that’s beneath him!
Reference 8 - 4.27% Coverage
The four assistant coaches arrested aren’t victims, for sure, because they surely knew what they
were doing was against rules, if not laws. But they are part of a machine that is powered by the
basic structure of college sports. When a system has billions of dollars flowing into it — and the
NCAA’s contract with CBS and Turner Sports for the NCAA tournament alone is worth $8.8
billion through 2032 — and yet has a major part of the workforce that is unpaid, well, then, how
is this not the end result?
Reference 9 - 2.40% Coverage
Six years ago, Michael Beasley laid out much of how this works. The Prince George’s County
kid was one of the most heralded recruits in the country back in 2006. He played one year at
Kansas State (yep, nothing strange going on there) and then became the second pick in the NBA
draft.
Reference 10 - 2.42% Coverage
There’s so much money involved, someone’s going to get it. And unless and until players
receive some sort of compensation that’s commensurate with their value to the school, there is
going to be corruption. Sometimes it will violate NCAA rules. Sometimes it will violate the law.
Reference 11 - 3.44% Coverage
Either way, given the current structure of college sports, we’re only minutes away from the next
violation — whether it’s exposed or not. There is drama on Tuesday, for sure, and the more
details we learn, the more damning it will feel to those individual coaches, to those individual
programs. And yet, we know — despite the inevitable upcoming denials from all sorts of sources
— it’s not just them.
Files\\WP2 - College basketball commission calls for rules changes, but sticks with
amateurism - § 4 references coded [ 3.56% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 0.81% Coverage
But the panel did not recommend that athletes be paid, staunchly affirming the values of
amateurism and
an education for the 98.8 percent of college basketball players who do not go on to NBA careers.
Reference 2 - 0.36% Coverage
But the panel consistently rejected remedies that would “professionalize” the sport.
Reference 3 - 1.59% Coverage
But he was disappointed that the report didn’t tackle college basketball’s commercialization head
on. College basketball is a multibillion dollar industry in which coaches and schools make
millions from shoe companies, Bilas noted, but paying players — or providing them anything
more than a cost-of-living stipend and chance at an education — is cast by the report as “morally
wrong.”
Reference 4 - 0.80% Coverage
While Emmert and the NCAA lauded the commission’s work, the National College Players
Association — a nonprofit that represents the interests of college athletes — panned the results
as a failure
Files\\WP4 - Whites oppose — and blacks support — paying NCAA athletes, especially when
they’re thinking about race - § 3 references coded [ 5.58% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.88% Coverage
Last Monday, Kylia Carter, the mother of former Duke basketball star Wendell Carter, gave a
passionate speech arguing that today’s college basketball system is equivalent to slavery. Carter
was reacting to the April 25 release of the Commission on College Basketball’s long-awaited
report on corruption in the NCAA. Created after bribery scandals involving highly prized
basketball recruits, the commission offered a host of recommendations, including imposing harsh
penalties on athletic programs that knowingly violate NCAA rules.
Reference 2 - 1.73% Coverage
Why is opinion on this issue so polarized by race? Because a disproportionately large percentage
of college basketball and football players are African American. As with welfare, health care and
criminal justice reform, that means that, for most Americans, debates over NCAA compensation
are implicitly debates about race.
Reference 3 - 0.97% Coverage
A number of recent commentators have tried to make this explicit, with arguments such as, “The
NCAA isn’t just perpetuating a financial injustice. It’s also committing a racial one.”
Files\\WP5 - College sports programs aren’t victims of fraud. They’re participants - § 5
references coded [ 12.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.19% Coverage
But what’s happening in a Manhattan courtroom at the moment is a weak inversion of justice.
Federal prosecutors for the Southern District of New York are aiming low, not high. They are
arguing a nonsensical case that claims major colleges are somehow the defrauded victims of the
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elaborate black-market recruiting economy that the schools themselves created.
Reference 2 - 2.99% Coverage
With that statement, Kaplan questioned the underlying premise of the entire trial.
At the heart of the matter is this: If coaches and school officials were aware that sneaker execs
and other middlemen were making illicit payments to secure five-star recruits on their behalf,
then they are hardly the dupes or injured parties in a fraud. They are participants in one.
This is a fundamental flaw in the Southern District’s case: It has failed utterly to identify the real
perpetrators or victims.
Reference 3 - 2.15% Coverage
A year ago, the feds boasted that this investigation, which included arrests of 10 minor figures,
would roll up the corruption in college athletics. “We have your playbook,” FBI assistant
director William Sweeney Jr. boasted to all those engaging in corrupt practices.
But in fact, they don’t have the playbook at all. That, or they are hopelessly naive.
Reference 4 - 2.05% Coverage
What Gassnola is describing is a conspiracy. A racket.
And let’s be perfectly clear on who the real victims and perpetrators of it are. The real victims
are not school officials who lunged at huge financial arrangements with shoe companies and
boosters, then tried to isolate themselves from shady dealings with implausible deniability.
Reference 5 - 2.75% Coverage
The primary victims are those collegiate athletes who are being defrauded from the legitimate
educational value of their scholarship agreements, by the illicit financial forces that create
academic fraud, pressure them into unwanted lesser majors, make it harder to graduate and
corrode their collective reputations. Secondary victims are the 97 million viewers of the NCAA
tournament who expect a reasonably fair and transparent playing field.
Explanation
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 6 references coded [ 12.57% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.19% Coverage
Charge. The Commission on College Basketball has been established by the NCAA Board of
Governors, Division I Board of Directors and NCAA President to fully examine critical aspects
of Division I men’s basketball.
Reference 2 - 0.57% Coverage
Speciﬁcally, the commission will focus on three areas:
Reference 3 - 1.06% Coverage
Nonscholastic basketball, with a focus on the appropriate involvement of college coaches and
others.
Reference 4 - 4.90% Coverage
Duties and Responsibilities of the Commission. The commission will gather information and
expert opinions for making transformative recommendations to the DI Board of Directors and
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NCAA Board of Governors on the needed legislation, policies, actions and structure(s) to protect
the integrity of college sports, with a focus on Division I men’s basketball. The goal is for the
commission to complete its work with a report to the boards for action at their April 2018
meetings.
Reference 5 - 1.77% Coverage
Appointment/Terms of Ofﬁce. a. Appointments. The commission chair and members are
appointed by the NCAA president. b. Term. Members will serve an initial six-month term.
Reference 6 - 2.07% Coverage
Meeting Frequency and Flexibility. The commission will have at least four meetings by March
2018, with periodic brieﬁngs to the executive and administrative committees of the boards and a
ﬁnal brieﬁng
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 44 references
coded [ 31.48% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.82% Coverage
This morning, the independent Commission on College Basketball led by Dr. Condoleezza Rice
presented its recommendations to address the issues facing men’s collegiate basketball. Dr. Rice
and members of the Commission presented their findings to the NCAA’s Board of Governors,
Division I Board and Presidential Forum, and Division II and III Presidents’ Councils of the
NCAA.
Reference 2 - 0.79% Coverage
Established by the NCAA Board of Governors, the Division I Board of Directors, and the NCAA
President in October 2017, the Commission was tasked with assessing the state of the enterprise
and recommending transformational changes to address multiple issues and challenges facing
men’s college basketball. Commission members include the following individuals:
Reference 3 - 0.25% Coverage
The crisis in college basketball is first and foremost a problem of failed accountability and lax
responsibility.
Reference 4 - 0.41% Coverage
The Commission found that talking to the stakeholders was, at times, like watching a circular
firing squad – the problem, the issue, and ultimately the fault was always that of someone else.
Reference 5 - 0.42% Coverage
The Commission has made a number of recommendations that are intended to revive and
strengthen the collegiate model and give young men the opportunity to pursue both athletic and
academic success.
Reference 6 - 0.45% Coverage
We are also recommending several steps to address the actual root cause of the problem –
governance and leadership lapses among many who were charged with protecting the best
interests of collegiate athletes.
Reference 7 - 0.35% Coverage
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That behavior has too often been ignored and inadequately punished. Throughout our work as a
commission we heard too many times: “Everyone knew what was going on.”
Reference 8 - 0.54% Coverage
We thus offer these recommendations to try and get back on course. Some may disagree with the
recommendations made here. Our focus has been to strengthen the collegiate model – not to
move toward one that brings aspects of professionalism into the game.
Reference 9 - 0.77% Coverage
We start from the belief that a young man whose talents allow him to play college basketball can
benefit greatly from the experience. He has a chance to receive that prized possession in our
economy and our society – a college degree. He will meet influential people who can mentor him
throughout his life and who can help him to establish a career after graduation.
Reference 10 - 0.79% Coverage
Given that only 1.2% of college basketball players go on to play in the NBA and that the average
NBA career is 4.5 years – the college degree is the real ticket to financial security for most
student-athletes. For the exceptionally talented – a professional track may be the best choice –
and the choice is always there for those who are fortunate enough to succeed in the NBA.
Reference 11 - 1.24% Coverage
But the uniqueness of the opportunity that college basketball offers should not be underestimated
or undervalued. One only has to think of the non-athlete whose family made tremendous
sacrifices to send him to college and who works 20 hours a week and takes on loans that will
need to be repaid over years and even decades in order to earn a college degree. The student
athlete who fully takes advantage of this privilege will get a head start in life. And the college or
university that truly provides that opportunity will fulfill its mission and its charge to educate and
empower.
Reference 12 - 0.72% Coverage
Our recommendations are detailed because the problems in college basketball are complex and
the resolution of them requires precise remedies. This Commission has worked hard to devise
these recommendations. You can be sure that we will continue to be involved as key regulatory
bodies undertake their work to implement these changes.
Reference 13 - 0.75% Coverage
The current sad state of college basketball did not appear overnight and it will not be repaired
quickly. We know that there are many who argue that the problems facing college basketball are
just too hard to solve. We strongly disagree. College basketball is too precious – and the fate of
the young men who play it is too important --to not get it right.
Reference 14 - 0.41% Coverage
This work will not be easy, but we need to make a start – and a bold one -- to turn the ship in the
right direction. For the good of all involved, we need to put the “college” back in college
basketball.
Reference 15 - 0.14% Coverage
Now, to the recommendations, which come in four strategic areas.
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Reference 16 - 0.22% Coverage
Our first group of recommendations focus on creating realistic pathways for studentathlete
success.
Reference 17 - 0.24% Coverage
If these players are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the collegiate model
will be reduced.
Reference 18 - 0.77% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that student-athletes be able to test their professional
prospects and maintain eligibility if they do not sign a professional contract. We believe high
school and college players who declare for the draft and are not drafted should remain eligible
for college basketball unless and until they sign a professional contract.
Reference 19 - 1.86% Coverage
I want to note that the Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s
and NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make studentathletes who
attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years. By requiring
students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their education, the
baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn degrees. However, it
would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against their will, where they
will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the undermining of the collegiate
model. Players with professional earning power should be able to choose a professional path.
The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier for them to return and
complete their degrees.
Reference 20 - 0.95% Coverage
The Commission believes student-athletes must have the information they need to understand
their real choices and be better positioned to take advantage of either the collegiate or
professional path they choose. Players should be able to receive meaningful assessment of
professional prospects earlier with assistance from certified agents. If NCAA rules do not allow
them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 21 - 0.89% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA and its member institutions develop strict standards for
certifying agents and allow only those NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at
an appropriate point in their high school careers as determined by the NCAA. The NCAA should
appoint a Vice-President level executive who, among other responsibilities, would develop these
standards and administer this program.
Reference 22 - 0.54% Coverage
We further recommend that the NCAA incentivize better behavior from agents by decertifying
any agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation and also deeming any student-athlete
who enters into an agreement with a non-certified agent ineligible.
Reference 23 - 1.19% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and commit to paying
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for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave member
institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Many member institutions
already provide degree completion programs, but the NCAA rules should standardize this
offering, and the NCAA must provide the necessary funds to schools that cannot afford this. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 24 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Reference 25 - 0.49% Coverage
The Commission’s second strategic area of recommendations focuses on establishing
professional and neutral investigation and adjudication of serious infractions, and holding
institutions and individuals accountable.
Reference 26 - 1.25% Coverage
First, the NCAA should create independent investigative and adjudicative arms to address and
resolve complex and serious cases involving violation of NCAA rules. As of now, volunteers
who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions resolve these cases, and during our
Commission testimony not a single stakeholder supported the current system for handling highstakes infractions. Today’s current state where an entire community knows of significant rule
breaking and yet the governance body lacks the power or will to investigate and act breeds
cynicism and contempt.
Reference 27 - 0.90% Coverage
To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement and resolution of high stakes
cases must be placed in the hands of independent professionals. A panel of professional
adjudicators, appointed for a term of years, must make final and binding decisions and must have
the authority to impose substantial punishments, including the loss of post-season play and the
revenues from post-season play.
Reference 28 - 0.19% Coverage
The Commission further recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
Reference 29 - 0.49% Coverage
Currently, the rewards for violating the rules far outweigh the risks, and we recommend
significant increases in the penalties imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of
NCAA rules to reverse this calculation.
Reference 30 - 1.34% Coverage
We recommend the following increases in the core penalty structure:
1. Increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban,
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including the NCAA tournament.
2. Increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue sharing in
post-season play, including revenue from the NCAA tournament.
3. Increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow bans of more than one season
4. Increase the restrictions on head coaches to allow bans of more than one season; and
5. Increase the penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans
Reference 31 - 0.29% Coverage
Today, there is simply no significant risk to a member institution if they choose to employ an
individual who is under a show cause order.
Reference 32 - 0.81% Coverage
To address this weakness, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a
coach or athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA rules be
subject to significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program reoffends, up to an
including a ban of up to five years from post-season tournaments, including the NCAA
tournament.
Reference 33 - 1.50% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual accountability for
rules violations for coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents. We recommend that the
NCAA amend its rules to require colleges to include in the employment contracts of
administrators and coaches’ individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA
investigations, including financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA
enforcement proceedings, decisions and discipline – up to and including discharge. A failure to
cooperate should trigger penalties – up to and including a five-year ban on participation in the
tournament and loss of revenue.
Reference 34 - 0.56% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring college and
university presidents, coaches, and athletic directors to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA rules.
Reference 35 - 0.42% Coverage
Finally, the Commission recommends that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing
academic fraud or misconduct by member institutions and make application of those rules
consistent.
Reference 36 - 0.71% Coverage
The NCAA must have jurisdiction to address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent that it
affects student-athletes’ eligibility. Member institutions can no longer be permitted to defend a
fraud or misconduct case on the ground that all students, not just athletes, were permitted to
“benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Reference 37 - 0.33% Coverage
The Commission’s third strategic area of focus relates to mitigating non-scholastic basketball’s
sometimes harmful influence on college basketball.
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Reference 38 - 0.50% Coverage
The corruption we observed in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. Put frankly,
youth basketball in this country is ungoverned space. There are good programs – but there are
too many that condone illicit behavior.
Reference 39 - 0.69% Coverage
That development would include not only basketball, but also academic and life skills, health and
collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program would be NCAAadministered regional
non-scholastic basketball events in July that would be the only ones that NCAA coaches attend
in that crucial recruiting month.
Reference 40 - 1.27% Coverage
But the NCAA and NCAA coaches should no longer associate with non-scholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. The Commission also endorses and recommends adoption of a
number of rule changes recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches and
other organizations to reduce the influence of third parties and increase the ability of college
coaches to interact with recruits and current players. These rule changes can we found in the full
report we are releasing today.
Reference 41 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission’s final area of strategic focus centered around the governance structure of the
NCAA.
Reference 42 - 1.05% Coverage
It is clear for all to see that current structure and system simply isn’t working. The Commission
recommends that the NCAA restructure its highest governance body, the Board of Governors, to
include at least five independent public members with voting rights, and who have the
experience, stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA in reestablishing itself as an effective
leader and regulator of college sports. One of these public members should also serve on the
NCAA’s Executive Board.
Reference 43 - 0.74% Coverage
Like public companies, major non-profit associations, indeed universities themselves, usually
include outside board members to provide objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and
wisdom. The Commission will make independent board member recommendations to the NCAA
to assist in it assembling a first-rate list of candidates.
Reference 44 - 0.74% Coverage
In closing, we must remember why we are all here. It is clear the NCAA has often failed to carry
out its responsibility to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body. But the NCAA is not really
Indianapolis. It is the sum total of its member institutions.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 179 references coded [ 31.53% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage
The Independent Commission on College Basketball was established on October 11, 2017, to

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

224

assess the state of the enterprise and to recommend transformational changes to address multiple
issues and challenges.
Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage
The indictments handed down by the Justice Department and the ongoing FBI investigation
spurred the NCAA to ask for this report. Whatever the outcome of the legal process, radical
changes are long overdue.
Reference 3 - 0.04% Coverage
Lost in the talk of big money and corruption is colleges’ central mission to provide higher
education to students.
Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage
There is debate about how to measure the graduation rate for college students, including studentathletes. There is, however, general agreement that the graduation rate for men’s Division I
basketball players lags behind that of other student-athletes, perhaps significantly.1
NCAA schools must take seriously
the obligation to help all student-athletes obtain the education they are promised.
Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage
College basketball, like college sports generally, is to be played by studentathletes who are members of the collegiate community, not paid professionals.
Reference 6 - 0.12% Coverage
Over several decades, however, trends have emerged that call this understanding into question.
Millions of dollars are now generated by television contracts and apparel sponsorship for the
NCAA, universities and coaches. The financial stake in success has grown exponentially; and
thus, there is an arms race to recruit the best talent – and if you are a coach – to keep your job.
Reference 7 - 0.16% Coverage
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement functions were designed for a simpler time, when
rule violations did not put so much at stake. As a result, the NCAA, as an enforcement entity, has
little credibility with the public and its members, and what it has continues to dwindle. There are
multiple cases of compromised academic standards and institutional integrity to keep the money
and talent flowing. The NCAA and its member institutions have been unable to adequately deter
or punish bad behavior.
Reference 8 - 0.10% Coverage
Given the undeniable impact of “big money” on the college game, it is fair to ask whether the
ideal of college basketball played by student-athletes who are part of the academic community –
not hired guns for a season or two – is still viable. The answer is yes, and the effort is worth
making. Transformative changes are necessary,
Reference 9 - 0.08% Coverage
goal should not be to turn college basketball into another professional league. Rather, we must
change fundamentally the current culture and rules to address the effect that money has had on
college basketball, the NCAA and its member institutions.
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Reference 10 - 0.15% Coverage
To this end, the Commission makes a number of recommendations set forth
below. To ensure that we take advantage of the current momentum for change, the Commission
further calls on the NCAA to draw up its plan to implement the Commission’s recommendations,
including draft legislation, by early August 2018. The Commission will promptly reconvene and
review the NCAA’s plans to provide its input for the NCAA’s concrete measures to renew
college basketball.
Reference 11 - 0.15% Coverage
Elite high school players with NBA prospects and no interest in a college degree should not be
“forced” to attend college, often for less than a year. These uniquely talented players are the
focus of agents, apparel companies, investment advisors, college coaches and others seeking to
profit from their skills and offering them cash and other benefits in hope of future gain. If they
are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the collegiate model will be reduced.
Reference 12 - 0.06% Coverage
Moreover, the recent commitment of the NBA to improve the G League may enhance its appeal
as a professional option for elite players who are 18 and do not wish to attend college.
Reference 13 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s and
NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make student-athletes who
attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years.
Reference 14 - 0.19% Coverage
requiring students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their
education, the baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn
degrees. However, it would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against
their will, where they will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the
undermining of the collegiate model. Players with professional earning power should be able to
choose a professional path. The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier
for them to return and complete their degrees.
Reference 15 - 0.11% Coverage
The Commission is concerned about one unintended consequence of ending one-and-done,
specifically the potential abuse of the NCAA’s current practice of granting immediate collegiate
eligibility to high school players who “reclassify”— i.e., those who make themselves eligible to
enter college prior to the graduation date of their high school class.
Reference 16 - 0.12% Coverage
We fear that, should the NBA and the NBPA make 18 the minimum age for entry into the NBA,
the growing trend of reclassification will accelerate, creating a new generation of 17-year-old
one-and-done players. The Commission urges the NCAA to monitor this situation and to enact
appropriate rule changes if that potential abuse occurs with the end of one-and-done.
Reference 17 - 0.13% Coverage
In that circumstance, the Commission will reconvene and consider the other tools at its disposal.
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These could range from the baseball rule, to freshman ineligibility, to “locking up” scholarships
for three or four years if the recipient leaves the program for the NBA after a single year. That
would be a disincentive to recruit an athlete for a one-year run at the title. In short, the current
situation is untenable.
Reference 18 - 0.06% Coverage
The Commission recommends that high school and college players who declare
for the draft and are not drafted remain eligible for college basketball unless and until they sign a
professional contract.
Reference 19 - 0.06% Coverage
Specifically, players who are not drafted should be permitted to change their minds and attend
college or return to college, provided they remain academically and otherwise eligible.
Reference 20 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission also recommends imposing two additional conditions on this retention of
eligibility: The player must return to the same school, and the player must request an evaluation
from the NBA’s Undergraduate Advisory Committee before entering the draft. The NBA has
unique credibility with elite players who should have the benefit of the NBA evaluation in
deciding whether to enter the draft.
Reference 21 - 0.11% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their
professional prospects. Players who think they are surefire professionals are often mistaken. The
numbers tell this story: Only a very small percentage of NCAA men’s basketball players make it
to the NBA (around 1.2%), let alone have successful careers.2
Reference 22 - 0.12% Coverage
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind
of misjudgment that should deprive student-athletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college
or to continue in college while playing basketball. While this rule change may inconvenience
coaches seeking to set their rosters for the following season, we conclude that the studentathletes’ interest should govern here.
Reference 23 - 0.12% Coverage
A player chagrined to discover that he lacks an NBA future may grow into his collegiate
experience and adopt a different plan for the future. This change, along with several others
recommended, will demonstrate that the NCAA is serious about the value and importance of
college for student-athletes, and committed to helping them attend and work towards a degree.
Reference 24 - 0.11% Coverage
Players who transfer are less likely to complete their
Third parties often influence transfer decisions for their own purposes and without thought to the
impact of transfer on the student-athlete. The detrimental effect of transfer on a student-athlete’s
education means that transferring should not be made easier for basketball’s sake.
Reference 25 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission also discussed the graduate transfer rule. The NCAA enacted the rule in 2006
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to assist academically high-achieving students who had graduated from college with remaining
athletic eligibility by allowing them to transfer in order to pursue a graduate degree. In recent
years, graduating student-athletes, including in men’s basketball, increasingly appear to make
transfer decisions for reasons other than academics. In 2011, there were 15 men’s basketball
graduate transfers; in 2016, there were 87.7
Only 34% of these transfers graduate from their graduate school programs.8 We heard that
recruiting and tampering related to potential graduate transfers is rising.
Reference 26 - 0.14% Coverage
We understand that the NCAA’s Transfer Working Group is currently considering this issue and
potential responses, including “locking down” scholarships for the period of a degree program
and imposing an enhanced penalty on a team’s Academic Progress Rate if the recipient leaves
before completing his graduate program. We ask the NCAA to monitor this issue and develop
appropriate legislation to ensure that the rule is serving its intent.
Reference 27 - 0.05% Coverage
The NCAA rules should provide that student-athletes may meet and contract with NCAAcertified agents and that they will not lose their eligibility by doing so.
Reference 28 - 0.15% Coverage
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic basketball, the
Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players about their professional
and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health and more. Student-athletes must
have the information they need to understand their real choices and be better positioned to take
advantage of either the collegiate or the professional path they choose.
Reference 29 - 0.21% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who
leave member institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Colleges and
universities must fulfill their commitments to student-athletes to provide not just a venue for
athletic competition, but also an education. They must promise student-athletes that the option to
receive an education will be there, even after the athlete is finished with his athletic career. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 30 - 0.13% Coverage
Many NCAA member institutions already provide Degree Completion Programs. NCAA rules
should standardize this offering. The NCAA must also define a category of relatively
disadvantaged schools for which this requirement would impose a substantial burden, and create
a fund to provide the benefit for students at those institutions, using the revenues of the NCAA
Basketball tournament.
Reference 31 - 0.10% Coverage
The NCAA is frequently criticized for not permitting payment to student-athletes,
on the ground that these young people are engaged in an activity that generates billions of dollars
and yet they do not benefit. The debate is longstanding; views are entrenched; and both sides
make important points.
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Reference 32 - 0.11% Coverage
One significant counter to that argument is that many Division I student-athletes benefit
enormously from engaging in intercollegiate sports. In addition to receiving full scholarships up
to the cost of attendance (ranging from $13,392 to $71,585 for in-state students and from
$18,125$71,585 for out-of-state students depending on the institution),
Reference 33 - 0.15% Coverage
receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career advice and
more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars annually.10
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11
As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced Again, the Commission
agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to assist
student-athletes in earning their degrees.
Reference 34 - 0.32% Coverage
The Commission is familiar with the related debate about whether studentathletes should earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, images and
likenesses (NIL). Many argue that allowing these payments would be analogous to the receipt of
funds by collegiate Olympians and thus consistent with the collegiate model, particularly if
students did not receive the funds until after college. The NCAA is a defendant in litigation
involving such payments, which appears to raise fundamental questions about whether these and
similar payments are consistent with the collegiate model. The court stated that “[t]he difference
between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums
untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed,
we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon
v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
Reference 35 - 0.14% Coverage
If a college or university is using a student-athlete’s NIL for commercial purposes, the school
must ask that student-athlete for consent, which must be voluntarily given. See also NCAA
Bylaw 12.5 (Promotional Activities) (describing permissible and nonpermissible uses). When the
legal parameters relevant to this issue are clearer,12
the
Commission also believes that the NCAA should reconsider its treatment of studentathletes’
NIL.
Reference 36 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 37 - 0.05% Coverage
significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must receive an
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education that is valuable, not a pretense.
Reference 38 - 0.04% Coverage
The NCAA will have to incur substantial costs for several of these recommendations. But it will
be money well spent.
Reference 39 - 0.12% Coverage
Stakeholders informed the Commission that when the stakes are high, colleges
are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles and NCAA
rules often are not enforced. Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations.
Reference 40 - 0.14% Coverage
No stakeholder supported the current system for handling high-stakes infractions. Many
informed us that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that led to this
Commission, the reaction was that “everyone knows” that these payments occur. That state of
affairs – where the entire community knows of significant rule breaking and yet the governance
body lacks the power or will to investigate and act – breeds cynicism and contempt.
Reference 41 - 0.12% Coverage
In addition, these and all NCAA investigators must exercise reasonable prosecutorial discretion
and common sense so that resources are focused on serious infractions and punishment is
appropriately calibrated and consistently administered. There are multiple examples of minor
infractions that are not worth the time and effort that the NCAA now spends on them.
Reference 42 - 0.07% Coverage
Volunteers who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions should not
resolve cases. Instead, a panel of professional adjudicators, appointed for a term of years, must
make final and binding decisions and must have the authority
Reference 43 - 0.06% Coverage
To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement and resolution of high stakes
cases must be placed in the hands of independent professionals and neutrals.
Reference 44 - 0.11% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA enact significant increases in the penalties
imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of NCAA rules. Currently, the rewards for
violating the rules far outweigh the risks. To reverse this calculation, the Commission
recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
Reference 45 - 0.21% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue
sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire period of the ban;
(iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv) increase the
penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than one season; and (v) increase the
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penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans.
Reference 46 - 0.17% Coverage
In addition, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a coach or
athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA rules be subject to
significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program reoffends, up to and including a ban
of up to five years from post-season tournaments, including the NCAA tournament, and a loss of
revenues from those tournaments for that same period. There must be significant risk associated
with employing an individual who is under a show cause order.
Reference 47 - 0.19% Coverage
These individuals will find it much easier to do so if they enact comprehensive
compliance programs at their institutions. The costs of compliance may be significant, but they
should be small by comparison to the costs of being found in violation of NCAA rules. The
NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals if they knew or should
have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including termination. These
penalties should be mitigated or enhanced depending up the presence and effectiveness of the
institution’s compliance program.
Reference 48 - 0.11% Coverage
Coaches are the public focus of blame for NCAA violations. For too long, college
presidents and administrators have not been viewed as accountable for the conduct of their
athletic programs. That will have to change. College presidents and highlevel administrators
cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the infractions in those programs.
Reference 49 - 0.26% Coverage
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
Reference 50 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 51 - 0.34% Coverage
In the near term, the Commission recommends that the NCAA promptly adopt
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and enforce rigorous criteria for certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches
attend. In order for the NCAA to certify a non-scholastic basketball event, the owners, event
operators, sponsors, and coaches for the event must agree to financial transparency about all
events they run, including those that are not certified by the NCAA. This requirement includes
agreement (i) to be subject to audit and to provide all required IRS and other tax filings upon
request; (ii) to disclose all sources of financing and other payments and the recipients of all funds
provided for or collected in relation to the event; and (iii) to disclose any financial relationship
between the event sponsors and coaches with any administrator, coach or booster at any NCAA
school. The money flowing from apparel companies and other third parties into non-scholastic
basketball must be disclosed and accounted for, in order to address the corruption arising from
non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 52 - 0.19% Coverage
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have educational
components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that requirement more
effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families, including travel, meals,
accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must be disclosed to the NCAA, along
with the source of their provision. The NCAA must enforce the requirement that such benefits be
reasonable and appropriate and assure that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying
the timing or providing the benefits to another.
Reference 53 - 0.30% Coverage
Currently, non-scholastic basketball is an ungoverned space with coaches, players and their
families, agents and sponsors exchanging money and goods in the hope of future benefits and
without accountability. Of particular importance to the Commission are the cases in which nonscholastic basketball event operators and coaches seek benefits from colleges and college
coaches in exchange for influencing their players’ college choices. To recruit effectively, many
NCAA coaches need to attend non-scholastic basketball events in which large numbers of elite
players participate. In turn, these events, leagues and teams attract high school players by giving
them the opportunity to be seen and evaluated annually by college coaches. Thus, using its
certification requirement, the NCAA has some leverage to impose the financial transparency
requirements and other reforms that the Commission recommends above.
Reference 54 - 0.23% Coverage
It appears, however, that they do not have effective controls in place in their spending in nonscholastic basketball. The Commission calls on the boards of these companies to publicly
support and implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own
investments in non-scholastic basketball. Particularly in light of the facts uncovered in the recent
FBI investigation, these public companies should be concerned about how their money is used in
non-scholastic basketball. We expect that these companies will insist that all employees provide
detailed accountability about such expenditures and cooperate with new NCAA rules about
financial transparency and accountability.
Reference 55 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
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resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 56 - 0.22% Coverage
In sum, the NCAA and NCAA coaches may no longer associate with nonscholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. Moreover, in light of the recommendation that players be
permitted to choose a professional pathway at an earlier time, the NCAA and others should
devote significant resources to earlier development, including education, for players in youth
basketball. The corruption we observe in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. The
reforms recommended by the Commission will be fruitless unless the NCAA gives serious
attention to regulating summer programs.
Reference 57 - 0.07% Coverage
changes recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches and other
organizations to reduce the influence of third parties and increase the ability of college coaches
to interact with recruits and current players.
Reference 58 - 0.40% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA restructure its highest governance
body, the Board of Governors, to include at least five public members with the experience,
stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA in re-establishing itself as an effective and respected
leader and regulator of college sports. One of these public members should also serve on the
NCAA’s Executive Board. The current Board of Governors includes 16 institutional presidents
or chancellors, the chairs of the Division I Council and the Division II and III Management
Councils, and the NCAA president. NCAA Constitution 4.1.1 (Composition). Like public
companies, major non-profit associations usually include outside board members to provide
objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom. Board members with those qualities
will provide valuable insight to the NCAA generally, and as it works towards the restoration of
college basketball. The NCAA should promptly identify candidates with the appropriate stature
and characteristics, and change its rules to require public voting members on its highest
governing body. The Commission will make independent board member recommendations to the
NCAA to assist it in assembling a first-rate list of candidates.
Reference 59 - 0.28% Coverage
The NCAA has often failed to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). But, the NCAA is
not really Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions. When those institutions and
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those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and norms in order to achieve oncourt success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these individuals hide behind the NCAA
when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded state of intercollegiate athletics, in
general, and college basketball in particular. The Commission makes these recommendations to
support fulfillment of the NCAA’s purposes and to impose accountability on institutions and
individuals undermining their achievement.
Reference 60 - 0.27% Coverage
On September 26, 2017, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York announced the arrest of ten persons for involvement in fraud and
corruption schemes related to college basketball – four NCAA Division I college basketball
coaches, the head of Global Sports Marketing – Basketball and two individuals affiliated with a
major athletic apparel company, and three athlete advisors. The first scheme involved allegations
that college coaches took cash payments from athlete advisors to steer players and their families
to the advisors making the payments. The second scheme involved allegations that a senior
executive at a sports apparel company worked with athlete advisors to funnel payments to highschool players and their families to obtain their commitment to attend universities sponsored by
the apparel company.
Reference 61 - 0.45% Coverage
After the announcement of these charges, the NCAA’s President, Mark Emmert, stated that it is
“very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so
quickly.” Statement from Pres. Mark Emmert, Oct. 11, 2017. He continued: “[w]hile I believe
the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the culture of silence in college basketball enables
bad actors, and we need them out of the game. We must take decisive action. This is not a time
for half-measures or incremental change.” As a first step, he announced that the NCAA Board of
Governors, the Division I Board of Directors and the NCAA President had established an
independent Commission on College Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. The
Commission was to “examin[e] critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working” and focus
on three areas:
•
The relationship between the NCAA national office, its members, their studentathletes and
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, nonscholastic basketball and athlete
agents and advisors.
•
The relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the challenging effect of the
NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one-and-done phenomenon in men’s college
basketball.
•
The creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and its national
office to promote transparency and accountability.
Reference 62 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission was charged with gathering information and expert opinions
for making “transformative recommendations” to the Division I Board of Directors and NCAA
Board of Governors on “legislation, policies, actions and structure(s) to protect the integrity of
college sports, with a focus on Division I men’s basketball.” Members of the Commission were
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appointed for an initial six-month term. The Commission’s goal was the completion of its work
and a report to the NCAA Boards for action at their April 2018 meetings. This document is that
report, and it contains the Commission’s recommendations with respect to the challenges
currently facing college basketball.
Reference 63 - 0.26% Coverage
Before going further, however, the Commission believes it is important to
confront the uncomfortable fact that the challenges identified in this report have been part of the
landscape of pre-professional basketball for many years, and that others have previously made
serious efforts to address them with only limited success. To be sure, these challenges have
become more prominent in the past decade as elite basketball – pre-college, in-college and postcollege – has become exponentially more lucrative. The fact remains, however, that today’s
issues have been around a long time, and their existence is widely acknowledged. Virtually all
stakeholders and others providing information to the Commission at some point uttered the
discouraging phrase: “Everyone knows what’s been going on.”
Reference 64 - 0.16% Coverage
However, the Commission recognizes that some humility is required in light of past failures and
the size of the challenge. Stakeholders do not agree about either the causes or the potential
solutions to the current challenges that face pre-professional basketball. The Commission
believes that these challenges will persist unless all stakeholders accept responsibility for the
credibility of the game, the reputations of the schools who field teams and the integrity of the
athletes who compete.
Reference 65 - 0.25% Coverage
From mid-October 2017 through early April 2018, the Commission sought the views of
stakeholders. In meetings, the Commission directly heard the views of a number of parties. In
addition, the Commission opened a portal and solicited public comment on its work, receiving
numerous helpful written responses. The Commission heard directly from the NBA, the NBPA,
USA Basketball, numerous NCAA offices and departments, multiple athletic conferences,
several apparel companies and agents, college and high school coaches associations, student and
faculty associations, athletic directors’ associations, other interested associations and groups, the
Uniform Law Commission, athletes and other individuals. The Commission appreciates all of
this helpful input into its work.
Reference 66 - 0.02% Coverage
The Commission also benefited from the following briefings:
Reference 67 - 0.30% Coverage
In its meetings, the Commission spent close to 70% of its time in executive session to discuss its
dialogue with stakeholders and the materials and presentations it had received. The
Commission’s discussions were enhanced by the varied and deep experience of its members,
including former student-athletes, former professional athletes, coaches, athletic directors,
university presidents and provosts and NBA owners. The Commission also benefited from the
insights, experience and expertise of its members who are “outsiders,” and brought to bear their
unique perspectives from government and the military on the current problems of men’s Division
I basketball. Through executive session discussions, the Commission was able to assess how the
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information it received and the perspectives of stakeholders might affect potential NCAA actions
to address the issues identified for the Commission’s consideration.
Reference 68 - 0.29% Coverage
Both Division I men’s basketball and the NBA are multi-billion dollar enterprises. Many
individuals and entities earn a living and more by direct and indirect association with these
entities. Thus, the financial stakes are high for elite players, 14
coaches, athletic
directors, colleges and universities, apparel companies, agents and athlete advisors of all stripes.
Where this much money is at stake, the incentives to break rules are high. To identify issues and
craft potential recommended responses, the Commission was asked to focus on three categories
of relationships in college basketball: (1) the relationships between college basketball and the
NBA and NBPA; (2) the relationships between the NCAA and its member institutions; and (3)
the relationships between college basketball and apparel companies, non-scholastic basketball
(coaches and leagues), agents and other third parties.
Reference 69 - 0.19% Coverage
a small group of elite players who would prefer to bypass college and play in the NBA after high
school and who would be drafted, were it permitted under the NBA’s and NBPA’s collectively
bargained rules. These players often do not find the alternative professional options – such as the
G League or non-U.S. leagues – as desirable as making a name for themselves in Division I
men’s basketball. Thus, these players, colloquially referred to as one-and-done players, attend
college for a single year – and sometimes only until the day their schools are eliminated from the
NCAA tournament.
Reference 70 - 0.31% Coverage
Many who number among elite players while in high school believe and expect
that they will play professional basketball. See Executive Summary (ES) Section 1.B. Many third
parties – e.g., agents, apparel companies and other athlete advisors – see some high school
players’ potential for a professional career, and the potential for earnings for themselves, and are
willing to invest in a significant number of players in the hope that some will be drafted and
yield returns. Thus, the incentives for third parties to make improper payments to players and
others with influence over players exist beyond the small group of players who may be one-anddone, and extend into the slightly larger group of players who will play additional years of
college basketball before playing professionally. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that substantial
third-party attention, including financial attention, will focus on one-and-done players and a
relatively small additional group.
Reference 71 - 0.24% Coverage
For a subset of these players who have no intention of spending more than a year or two in
college or whose time is fully consumed by basketball, maintaining academic eligibility to play
may be a challenge. If that player is good enough, however, the school may be strongly
motivated to assist that student-athlete in maintaining his eligibility. This situation creates
another opening for corruption – the manipulation and dilution of academic standards by school
officials, along with other academic misconduct. A series of recent cases involve this
phenomenon. Other cases illustrate the lack of clarity about the NCAA’s rules and the likely
punishment for academic misconduct, as well as inconsistency in the NCAA’s application of the
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rules
Reference 72 - 0.10% Coverage
The NCAA’s current rules on amateurism place limits on the ability of those players to test the
professional market for their services and to obtain assistance from an agent in assessing their
potential value. This, in turn, may prevent student-athletes from taking full advantage of their
collegiate opportunities.
Reference 73 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission heard from many commenters who identified both the NCAA’s
enforcement process and the substance of the NCAA’s rules as inadequate to deal with the
challenges presented by Division I men’s basketball.
Reference 74 - 0.17% Coverage
Eligibility and Academic Misconduct. The Commission heard criticism of the
NCAA’s rules related to academic eligibility. See NCAA Bylaws, Art. 14. With respect to postenrollment academic performance, the NCAA’s “progress towards degree” requirements
determine whether individuals remain eligible to play. Stakeholders did not take issue with the
substance of these rules. Instead, the Commission heard criticism about the NCAA’s relationship
with member institutions’ course offerings and academic requirements.
Reference 75 - 0.08% Coverage
Some stakeholders believe that the NCAA should not be in the business of
enforcing academic standards. However, many others assert that the NCAA’s current rules with
respect to academic standards undermine the integrity of the collegiate experience and game.
Reference 76 - 0.33% Coverage
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules
regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams qualify as
“amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years. Although there are
exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to receive compensation in any
form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a contract or commitment to play
professional athletics, to receive consideration from a professional sports organization, to
compete on a professional team and to enter into an agreement with an agent. In addition, a
student-athlete cannot receive preferential treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic
reputation or skill, unless specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws
12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or
Competition), 12.1.2 (Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
Reference 77 - 0.16% Coverage
Some stakeholders note that many elite players receive some form of payment to
play basketball before attending college; that student-athletes are bringing substantial sums into
NCAA and collegiate coffers; and that playing Division I men’s college basketball is essentially
a full time job that does not leave room for a normal college experience. They conclude for some
or all of these reasons that players should receive some recompense (beyond the full value of
their education) for playing basketball.
Reference 78 - 0.18% Coverage
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Others recognize the validity of some of these points, but contend the studentathletes receive significant benefits from their college experiences, including the value of the
scholarship (the full cost of a college education), the associated training, coaching and benefits of
being on a collegiate team, and the lifelong incremental increase in earning power resulting from
a college degree. See ES Section 1.D. Many believe that paying players is not financially or
legally feasible and that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the collegiate game.
Reference 79 - 0.10% Coverage
They support a variety of means – other than payment – to address the economic circumstances
and equities of student-athletes in high-revenue sports, and to ensure that they receive the
education that the college promises. In addition, they support continued enforcement of the
amateurism rules.
Reference 80 - 0.24% Coverage
Still others believe that the NCAA rules are so focused on pre-professional sports that the NCAA
has failed to create a system that makes sense for the majority of studentathletes who will not
make a living at their sports. Under these rules, stakeholders assert, student-athletes who accept
any “benefit,” no matter how small, risk losing their eligibility to compete. The NCAA’s
administration of the “no benefit” rule, see NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2 (Nonpermissible), was
criticized as penalizing student-athletes and preventing them from engaging in normal
interactions with friends and mentors. Those holding this view suggest that the NCAA should
engage in common sense calibration of the “no benefit” rule for particular contexts.
Reference 81 - 0.28% Coverage
Agents. NCAA rules further forbid collegiate athletes to enter into any agreement (oral or
written) with agents for purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial
gain, even if that agreement is limited to future representation. Prohibited marketing includes
negotiations with professional teams, seeking product endorsements and efforts to place an
athlete at a particular school. The rules likewise forbid family members or other representatives
to enter into such an agreement on behalf of an athlete. In addition, athletes may not accept
benefits from agents even if those benefits do not have strings visibly attached. NCAA Division I
Bylaws 12.3.1 (General Rule); 12.3.1.2 (Representation for Future Negotiations); 12.02.1
(Agent); 12.3.3 (Athletics Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1.3 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).18
Reference 82 - 0.23% Coverage
Some stakeholders expressed the view that agents should be permitted to have earlier access to
athletes, potentially as early as during high school, and certainly at the beginning of each
academic year in college. Agents opined that parents, families and students are eager for
knowledge about their collegiate, professional and post-collegiate options and that they will find
that information one way or another. They assert that student-athletes routinely misunderstand
their own professional prospects and their best path to success and that agents and advisors could
assist student-athletes in making the best choices about eligibility, including choices that would
result in higher levels of educational achievement.
Reference 83 - 0.09% Coverage
In addition, many stakeholders, including agents, told the Commission that agents
are determined to develop relationships with professional prospects and, whatever the rules
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provide, will find ways to make contact with student-athletes and those who influence them.
Reference 84 - 0.07% Coverage
It would be better, stakeholders argue, if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by
restricting contact to specific times and places.
Reference 85 - 0.24% Coverage
Still other stakeholders, including a number of agents, took the position that allowing agents to
have contact with high school students will result in even earlier agent involvement in studentathletes’ decision making, including their selection of a grassroots or non-scholastic basketball
coach, a high school, a college, etc. These stakeholders maintain that the barriers to entry for
professional agents should be higher (while recognizing that the NBPA has recently taken
important steps to improve the quality of the agent cadre), and that the penalties for agents who
violate NCAA rules should be higher (either through enforcement of state laws or through
reporting of violations to the NBPA or other unspecified rule changes).
Reference 86 - 0.16% Coverage
Recruiting. In the view of many Division I coaches, the NCAA rules hamstring college coaches
and allow non-scholastic coaches and other third parties to become the primary influences over
elite high school players. For example, Division I coaches have limited opportunities to evaluate
high school players in both scholastic and nonscholastic settings, and those players cannot
officially visit colleges and universities until late in their junior year. See generally NCAA
Division I Bylaws, Art. 13.
Reference 87 - 0.20% Coverage
Indeed, Division I coaches complain that they are dependent on non-scholastic coaches, leagues
and events for opportunities to view players, giving those third parties even more leverage over
high school players. In the interim, high school players are playing non-scholastic basketball
sponsored by apparel companies who provide those high school players with gear, travel and
experiences. Division I coaches seek to increase their direct contact with high school players at
critical junctures, and to limit their dependence on non-scholastic coaches, leagues and apparel
companies for access to high school players.
Reference 88 - 0.34% Coverage
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to impose
harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents) who violate the
rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate with NCAA
investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the ability to impose loss
of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of revenue from post-season play
on those who commit serious infractions and those who decline to cooperate with NCAA
investigations. They believe that the availability – and utilization – of these penalties would get
presidential and board-level attention at colleges. These persons further note that administrators,
athletic directors and coaches who violate the rules often move on to other member institutions,
and do not pay a significant price for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the
institutions that hire individuals who have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking
the risk of hiring past offenders.
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Reference 89 - 0.17% Coverage
Currently, the NCAA “certifies” some non-scholastic or non-scholastic basketball
events and leagues. NCAA Division I Bylaws 13.18 (Basketball Event Certification); 17.31.4.1
(Summer Basketball Leagues). Coaches at NCAA member institutions can attend these summer
events only if the NCAA certifies them. Unfortunately, however, the requirements for NCAA
certification are minimal, to be generous; and some of the requirements are poorly implemented
while others are not enforced. Non-scholastic basketball is largely unregulated.
Reference 90 - 0.18% Coverage
In addition to coaching, experience, gear and travel, these non-scholastic basketball teams and
events offer players exposure, including to Division I coaches. For example, Division I coaches
attend and recruit at the NCAA-certified events which are held in April and July each year.
Many summer coaches have ongoing relationships with Division I coaches. They can thus bring
“their” players to the attention of Division I coaches and potentially influence players to attend
particular schools, including schools where “their” apparel company is a sponsor.
Reference 91 - 0.22% Coverage
The Commission heard varying views on whether the NCAA should be more or
less or differently involved in non-scholastic basketball. All stakeholders agreed that nonscholastic basketball has provided substantial benefits to many student-athletes – competition,
gear, travel and similar enriching experiences, coaching, exposure to college coaches and an
opportunity to receive a college scholarship, among other things. In addition, many college
coaches use the events at which significant numbers of high school players gather to evaluate
potential recruits efficiently and economically. Coaches at less advantaged schools rely on these
large gatherings to scout
Reference 92 - 0.25% Coverage
That said, virtually all stakeholders expressed the view that currently, nonscholastic basketball
lacks sufficient regulation, with detrimental effects on college basketball. For example,
significant money flows into summer ball from apparel companies, agents, investment advisers
and other sources, and there is little accountability or transparency about many of the sources and
expenditures of those funds. Many state that it is well known that student-athletes are paid –
either directly or indirectly (through family members or otherwise) – to play for particular
summer teams. Almost all elite basketball players participate in non-scholastic basketball. Thus,
as noted above, many players and their families are accustomed to being paid before they attend
college.
Reference 93 - 0.07% Coverage
Under the current system, Division I men’s basketball players are amateurs (student-athletes) and
may receive a scholarship to matriculate and play basketball for their institution, but may not be
paid for doing so.
Reference 94 - 0.15% Coverage
Many of these incentives for third-party conduct are present not only when high school players
enter college, but also when college players consider transferring to another institution. As noted
above, roughly 40% of freshmen in Division I men’s basketball depart the institution they choose
to attend by the end of their sophomore year. Third parties influence many of these transfers. The
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question of improper influence, accordingly, clearly extends to transfers.
Reference 95 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 96 - 0.12% Coverage
As it gathered information and listened to stakeholders, the Commission heard
numerous recommendations for specific reforms to address the issues in Division I men’s
basketball described above. In assessing both the challenges and the potential reforms, the
Commission accepted as its foundational principle the collegiate model of athletic competition.
Reference 97 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling
their intercollegiate athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the
NCAA. NCAA Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s
activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its members’
acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
Reference 98 - 0.12% Coverage
The issues currently confronting the NCAA and Division I men’s college basketball
are long standing and complex. The Commission believes, however, that implementing the
recommendations below will support the integrity of the collegiate game and the NCAA’s
member institutions without unduly limiting the individual opportunities of student-athletes.
Reference 99 - 0.22% Coverage
In the Commission’s view, preventing young athletes capable of and preferring to
play in the NBA from doing so, and pushing them into enrolling in college for a single year (or
less), is doing more harm than good for college basketball and college. The potential earning
power of marquee college players who can win championships for their schools is an irresistible
draw for third-party attention and money, most notably from athlete advisors. Their gamechanging potential for a college team creates the strongest motivation for improper payments
from third parties and violations of NCAA rules by school administrators, coaches and other
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persons associated with member institutions.
Reference 100 - 0.30% Coverage
negotiating the NBA, shoe and apparel, and other endorsement contracts of professional players.
Financial advisers earn significant commissions for investing professional players’ funds.
Competition to sign potential professional players is cutthroat. Agents and other advisers seek to
enter into relationships with potential professionals when those players are in high school and in
college, and they do so by paying the players and those with influence over the players, including
family members and coaches, in violation of NCAA rules. Agents and other advisers also appear
to have (and many actually have) valuable information and access to opportunities, such as
coaching, training and exposure to college coaches. Agents and other advisers thus form early
relationships with potential professional players and their “influencers,” and players and their
“influencers” become accustomed to being paid.
Reference 101 - 0.11% Coverage
Eliminating one-and-done players from college basketball will remove the group
of most likely future professionals, and the associated potential for corrupt payments from
agents. Allowing collegiate players who become clear professional prospects to depart when they
choose to do so should similarly lessen the temptation to cheat while in college.
Reference 102 - 0.19% Coverage
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can also corrupt
the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special benefits to these
athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all students. Finally, the
matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short time primarily to play
Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain student-athletes will not, as a
practical matter, be college students.
Reference 103 - 0.24% Coverage
Many Division I college basketball players who will never play in the NBA will bring
championships and money to their schools and, as a result, may be offered payment by those
who would benefit or by boosters. In addition, many of those players will have professional
potential and receive payments based on the mistaken hopes of third parties for eventual rewards.
Colleges, too, will reap enormous benefits from the attendance of players unlikely to make it to
the NBA, and thus may be motivated to compromise academic standards. Many student-athletes
who play Division I college basketball have the “student” part of their student-athlete experience
diluted so they can focus on basketball, without regard to their professional potential.
Reference 104 - 0.44% Coverage
The Commission considered alternatives to the recommendation above. In light of the value and
importance of staying in college for more than a year, the Commission carefully considered
recommending adoption of the so-called baseball rule.21
To
oversimplify, that rule would provide that if a player enrolls in college, his eligibility terminates
on the first day of matriculation and he remains ineligible to play in the NBA or G League until
he is at least 21 years old or his entering class completes its third year in college. This rule offers
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some significant benefits. It would require students who choose the collegiate path to understand
that they are making a serious commitment to their education, and it would create a context in
which athletes are ultimately more likely to receive their degrees.
However, the baseball rule would also force collegiate players who could sign with
an NBA team to remain in school, with the negative consequences that would entail. Moreover,
both the culture and professional path of a major league baseball player differ dramatically from
that of an NBA player. Baseball has a tiered, large-scale minor league system, and even elite
players often spend years developing in the minors. In addition, one baseball player generally
cannot change the fortunes of a baseball team. As a result, the baseball rule does not translate
perfectly to basketball.
Reference 105 - 0.20% Coverage
If the NBA and the NBPA were to adopt the “baseball rule,” we believe that the
challenges created by the presence of one-and-done players would simply migrate to older future
NBA players unhappily captive in their second and third collegiate years. Holding players with
NBA opportunities hostage also feeds the narrative of collegiate player exploitation, putting
pressure on the NCAA’s commitment to the collegiate model. Players with professional earning
power should have the freedom to choose a professional path. The Commission believes that
student-athletes should be encouraged but not forced to remain in college.
Reference 106 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission also considered ending freshman eligibility. This change would penalize many
student-athletes ready to play Division I college basketball in their first years (and their schools)
in order to address a problem created by a small group.
Reference 107 - 0.21% Coverage
an alternative to the blanket elimination of freshman eligibility, the Commission also considered
conditioning such eligibility on some additional measure of Freshman Readiness, a
demonstration that a student-athlete’s high school experience has prepared him for college
academic requirements. As a less drastic measure, the Commission considered making all
Division I basketball scholarships three or four year scholarships such that colleges would be
required to “lock up” scholarships if they recruited a player unlikely to matriculate for more than
a year or did so regularly. There are serious downsides to each of these alternatives
Reference 108 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission recommends that student-athletes be permitted to enter the
draft and retain their collegiate eligibility if they are not drafted, provided they otherwise remain
eligible to do so and they return to the same school.
Reference 109 - 0.37% Coverage
The NCAA should provide high school and college players with additional
flexibility in retaining collegiate eligibility while assessing their professional prospects. Under
current NCAA rules, players may apply for an NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee
evaluation and participate in the NBA Combine, but players lose their collegiate eligibility if
they do not remove their names from the draft within ten days after the NBA Combine. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 12.2.4.2.1 (Exception – Basketball). It is easy to say that young players should
know that they will not be drafted and that they “make their own beds” when they fail to
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withdraw from the draft. But, this kind of misjudgment is widespread, and the penalty for it
should not be so high, if we are serious about the value and importance of college. The quality
and value of the college experience increases with the amount of time a student-athlete spends on
campus. With the completion of each academic year, a student will face a lower hurdle to
earning a degree. Student-athletes who are wrong about their professional prospects should retain
the opportunity to work toward the degree they were promised.
Reference 110 - 0.14% Coverage
We recognize that this regime has some downsides. Under current collectively
bargained rules, a player who declares for the draft, but is not drafted, is a free agent and may
sign with any NBA team at any time, including the middle of the next college season. To address
this problem, the Commission requests that the NBA and the NBPA agree that players who are
not drafted become ineligible for the NBA until they enter the draft again.
Reference 111 - 0.24% Coverage
In addition, if players remain in the draft until it occurs, college coaches will not know until June
which players are eligible for, or remain on, their rosters for the next season. However, the NBA
draft is two rounds and involves only 60 players. Data show that international players will take
approximately 40% of these slots. Thus, this uncertainty implicates very few players (around 36),
and we believe that college coaches are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to
accurately predict whether a young player is, in fact, likely to be drafted. Student-athletes may
make some decisions that cost them collegiate eligibility, but the Commission recommends that
these points of no return be modified in light of current realities.
Reference 112 - 0.31% Coverage
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a season before
returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.1 (Residence
Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious disadvantages in
completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this issue, over the last few years,
hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is upward.22
Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be in a better
“basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover, third parties influence
many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best interests of the player in mind.
Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence requirement” of the transfer rule remain
in place, whatever other changes are made in the NCAA’s transfer rules.
Reference 113 - 0.20% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for the certification of agents, and authorize and make opportunities for those
certified agents to engage with student-athletes at school at specific times during the calendar
year. To implement this requirement, the NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive
to develop detailed standards for NCAA certification and administer the program. The NCAA’s
program should also educate elite student-athletes at member institutions about NCAA eligibility
rules and requirements and professional prospects.
Reference 114 - 0.20% Coverage
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The NCAA’s rules already allow student-athletes to retain lawyers and advisors to
provide professional advice at market value, provided the lawyer or advisor does not engage in
the representational activities of agents. NCAA-certified agents should also be permitted to
provide such advice. Further, high school players considering entering the draft should be
allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors just as high school baseball players may
engage agents for advice about the draft. Cf. NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.3.1 (Exception –
Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey – Prior to Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment).
Reference 115 - 0.33% Coverage
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA rules
define as “agents”24
Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met or their employees. However, the
Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid, either
directly or indirectly.25
advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into agreements
with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought that this would
simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age. Instead, agents
recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with high school and collegiate
players and make their cases so that players would have all available options before they enter
the professional market. The Commission intends NCAA-certification to provide these
opportunities for “good” agents.
Reference 116 - 0.19% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for degree completion for student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave
college after progress of two years towards a degree. The NCAA must require Division I
programs to establish a Degree Completion Program to support degree completion by studentathletes who compete and complete two years of college and then leave school, but later seek to
return to college to finish their education. The NCAA and its member institutions must keep
focused on the prize here – a college degree.
Reference 117 - 0.12% Coverage
As described above, the Commission starts from the premise that students
who are athletes – not paid professionals – play college sports. It is worth noting that studentathletes choose the collegiate path, and we want to enhance their ability to decide whether to do
so. But they are making a choice; if it is not the right choice and a professional path is more
desirable, they should take it.
Reference 118 - 0.07% Coverage
schools, cannot participate fully in the academic and social experience of college, and therefore
should be treated as professional athletes and paid more than the full cost of their college
educations.
Reference 119 - 0.20% Coverage
Proponents of pay-for-play contend that it is past time to recognize that men’s Division I football
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and basketball players are not student-athletes, but are instead professional athletes who are not
receiving a college education. As a matter of fairness, they contend, the players who earn these
massive revenues should share in them, rather than seeing the money flow to coaches, athletic
directors, excessive facilities and elsewhere. Thus, the argument continues, colleges should
openly bid for players’ services, instead of obtaining their services through a corrupt process as
they are alleged to do now.
Reference 120 - 0.32% Coverage
Opponents of pay-for-play strongly believe that college basketball should remain a game played
by student-athletes that has unique value and appeal. They also strongly resist the argument that
student-athletes do not benefit from attending college and participating in intercollegiate
basketball. Their counter is simple. Student-athletes in fact benefit enormously. They receive full
scholarships up to the cost of attendance, see ES Section 1.D. Students with demonstrated
financial need are also eligible for Pell grants of $5,800 annually. Student-athletes often receive
benefits such as meals, special academic support, travel expenses, coaching, training and
nutritional advice, career guidance and more, worth tens of thousands of dollars annually.
Obviously, studentathletes who remain in school for four years receive four times this value,
along with the increased earning power of a college degree, which is roughly $1 million over a
lifetime. See ES Section 1.D.
Reference 121 - 0.34% Coverage
In addition, all agree that the complexities of developing a lawful and fair payfor-play system are staggering. In an open market for player services, payments would vary
based on the talent of the individual, the revenue that he or she would generate, the local sports
market, etc. It is unclear what happens to the players who are not worth that much in a pay-forplay model, or whether colleges can compete for players’ services annually. Opponents of payfor-play also point out that no system would be fair to all students, sports and schools, and that
many programs would cease to exist, depriving large numbers of student-athletes without
professional potential of an opportunity to attend college. They also observe that if players were
paid a salary instead of the full cost of attendance at college, they would pay taxes on that salary,
and thus receive little benefit. Paying student-athletes, others assert, would erode the associations
between athletes and their schools, athletes and their teammates, and athletes and their fellow
students.
Reference 122 - 0.24% Coverage
This debate is longstanding, and many have entrenched views. College basketball
has earned billions for NCAA institutions. Indeed, the major, revenue-generating college sports
have supported the inter-collegiate athletic experiences of thousands of athletes in sports that are
not profitable and have provided a multitude of other benefits to member institutions. However,
those billions have also been used to finance breathtaking salaries for some coaches in revenuegenerating sports and extravagant athletic facilities, while some colleges reduce academic
offerings. Many, including some members of this Commission, wonder whether colleges and
universities are making the right choices about their institutions’ educational missions.
Reference 123 - 0.32% Coverage
The Commission has already expressed its view that student-athletes receive valuable benefits by
pursuing a degree and participating in intercollegiate sports. In addition to the economic benefits
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detailed above, college sports is a valuable part of a college education, as illustrated by numerous
student-athletes who study, train and compete with no thought or possibility of “going pro.” But
the Commission shares the concerns of those who believe that the athletes generating these
billions in revenues for NCAA colleges and universities and their coaches and administrators
often are not receiving the benefit of the college education that they are promised. This problem
is compounded when players with professional options are not permitted to leave college and
play professionally. The Commission likewise believes that the large sums of money and the
prestige that accompany college basketball championships can corrupt colleges’ admission
standards, academic offerings and integrity.
Reference 124 - 0.28% Coverage
One aspect of this debate is particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate. Paying modest
salaries to Division I basketball players will not address the particular corruption the
Commission confronts; nor will providing student-athletes a modest post-graduation trust fund
based on licensing of names, images and likenesses. None of the contemplated payments would
be sufficient to reduce the corrupt incentives of third parties who pay certain uniquely talented
players in the hope of latching onto their professional futures, of coaches and boosters seeking to
secure the success of their programs, or of colleges willing to undermine their education mission
to ensure the eligibility of players. One would have to adopt a full-scale professional model to
forestall that corruption or, as the Commission recommends, try instead to revitalize the college
model.
Reference 125 - 0.13% Coverage
Finally, the Commission is also aware of many voices suggesting that allowing student athletes
to earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, image and likenesses (NIL) is
consistent with the collegiate model, particularly if students do not receive those funds until after
college. Notably, the NCAA is a defendant in litigation involving the NCAA’s refusal to allow
students to do so.
Reference 126 - 0.12% Coverage
The court stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is
a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
Reference 127 - 0.23% Coverage
But, in the current legal circumstances, the Commission decided to address the charge of
exploitation by providing individual student-athletes with access to professional opportunities,
and ensuring that the student portion of student-athlete is real. Specifically, the Commission
recommends allowing student-athletes with a professional pathway to make the choice to leave
college every year, creating resources so that they can make an informed choice whether to do
so, welcoming back student-athletes whom the NBA does not draft, making a serious financial
commitment to degree completion and severely punishing those who undermine the premise that
student-athletes must receive a valuable – not a sham – education.
Reference 128 - 0.29% Coverage
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In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 129 - 0.35% Coverage
The consensus view – including within the NCAA – is that the NCAA investigative
and enforcement process is broken. The NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles
do not work in situations when large sums of money and serious reputational damage is at stake.
Schools and individuals “lawyer up” to protect their financial and reputational interests. The
current NCAA system does not provide its personnel with the tools and authority necessary to
investigate complex cases and effectively prosecute violators of the rules. Decision makers are
volunteers and NCAA members; they face perceived conflicts of interest in adjudicating
complex cases with adverse consequences for the credibility of the process. Punishment is often
unpredictable and inadequate to deter violations. In many cases, the process takes years, and the
NCAA imposes punishment long after the departure of bad actors. Prominent coaches and
administrators escape accountability for what they knew or should have known was occurring in
their programs. A significant institutional overhaul is required.
Reference 130 - 0.11% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends that the NCAA establish two tracks for addressing rules
violations – one track for complex cases28
and a second for all others.
The current NCAA process would remain in place for the second category of cases, but the
NCAA must create an entirely new process for investigating and deciding complex cases.
Reference 131 - 0.29% Coverage
Most significantly, the Commission recommends that the Committee on Infractions appoint a
panel of paid independent decision makers, such as lawyers, arbitrators and retired judges. These
decision makers would form a pool from which three adjudicators would be randomly selected to
resolve each complex case. Members of the panel would serve for a term of five years (with
some shorter and longer terms initially so that the entire panel does not turn over
simultaneously). The panel would operate under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association or analogous rules; its decisions would be final and binding, subject to review only
under the Federal Arbitration Act. Volunteers and members should not decide whether fellow
member institutions have violated NCAA rules, nor the appropriate punishment for those
violations. It is time for independent adjudication of the NCAA’s complex cases.
Reference 132 - 0.06% Coverage
The Commission recognizes that instituting an adversary process may further delay
a process already criticized as too slow. The Commission recommends two measures to address
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this issue.
Reference 133 - 0.11% Coverage
First, the NCAA should adopt rules authorizing the independent panel of adjudicators to grant
preliminary injunctive relief – that is, to forbid or require certain action while the adjudication is
taking place – against institutions and individuals where the NCAA’s investigator and advocate
demonstrates a substantial likelihood
Reference 134 - 0.06% Coverage
Second, the NCAA should establish reasonable time limits for submission and decision of a case,
which must be enforced except in extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the panel.
Reference 135 - 0.16% Coverage
Second, the Commission recommends that the NCAA ensure professional
investigation and prosecution of serious violations. There are at least two ways to do so. After its
appointment, the independent adjudication panel could create a panel of outside counsel (not the
NCAA’s usual counsel who would be in a conflict of interest) to investigate and advocate in
complex cases. In the alternative, the NCAA could establish a separate investigation and
advocacy office, with rules guaranteeing its independence.
Reference 136 - 0.27% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that the newly formed investigative office
(or appointed law firm) and, indeed, all relevant NCAA investigative bodies, be instructed to
exercise appropriate enforcement discretion and common sense – that is, to set appropriate
priorities for enforcement, to make reasonable decisions about punishment, and not to expend
excessive resources on violations that are de minimis. This investigative entity should give
serious infractions substantial attention and seek punishments that will deter future violations.
But it should also recognize that certain kinds of minor violations should be handled differently,
both in terms of resources expended and punishment recommended. In the exercise of such
discretion, plainly self-reporting and other indicia of cooperation should be considered.
Reference 137 - 0.44% Coverage
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes to cooperate in
NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can consider in assessing penalties. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The
NCAA also must adopt rules that require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate
with NCAA investigations, with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing
significant consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically, to
participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents, administrators, and
coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including by providing documents
and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators. In addition, while the NCAA does not have
subpoena power, it can adopt rules requiring as a condition of membership, that member
institutions enter into contractual agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member
institutions contractually impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents,
administrators and coaches. NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report
and provide evidence of violations.
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Reference 138 - 0.11% Coverage
Relatedly, the independent panel of adjudicators must have the authority, on a motion to show
cause, promptly to impose consequences for failure to cooperate in investigations of complex
matters, including, where appropriate, loss of the right to participate in post-season tournaments
and other NCAA events and the loss of associated revenues.
Reference 139 - 0.13% Coverage
In a related point, the NCAA must authorize its investigators and advocates to
submit and rely on the evidence admitted in judicial and administrative tribunals and on the
decisions of those tribunals. There is no reason to require the NCAA to redo the work of other
tribunals. The independent panel of adjudicators can determine the reliability of the evidence and
the preclusive effect of other decisions.
Reference 140 - 0.16% Coverage
The Commission recommends significant changes in the penalty structure and the
nature of penalties imposed on NCAA member institutions for certain violations. The
Commission considers non-cooperation a separate serious offense that should receive substantial
penalties, including the loss of participation in and revenues from the NCAA tournament for up
to five years. In addition, the Commission believes that serious repeated violations of NCAA
rules must be subject to these same severe penalties.
Reference 141 - 0.23% Coverage
Current core penalties for violations of NCAA rules are set out in the Division I Manual, Article
19, Figure 19.1. The NCAA adopted these penalties in October 2012, effective August 2013.
Due to the length of the NCAA’s adjudication process, the first cases in which the current
penalty matrix applies have only recently been resolved. (The penalty matrix in effect at the time
of a violation applies to that violation without regard to subsequent amendments.) The matrix
provides appropriate types of penalties for violations by institutions – i.e., probation, fines,
suspensions, scholarship reductions, forfeitures, post-season bans, head-coach restrictions,
recruiting visit restrictions.
Reference 142 - 0.12% Coverage
The Commission considered whether the core institutional penalties are sufficiently
severe to have the desired deterrent effect. The Commission believes that many at NCAA
member institutions consider the rewards of NCAA rule violations to outweigh the risks, and
thus it recommends the following changes in the NCAA’s institutional penalties and penalty
structure:
Reference 143 - 0.14% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all sharing
in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the same fiveyear period; (iii) increase
the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans
Reference 144 - 0.12% Coverage
Second, the Commission recommends that the NCAA inform members that past penalties
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imposed for particular violations have no precedential value, and that the independent panel shall
conduct a de novo assessment of the appropriate penalties for violations with the need for
deterrence in mind. The panel must be free to calibrate punishment without regard to past
practice.
Reference 145 - 0.12% Coverage
Third, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a
coach, athletic director or other administrator under a show cause order for a previous violation
of NCAA rules must receive enhanced penalties if that individual’s program reoffends.
Institutions that hire an individual under a show cause order must be aware that
they are taking a significant risk.
Reference 146 - 0.20% Coverage
Fourth, the Commission recommends that the NCAA highlight the availability
of a five-year ban from the NCAA tournament and the loss of all revenues from the tournament
for that same period for member institutions’ programs found to have engaged in systematic,
severe and repeated violations of NCAA rules. The Commission acknowledges that imposing
this penalty will result in significant punishment of innocent members of the college community
and beyond, and that it must be limited to the extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, the NCAA
should use this punishment where necessary to address sufficiently grave patterns of misconduct.
Reference 147 - 0.10% Coverage
certify annually that they have conducted due diligence and that their athletic programs comply
with NCAA rules. The NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals
if they knew or should have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including
termination.
Reference 148 - 0.36% Coverage
In terms of substantive rules changes, the NCAA’s jurisdiction with respect to academic issues
must be clarified, stated in amended rules and communicated to member institutions. The rules
must be amended to allow the NCAA to address all academic fraud and cheating to the extent it
is used to corrupt athletic eligibility. Member institutions should not be able to shield academic
fraud to ensure athletic eligibility by extending that fraud to the entire student body. In addition,
the NCAA’s imposition of discipline for academic fraud and misconduct has been inconsistent
and untimely. The relationship between punishment and the school’s involvement, including its
self-reporting, is unclear. Member institutions do not fulfill their commitment to student-athletes
when they allow them to maintain eligibility through academic fraud or misconduct. The NCAA
must also amend its rules to clarify the standard for academic fraud and misconduct and to
establish consistent punishments for the violations of these rules. Going forward, the NCAA
must apply a revised standard consistently across member institutions.
Reference 149 - 0.34% Coverage
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified nonscholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
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others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 150 - 0.28% Coverage
Putting to one side agents paying large sums of money to players, the
Commission heard comments that collegiate players or their families may receive from agents a
meal or minor travel expenses or some other small benefit that those with limited financial
means are strongly tempted to accept. The Commission concludes that the NCAA and its
member institutions must enhance the resources of Student Assistance Funds and educate
student-athletes about the benefits that it can provide to address the legitimate school-related
needs of student-athletes. NCAA Division I Bylaws 15.01.6.1, 16.11.1.8 (Student Assistance
Fund). Specifically, the Commission believes that the Fund should be increased and used for
additional purposes, such as providing Division I schools with the resources to assist parents and
families to travel to student-athletes’ games, subject to means testing
Reference 151 - 0.20% Coverage
The NCAA must adopt rules that will reform non-scholastic basketball or disassociate college
basketball from the corrupt aspects of non-scholastic basketball. The Commission recommends
that the NCAA take both short and long-term action. In the short term, the NCAA must adopt
rigorous certification criteria for non-scholastic basketball events its coaches may attend,
including significant measures to ensure financial transparency and accountability. In the long
term, the NCAA should administer its own regional camps for high school players in the group
subject to college recruiting in July of each year.
Reference 152 - 0.08% Coverage
The Commission heard from numerous stakeholders that non-scholastic basketball
provides recreation, competition and gear for thousands of children who will never play elite
high school or college basketball, let alone play professionally.
Reference 153 - 0.06% Coverage
However, the Commission also heard from many that because non-scholastic basketball is
unregulated, some teams, events and tournaments have damaging consequences for college
basketball.
Reference 154 - 0.06% Coverage
The NCAA certifies non-scholastic basketball events and leagues, but the
requirements for certification are minimal and those that exist appear to be poorly implemented
and inadequately enforced.
Reference 155 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA must manage its relationships with non-scholastic basketball, with the
objective of preventing the corruption of college basketball. The Commission believes that the
elimination of one-and-done players from college basketball will diminish the influence of non-
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scholastic basketball event organizers and coaches with college programs. Clearly, however,
problems will remain. College coaches recruit roughly 1125 high school players to Division I
programs every year. To the extent college coaches and non-scholastic basketball event
organizers and coaches are scratching each other’s backs for personal gain, they are corrupting
college basketball. To the extent non-scholastic basketball event organizers and coaches are
paying – or arranging for the payment of – players and their families to participate in or enter
particular summer programs, they are creating a culture that contributes to the expectation of
continued payment while in college.
Reference 156 - 0.18% Coverage
The NCAA and its member institutions have some leverage in their relationship with nonscholastic basketball. Players whom the NBA will not draft from high school – that is, most
players – seek to play college basketball. To do so, they must be seen and evaluated by college
coaches. Most college coaches cannot see sufficient players by attending high school games,
involving only one or two players whom they are recruiting at a time. Instead, they assess players
at summer events where numerous players with the potential to play college basketball compete
against each other.
Reference 157 - 0.13% Coverage
non-scholastic basketball needs NCAA coaches, and NCAA coaches need non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission’s guiding principle in this area is that the NCAA should not certify,
and NCAA coaches should not participate in, non-scholastic basketball events involving
coaches, leagues or sponsors who are not fully transparent about the sources and amounts of their
financial support.
Reference 158 - 0.10% Coverage
More specifically, while NCAA coaches are forbidden to attend non-scholastic basketball events
not certified by the NCAA, the NCAA’s current criteria for certification are plainly insufficient.
The new criteria for certification must include detailed requirements for financial transparency.
Reference 159 - 0.24% Coverage
Any person or entity that sponsors a summer league, team or event must disclose any payments
made to or received from any coach, event operator, owner or any other entity associated with
that league, team or event. Any coach, event operator, owner or other entity associated with that
summer league, team or event must disclose any payment received that is related to the event and
how the payments will be expended. The Commission leaves to the NCAA the design of the
disclosure forms and the details of the requirements, but it must require the provision of any nonprofit organization’s financial filings with the government and full financial transparency – going
both ways – for non-scholastic basketball sponsors, event operators and coaches.
Reference 160 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
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admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 161 - 0.10% Coverage
It is important to note that the Commission believes developing players at each
level will require a collaboration among USA Basketball, the NCAA, the NBA and the NBPA.
The absence of any one of these stakeholders in the youth development space will exacerbate the
current problems with recruiting and development.
Reference 162 - 0.14% Coverage
At Level 1, USA Basketball with the NBA should take the lead in organizing and implementing
a program targeting this tier of players. USA Basketball with the NCAA should take the lead in
organizing and implementing Level 2, and the NCAA should take the lead in organizing and
implementing Level 3. Each of the stakeholders will need to bring commitment, experience,
financial resources, and the necessary authorities to this shared effort.
Reference 163 - 0.09% Coverage
Player development must expand well beyond basketball to include academic, health, wellness,
and life skills. The Commission recommends four physical interactions with pre-collegiate
players at each level annually (camps, clinics and tournaments) with continuing on-line
Reference 164 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission recommends that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional
camps each summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during that
time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted to account for these
events.
Reference 165 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 166 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 167 - 0.07% Coverage
recommendations are intended to strengthen the relationships between NCAA coaches and
prospective and current student-athletes so that these coaches are not required to recruit and
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instruct through third parties.
Reference 168 - 0.19% Coverage
First, the Commission supports the NABC’s recommendation that the summer
recruiting calendar for evaluating college prospects be modified to allow college coaches to
attend two weekends of scholastic-sponsored events in June and to attend three weekends of
NCAA-sponsored events in July (once established). The Commission further supports the
requirement that once NCAA-sponsored events for July are established, NCAA coaches be
limited to recruiting at those events during that time. Many of the problems associated with nonscholastic basketball occur in the summer.
Reference 169 - 0.21% Coverage
Second, the Commission supports NABC’s recommendation that official visits
be permitted to begin during the summer between a prospective student-athlete’s sophomore and
junior years. The rules should allow five official visits before completion of the junior year and
five additional visits during the senior year, and limit the student to one visit per year per
institution. Prospective student-athletes are visiting colleges earlier in their development, and
third parties may fund those visits where families cannot afford the trips. The Commission
agrees that allowing earlier official visits may alleviate some of this pressure.
Reference 170 - 0.14% Coverage
Third, the Commission further supports the recommendation that coaches be
permitted to provide more than two hours of skills instruction per week in the off-season. We are
informed that an unintended consequence of current limits on NCAA coaches’ hours of skills
instruction is that agents and other third parties pay for trainers, and we agree that allowing
coaches additional time to work with players would be preferable.
Reference 171 - 0.14% Coverage
Finally, to establish additional points of interaction between college coaches and studentathletes, the Commission supports the recommendation that video operators and other “staff’ be
permitted to coach their teams. The Commission was informed that NCAA schools are not doing
enough to develop the next generation of coaches; in any event, this restriction sets artificial
limits on relationships between coaching staffs and team members.
Reference 172 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission believes that additional recommendations of the NABC and
others are worthy of NCAA study. It also supports the NABC’s intent to reinvigorate its Code of
Ethics and disciplinary rules and enforcement.
Reference 173 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA restructure its Board of Governors to include at
least five public voting members with the experience, stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA
in re-establishing itself as an effective and respected leader and regulator of college sports. It
further recommends that at least one of these public members also be a member of the NCAA’s
Executive Board.
Reference 174 - 0.14% Coverage
The NCAA Board of Governors is currently composed of presidents or chancellors of NCAA
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colleges and universities, chairs of NCAA division governance bodies and the NCAA president.
NCAA Constitution 4.1.1. Each of these Board members wears a second hat for a school,
conference or NCAA division or body that creates at least an appearance that he or she cannot be
entirely objective in determining the direction of the Association.
Reference 175 - 0.12% Coverage
The NCAA administers what is effectively a public trust in the United States — athletic
competition among college athletes. Public members of boards serve important functions. They
provide objectivity, fresh perspectives and independent viewpoints and judgments. Many nonprofit associations utilize public board members for precisely these reasons.
Reference 176 - 0.15% Coverage
The NCAA Board needs excellent public members, with the benefits that such members provide.
The NCAA should promptly amend its Constitution to restructure the Board to include public
voting members, while simultaneously creating a slate of candidates with the appropriate stature
and characteristics. The Commission will provide recommendations to assist the NCAA in
ensuring compilation of a high-quality slate of potential public board members.
Reference 177 - 0.02% Coverage
The Commission has made a number of important recommendations.
Reference 178 - 0.15% Coverage
Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not in execution — such
as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems. Others should be easy to execute
— specific changes in the available punishments under Article 19 and in the recruiting rules.
Some do not require rules changes, but instead the devotion of financial and administrative
resource to planning, for example, the creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps.
Reference 179 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\CCB4 - Recruiting and College Choice Study - § 9 references coded [ 10.99%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.55% Coverage
The survey also attempted to identify “elite” student-athletes. This includes those who were
ranked in the ESPN, Rivals or Scout Top 100, those named Max Prep All-Americans, or those
who played in either the McDonalds All-American Game or the Jordan Brand Classic. 21% of
student-athletes in the sample (N=522) have been classified as “elite” in the following analyses.
Reference 2 - 1.67% Coverage
Men’s basketball student-athletes reported high parental/family expectations of playing college
and/or professional basketball that started at a young age. Expectations of a pro-career are higher
among elite players (59%) as compared to non-elite (35%). These family expectations may fuel
unrealistic professional expectations expressed by the student-athletes themselves in the survey.
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Reference 3 - 1.98% Coverage
While a majority attended one high school and played on one or two AAU/club teams, 17% of
non-elite players and 28% of elite players indicated that they moved “specifically to play for a
new high school or AAU/Club team during high school.” Elite players were slightly more likely
to attend more than one high school and to play on multiple AAU teams. Over half indicated
receiving additional skill instruction or personal training outside of the team context during high
school.
Reference 4 - 0.56% Coverage
Elite players are more likely to have played on an AAU team affiliated with an apparel company
(84%, versus 56% for non-elite players).
Reference 5 - 1.48% Coverage
The opportunity to develop skills to compete at a higher level was the greatest driver in college
choice. The presence of a particular coach was a stronger factor among elite players (78%) than
non-elite players (66%). Three out of four student-athletes also indicated that academic programs
contributed to their reason to attend their current college.
Reference 6 - 0.70% Coverage
Student-athletes who played on an AAU/Club team affiliated with Adidas or Nike are slightly
more likely to play on college teams sponsored by the same apparel company.
Reference 7 - 1.17% Coverage
Nine out of 10 student-athletes reported feeling positive about both the efforts they have made in
their college classes and the likelihood that they will graduate from college. Additionally, over
90% believe that having a college degree is important to their long-term success.
Reference 8 - 1.26% Coverage
59% of the student-athletes in the sample believe it is likely that they will play professional
basketball in some capacity. In both the non-elite and elite subgroups, those whose parents held
expectations that they would play professionally are much more likely to have pro-aspirations
themselves.
Reference 9 - 0.62% Coverage
Under half of the sample reported having access to accurate information about their chances of
playing professionally (43% non-elite, 52% elite).
Files\\ESPN1 - Why the college basketball scandal won’t get fixed until the NCAA pays
athletes - § 29 references coded [ 20.64% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.65% Coverage
It is an extraordinarily sad time in college sports. Ten people were arrested Tuesday and charged
with fraud and corruption after a two-year FBI investigation.
Reference 2 - 0.71% Coverage
A Hall of Fame coach was, as the attorney for Louisville’s Rick Pitino said, "essentially fired,"
as was one of the most respected athletic directors in the country, Tom Jurich.
Reference 3 - 0.59% Coverage
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A high-ranking Adidas employee was charged in a bribery scheme, as were assistant basketball
coaches at Arizona, Oklahoma State, USC and Auburn.
Reference 4 - 0.91% Coverage
This is certainly not the end of this scandal, as its tentacles reach far and wide. This probe could
extend to high-profile agents, other programs and others in the sports apparel industry and
grassroots basketball industry.
Reference 5 - 0.51% Coverage
While this is horribly unpleasant and far from over, I don’t see meaningful change coming to
college sports. The reason? Money.
Reference 6 - 0.27% Coverage
While this ugly scandal seems to be the NCAA’s worst ever, it is not.
Reference 7 - 0.47% Coverage
We have seen big scandals before, and as long as we maintain the current corrupt system and
rules, we will be here again.
Reference 8 - 0.58% Coverage
We have implemented rules after each scandal to make ourselves feel better, but they don’t do
any good. They can’t do any good. The reason? Money.
Reference 9 - 0.85% Coverage
Why do you suppose we don’t see such scandals in Division II or Division III sports? Money. In
Divisions II and III, the salaries, revenues and expenditures are in line with the stated missions of
the institutions.
Reference 10 - 0.68% Coverage
Division I football and basketball are multibillion-dollar industries, paying coaches and
administrators multimilliondollar salaries while generating billions
Reference 11 - 0.27% Coverage
of millions from apparel deals with Adidas, Nike and Under Armour.
Reference 12 - 1.10% Coverage
Let’s not pretend that Ed McMahon knocked on the NCAA’s door and surprised the organization
with a check for billions of dollars. The NCAA and its members carefully, thoughtfully and
purposefully built a multibillion-dollar industry. This was no accident. It was planned.
Reference 13 - 0.82% Coverage
In college sports, money will find a way. Money will always find a way, because the NCAA and
its member institutions are addicted to money and will continue to chase it. That seems beyond
reasonable dispute.
Reference 14 - 0.86% Coverage
That is not to say that the NCAA’s corrupt system and rules are the reason that rules and laws
were broken, or to excuse rule-breaking and lawbreaking. There is no legitimate excuse to break
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the rules or break the law.
Reference 15 - 0.52% Coverage
Instead, we should endeavor to change the rules to make them fair, reasonable and moral. Right
now, they are none of those things.
Reference 16 - 1.07% Coverage
The current NCAA system and rules are largely responsible for creating the underground blackmarket economy for players. There are contradictions everywhere, to the point of hypocrisy, and
business relationships with third parties that strain the imagination.
Reference 17 - 1.14% Coverage
Do you believe the shoe companies will go away based upon this scandal? No way. They are
partners with the NCAA and its member institutions. NCAA institutions accept hundreds of
millions of dollars annually to wear apparel and shoes and use the unpaid, amateur players as
billboards.
Reference 18 - 0.29% Coverage
given the NCAA’s amateurism rules, it sure does create a contradiction.
Reference 19 - 0.73% Coverage
There is no question that NCAA schools could buy the apparel they need, but instead they
choose to accept the revenue and profit from the relationship while using the players to do it.
Reference 20 - 0.81% Coverage
Do you believe that the NCAA can stop the influence of grassroots basketball or the AAU scene?
No way. There is nothing inherently wrong with players playing basketball at camps or in
summer tournaments.
Reference 21 - 1.13% Coverage
Players will continue to play, and tournament operators will continue to make money off the
players and college recruiters who come to watch the players. If the NCAA attempted to affect
the grassroots culture, it would open itself up to legal action for anticompetitive practices.
Reference 22 - 1.30% Coverage
Do you believe that the NCAA will stop the influence of agents? No way. Because of NCAA
rules that disallow a player from having an agreement with an agent, the ethical agents are on the
sideline while the unethical and lesserqualified agents have full access and open-field running to
unpaid, amateur players and prospects.
Reference 23 - 0.50% Coverage
Unintentionally, but predictably, the NCAA’s amateurism rules have helped create the blackmarket economy for players.
Reference 24 - 0.58% Coverage
The NCAA uses the players as billboards for apparel deals and uses their names and likenesses
to sell the product, and to sell media-rights deals.
Reference 25 - 0.80% Coverage
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The NCAA continues benefiting from this multibilliondollar business, while the players get only
a scholarship, and the only ones exploiting the athletes are the NCAA and the member
institutions.
Reference 26 - 0.69% Coverage
When you use a person to make money while at the same time limiting that person from making
money, you exploit. Players are certainly not mistreated, but they are exploited.
Reference 27 - 0.76% Coverage
These players are worth a ton of money, to schools, to agents and to shoe companies. And these
players are worth far more than a scholarship. In fact, a scholarship is the LEAST they are worth.
Reference 28 - 0.85% Coverage
Schools do not have to offer scholarships, but do. They do not have to offer stipends, but do. If
they didn’t, they would be hurt in the marketplace, even though there is a unilaterally imposed
wage cap on athletes.
Reference 29 - 0.21% Coverage
Money will find a way. In NCAA sports, it always does.
Files\\ESPN2 - NCAA announces new college basketball policy, including agents for players
and longer postseason bans - § 38 references coded [ 32.85% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.83% Coverage
The NCAA adopted a sweeping series of policy and rules changes Wednesday that it hopes will
clean up college basketball, which has been engulfed by an FBI investigation and other
corruption over the past two years.
Reference 2 - 2.15% Coverage
Among the significant changes that were adopted by the NCAA’s board of governors and
Division I board of directors are allowing elite high school basketball recruits and college players
to be represented by agents who are certified by the NCAA; allowing eligible underclassmen to
enter the NBA draft and return to school if undrafted; introducing more rigorous certification
requirements for summer amateur basketball events; and imposing longer postseason bans,
suspensions and increased recruiting restrictions for coaches who break rules.
Reference 3 - 0.77% Coverage
Since 2016, eligible underclassmen were able to enter the NBA draft, participate in the combine
and then return to school as long as they withdrew from the draft no more than 10 days after the
combine.
Reference 4 - 0.87% Coverage
Pending anticipated approval from the NBA and National Basketball Players Association, the
NCAA will now allow underclassmen to enter the draft, participate in the combine and then
return to school if they go undrafted.
Reference 5 - 1.00% Coverage
The only requirements are that they request an evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate
Advisory Council before deciding to enter the draft and then notify their school’s athletics
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director of their intention to return by 5 p.m. on the Monday after the draft.
Reference 6 - 0.44% Coverage
The players who return would be ineligible for the NBA draft until the end of the next college
basketball season.
Reference 7 - 0.51% Coverage
Enforcement: The NCAA is overhauling its process for investigating and adjudicating complex
cases involving rules violations.
Reference 8 - 0.65% Coverage
Two independent groups will be appointed to oversee and resolve complex cases, which might
involve academic misconduct, major penalties or adversarial behavior.
Reference 9 - 0.87% Coverage
Emmert said the enforcement rule changes will apply to all sports in Division I, and that the
NCAA expected to have between three to five such cases every year, based on recent history.
The new process will begin on Aug. 1, 2019.
Reference 10 - 0.98% Coverage
School representatives, NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions members or NCAA
enforcement staff can request that the independent groups review a complex case. An Infractions
Referral Committee will then decide whether the request is granted.
Reference 11 - 0.93% Coverage
The first independent group, called the Complex Case Unit, will include both external
investigators with no school or conference affiliation and select NCAA enforcement staff. It will
decide whether further investigation is needed.
Reference 12 - 1.25% Coverage
A second group, called the Independent College Sports Adjudication Panel, which will comprise
15 people with backgrounds in law, higher education and sports and with no affiliations to
NCAA schools or conferences, will review the findings of the first group, oversee the hearing
and decide penalties, if applicable.
Reference 13 - 0.49% Coverage
The NCAA said it is also holding school presidents and athletics staff more accountable for
cooperating with investigators.
Reference 14 - 0.50% Coverage
They’ll be contractually obligated to report violations in a timely manner and provide
documentation and evidence when asked.
Reference 15 - 1.02% Coverage
The chair of the Division I Committee on Infractions or the Independent College Sports
Adjudication Panel will have the power to impose immediate penalties when schools or
individuals do not cooperate, including loss of revenue or postseason opportunities.
Reference 16 - 1.03% Coverage
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In another change that takes effect now, the people investigating NCAA cases will be allowed to
accept information established by another administrative body, including a court of law,
government agency, accrediting body or a commission authorized by a school.
Reference 17 - 1.04% Coverage
For example, the NCAA would be able to accept evidence and findings from the federal
government’s investigation into bribes and other corruption in college basketball and punish
those found guilty of wrongdoing, without investigating the allegations on its own.
Reference 18 - 1.26% Coverage
The NCAA said coaches and staff members who break its rules will face more severe penalties,
including longer postseason bans (up to five years), longer head coach suspensions (beyond one
season) and longer employment limitations (potentially lifetime show-cause orders). Those
changes also take effect immediately.
Reference 19 - 1.15% Coverage
Agents: Effective immediately, the NCAA will allow college players to be represented by
NBPA-certified agents (the agents must become NCAA-certified no later than Aug. 1, 2020)
beginning after any season, as long as they request an evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate
Advisory Committee.
Reference 20 - 0.36% Coverage
Agents will be permitted to pay for meals and transportation for players and their families
Reference 21 - 1.39% Coverage
If the NBA and National Basketball Players Association change their rules and make high school
basketball players eligible for the draft at age 18, as expected, they’ll be allowed to sign with an
NCAA-certified agent starting July 1 before their senior year of high school, as long as they have
been identified as an elite senior prospect by USA Basketball.
Reference 22 - 0.49% Coverage
A USA Basketball official told ESPN that his group hadn’t yet approved some of the changes
announced by the NCAA on Wednesday.
Reference 23 - 0.56% Coverage
Several NBA officials have also told ESPN that they didn’t think the league’s age requirement
would be lowered to 18 until 2021 at the earliest.
Reference 24 - 0.43% Coverage
The agent agreements must be in writing and will be terminated when the student enrolls or
returns to college.
Reference 25 - 0.53% Coverage
Beginning later this month, basketball prospects will now be allowed to take as many as 15
official visits, compared to only five before.
Reference 26 - 1.47% Coverage
The prospects can begin making trips on Aug. 1 before their junior year of high school. They’ll
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be permitted to make five visits between Aug. 1 and the end of their junior year; five visits
between the end of their junior year and Oct. 15 after high school graduation; and five more
visits between Oct. 15 after high school graduation and the remainder of their college eligibility.
Reference 27 - 1.19% Coverage
A student-athlete can visit a particular campus only once per year, and Division I schools will
now be permitted to pay for 28 official visits over a rolling, twoyear period (34 visits for service
academies.) The previous totals were 24 official visits for Division I programs and 30 for service
academies.
Reference 28 - 0.86% Coverage
Starting in August 2019, Division I schools will be required to pay for tuition, books and fees for
scholarship basketball players who leave school and return within 10 years to the same school to
earn their first degree.
Reference 29 - 0.33% Coverage
Only players who attended school for at least two years before leaving are eligible.
Reference 30 - 0.48% Coverage
The NCAA is establishing a fund for schools that are financially unable to pay for the players’
education when they return.
Reference 31 - 0.85% Coverage
Beginning in January, basketball-related events for high school students will be more scrutinized
during certification to address concerns about corruption and third-party influence among high
school players.
Reference 32 - 0.68% Coverage
A new recruiting calendar in 2019 will allow college coaches to attend more high schoolsponsored events, but will limit their access to events not sponsored by high schools.
Reference 33 - 1.19% Coverage
College coaches will be permitted to attend the National Basketball Players Association Top 100
Camp in mid-June, as well as two more events at the end of that month, if the National
Federation of State High School Associations has approved them. Four-day recruiting periods
were added to April, as well.
Reference 34 - 0.67% Coverage
The new calendar also allows coaches to attend NCAA youth development camps in late July,
which are a new collaboration between the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and NBPA.
Reference 35 - 0.63% Coverage
They can also still attend one weekend youth basketball event in early July; coaches could
previously attend three weekends of youth basketball events in July.
Reference 36 - 1.26% Coverage
Effective immediately, college coaches and staff must now report to the university’s president or
chancellor their athletics-related income that exceeds more than $600 from any source outside
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their school, including endorsement or consultation contracts with apparel companies like
Adidas, Nike and Under Armour.
Reference 37 - 0.97% Coverage
The NCAA said it is pursuing agreements with the apparel companies on its expectations for
more accountability and transparency regarding the companies’ involvement in youth basketball,
which it hopes to have in place within six months to a year.
Reference 38 - 0.80% Coverage
The NCAA board of governors hopes to develop agreements that require apparel companies to
make annual disclosures, report NCAA violations and obtain NCAA certification for its youth
basketball events.
Files\\ESPN3 - NCAA’s new proposed rules blindside NBA, USA Basketball officials - § 9
references coded [ 15.78% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.48% Coverage
Top officials with the NBA and USA Basketball were blindsided by the NCAA’s announcement
of future rules changes regarding pro basketball prospects, as well as the timing of it, sources
told ESPN.
Reference 2 - 3.22% Coverage
The NCAA launched a commission and set of subcommittees to address the fallout from the
recent FBI investigation into the college basketball industry, resulting in several policy shifts,
including the assigning of responsibility to USA Basketball for something the organization had
already told the NCAA it wanted no part of: selecting elite senior high school prospects who will
be allowed to sign with registered agents.
Reference 3 - 2.11% Coverage
USA Basketball doesn’t have the infrastructure or interest in accepting the role of evaluating the
nation’s top prospects for selecting a yet-to-be-determined number of players who will annually
be allowed to sign with agents at the end of their junior years, sources told ESPN.
Reference 4 - 0.55% Coverage
USA Basketball prefers that the NBA make those decisions, sources said.
Reference 5 - 3.16% Coverage
The NBA already oversees the invitation process to the Chicago pre-draft combine and
Portsmouth Invitational camps every spring. The NBA will be immersed in scouting the high
school ranks once those players have an earlier target date for entering the draft, and if the
NCAA wants to allow a select number of high school players to sign with agents, the belief is
that NBA front offices would be most informed to cull a list.
Reference 6 - 1.77% Coverage
The NBA, USA Basketball and NCAA did meet and discuss these prospective changes, but the
NBA and USA Basketball never believed they had come to a consensus with the NCAA on how
they would move forward together on the issues, sources said.
Reference 7 - 0.51% Coverage
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Then the NCAA’s announcement of a litany of changes came Wednesday.
Reference 8 - 1.71% Coverage
Several NBA officials were surprised over the presumptive and premature nature of the NCAA’s
rules changes, which assumed that the NBA and National Basketball Players Association will
abandon the one-and-done college rule
Reference 9 - 1.26% Coverage
While that appears to be the direction the league and union are headed, discussions are centered
on the 2022 draft as the earliest date for that change to go into effect.
Files\\ESPN4 - Commission on College Basketball calls for sweeping reforms by NCAA - §
37 references coded [ 17.73% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.58% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball recommended an end to the one-anddone rule, potential
lifetime bans for rule-breakers, and changes to the relationship between the NCAA and apparel
companies.
Reference 2 - 0.33% Coverage
Wednesday at a news conference in Indianapolis after the independent panel released a detailed
60page report.
Reference 3 - 0.43% Coverage
On Wednesday, the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors said it has
unanimously endorsed all the commission’s recommendations.
Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage
The endorsement isn’t an immediate change.
Reference 5 - 0.89% Coverage
now begin the hard work of changing rules, crafting legislation and building consensus among
351 Division I members on how best to make all this work. NCAA’s Division I Council,
comprised mostly of athletic directors, had already begun working on some of the areas where
the commission recommended reforms.
Reference 6 - 0.43% Coverage
The 12-member commission was formed in the wake of last fall’s FBI investigation into
corruption and fraud in college basketball and recruiting.
Reference 7 - 0.59% Coverage
Ten people were arrested in September, including officials at Adidas and assistant coaches at
Arizona, Oklahoma State, USC and Auburn. NC State and Kansas were mentioned in more
recent court documents.
Reference 8 - 0.54% Coverage
Former Louisville head coach Rick Pitino also lost his job as a result of the probe, whose
findings allege that five-star recruit Brian Bowen received $100,000 to sign with the Cardinals.

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

265

Reference 9 - 0.65% Coverage
The committee’s report called the environment surrounding college basketball "a toxic mix of
perverse incentives to cheat," and said that responsibility for the current mess goes all the way up
to university presidents.
Reference 10 - 0.37% Coverage
Ending one-and-done is the biggest change suggested by the commission, even though it’s an
NBA rule -- which Rice pointed out.
Reference 11 - 0.41% Coverage
The rule was implemented in 2006 despite the success of straight-from-highschool stars such as
LeBron James, Kobe Bryant and Kevin Garnett.
Reference 12 - 0.64% Coverage
If a change is not made to one-and-done, Rice said the commission will look into options, such
as making freshmen ineligible or locking a scholarship for three or four years if the recipient
leaves a program after one year.
Reference 13 - 0.59% Coverage
The NBA and NBPA conversations on eliminating the one-and-done rule are centered on the
2020 draft as the earliest possible date for change, league sources told ESPN’s Adrian
Wojnarowski on Wednesday.
Reference 14 - 0.35% Coverage
The Players Association’s executive committee, including president Chris Paul, won’t meet until
after the NBA season.
Reference 15 - 0.45% Coverage
The commission also recommends college players should be able to return to school if they go
undrafted, as long as they don’t sign a professional contract.
Reference 16 - 0.45% Coverage
As it stands, players can test NBA draft waters without an agent, but must withdraw their name
weeks before the draft should they decide to return to school.
Reference 17 - 0.61% Coverage
NBA commissioner Adam Silver and NBPA executive director Michele Roberts released a joint
statement Wednesday saying they will "continue to assess" the commission’s suggestions on
draft eligibility rules.
Reference 18 - 0.57% Coverage
Another change to the current process suggested by the commission would be enabling high
school and college players to sign with certified agents before deciding on whether to enter the
NBA draft.
Reference 19 - 0.62% Coverage
Dawkins allegedly helped funnel money to prospects through assistant coaches and shoe
companies. Once a player signs with an agent or accepts money from an agent, he is ineligible
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according to current NCAA rules.
Reference 20 - 0.25% Coverage
Rice also called for an overhaul to the investigative and enforcement arms of the NCAA.
Reference 21 - 0.44% Coverage
In addition to using independent and neutral investigators, the commission recommends much
harsher NCAA penalties for cheaters and rulebreakers.
Reference 22 - 0.34% Coverage
For Level I violations, that includes a five-year postseason ban and loss of all revenue sharing in
postseason play.
Reference 23 - 0.42% Coverage
Most noticeably, the commission recommends stiffer penalties for coaches that knowingly break
rules -- including potential lifetime bans.
Reference 24 - 0.38% Coverage
The commission also called out university presidents, saying administrators can’t be allowed to
turn a blind eye to infractions.
Reference 25 - 0.48% Coverage
In a direct reference to the recent NCAA investigation into academic fraud at North Carolina, the
commission recommended the NCAA have jurisdiction into that area.
Reference 26 - 0.42% Coverage
She said the loophole that all students, not just athletes, were able to benefit from the fraudulent
classes should not be a legitimate defense.
Reference 27 - 0.70% Coverage
can go to watch prospects at events sponsored by Nike, Adidas or Under Armour or are run
independently. The commission recommends the NCAA start its own regional events in July,
and make them the only events that coaches can attend that month.
Reference 28 - 0.39% Coverage
The commission also called for the NCAA to work closer with USA Basketball, the NBA and
the NBPA to start a new youth basketball program.
Reference 29 - 0.22% Coverage
It’s not yet clear how the governing body would pay for some of the proposals.
Reference 30 - 0.30% Coverage
Adidas was at the forefront of the FBI investigation, with two Adidas officials among those
arrested.
Reference 31 - 0.60% Coverage
According to court records, they allegedly helped funnel money to prospects in order to get them
to sign with Adidas-sponsored schools. The commission calls for more financial transparency in
this area.
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Reference 32 - 0.63% Coverage
The commission did not make any recommendations in the area of paying collegiate athletes or
enabling them to earn money off their names or likenesses. Rice did address the issue, but
acquiesced to the courts for now.
Reference 33 - 0.23% Coverage
At the Final Four, Emmert said he didn’t see paying players as a likely option.
Reference 34 - 0.68% Coverage
The commission, in addition to Rice and Robinson, also includes NBA Hall of Famer Grant Hill,
former coaches John Thompson III and Mike Montgomery, school presidents, athletic directors
and USA Basketball chairman Martin Dempsey.
Reference 35 - 0.70% Coverage
It was tasked to focus on three areas: the relationship of the NCAA with apparel companies,
grassroots basketball and agents; the NCAA’s relationship with the NBA and the one-and-done
rule; and the relationship between schools and the NCAA.
Reference 36 - 0.46% Coverage
ESPN reported in November that the group met with Silver and Roberts. Emmert has also said
the commission met with agents and officials from apparel companies.
Reference 37 - 0.44% Coverage
The commission’s report admonished those within college sports who use the NCAA as a
scapegoat for the problems in basketball, saying universities and
Files\\ESPN5 - Why the NCAA hoops scandal will likely spread as trial starts - § 29
references coded [ 31.15% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.84% Coverage
Coaches at Arizona, Creighton, DePaul, LSU, Maryland and Michigan State also were involved
in recruiting the top prospects in question: Brian Bowen, Silvio De Sousa, Balsa Koprivica and
Nassir Little.
Reference 2 - 1.77% Coverage
Arizona was heavily involved in recruiting Bowen and Little before they ended up signing with
Louisville and North Carolina, respectively. In fact, Bowen was probably headed to Arizona
until Wildcats guard Rawle Alkins decided to return for the 2017-18 season. Little had Arizona
among his final five schools until former Wildcats assistant Emanuel "Book" Richardson was
among the coaches arrested by the FBI in September 2017.
Reference 3 - 1.60% Coverage
ESPN reported in February that defendant Christian Dawkins and Arizona coach Sean Miller had
discussions about a $100,000 payment to ensure that star center DeAndre Ayton, the No. 1 pick
in June’s NBA draft, signed with the Wildcats. Arizona’s outside counsel, Paul Kelly of Boston,
said Ayton denied receiving money to influence his decision in multiple interviews with the FBI
and NCAA.
Reference 4 - 0.45% Coverage
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At the time, Miller denied the allegations -- and adamantly insisted he had never willfully broken
NCAA rules.
Reference 5 - 1.39% Coverage
Arizona officials have denied multiple openrecords requests from ESPN for any subpoenas the
university received from the federal government for information and grand jury testimony related
to the investigation. They repeatedly cited "the balancing test established by the Arizona courts
to protect the best interests of the state."
Reference 6 - 0.69% Coverage
Creighton also recruited Bowen -- he made two visits to the Omaha, Nebraska, campus -- and
Bluejays assistant Preston Murphy grew up with Dawkins in Saginaw, Michigan.
Reference 7 - 1.07% Coverage
owen also strongly considered DePaul, which hired two assistant coaches with strong ties to him:
Shane Heirman, Bowen’s coach at La Lumiere School in LaPorte, Indiana, and Tim Anderson,
who coached Bowen in the Nike-affiliated Mean Streets program in Chicago
Reference 8 - 1.89% Coverage
In court documents filed last month in former Louisville coach Rick Pitino’s lawsuit against the
university, the school’s attorneys alleged that Pitino ignored red flags after hearing allegations
that DePaul had offered Bowen $200,000 to play there. The court filing included a text message
that Pitino is said to have
sent to then-Cardinals assistant Kenny Johnson on June 2, 2017, saying: "Coach DePaul trying to
pay Bowen 200 k to come there. Crazy world!"
Reference 9 - 0.63% Coverage
After the court filing was released, Pitino said he never believed DePaul had the financial means
to pay Bowen that much money, and DePaul officials told
Reference 10 - 0.85% Coverage
Michigan State also recruited Bowen, and Spartans coach Tom Izzo has been a longtime friend
of Dawkins’ family. Jason Richardson, the nephew of Bowen’s father, also played for the
Spartans from 1999 to 2001.
Reference 11 - 0.42% Coverage
LSU recruited Little and Koprivica, who might decide to skip college altogether, sources told
ESPN.
Reference 12 - 1.26% Coverage
Tigers coach Will Wade signed the No. 5 class in the country this past year, including four
players in the ESPN Top 100. In response to an open-records request from ESPN, LSU officials
said no calls were found in records for Wade’s university-issued cell phone to two cell phone
numbers registered to Dawkins.
Reference 13 - 1.33% Coverage
THIS IS ONLY the beginning. The scandal could grow even more after the current trial of
Adidas executive James Gatto, Adidas consultant Merl Code and Dawkins, all charged with
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conspiring to pay high school prospects and/or their families to sign with Adidas-sponsored
schools. Another five defendants await prosecution.
Reference 14 - 0.94% Coverage
Former Auburn assistant Chuck Person and onetime NBA referee Rashan Michel are scheduled
for trial in New York on Feb. 4. Person is accused of accepting $91,500 over 10 months to steer
Auburn players to certain financial advisers.
Reference 15 - 1.28% Coverage
Three other former assistant coaches -- Arizona’s Emanuel Richardson, Oklahoma State’s
Lamont Evans and USC’s Tony Bland -- are scheduled for trial on April 22. They’re accused of
accepting bribes from Dawkins and financial adviser Munish Sood to steer players toward
certain agents and financial planners.
Reference 16 - 0.91% Coverage
People involved in the current case believe there might be another superseding indictment
coming from the government in the Evans case that could add criminal charges related to the
pay-for-play schemes at other schools.
Reference 17 - 0.70% Coverage
Multiple people involved in the federal investigation have told ESPN in recent months that the
FBI advised NCAA officials to stand down until the criminal trials are over.
Reference 18 - 0.58% Coverage
Yahoo reported in February that NCAA officials were taking a closer look at LSU’s recruiting
practices; the school and NCAA denied the report
Reference 19 - 1.36% Coverage
When Kansas officials self-reported details of freshman Billy Preston’s car wreck -- the school
later suspended him while it looked into the "financial picture" of the car -- to NCAA officials in
November, there wasn’t much the NCAA could do because the FBI was also investigating
alleged payments from Adidas to Preston’s mother.
Reference 20 - 0.87% Coverage
The government contends the defendants and others purposely concealed illicit payments from
coaches and university officials, so it’s difficult to say how schools such as Kansas and Maryland
will be impacted.
Reference 21 - 0.73% Coverage
Miami’s coaches contend they were unaware of a pay-for-play scheme involving Little, and
attorneys involved in the case told ESPN that the Hurricanes are probably in the clear.
Reference 22 - 0.84% Coverage
There is evidence, however, that assistant coaches at Louisville and NC State might have been
involved in the facilitation of impermissible payments, which might open those schools to
NCAA punishment.
Reference 23 - 0.66% Coverage
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In March, Cal State Northridge hired Mark Gottfried, who was NC State’s coach when Dennis
Smith Jr., whose father is said to have received $40,000, played there.
Reference 24 - 0.90% Coverage
De Sousa, meanwhile, was expected to sign with Maryland before switching to Kansas, and
Terrapins officials revealed in July that the school received a federal subpoena requesting
information about his recruitment.
Reference 25 - 0.77% Coverage
Fenny Falmagne, De Sousa’s legal guardian, has denied receiving money. Falmagne is also the
guardian of Bruno Fernando, another player from Angola, who played for the Terps last season.
Reference 26 - 0.94% Coverage
On Aug. 9, the NCAA adopted a sweeping series of policy and rules changes that it hopes will
clean up college basketball, based on a series of recommendations from a committee led by
former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Reference 27 - 1.84% Coverage
change that took effect immediately was allowing people investigating NCAA cases to accept
information established by another administrative body, including a court of law, government
agency, accrediting body or a commission authorized by a school. For example, the NCAA could
accept evidence and findings from the federal government’s investigation and punish those found
guilty of wrongdoing -- without conducting its own investigation.
Reference 28 - 1.96% Coverage
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTORS ARE taking some action to limit schools’ exposure in this
trial.
They have asked U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan to limit what defense attorneys can say
about the four victim schools’ past infractions, including the stripper parties that occurred inside
Louisville’s athletics dormitory and the actions of Ponzi schemer Nevin Shapiro, who alleged he
provided impermissible benefits to more than 70 Miami student-athletes between 2002 and 2010.
Reference 29 - 1.71% Coverage
Additionally, the federal government wants to prohibit defense attorneys from discussing cases
that involve non-victim schools. For example, the government might not want defense attorneys
talking about how former USC basketball star O.J. Mayo and football star Reggie Bush allegedly
received tens of thousands of dollars in impermissible benefits while playing for the Trojans and
yet no one was prosecuted.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 2 references coded [
1.87% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.02% Coverage
The direct and, at times, blunt statements came at a time when members of several college
basketball programs are being investigated by the FBI for corruption
Reference 2 - 0.85% Coverage
Those charges led the NCAA to establish a Commission on College Basketball to explore the

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

271

issues and recommend necessary changes.
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 1 reference coded [
0.67% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.67% Coverage
Section Four: Add Five Independent Public Members to The NCAA’s Board of Governors.
Files\\NCAA3 - NCAA Provides Reinstatement Decision for Kansas’ Silvio De Sousa - § 3
references coded [ 19.04% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.60% Coverage
University of Kansas men’s basketball student-athlete Silvio De Sousa must sit out the remainder
of the 2018-19 season and the 2019-20 season because his guardian received payment from a
university booster and agent and agreed to receive additional funds from the same person.
Reference 2 - 6.18% Coverage
According to the facts provided for purposes of the reinstatement request, De Sousa’s guardian
received payment of $2,500 from an agent and booster of the school. He agreed to accept
additional payment of $20,000 from the same individual and an Adidas employee for securing
De Sousa’s enrollment at Kansas.
Reference 3 - 7.26% Coverage
According to the guidelines adopted by the NCAA Division I membership, when a prospective
studentathlete allows a third party to involve himself in the recruitment process, the prospective
student-athlete is then responsible for the actions of that person, regardless of whether the
prospective student-athlete had knowledge or if beneﬁts were received.
Files\\NCAA5 - NCAA to Help Certify June Basketball Events - § 1 reference coded [ 2.16%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.16% Coverage
Acting on recommendations from the Commission on College Basketball, the NCAA on
Tuesday announced it will certify scholastic boys’ basketball events this June for high schools
that are not members of state high school associations afﬁliated with the National Federation of
State High School Associations.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 2 references coded [ 2.93% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.58% Coverage
The relationship of the NCAA national ofﬁce, member institutions, student-athletes and coaches
with outside entities
Reference 2 - 1.35% Coverage
Nonscholastic basketball, with a focus on the appropriate involvement of college coaches and
others.
Files\\NYT1 - In College Basketball Scandal, Follow the Money ... and the Shoes - § 21
references coded [ 33.59% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 1.70% Coverage
In the sneaker business, the feet of professional athletes are the most valuable billboards in the
world. The company that gets its shoes on the best basketball players, football players and soccer
players wins, because those athletes’ footwear choices have outsize inﬂuence over everyone
else’s purchasing decisions.
Reference 2 - 1.66% Coverage
That fundamental truth about high tops and cleats — that getting top players in your brand and
keeping them there is good business — was the subtext of a critical piece of a corruption and
bribery network outlined on Tuesday by federal prosecutors, which swiftly resulted in the demise
of a Hall of Fame coach’s career.
Reference 3 - 2.55% Coverage
The University of Louisville announced on Wednesday that it had abruptly ended the coaching
tenure of Rick Pitino, winner of two national championships and among the most successful
coaches in college basketball history. The decision was made a day after the United States
attorney for the Southern District of New York said in a criminal complaint that two coaches had
been part of a scheme to funnel money from the university’s apparel partner, Adidas, to two high
school prospects.
Reference 4 - 1.14% Coverage
The complaint, which accused an Adidas executive and others of wire fraud and money
laundering, did not disclose the names of anyone at Louisville. Pitino denied any knowledge or
responsibility for the accusations.
Reference 5 - 1.83% Coverage
The plan, prosecutors said, was that the teenage athletes would play for a university that had a
sponsorship deal with Adidas and then sign sponsorship deals of their own with the company
once they turned pro and potentially earned millions of dollars in the N.B.A. In other words,
investing in athletes at a young age could yield huge returns later.
Reference 6 - 2.44% Coverage
The accounts by federal prosecutors were not unlike those that the Department of Justice
described in 2015 in the sweeping corruption case focused on FIFA, international soccer’s
governing body. No one from Nike was charged in that case, but American prosecutors said that
bribes helped secure Nike’s breakthrough sponsorship deal with Brazil’s national soccer team in
the mid-1990s, elevating the company’s global proﬁle and helping it expand into soccer.
Reference 7 - 2.38% Coverage
Nike contracted to pay $160 million for that deal — and the company paid an additional $40
million that was not reﬂected in the ofﬁcial agreement, federal authorities said. Nike brokered the
deal through a Brazilian businessman who pleaded guilty in the United States to an array of
corruption charges, admitting to having solicited and accepted hundreds of millions of dollars in
bribes from people seeking lucrative marketing and media contracts.
Reference 8 - 1.63% Coverage
Shoe company involvement in college sports dates to 1977, when Sonny Vaccaro — a longtime
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basketball hand and then shoe-company executive — signed several coaches he knew, including
Jerry Tarkanian of Nevada-Las Vegas, to contracts with Nike. For a fee, the coaches were sent
shoes to have their players wear.
Reference 9 - 0.84% Coverage
Vaccaro said that “the world changed” in 1987, when Nike signed its ﬁrst all-school deal,
agreeing to sponsor all the athletic teams at the University of Miami.
Reference 10 - 1.60% Coverage
Last month, the Louisville athletic director, Tom Jurich, announced a 10-year, $160 million
sponsorship deal with Adidas. On Wednesday, the university announced that he, too, was being
removed from his position, “until the board of trustees has an opportunity to evaluate his
continued employment.”
Reference 11 - 1.68% Coverage
Adidas manufacturers shoes in China, India, Cambodia and other countries and sells them
around the world. But the actions of Jim Gatto, the Adidas executive named in the criminal
complaints, show that high schools and summer-league teams throughout the United States are
particularly vital to the sneaker business.
Reference 12 - 1.23% Coverage
Nike, Adidas and Under Armour are the biggest players on the college basketball scene. In
recent years, all three have invested vast sums in so-called grass-roots basketball leagues, which
exist outside the high school structure.
Reference 13 - 1.34% Coverage
The three companies have their own leagues — Nike’s E.Y.B.L., Adidas’s Gauntlet, Under
Armour Association — each with dozens of teams. The companies shower teams with money,
swag and perks. Parents of top prospects are commonly involved with the teams.
Reference 14 - 1.63% Coverage
The companies ﬁercely compete with one another to have the best 16-year-old prospects playing
in their leagues. Two years ago, for instance, Nike auspiciously scheduled an impromptu trip to
the Bahamas for the best players in its league at the same time as a celebrated Under Armour
tournament in New York City.
Reference 15 - 2.11% Coverage
The nexus of grass-roots teams, colleges and sneaker companies was a signiﬁcant portion of the
criminal complaints. Prosecutors said an agent was recorded discussing how to get a high school
player to commit to Louisville, and said the key was to keep money going to the player’s
grass-roots basketball coach, who could in turn pass it on to the player’s family. The coach’s
team was sponsored by Adidas
Reference 16 - 0.59% Coverage
Though the company name is redacted in the documents, the coach himself added, “all my kids
will be Adidas kids.”
Reference 17 - 2.27% Coverage

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

274

The criminal complaints describe rampant under-the-table payments that were commonly
inspired by a young athlete’s future earning potential. One player agent, in a recorded
conversation, urged that an offer to a player be increased because a rival company was “coming
in with a higher number,” and an Adidas ofﬁcial discussed masking payments from apparel
companies to high school athletes as though it were business as usual.
Reference 18 - 1.11% Coverage
In the Louisville case, prosecutors said $100,000 was to be steered to a teenage player from
Adidas. The complaint referred to two unnamed coaches as being involved. It is not known
whether Pitino was one of them.
Reference 19 - 0.70% Coverage
It is not out of the question that Pitino will ﬁnd another college coaching job; he has survived
several major scandals in his career.
Reference 20 - 1.67% Coverage
In 2009, he confessed that he had an affair with the wife of the team’s equipment manager and
paid for her to have an abortion. In 2015, a former director of basketball operations was found to
have provided strippers and prostitutes to the Louisville team’s players and recruits in a campus
dormitory over several years.
Reference 21 - 1.48% Coverage
But for many in Kentucky, he will remain a coaching legend. Long before winning a title with
Louisville, he resurrected Kentucky’s storied program and led the Wildcats to the 1996 national
title. That team, regarded as one of the best in college basketball history, wore Converse.
Files\\NYT2 - The Corruption at the Heart of March Madness - § 10 references coded [
28.66% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage
With a series of federal bribery and fraud charges announced this week, prosecutors are now
treating these shady dealings as what they are: corruption, not a rules violation.
Reference 2 - 2.24% Coverage
Coaches, the very people whom prized young athletes should be able to trust, were found to be
proﬁting from them and helping others — agents, ﬁnancial advisers, the Adidas shoe company
— proﬁt, too.
Reference 3 - 4.33% Coverage
The criminal complaints were rare in an area too often relegated to self-policing by universities
and the N.C.A.A. — the watchdog of college sports and the umbrella organization that runs the
popular, immensely proﬁtable basketball championship tournament dubbed March Madness,
where college stars compete before some of them go on to professional careers as millionaires.
Reference 4 - 2.60% Coverage
At one college, an Adidas representative promised a player’s family $100,000 for committing to
a school and an endorsement, the charges said. At another, an associate head coach allegedly
took nearly $100,000 to steer players
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Reference 5 - 1.35% Coverage
The dimension of the scandal was clear when the University of Louisville ousted its coach, Rick
Pitino, on Wednesday.
Reference 6 - 3.28% Coverage
One complaint, while not actually naming Louisville or Mr. Pitino, implied that someone in the
basketball program directed money from Adidas to two high school prospects. The university
signed a 10-year, $160 million contract this summer with Adidas for the men’s basketball
program.
Reference 7 - 3.09% Coverage
But the coach, the nation’s highest paid, at $7.7 million a year, has a reputation for cutting
ethical corners. He was suspended and his program were put on N.C.A.A. probation in June after
investigators found prostitutes were provided for players and teenage recruits.
Reference 8 - 2.18% Coverage
Other N.C.A.A. practices are in need of reform, like the “one-and-done” phenomenon, in which
high school stars play at universities for just a year before moving on to professional careers.
Reference 9 - 4.27% Coverage
This situation arose after the National Basketball Association and its players’ union agreed to bar
players before they have turned 19 or until a year after high school graduation. Previously, high
school players could sign on and earn full professional salaries — safe from the no-income
college rules and ﬁctions that invite the sort of abuses laid bare in the complaints.
Reference 10 - 3.33% Coverage
College basketball programs unscrupulously compete for top players to earn more from the
immense pot of proﬁt from television. The complaints cast a spotlight on that greed and
hypocrisy, which is infesting what is supposed to be, but hasn’t been for some time, an innocent
and amateur sport.
Files\\NYT3 - Amid Scandal, N.C.A.A. Forms Commission to Reform Men’s Basketball - §
12 references coded [ 28.53% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.24% Coverage
Responding to federal charges last month that depicted a corrupt black market for high school
and college basketball players, the N.C.A.A. on Wednesday said that it would create a college
basketball commission to investigate changes for “a system that clearly is not working.”
Reference 2 - 3.25% Coverage
In September, United States prosecutors in the Southern District of New York announced
charges against 10 men — assistant coaches, an Adidas ofﬁcial, an A.A.U. coach, an aspiring
agent and others — stemming from schemes to funnel money to players and coaches in return for
players’ commitments to teams or pledges to sign with Adidas or with certain money managers
or agents once they turned professional.
Reference 3 - 3.22% Coverage
According to the statement, the commission will meet starting next month and deliver
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recommendations to the boards that set the rules for the N.C.A.A., a membership association, in
April. Its chairwoman will be Condoleezza Rice, the former national security adviser and
secretary of state, who has also served as Stanford’s provost and a member of the College
Football Playoff selection committee.
Reference 4 - 1.82% Coverage
The commission’s members include Jeremy Foley, who retired last year as Florida’s athletic
director; Mary Sue Coleman, president of the Association of American Universities; and Gene
Smith, Ohio State’s athletic director.
Reference 5 - 0.55% Coverage
The group will examine three broad areas, according to the N.C.A.A.:
Reference 6 - 1.54% Coverage
The N.C.A.A.’s fundamental regulatory arrangement, which requires colleges and universities to
self-police and police one another, a model that, Emmert said, had failed in this instance.
Reference 7 - 6.59% Coverage
The rules regarding three interrelated institutions that were crucial to the scandal outlined by
federal authorities: apparel companies, nonscholastic basketball programs and agents. The three
main apparel companies — Nike, Adidas and Under Armour — sponsor most of the highproﬁle
teams as well as their own leagues for teenage players that exist outside the high school
structure. Players who are, or wish to be, college athletes are barred from signing with apparel
companies, but agents and other middlemen are widely suspected of connecting players and
companies under the table, including through A.A.U. teams; one complaint alleged that an
Adidas ofﬁcial had conspired to pay three players to commit to college programs sponsored by
Adidas. As of now, college basketball players also cannot sign with agents.
Reference 8 - 3.10% Coverage
The N.C.A.A.’s relationship to the N.B.A., and the N.B.A. rule, initiated more than a decade ago,
barring players from entering the league until they are 19 or one year removed from high school.
The so-called one-and-done rule leads the best high school prospects to play college basketball
for just one season, under little pretense that they are interested in other aspects of college.
Reference 9 - 1.62% Coverage
Emmert, who will sit on the commission alongside the former N.B.A. stars David Robinson and
Grant Hill, said that in his personal view prospects should be able to go straight from high school
to the N.B.A.
Reference 10 - 1.17% Coverage
But he drew the line at changes to the amateur model, which prevents colleges from
compensating athletes beyond scholarships and related costs.
Reference 11 - 1.63% Coverage
While he declined to speak for the commission, its members do not include any public critics of
amateurism, and some — such as the Rev. John I. Jenkins, the president of Notre Dame — are
outspoken supporters
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Reference 12 - 1.79% Coverage
Emmert conﬁrmed that he and the rest of the N.C.A.A. ofﬁce in Indianapolis learned about the
yearslong federal probe from news media reports. But if the criminal investigation surprised him,
not all of the allegations did.
Files\\NYT4 - N.C.A.A. Panel Proposes Reforms, Including End to ‘One and Done’ - § 27
references coded [ 32.28% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.18% Coverage
N.C.A.A. leaders endorsed a series of broad recommendations they received Wednesday from a
commission chaired by the former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice in the latest attempt to
clean up men’s college basketball and ﬁx a system mired with corruption.
Reference 2 - 1.17% Coverage
But while the proposed changes would alter the texture of the sport, they stopped well short of
challenging the longtime requirement that the college athletes remain amateurs, uncompensated
beyond a scholarship and a stipend for their talents and efforts.
Reference 3 - 0.95% Coverage
Mark Emmert, the president of the N.C.A.A., asked Ms. Rice to lead the commission last fall
after federal prosecutors ﬁled bribery and fraud charges against 10 people connected with men’s
college basketball.
Reference 4 - 1.02% Coverage
The defendants include assistant coaches, a shoe company executive and two associates who
were implicated in schemes to funnel money to prospects and their families in exchange for
commitments to attend certain colleges.
Reference 5 - 1.05% Coverage
Many of the proposed changes could become a part of the N.C.A.A. legislative code in August.
Mr. Emmert, who is relying on Ms. Rice’s stature to boost the credibility of the N.C.A.A., has
said he is aiming for results “by tip-off 2018.”
Reference 6 - 0.76% Coverage
The commission proposed allowing regulated contact between athletes and agents to give players
access to more information about their prospects as professionals.
Reference 7 - 0.80% Coverage
It recommended overhauling summer basketball, requiring the shoe and apparel companies that
run the showcase events to assume far more “transparency and accountability.”
Reference 8 - 0.69% Coverage
It even raised the possibility of eliminating the companies from the crucial July evaluation
period, when coaches attend the events to scout recruits.
Reference 9 - 0.31% Coverage
It also noted the widespread public support for plans to pay players.
Reference 10 - 1.38% Coverage
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The commission also recommended eliminating the so-called one-and-done rule, which requires
players to be 19 years old or a year removed from high school to be eligible for the N.B.A. draft,
though that rule will not change without the N.B.A. and the National Basketball Players
Association changing it.
Reference 11 - 1.03% Coverage
In an interview at N.C.A.A. headquarters here, Ms. Rice described the proposals as essential to
rescuing the most popular college sport other than football and the one that provides the vast
majority of the N.C.A.A.’s revenue.
Reference 12 - 0.74% Coverage
But Ramogi Huma, the president of the College Athletes Players Association, an advocate for
more rights for athletes, said the commission dodged the main issues.
Reference 13 - 0.85% Coverage
The last time a scandal of this nature and scope hit college basketball may have been in the early
1950s, when revelations of point shaving by several top teams knocked the sport on its back.
Reference 14 - 1.83% Coverage
The federal charges, which were followed by indictments, introduced the risk of criminal
prosecution into a well-known part of college basketball. The allegations made a mockery of
N.C.A.A. amateurism rules and painted a black mark on several of the most prominent basketball
programs. Documents obtained by Yahoo Sports in February seemed to implicate players at a
dozen other blue-chip programs.
Reference 15 - 2.07% Coverage
Eliminating one-and-done would produce a noticeable difference in how the sport has operated
for more than a decade. The most talented players play only their freshman season, attend
college for less than a year and mainly congregate at a few programs, notably Kentucky and
Duke. The commission said that if the N.B.A. and its players’ union did not change the rule, it
would reconvene to consider unilateral alternatives such as freshman ineligibility.
Reference 16 - 0.69% Coverage
In a joint statement, the N.B.A. and the players’ union pledged only to continue assessing the
rules, but no changes are expected before the 2020 draft.
Reference 17 - 2.44% Coverage
The commission, which included former players (Grant Hill, David Robinson), former coaches,
university presidents, the heads of the Association of American Universities and U.S.A.
Basketball, and others, called on the N.C.A.A. to establish a new system for summer basketball,
so central to the recruitment process, that could diminish the inﬂuence of the three main apparel
companies. Adidas, Nike and Under Armour sponsor not only summer basketball but also most
of the college teams that high school prospects aspire to play for.
Reference 18 - 1.74% Coverage
Speciﬁcally, the commission envisioned allowing coaches as soon as next year to attend only
N.C.A.A.-administered regional events during the crucial July evaluation period. It was not clear
what role the three main sneaker companies would or would not have at those events. Each of
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them currently sponsors gigantic events in July that are unmissable for top prospects and
coaches.
Reference 19 - 2.12% Coverage
Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York have said that an Adidas executive and several
others with ties to the sneaker giant were central to schemes to bribe players’ families and
college basketball coaches to coax top prospects to commit to colleges that Adidas sponsored,
like Louisville, Miami and Kansas, and later sign with Adidas. Narratives outlined by
prosecutors strongly suggest that similar behavior is conducted in the name of Adidas’s rivals.
Reference 20 - 1.16% Coverage
The commission suggested allowing players to have limited contact with agents, starting in high
school, to help make decisions about the N.B.A. And it proposed permitting players who declare
for the N.B.A. draft but are not selected to return to college.
Reference 21 - 1.41% Coverage
It also recommended increasing the severity of penalties for teams and coaches who violate
rules, to ﬁve-year postseason bans for teams and lifetime suspensions for coaches. In addition, it
said people outside the organization should be involved with the penalties process and serve on
the N.C.A.A.’s board.
Reference 22 - 1.66% Coverage
And yet throughout the report the commission performed a delicate dance — acknowledging that
the very corruption it sought to eliminate arose in part because players generate substantial sums
for high school teams, agents, money managers, college teams, coaches and shoe companies but
can’t take money beyond a scholarship and related costs of attending school.
Reference 23 - 0.61% Coverage
In fact, many of the commissioners endorsed providing athletes with a cut of the revenue they
helped generate, according to Ms. Rice.
Reference 24 - 1.55% Coverage
She said the commission declined to address this topic because of pending litigation. Plaintiffs in
the so-called Jenkins case want a federal court to strike down the N.C.A.A. ban on player
compensation on antitrust grounds.
A lawyer representing the Jenkins plaintiffs, Jeffrey Kessler, said that his case concerned a
different nuance.
Reference 25 - 1.09% Coverage
Ms. Rice’s remarks, along with things Mr. Emmert has said and sentiments athletic directors
have expressed recently, have lent momentum to the sense that there will be more payments to
players, of some kind, in the not-too-distant future.
Reference 26 - 0.80% Coverage
Seasoned observers dismissed both the notion that the proposals would solve all of college
basketball’s problems and the notion they would accomplish essentially nothing.
Reference 27 - 1.18% Coverage
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Gabe Feldman, director of Tulane’s sports law program, said allowing contact with agents was
provocative. “That was completely taboo for a very, very long time,” he said, adding that any
major changes to N.C.A.A. rules would take time. “It’s a big ship to move.”
Files\\NYT5 - N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corruption
Scandal - § 15 references coded [ 38.46% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.46% Coverage
College basketball players who declare for the N.B.A. draft will be allowed to hire agents after
two N.C.A.A. boards adopted a series of reforms to the sport’s rules on Wednesday.
Reference 2 - 2.47% Coverage
The changes, which also could apply to certain high school players if the N.B.A. changes its
draft rules, were made as the N.C.A.A. continues to grapple with the fallout of the federal
indictments last year that suggested extensive corruption in recruiting at the nexus of apparel
companies and agents.
Reference 3 - 1.01% Coverage
But the governing body stopped short of making the more fundamental changes to the amateur
model that some have long sought.
Reference 4 - 3.17% Coverage
In a stark departure from the N.C.A.A.’s longtime ban on agents’ involvement, the reforms
would permit college players who declare for the draft to employ agents, and they would extend
the same exception to certain high school seniors whom U.S.A. Basketball deems elite — but
only if the N.B.A. changes draft rules that currently bar players from going directly from high
school to the pros.
Reference 5 - 2.66% Coverage
Also notable: Players who declare for the N.B.A. draft but are not selected will be allowed to
return to their college teams. Under previous rules, players with college eligibility remaining
who wanted the option of returning to college could not hire an agent and had to withdraw from
the N.B.A. draft well before it took place.
Reference 6 - 3.98% Coverage
The N.C.A.A. board of governors and the Division I board of directors also approved alterations
to the summer basketball calendar meant to increase the transparency, and perhaps reduce the
inﬂuence, of summer showcases typically sponsored by the same apparel companies — Nike,
Adidas and Under Armour — that sponsor most top college basketball teams. New disclosure
requirements for those companies as well as for coaches are intended to reveal just who is paying
for what, and how much.
Reference 7 - 5.10% Coverage
And the boards proposed changes to the N.C.A.A.’s governance and penalty structure, some of
which need to be ratiﬁed at its annual convention in January: increasing penalties; making
university presidents and chancellors accountable for violations; adding the ﬁrst independent
members to the N.C.A.A. board of governors; and permitting N.C.A.A. inquiries to use
information found by other investigative bodies. This last change could allow the N.C.A.A. to
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rely on the work currently being done by federal prosecutors, who have tools like subpoenas and
the threat of jail time at their disposal during investigations.
Reference 8 - 1.54% Coverage
The new rules followed recommendations made in April by a panel that Emmert convened to
investigate the corruption crisis and that was led by the former secretary of state Condoleezza
Rice.
Reference 9 - 4.10% Coverage
That group’s most eye-catching suggestion was the elimination of the so-called “oneand-done”
rule, the requirement that N.B.A. draftees be 19 years old or a year removed from high school.
That rule, created for the 2006 draft, birthed a system in which the most talented college players
competed in college during their freshman seasons and then left to play professionally. Change
on that front will have to wait for action from the N.B.A. and its players’ union; it is not expected
before at least 2020.
Reference 10 - 1.75% Coverage
Last September, prosecutors in the United States Southern District of New York charged nearly a
dozen individuals, including assistant coaches at major programs, a former Adidas executive,
middlemen and others
Reference 11 - 2.76% Coverage
In some cases, assistant coaches were said to have steered players toward a money manager who
had bribed the coaches; in others, Adidas employees were accused of funneling money to
prospects’ families in exchange for pledges to commit to teams sponsored by the company and to
sign endorsement deals with Adidas once the players turned pro.
Reference 12 - 2.83% Coverage
Several complaints have implicated prominent basketball teams in Adidas’s stable: Kansas,
Louisville (whose former head coach, the Hall of Famer Rick Pitino, lost his job amid the
charges) and Miami. Documents and bank records from the investigation, obtained in February
by Yahoo Sports, implicated at least 20 top men’s basketball programs.
Reference 13 - 2.50% Coverage
The federal investigation has brought attention to open secrets in men’s college basketball,
including the involvement of agents and the power the gigantic apparel companies exert over the
system by showering many millions of dollars every year on both college teams and precollege
grass-roots leagues.
Reference 14 - 1.26% Coverage
The accusations also raised anew the question of whether to allow some athletes to collect
compensation beyond a scholarship and an educational stipend.
Reference 15 - 1.86% Coverage
While Rice’s group, and Rice personally, suggested such fundamental reform made sense, it
declined to make any suggestions in this area, citing pending antitrust cases targeting the
N.C.A.A.’s restrictions on compensation.
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Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 8 references coded [
12.46% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.77% Coverage
Basketball student-athletes have more freedom and ﬂexibility to decide about going pro or
getting a college education, and they can receive ﬁnancial assistance if they leave school early
and wish to return later to ﬁnish their degree.
Reference 2 - 1.53% Coverage
Basketball student-athletes can make more frequent campus visits paid for by colleges (referred
to as ofﬁcial visits), which can begin as soon as Aug. 1 the summer before their junior year in
high school.
Reference 3 - 2.01% Coverage
Five visits between Aug. 1 and the end of their junior year of high school. Five visits between the
end of their junior year and Oct. 15 after high school graduation. Five visits between Oct. 15
after high school graduation and the remainder of their college eligibility.
Reference 4 - 1.38% Coverage
A student-athlete can visit a school only once per year. Unofﬁcial visits — those made at his or
her own expense — cannot begin before Aug. 1 of the student’s sophomore year of high school.
Reference 5 - 0.92% Coverage
Schools now can pay for 28 ofﬁcial visits for recruits (34 for national service academies) over a
rolling, twoyear period.
Reference 6 - 1.32% Coverage
College basketball players can be represented by an agent beginning after any basketball season
if they request an evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee.
Reference 7 - 1.92% Coverage
All agreements between agents and high school or college student-athletes must be:
In writing. Terminated when the student enrolls in or returns to college. Disclosed to the NCAA
(for high school students) or the school (for students already in college).
Reference 8 - 1.61% Coverage
Since 2016, college athletes who are interested in going pro have been able to declare for the
draft and attend the NBA combine but have been required to withdraw no more than 10 days
after the combine to stay eligible.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 4 references coded [ 15.63%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.09% Coverage
The recruiting calendar, which creates more restrictions around events not sponsored by high
schools, will allow coaches to attend additional high school-sponsored events. The new rules add
four-day recruiting periods (Monday through Thursday) in April but do not increase the limit on
days individual coaches can recruit. Also, coaches will be allowed to attend and evaluate recruits
at the National Basketball Players Association Top 100 Camp in mid-June.
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Reference 2 - 5.17% Coverage
Additionally, coaches will be able to attend events during the last two weekends of June if the
events are approved by the National Federation of State High School Associations; organized by
groups afﬁliated with high schools or high school coaching associations; and occur at middle
schools, high schools or colleges. Coaches also can attend one weekend youth basketball event in
early July.
Reference 3 - 2.17% Coverage
The calendar also allows coaches to attend NCAA youth development camps in late July, a new
collaboration between the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and NFHS
Reference 4 - 2.20% Coverage
Coaches and athletics staff must report to the university’s president or chancellor athleticsrelated income of more than $600 from any source outside their school.
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 2 references coded [
10.22% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.11% Coverage
One of the public members will lead the group. In addition to general oversight, this committee
will nominate members for the new independent groups listed below and work with the Division
I Board of Directors on policies and procedures for the independent enforcement and infractions
processes.
Reference 2 - 6.11% Coverage
This independent investigations group will include both external investigators with no school or
conference afﬁliations and select NCAA enforcement staff. Independent investigators are a key
part of the new process. Once a case is referred, unit members will decide whether further
investigation of the facts is needed and, if it is, conduct the investigation and shepherd the case
through its review by the Independent Resolution Panel.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 1 reference coded [ 4.60%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.60% Coverage
Full cooperation means reporting violations in a timely manner; sharing all knowledge and
documents requested in a timely manner; providing access to all electronic devices, social media
and other technology; and maintaining conﬁdentiality.
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 21.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 21.12% Coverage
Pending adoption at the NCAA Convention in January, ﬁve independent members will be added
to the NCAA Board of Governors, which is responsible for oversight of the entire Association.
Each member will be nominated by the Board of Governors Executive Committee, approved by
the full board and serve a threeyear term, which can be renewed once. The terms of the
independent board members are longer than those served by school representatives. One
member, voted on annually by all the independent members, will serve as a lead independent
member and can serve in that role for no more than three years.
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Files\\SI1 - Commission on College Basketball Recommends End to One-and-Done, Increased
NCAA Penalties - § 10 references coded [ 25.33% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.88% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball released its findings Wednesday morning, calling for
those in charge to take control of the sport by reforming the one-and-done rule, allowing players
to return to school if they go undrafted by the NBA and getting rid of coaches who cheat by
banning them for life.
Reference 2 - 2.65% Coverage
In the 60-page report, the commission said that college basketball is "a toxic mix of perverse
incentives to cheat" and called on university presidents to step up.
Reference 3 - 2.77% Coverage
It presented the proposed reforms to university presidents of the NCAA Board of Governors and
the Division I Board of Directors at the NCAA headquarters in Indianapolis.
Reference 4 - 0.99% Coverage
The next step is implementing these changes for next season.
Reference 5 - 1.65% Coverage
The commission was chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State and Stanford provost
Condoleezza Rice.
Reference 6 - 3.00% Coverage
accusations of widespread bribery, wire fraud and corruption in college basketball, leading to the
arrest of 10 people, including four former assistant college basketball coaches.
Reference 7 - 1.70% Coverage
Schools such as Louisville, Kansas, North Carolina State and Miami have been implicated in the
scandal.
Reference 8 - 3.00% Coverage
Former Louisville head coach Rick Pitino, who was dismissed in October, has been the most
prominent name to lose his job as a result of the FBI findings. Pitino has denied any wrongdoing.
Reference 9 - 1.67% Coverage
The group was tasked with reforming rules, including looking at the NCAA’s relationship with
the NBA.
Reference 10 - 3.02% Coverage
The 12-member commission included former NBA stars Grant Hill and David Robinson, former
Georgetown coach John Thompson III and Ohio State athletic director Gene Smith, among
others.
Files\\SI2 - NCAA Announces Undrafted Players May Return To School, Relaxed Agent
Rules - § 12 references coded [ 25.13% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.93% Coverage
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The NCAA announced a series of policy changes regarding their rules for student athletes on
Wednesday following the ongoing FBI Investigation into several prominent college basketball
programs.
Reference 2 - 3.96% Coverage
Among the most significant changes are the new rules that allow players participate in the NBA
combine but are not selected in the draft to return to school, provide financial assistance to
players who leave school early and wish to return later to finish their degree, and give "elite"
high school and college athletes the opportunity to be represented by an agent. Agents must be
certified by an NCAA program.
Reference 3 - 1.53% Coverage
The NCAA clarified that this rule would only apply after the NBA and NBPA begin allowing
players to be drafted out of high school, meaning 2021 at the earliest.
Reference 4 - 2.00% Coverage
College players can be represented by an agent after any season if they have requested an
"evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee," but must end the relationship if
they return to school.
Reference 5 - 1.57% Coverage
If a high school player has been designated an "elite senior prospect" by USA Basketball, the
player can be represented beginning July 1 before their senior year.
Reference 6 - 2.44% Coverage
USA Basketball has not had any substantive conversations with the NCAA or given their
approval for these changes yet, ESPN’s Jonathan Givony reports. It is unclear how this decision
will impact high school players who are not USA Basketball eligible.
Reference 7 - 3.53% Coverage
In repsonse to the recommendations issued in April from the Commission on College Basketball,
the NCAA’s Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors are implementing changes to
provide student-athletes more freedom and flexibilty to decide about going pro and minimize the
leverage of outside influences on high school recruits and college athletes.
Reference 8 - 3.13% Coverage
The changes will also make the NCAA investigations and infractions process more efficient,
setting stronger penalties for schools or individuals who violate NCAA rules to deter future
violations and bringing independent investigators to the table to make decisions, enforce rules,
and reduce conflicts of interest.
Reference 9 - 1.35% Coverage
University presidents and chancellors will also now be personally responsible for their athletics
programs abiding by the NCAA’s rules.
Reference 10 - 1.27% Coverage
The investigation launched in 2017 uncovered mass corruption, bribery and wire fraud involving
some of the sport’s top programs.
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Reference 11 - 1.41% Coverage
Several coaches were indicted in a fraud and corruption scheme—which also included managers,
financial advisers and Adidas representatives.
Reference 12 - 0.98% Coverage
The new policies were put in place to prevent further corruption and dissuade future rulebreakers.
Files\\SI3 - A Bust, and No Boom - One Year After the College Hoops Scandal Broke, What’s
Truly Changed~ - § 18 references coded [ 31.63% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.64% Coverage
The news breaks have been slow since then, but the fallout has been considerable.
Reference 2 - 1.34% Coverage
Louisville fired Hall of Fame coach Rick Pitino for his role in recruiting Brian Bowen, whose
family allegedly received $100,000 from Adidas to sign with the Cardinals.
Reference 3 - 1.11% Coverage
Bowen transferred to South Carolina, but the NCAA declared him ineligible for 2018–19; he will
instead play professionally in Australia.
Reference 4 - 3.45% Coverage
A handful of other players reneged on their commitments to schools caught up in the FBI probe,
which didn’t make national news but will change the championship picture. Point guard Jahvon
Quinerly (now at Villanova) and forward Shareef O’Neal (UCLA) both decided not to play for
Arizona after assistant coach Emanuel (Book) Richardson was arrested and charged with five
felonies as part of the investigation. (He is awaiting trial.)
Reference 5 - 2.11% Coverage
Many expected Arizona coach Sean Miller to be dismissed after a February ESPN report alleged
that he had been recorded in 2016 discussing a payment for forward Deandre Ayton, but Miller’s
contract was merely amended to dock him $1 million if he is criminally charged.
Reference 6 - 1.33% Coverage
Yet changes to the system that birthed all of this—one that can turn paying a teenager to play
basketball into a potential federal crime—have been merely incremental.
Reference 7 - 1.55% Coverage
In April, an NCAA-appointed committee headed by Condoleezza Rice announced a package of
nonbinding recommendations that were oddly preoccupied with the NBA’s changing its draftentry rules.
Reference 8 - 0.83% Coverage
Last month the NCAA made tweaks to the spring and summer recruiting schedule, but those will
go unnoticed
Reference 9 - 1.23% Coverage
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It also accepted the Rice committee’s advice by allowing basketball players to join baseball and
hockey players in having permission to work with agents.
Reference 10 - 2.12% Coverage
But those eligible for this benefit are limited to 1) incoming freshmen who have been designated
“elite senior prospects” by USA Basketball and 2) underclassmen who declare for the draft and
get invited to the NBA’s combine but are not selected, which rarely happens.
Reference 11 - 2.34% Coverage
In the process, the NCAA excluded those not ticketed for the NBA but who want to gauge pro
opportunities overseas, as well as those not part of USA Basketball—a body reportedly rankled
by not having been consulted in the NCAA’s decision to bestow on it the power to determine
who is agent-eligible.
Reference 12 - 0.94% Coverage
And so we sit on the verge of a season with a game largely unchanged from the one that was
supposedly imploding a year ago.
Reference 13 - 2.75% Coverage
Still unaddressed are the core economic realities and motivations fueling the black market, so
simple any student-athlete being compensated with Economics 101 credits could explain it: The
players have a value to schools, coaches, boosters, communities and shoe companies that is
drastically out of line with what they can receive in return.
Reference 14 - 1.38% Coverage
Perhaps each of these changes is just a step in the inevitable march toward larger reform—a
continuation of the past decade’s gradual easing of various arcane restrictions.
Reference 15 - 1.78% Coverage
More change could come this month when the class-action lawsuit brought by former West
Virginia running back Shawne Alston and former Cal center Justine Hartman against the NCAA
and 11 major conferences is heard in Oakland.
Reference 16 - 2.13% Coverage
Alston and Hartman contend that the NCAA’s capping of scholarship value is equivalent to
suppressing market competition. There is a chance the outcome in this case will have more direct
and wide-ranging results than the headline-grabbing results from the FBI sting.
Reference 17 - 2.45% Coverage
As much as the NCAA has lobbied for the NBA to abolish its age minimum of 19 for draft
eligibility, the change would likely have less effect on illicit payments than many hope: The
suitors for elite high school prospects would then include the NBA, increasing colleges’ needs to
offer financial benefits as well.
Reference 18 - 2.15% Coverage
Of course, it is worth keeping in mind that a year ago there was no inkling that college basketball
was on the brink of significant change. We may soon learn we’re not so much a year past one
bombshell than a short time away from another. Maybe that will be the true wake-up call.
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Files\\SI4 - Despite the Judge’s View, the College Hoops Trial Was Always About the
NCAA’s Archaic Rules - § 21 references coded [ 34.48% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.96% Coverage
For some three weeks Judge Lewis A. Kaplan reminded jurors in this month’s college basketball
corruption case that NCAA rules were not on trial.
Reference 2 - 0.97% Coverage
The defendants’ counsel readily admitted in their opening remarks that their clients had broken
such by paying money to top high school players.
Reference 3 - 1.82% Coverage
Time and time again Kaplan made clear that the case’s central question was not whether the
individuals standing trial had violated these regulations, but if they had undertaken criminal
actions in doing so and hiding it from the colleges these recruits planned to attend.
Reference 4 - 1.80% Coverage
On Wednesday, in the middle of its third day of deliberations, the jury determined that they had.
All three defendants in the case—Adidas executive Jim Gatto, former Adidas consultant Merl
Code and aspiring player representative Christian Dawkins—were found guilty
Reference 5 - 0.52% Coverage
It is important not to lose sight of this scene’s root cause: the NCAA’s rules.
Reference 6 - 2.10% Coverage
Gatto and Code worked for Adidas, which paid millions to its partner schools and their coaches
to benefit their basketball programs; Dawkins, working as a sort of recruiter for an agency that
represented NBA players, worked as an informal liaison that helped broker deals for players
before they reached the pros.
Reference 7 - 1.61% Coverage
The trio, along with others, arranged payments to players so that they would attend Adidasaffiliated universities, but unlike the company’s payments to athletic departments and coaches,
the NCAA does not permit such deals with players.
Reference 8 - 1.90% Coverage
The defendants then schemed to shield these transactions from university compliance offices and
NCAA overseers— which the government contended amounted to defrauding these schools of
their ability to award athletic scholarships to players who would be eligible under the NCAA’s
Reference 9 - 0.79% Coverage
Which is why, regardless of Kaplan’s instructions to the jury, this case was indeed about the
NCAA rulebook all along.
Reference 10 - 1.86% Coverage
The prosecution even argued as much in its closing statement, asserting that the defendants’
entire scheme depended on misleading schools regarding players’ eligibility—eligibility that is
wholly determined by the NCAA’s archaic, unrealistic definition of amateurism.
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Reference 11 - 1.38% Coverage
That standard has yet again been shown to be completely detached from the realities of a market
that the NCAA and its member institutions are otherwise gladly willing to let freely seep into
their every pore.
Reference 12 - 1.25% Coverage
Blaming rules for rule-breaking is often seen as a bad-faith tactic for absolving blame, and
understandably so. But in this case it is the rules themselves that have been made in bad faith.
Reference 13 - 1.40% Coverage
Seven-figure coaching salaries, nine-figure apparel sponsorships, 11-figure TV deals—for
decades the college sports industrial complex has continually and exponentially engorged itself
at every turn.
Reference 14 - 1.58% Coverage
Still as the size of its financial pie has been stretched and stretched, it has steadfastly fought to
deny anything more than a scholarship-and-stipend-sized slice to the labor that performs its
essential product by playing the games.
Reference 15 - 1.04% Coverage
These players, as has been argued by an increasing number of voices and as was thoroughly
demonstrated in this trial, have a value far exceeding this slice.
Reference 16 - 1.22% Coverage
The coaches are paid in part on the basis of being able to attract these players; the apparel
companies are partly inspired to enter contracts with the schools in order to be associated
Reference 17 - 0.92% Coverage
Yet the NCAA’s rules force the market for these players’ services into the shadows—the place
where the defendants and their ilk operate.
Reference 18 - 3.82% Coverage
The trial’s illumination of this marketplace was as unseemly as it was telling, with testimony
referencing shady invoices, deceitful cover stories and clandestine “Bat phones.” Still, it was not
a complete reveal, as the defense’s attempts to admit evidence of similar dealmaking beyond the
charges —in order to portray their clients as simply players of a dirty game in which the
university’s basketball coaches were knowing participants—were denied by Judge Kaplan,
pointing jurors toward evaluating the defendants in isolation instead of their larger context.
Reference 19 - 3.66% Coverage
These denials may set the stage for the defense’s case in appeals court, where it could find more
sympathetic ears. But in the meantime three men face potential prison time because they
included players and their families into the mutually beneficial financial relationship enjoyed by
the schools and companies that relies on said players’ talents— and the body in charge of the
sport decided it cannot stand as much, elevating what otherwise seems like natural market forces
into something the government could convince a jury is a federal crime.
Reference 20 - 1.75% Coverage
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Beyond the courtroom’s walls, the prosecution’s contention that the universities were the victims
of a scheme by those convicted can be a harder sell; do not hold your breath waiting for these
schools to take action against their apparel-company benefactors.
Reference 21 - 2.15% Coverage
In their minds this trial, which was ostensibly not about NCAA rules, had sufficiently proven the
defendants’ guilt. To those not bound by the confines of a judge’s instructions and a trial’s scope,
a truer blame lay elsewhere, in the very rules whose violation were this crime’s original sin—and
constitute the NCAA’s too
Files\\SI5 - Why the Prosecution Won in the College Hoops Corruption Trial and What’s Next
- § 28 references coded [ 35.10% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.92% Coverage
In a decisive victory for federal prosecutors and a frightening warning to those involved in the
payment of college recruits, a New York jury has convicted Adidas director of global marketing
James Gatto, Adidas consultant basketball organizer Merl Code and client recruiter (a.k.a.
runner) Christian Dawkins of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud charges. U.S.
District Judge Lewis Kaplan will sentence the defendants on March 5, 2019. While a presentencing report will influence Judge Kaplan in determining appropriate prison sentences, it’s
expected that the three men will likely be sentenced to somewhere between two to five years in
prison.
Reference 2 - 0.73% Coverage
Prosecutors from the Southern District of New York convinced jurors that the necessary
elements of wire fraud and conspiracy were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reference 3 - 0.50% Coverage
prosecutors established that top basketball recruits were paid thousands of dollars in clandestine
exchanges.
Reference 4 - 1.20% Coverage
This was not an especially stunning point. For years, if not decades, the idea that basketball
recruits were paid money “under the table” to attend certain colleges (in this case, colleges
sponsored by Adidas) was well known to many in the basketball and apparel industries.
Reference 5 - 1.29% Coverage
The more difficult challenge for prosecutors was to persuade jurors that these payments were not
only NCAA rule violations but also, much more importantly, crimes. They did so by depicting
the universities that enrolled the paid student-athletes—namely Louisville and Kansas—as
victims.
Reference 6 - 0.74% Coverage
This deduction may seem illogical since those universities enrolled players who would helped
their basketball programs win games and generate accompanying revenue.
Reference 7 - 0.76% Coverage
But prosecutors convinced jurors that they should regard the basketball program and its coaching
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staff as possessing disparate interests from the rest of the university.
Reference 8 - 2.05% Coverage
While the coach may gain from the enrollment of a superior player, the university provided that
same player a full athletic scholarship and financial aid under a false pretense. Along those lines,
the university and its admissions office staff purportedly believed that the player was eligible to
play under NCAA rules when in fact he was not. The university, then, lost control of its finite
financial assets, namely athletic scholarship and financial aid packages
Reference 9 - 1.30% Coverage
risk of punishment under NCAA amateurism rules. Likewise, prosecutors argued that there was
intent to harm these schools: certain Adidas employees, agents, coaches and family members of
the schools knowingly conspired to facilitate the enrollment of paid-off student athletes to the
school.
Reference 10 - 1.48% Coverage
The decisions of Gatto, Code and Dawkins to go to trial surprised some given data on federal
criminal trials. Approximately 90% of defendants in federal prosecutions plead guilty rather than
go to trial. Further, defendants who go to trial usually lose; federal prosecutors secure
convictions in somewhere between 85% and 95% of trials.
Reference 11 - 1.27% Coverage
Unfortunately for these three men, their odds of waging a successful appeal are also strikingly
low. According to the Judiciary Data and Analysis Office of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, only 7% of criminal conviction appeals to federal appellate courts lead to reversals.
Reference 12 - 1.80% Coverage
Still, Gatto, Code and Dawkins have an opportunity to petition the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit to review their guilty verdicts. A successful appeal is not one that claims the jury
“got it wrong.” Rather, a successful appeal proves that the presiding judge—here, Judge Kaplan
—made a mistake of law in his administration of the trial and that it was so meaningful as to lead
to a wrongful conviction.
Reference 13 - 0.55% Coverage
Typical grounds for an appeal are to argue the presiding judge mistakenly permitted or denied
certain evidence or testimony.
Reference 14 - 0.63% Coverage
the judge provided the jury with confusing instructions, and that led jurors into misunderstanding
legal principles and misapplying the law.
Reference 15 - 1.31% Coverage
Under rules in the Second Circuit, Gatto, Code and Dawkins have 30 days to file a notice of
appeal. The notice costs $505. To be clear, the notice is not itself an appeal. It merely expresses a
desire to appeal and secures the opportunity to do so. An appeal, with detailed legal arguments,
would follow.
Reference 16 - 3.05% Coverage
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An appeal would likely take months if not over a year. Appeals involve written briefs and, in
some cases, 10-or 15minute oral arguments by attorneys before a panel of three appellate judges.
An appeal is nothing like a trial. No evidence is offered, no testimony is presented, no witnesses
appear—the record is over and complete. Even the defendants themselves do not need to attend
any oral argument or otherwise actively participate in the appeal. Rather, the appellate panel
takes the facts and testimony established in the trial as the revelant record. The panel then
considers the defendants’ arguments that the law was misapplied. Far more often than not,
convictions are upheld on appeal.
Reference 17 - 0.88% Coverage
DEFENDANTS IN RELATED TRIALS MIGHT NOW WANT TO REACH PLEA DEALS—
AND THAT COULD IMPLICATE OTHERS
The convictions of Gatto, Code and Dawkins could motivate the other basketball corruption
defendants
Reference 18 - 1.11% Coverage
In February, a trial for former NBA player and Auburn assistant Chuck Person is scheduled, and
in April three coaches—Tony Bland, Lamont Evans and Emanuel “Book” Richardson—go to
trial. Prosecutors are likely emboldened by Wednesday’s convictions.
Reference 19 - 1.50% Coverage
A jury unanimously agreed that Gatto, Code and Dawkins desired to injure Louisville and
Kansas. The trio did so by conspiring to induce elite recruits into accepting NCAA-violating
inducements and by conspiring to induce those recruits into attending Louisville and Kansas,
thereby placing those institutions at risk of NCAA punishments.
Reference 20 - 0.95% Coverage
Armed with the convictions of Gatto, Code and Dawkins, prosecutors are likely more confident
than ever that they’ll likewise be able to establish that Person, Richardson and others
fraudulently deceived colleges.
Reference 21 - 1.79% Coverage
With that in mind, attorneys for Person, Richardson and the other defendants might strongly
encourage their clients to weigh the possibility of seeking plea deals with prosecutors. Any plea
deal would entail these defendants pleading guilty to crimes with the expectation that they would
not face prison time or face much less time than the years that Gatto, Code and Dawkins will
probably spend behind bars.
Reference 22 - 0.52% Coverage
In return, the defendants will need to play ball with the government. They’ll have to (1) share
any electronic records
Reference 23 - 0.99% Coverage
and (2) agree to testify against others, possibly including those who hired, mentored and trusted
them. As a result, in the coming weeks and months, additional persons in the basketball industry
could be charged with crimes.
Reference 24 - 1.06% Coverage
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Also, prosecutors normally prioritize convictions of the persons who had ultimate authority over
unlawful acts. Such convictions hold responsible the decision-makers, rather than those who only
implemented or administered decisions.
Reference 25 - 1.28% Coverage
Here, if prosecutors believe that head coaches and athletic directors were involved in corrupt
practices, they would be more inclined to cut plea deals with assistant coaches and other
defendants who could help prosecutors prove that the head coaches and athletic directors were
involved.
Reference 26 - 1.52% Coverage
This is why Wednesday’s convictions should worry anyone in college basketball who has
partaken in NCAA-violating payments to recruits and who are in any way connected to those
still facing trial: their names and wrongdoing could soon become bargaining chips in plea deals.
The government’s net of basketball corruption, then, could grow wider.
Reference 27 - 0.48% Coverage
While the NCAA was not a party in this trial, its ability to enforce compliance of rules stands to
gain from it.
Reference 28 - 1.46% Coverage
To the extent a highly regarded high school basketball player believes he can go to college and
get paid under-thetable, Wednesday’s convictions may cause that player to rethink his
assumptions. The pot of money being dispensed could become a lot smaller. For that reason, the
G League may become a much more attractive alternative.
Files\\TDG1 - Drake Group Blames Outdated NCAA Amateur Status Rules for Criminalizing
Outside Athlete Compensation - § 5 references coded [ 18.32% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.94% Coverage
Institutions of higher education have used this deﬁnition of “amateur” combined with rules that
keep young athletes captive (such as onerous transfer restrictions) and the selﬁsh motives of
professional sports leagues that do not have to fund minor leagues in football and basketball to
unreasonably limit the compensation that can be earned by collegiate athletes under the rubric of
“athletic scholarship.”
Reference 2 - 2.74% Coverage
Amateur” is nothing more than an NCAA overly broad mechanism that allows multi-milliondollar coaches and extraordinarily well-compensated athletic directors to earn lavish salaries and
perks while institutions of higher education receive tax deductible donations from exploiting the
value of collegiate athletes they refuse to allow the same earning rights as other students.
Reference 3 - 2.90% Coverage
The NCAA has the right and the obligation as an educational non-proﬁt institution to limit
institutional compensation of athletes to the cost of education. College sports should not be “pay
for play” professional sports, but continuing to treat college athletes as employees and
commodities for ﬁnancial gain and entertainment instead of as students, makes it a very tough
argument to continue to justify.
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Reference 4 - 6.62% Coverage
In other words, there are simple changes for the association to make that positions the athlete as a
student rather than an employee. The inability to separate the two has largely driven this
underground economy in college sports. While the NCAA also has the right to prohibit
professional athletes from participating in college sports, it shouldn’t have the right to prohibit
college athletes from working outside the university, contracting with an agent and using their
names, images and likenesses for private gain as long as the athlete does not use of the name or
afﬁliation with the institution. Athletes should be allowed to earn whatever the marketplace
dictates from endorsements (including the use of shoes, gloves or other items of personal sports
equipment), modeling, conducting a sports camp business or giving sports lessons to others as
long as the athlete does not enter into a contract to play professional sports.
Reference 5 - 3.12% Coverage
It is also proper for the NCAA to insist that such work be conditioned on the athlete
independently obtaining such employment, meaning that such work not be arranged by
individuals engaged by the collegiate institution or representatives of the institution’s athletics
interest for that purpose. It is also proper for the NCAA to insist on transparency in the athlete
reporting such income and to require that it reﬂect marketplace value.
Files\\TDG2 - The Drake Group Finds that the Independent Commission on College
Basketball Missed an Opportunity to Recommend Comprehensive Reform - § 9 references
coded [ 17.41% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.86% Coverage
First, we absolutely agree with the Commission that an elite athlete should have choices for
competition and development beyond the educational space if that is an athletes’desire.
Reference 2 - 1.14% Coverage
We also strongly support a change in the NBA’s age limit restriction on NBA draft entry as well
as allowing elite basketball athletes the opportunity to test the
waters of the NBA draft and seek advice from agents without losing NCAA eligibility.
Reference 3 - 2.19% Coverage
TDG strongly believes that elite development opportunities should exist outside of
intercollegiate athletics and that professional leagues have an
obligation not to impede that effort. Should athletes be good enough to go professional, they
should be allowed to do so at a time that is best for them. Also, if athletes want to attend college
they should be allowed to do that for as long or short a time as they desire just as other nonathlete students have such options.
Reference 4 - 0.96% Coverage
Other positives of the Commission report include requiring the certiﬁcation of agents and
reforming the sordid world of non-scholastic youth basketball. However, the Commission has
not gone far enough.
Reference 5 - 3.59% Coverage
Although the Report correctly emphasizes the value of a college education and the necessity of it
remaining the priority, the Commission only addressed academic integrity in the context of
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fraudulent coursework and the illconceived notion of institutional self-policing. It did not acknowledge the far more widespread
practice of institutions turning a blind eye to normal athletic departments practices designed to
keep athletes eligible through selection of less-demanding majors, easy (or fake) courses, and
friendly professors, rather than provide a real education.
Transparency and oversight by every institution’s faculty senate in this area would go a long way
toward showing that institutions are committed to providing a legitimate education.
Reference 6 - 2.06% Coverage
The biggest miss was the Commission’s failure to make a recommendation on allowing athletes
to earn money outside their participation in intercollegiate athletics via being allowed to market
their own names, images and likenesses
(NILs) and how such freedom might address some of the corruption and scandal at issue. The
Commission avoided this opportunity because it believed it needs ﬁrst the “legal parameters [to]
become clearer.”
Reference 7 - 3.37% Coverage
Indeed, the O’Bannon case in the Ninth Circuit recently decided on the proper antitrust
framework -the rule of reason– for the payment of NILs to athletes. Signiﬁcantly, the Chief
Judge in that case noted that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
was limited to the facts at hand, stated that “the national debate about amateurism in college
sports is important. But our task as appellate judges is not to resolve it.
Nor could we..” The Supreme Court, despite petitions for certiorari by both sides, declined to
review the decision. Other cases concerning payment of athletes exist in courts throughout the
states and 12 federal regional circuits. Waiting for the courts to develop clarity is risky and likely
to be frustrating.
Reference 8 - 1.16% Coverage
Courts decide cases on speciﬁc, relatively narrow sets of facts. As a result, absent an overarching
Supreme Court decision, which is by no means assured, a clear judicial resolution of the athletic
compensation issue could be a decade or more away.
Reference 9 - 2.08% Coverage
Quizzically Dr. Rice, in her remarks accompanying the Report’s release, did not shy away from
discussing the NIL and compensation matter issues, saying that “for the life of me I don’t
understand
the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars–and what
can’t be allowed . . . .” She pointed out that most Commissioners believe that the NIL rules
should be taken up as soon as the legal
framework is established.
Files\\TDG3 - The Drake Group Questions NCAA Division I Basketball Rules Changes - § 10
references coded [ 16.56% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.45% Coverage
Despite its recent reforms to Division I basketball, the NCAA continues to react to events instead
of leading college athletics to a more educationally sound future. The changes it has made to
Division I basketball misled the public into thinking that the corruption recently unearthed in that
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sport has been addressed. It hasn’t.
Reference 2 - 1.78% Coverage
In the Drake Group’s view, the NCAA’s lack of leadership is reﬂected in its failure to make rules
that promote athlete welfare and academic integrity. Instead, it uses a ﬂawed academic metric
(the Graduation Success Rate or GSR) designed to hide the underperformance of football and
basketball players and refuses to remedy the academic fraud that its member institutions commit
to keep athletes eligible.
Reference 3 - 1.63% Coverage
“The use of independent investigators and a ﬁfteen-member adjudication panel are long overdue
changes. NCAA members and the public have criticized the bias and conﬂict of interest inherent
in members judging institutions against which they compete. The perception exists that the major
revenue-producing institutions receive favored treatment under this system.”
Reference 4 - 0.85% Coverage
reinstatement of rules requiring coaches to declare outside income, to make such reports publicly
available, and to establish more rigid certiﬁcation standards for high school summer events.
Reference 5 - 2.04% Coverage
TDG Concern: No process has been deﬁned to determine “elite” status, which may invite
antitrust or equal protection litigation regarding an arbitrary evaluation and labeling system.
Athletes in all sports should be permitted to hire agents. It is reasonable for the NCAA to control
expense reimbursement by agents, but the NCAA must also control certiﬁcation of agents to
ensure that an agent does not represent both athletes and the coaches who are recruiting them.
Reference 6 - 1.87% Coverage
TDG Concern: All athletes should have the right to participate in a professional draft with no
penalty unless they actually accept an offer of employment. Athletes should not be considered
“professionals” and declared ineligible for college sport unless they sign a professional contract.
If an athlete is “selected” in the draft and then decides not to turn professional, the athlete should
remain eligible for college play.
Reference 7 - 1.47% Coverage
TDG Concern: How these institutional leaders will be held accountable is undeﬁned, except for
the suggestion that they may be ineligible to serve on the NCAA Board of Governors. The
NCAA refuses to use enforcement mechanisms that would be more effective, such as
ineligibility for national championships or suspension of membership.
Reference 8 - 1.86% Coverage
TDG Concern: It is unclear how an athlete will prove that he or she has exhausted all other
funding options. There are numerous local, national and institutional scholarships available from
multiple sources for which these students might be able to qualify. It seems unlikely that the
NCAA will or could maintain a list of such sources that the athletes need to try in order to
determine whether the search has been “exhaustive”.
Reference 9 - 1.85% Coverage
Polite added, “The Drake Group is disappointed that the NCAA continues to ignore the athlete
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employment issue, which was the primary underlying issue in the FBI investigation of the
NCAA basketball debacle and which the Rice Commission Report also ignored. Athletes should
be allowed to earn money outside of school by exploiting their names, images, and likenesses
(NILs) just as any other student with a special talent.”
Reference 10 - 1.77% Coverage
Drake Group is particularly concerned that the NCAA continues to ignore its responsibility to
ﬁnd member institutions guilty of academic fraud committed for the purpose of maintaining
athlete eligibility. Expecting institutions to self-police in this area is unrealistic and a serious
dereliction of duty with regard to the basic responsibilities of a national athletic governance
organization.”
Files\\TKC1 - Knight Commission Sees Integrity of College Sports at Risk - § 9 references
coded [ 17.61% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.10% Coverage
At today’s fall meeting, NCAA President Mark Emmert told the Knight Commission, “We
cannot go into the next basketball season without seeing fundamental change in the way college
basketball is operating.”
Reference 2 - 1.53% Coverage
Emmert acknowledged that the schools have a public trust problem. He said recent NCAA
polling showed that nearly 80 percent of people believed “big universities put money ahead of
their student-athletes,” and that nearly 70 percent of big schools are part of the problem, not the
solution
Reference 3 - 1.51% Coverage
“We need to ﬁnd a way to avoid careening from crisis to crisis,” he added. Emmert criticized the
NBA’s one-and-done rule for college basketball players, saying, “We do have 2 to 5 percent of
basketball players who really want to be professional basketball players, and if they want to be a
Reference 4 - 1.49% Coverage
Federal bribery and fraud charges were brought last month against 10 men, including four
assistant coaches and an Adidas oﬃcial. The Commission believes that the basketball scandals
are symptomatic of broader, systemic problems in men’s Division I basketball and FBS football.
Reference 5 - 1.71% Coverage
NCAA enforcement and compliance tools and practices have consistently failed to uncover the
type of behaviors exposed in the federal investigation. Yet these alleged illegal acts have been
rumored for years, fostering a recruiting culture in Division I men’s basketball that too often
crosses the line into corruption.
Reference 6 - 1.92% Coverage
“The Commission is deeply troubled by mounting evidence that the NCAA is unable to ensure a
level of integrity that must be a priority in the education and treatment of college athletes,” said
Commission co-chair Arne Duncan, former U.S. Secretary of Education, “These threats to the
integrity of college sports are an urgent call to reform, if ever there was one.”
Reference 7 - 2.63% Coverage
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The Commission meeting highlighted several broad areas of Division I basketball in need of
farreaching reform: Exploitation of college athletes by shoe companies and agents; the largely
unregulated structure of non-scholastic youth basketball and its recruiting culture; and changes to
the NCAA’s compliance and enforcement powers. Among other changes the Knight
Commission will explore are expanding the range of practices and tools for NCAA
investigations, including subpoena power.
Reference 8 - 2.91% Coverage
The Commission called on the NCAA to modify a rule that now eﬀectively allows an institution
under investigation to make its own determination about the academic legitimacy of its courses.
The NCAA should not be handcuﬀed in its authority to consider independent assessments of
academic fraud, such as those made by accrediting agencies and state licensing bodies. Other
loopholes in NCAA rules governing academic integrity, including the determination of what
constitutes impermissible academic beneﬁts for athletes, also need to be closed.
Reference 9 - 2.81% Coverage
The Commission plans to continue its exploration of other reform ideas – including how a
limited antitrust exemption for the NCAA, with restrictions, might address current problems, and
whether ﬁnancial beneﬁts could be provided to players for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses. These issues have been studied and discussed in prior Commission meetings, such as
those in May 2015 and May 2016. The Commission will also be studying and monitoring
reforms to improve the integrity and fairness of the transfer process.
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 4 references coded [ 17.13% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.63% Coverage
Over the past decade, several recommendations to align financial and athletic incentives with
educational values and to treat athletes like students helped propel the following policy changes:
Requiring teams to be on track to graduate at least 50 percent of their players to be eligible for
March Madness and other postseason championships and bowl games; adding substantial
academic incentives in the NCAA’s revenue distribution plan (and decreasing the amounts
awarded for success in the men’s basketball tournament); and reducing athletics time demands
on college athletes.
Reference 2 - 2.05% Coverage
Unfortunately, in the past, change and improvements have taken years to accomplish. We think
the ground is more fertile now for far-reaching reforms that the Commission on College
Basketball may be considering.
Reference 3 - 3.28% Coverage
These recommendations grew out of research conducted for the Knight Commission with
university presidents and higher education leaders in 2009 and again in 2012, and from the many
public meetings the Commission has held over the years with university presidents, faculty,
athletics administrators, coaches, athletes and other experts.
Reference 4 - 6.17% Coverage
First, the Knight Commission has recommended that independent directors be added to the
NCAA governing boards. This recommendation was initially made, but not accepted, when the
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NCAA restructured in 2013. We think at least one of these independent directors should be a
former men’s basketball player, given the role that March Madness plays in funding the NCAA
and its member conferences and institutions, and in holding the NCAA together. There could be
another spot among the independent directors for a former female athlete in any sport. Other
independent directors could be experts in fields like athlete health, safety and wellness.
Files\\TKC3 - Statements in Response to the Report by the Commission on College Basketball
- § 3 references coded [ 14.01% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 3.19% Coverage
“We applaud the far-reaching reforms recommended by the Commission on College Basketball,
which we will examine at the Knight Commission public meeting May 7 in Washington, D.C.,”
Reference 2 - 5.64% Coverage
“We are pleased to see the Rice Commission endorse a longstanding goal of the Knight
Commission, to add independent directors to the NCAA governing board. The addition of at
least ﬁve independent public members to the NCAA Board of Governors will improve
governance for all of college sports, not just college basketball.”
Reference 3 - 5.19% Coverage
“We still don’t know yet that the NCAA is capable of truly protecting and supporting the
education, health, safety, and well-being of student-athletes — and big challenges to the integrity
of college basketball persist. We look forward to addressing these challenges at our meeting next
month.”
Files\\TKC4 - Knight Commission Urges Tougher NCAA Reforms to Regain Public
Confidence in College Sports - § 13 references coded [ 11.66% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.50% Coverage
“The Commission on College Basketball rightly emphasized that ‘the NCAA administers what is
eﬀectively a public trust in the United States — athletic competition among college athletes,’”
Reference 2 - 1.55% Coverage
At today’s spring meeting, Commission members endorsed many of the recommendations made
by the panel led the Rice Commission, which the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I
Board of Directors accepted last week. Speciﬁcally, the Knight Commission expressed its
support for changes that will create a healthier summer recruiting environment for youth
basketball. It also supported the Rice Commission proposal to change the NBA draft eligibility
rule, but cautioned that allowing students to turn pro without a high school diploma could have a
corrosive eﬀect on educational attainment.
Reference 3 - 0.61% Coverage
Governance. As a ﬁrst step, add at least six independent directors to the 24-member Division I
Board of Directors, now comprised solely of institutional representatives, with an ultimate goal
of a majority of independent directors.
Reference 4 - 0.69% Coverage
Integrity and Financial Transparency. Adopt new and more stringent approvals, terms of
conditions, and ﬁnancial disclosures for income that NCAA institutions and their employees —
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particularly coaches — receive from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies.
Reference 5 - 0.62% Coverage
Student-Athlete Education and Development. Develop minimal professional standards that
NCAA coaches will be required to meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles as educators
and leaders in the development of student-athletes.
Reference 6 - 1.49% Coverage
“Adding independent directors will improve governance for all of college sports, not just college
basketball,” said Knight Commission co-chair Carol Cartwright. “As we ﬁrst suggested in 2013,
we also want to see independent directors added to the NCAA Division I Board of Directors. In
the long run, we’d like to see independent directors comprise a majority of both boards. Too
often, board members are expected to represent their conferences’ competitive and ﬁnancial
interests ﬁrst, instead of what may be best for student-athletes and college sports as a whole.”
Reference 7 - 0.77% Coverage
The recent college basketball scandal demonstrated that transparency and new restrictions are
needed for income obtained from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies, which have close ties
to non-scholastic basketball teams (club/travel teams), recruiting events, and NCAA institutions.
Reference 8 - 1.27% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new ﬁnancial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement ﬁnancial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
aﬃliated with the NCAA.
Reference 9 - 0.72% Coverage
No university can give the right to any employee to have a contract with shoe, equipment, and
apparel companies that are expressly or indirectly contingent on players wearing or using the
companies’ equipment or products. Such contracts must be made only with the university.
Reference 10 - 0.61% Coverage
Adopting new restrictions and imposing ﬁnancial disclosures on athletically-related outside
income received by employees, and making a failure to comply with these new requirements
subject to signiﬁcant infractions penalties.
Reference 11 - 1.56% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball concluded that “NCAA schools are not doing enough to
develop the next generation of coaches.” The Knight Commission agrees with that conclusion
and recommends the development of minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches must
meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles in the education and development of studentathletes. Such standards could require the completion of diﬀerent levels of coaching licenses or
professional certiﬁcates to redress the profession’s lax — and in some cases nonexistent —
certiﬁcation and licensure standards.
Reference 12 - 0.75% Coverage
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In a separate discussion related to NCAA transfer rules, the Knight Commission supported the
NCAA’s eﬀorts to eliminate the requirement that student-athletes must seek permission to
transfer from their institution to receive an athletics scholarship from their second institution.
Reference 13 - 0.52% Coverage
The change will allow student-athletes to notify their institutions of their intent to transfer so that
their names can appear in a national database of transfer students eligible for recruitment.
Files\\TKC5 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations - § 14 references coded [ 28.25%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.68% Coverage
In addition to adding at least five independent directors to the NCAA Board of Governors as
recommended by the Commission on College Basketball, add at least six independent members
to the NCAA Division I Board of Directors, and move towards making independent appointees
the majority on both boards.
Reference 2 - 1.41% Coverage
Background: The Commission on College Basketball, led by Condoleezza Rice, rightly
emphasized the NCAA’s often overlooked role: To administer what “is effectively a public trust
in the —United States—athletic competition among college athletes."
Reference 3 - 1.50% Coverage
We believe the NCAA can only fulfill its responsibility to administer this “public trust,” if its
governing board and the Division I Board of Directors are controlled by a majority of
independent appointees, much as is the case with many corporate and nonprofit boards.
Reference 4 - 0.63% Coverage
As a matter of guiding principle, independent directors should ultimately comprise majorities of
both boards.
Reference 5 - 3.37% Coverage
This change will shift the NCAA’s governance model from solely being a membership
association, with inherent conflicts of interest, to being more of a leadership organization capable
of propelling real change. In the current model, board members are often expected to represent
their conferences’ competitive and financial interests first, instead of what may be best for
student-athletes and college sports as a whole. More independent leadership of the NCAA will
provide greater objectivity, unhindered by institutional self-interest, to better safeguard the
integrity of college athletics.
Reference 6 - 1.03% Coverage
Adopt new and more stringent approvals, terms of conditions, and financial disclosures for
income that institutions and coaches receive from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies.
Reference 7 - 1.53% Coverage
No university can give the right to any employee to have a contract with shoe, equipment, and
apparel companies that is expressly or indirectly contingent on players wearing or using the
companies’ equipment or products. Such contracts must be made only with the university.
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Reference 8 - 2.25% Coverage
For any school where student-athletes are required or asked to wear or use apparel or equipment
displaying a company logo, mandate public disclosure of outside income that school employees,
including coaches, receive directly from the company or from the school with designated funds
from the company. This required public disclosure would extend to any private university that
competes in the NCAA.
Reference 9 - 3.99% Coverage
Reinstate the requirement for coaches and other administrators to receive approval from the
university CEO to receive any athletically-related outside income (e.g., income from shoe,
equipment and apparel companies). Further, strengthen this requirement by specifying that the
amount of income approved must be given in writing and prior to the receipt of such income.
[Note: This requirement would bring back and strengthen a requirement first adopted in 1992 at
the Knight Commission’s urging but rescinded in 2016.] In addition, university presidents should
be required to annually report to their governing boards the amounts and sources of athleticallyrelated outside income received by employees.
Reference 10 - 0.70% Coverage
Require the reporting of all athleticallyrelated outside income for coaches and administrators in
NCAA financial reports.
Reference 11 - 2.73% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new financial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
affiliated with the NCAA.
Reference 12 - 2.32% Coverage
Develop minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches will be required to meet to ensure
they are prepared for their roles as educators and leaders in the development of student-athletes.
Such standards could require the completion of different levels of coaching licenses or
professional certificates to redress the profession’s lax—and in some cases nonexistent—
certification and licensure standards.
Reference 13 - 3.41% Coverage
The Knight Commission is concerned about the implications of the National Association of
Basketball Coaches’ proposal to allow non-coaching personnel, such as basketball video
analysts, to engage in coaching activities. While the Knight Commission supports professional
development efforts, it cautions against any changes that will lead to further proliferation of
coaching staff members and the inability to enforce reasonable personnel limits. The ratio of
money spent on coaching and noncoaching personnel, compared to other program areas and
student-athlete support, is already badly skewed.
Reference 14 - 1.72% Coverage
The Knight Commission supports the Commission on College Basketball suggestion for the
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NBA and its players association to change the NBA draft eligibility rule but cautions that
allowing students to turn pro without a high school diploma could undermine educational
attainment among high school players.
Files\\TKC6 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations Cover Letter - § 4 references coded [
28.43% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 8.56% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics met on May 7, 2018 to consider the
Commission on College Basketball report and related issues. At the conclusion of our meeting,
we shared a series of recommendations that in a number of instances go beyond those proposed
by the Commission on College Basketball. The attached document provides additional
information.
Reference 2 - 8.31% Coverage
Governance. In addition to adopting the Commission on College Basketball proposal to add at
least five independent members to the NCAA Board of Governors, we recommend adding at
least six independent directors to the Division I Board of Directors. As a matter of guiding
principle, independent directors should ultimately comprise majorities of both boards.
Reference 3 - 6.07% Coverage
Integrity and Financial Transparency. Adopt new and more stringent approvals, terms of
conditions, and financial disclosures for income that NCAA institutions and their employees—
particularly coaches—receive from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies.
Reference 4 - 5.49% Coverage
Student-Athlete Education and Development. Develop minimal professional standards that
NCAA coaches will be required to meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles as educators
and leaders in the development of student-athletes.
Files\\WP1 - After another NCAA basketball scandal, let’s be honest - This is how college
sports works - § 12 references coded [ 30.04% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.99% Coverage
So today, we have Auburn, Southern California, Oklahoma State and Arizona as the bad apples.
They’re the college basketball programs that have assistant coaches who have been charged by
federal authorities because they allegedly accepted bribes to push players toward a slew of
potential moneymakers — financial advisers, Adidas, on and on.
Reference 2 - 2.03% Coverage
It would appear, too, from easily connected dots in the documents, that Louisville is being
accused of funneling $100,000 to gain the services of a single player, and Miami is accused of
planning to float a $150,000 offer for a recruit.
Reference 3 - 3.18% Coverage
Tuesday’s developments are the essence of breaking news. On the face of them, they’re alarming
— not so much because of the programs or coaches involved or the specifics of the transactions
(though, $100,000?!) — but because this comes from the FBI, adding weight and heft. The idea
of undercover videos in Las Vegas hotel rooms provides Hollywood intrigue, for sure.
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Reference 4 - 2.72% Coverage
There are likely clean major college athletics programs out there. Likely. But it’s also likely
there were baseball players who didn’t take performance-enhancing drugs around the turn of this
century. Saying with absolute certainty that a particular entity, though, is or was clean — that’s
perilous, for sure.
Reference 5 - 2.43% Coverage
Yet outright shock here? Really, there can’t be. The coaches arrested weren’t the head coaches at
those programs, not Auburn’s Bruce Pearl or Arizona’s Sean Miller, not USC’s Andy Enfield or
Oklahoma State’s Mike Boynton — or, the biggest among them all, Rick Pitino of Louisville
Reference 6 - 1.85% Coverage
Yet whatever the feds announced Tuesday, Pitino won’t be on the Cardinals’ sideline for the first
five games of the ACC season. Suspended, he is, for this previous isolated incident about which
he had no knowledge.
Reference 7 - 4.27% Coverage
The four assistant coaches arrested aren’t victims, for sure, because they surely knew what they
were doing was against rules, if not laws. But they are part of a machine that is powered by the
basic structure of college sports. When a system has billions of dollars flowing into it — and the
NCAA’s contract with CBS and Turner Sports for the NCAA tournament alone is worth $8.8
billion through 2032 — and yet has a major part of the workforce that is unpaid, well, then, how
is this not the end result?
Reference 8 - 2.40% Coverage
Six years ago, Michael Beasley laid out much of how this works. The Prince George’s County
kid was one of the most heralded recruits in the country back in 2006. He played one year at
Kansas State (yep, nothing strange going on there) and then became the second pick in the NBA
draft.
Reference 9 - 1.25% Coverage
But in a lawsuit, Beasley showed how a former agent bankrolled his AAU basketball team so the
coach of that team would push Beasley to that agency.
Reference 10 - 1.05% Coverage
That’s what the feds were alleging Tuesday, even in cases where athletes and their families
aren’t receiving $100,000.
Reference 11 - 2.42% Coverage
There’s so much money involved, someone’s going to get it. And unless and until players
receive some sort of compensation that’s commensurate with their value to the school, there is
going to be corruption. Sometimes it will violate NCAA rules. Sometimes it will violate the law.
Reference 12 - 3.44% Coverage
Either way, given the current structure of college sports, we’re only minutes away from the next
violation — whether it’s exposed or not. There is drama on Tuesday, for sure, and the more
details we learn, the more damning it will feel to those individual coaches, to those individual
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programs. And yet, we know — despite the inevitable upcoming denials from all sorts of sources
— it’s not just them.
Files\\WP2 - College basketball commission calls for rules changes, but sticks with
amateurism - § 22 references coded [ 25.16% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.49% Coverage
In an effort to solve the “crisis of accountability” in college basketball, a commission chaired by
former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice on Wednesday issued substantive, far-reaching
recommendations that called for tougher penalties for NCAA rules violations, financial
transparency by apparel companies and an end to the NBA’s “one-and-done” rule.
Reference 2 - 0.81% Coverage
But the panel did not recommend that athletes be paid, staunchly affirming the values of
amateurism and
an education for the 98.8 percent of college basketball players who do not go on to NBA careers.
Reference 3 - 1.06% Coverage
While it called for a fresh look at whether athletes should be able to earn money from the
marketing of their name, image or likeness, the panel noted that the NCAA should not — and, in
fact, could not — act until the courts resolve the issue via pending legal cases.
Reference 4 - 2.58% Coverage
The 14-member Commission on College Basketball was created in October by NCAA President
Mark Emmert in response to a federal investigation into bribery and fraud in the sport. The FBI
probe, which is ongoing, led to the arrests of 10 men, including assistant coaches at four schools,
on fraud and bribery charges for improper payments to steer top recruits to preferred agents and
financial advisers. It found that Adidas officials were offering six-figure payments to get top
recruits to Adidas-sponsored teams and that coaches accepted five-figure bribes to steer college
players to preferred agents and financial advisers.
Reference 5 - 2.10% Coverage
The relationship between shoe companies and college basketball has long bedeviled NCAA and
college officials. In their quests to gain advantages on signing NBA prospects, Nike, Adidas and
Under Armour all sponsor extensive grass-roots leagues for teenagers across the country. And
observers of the game have wondered whether there is a quid-pro-quo in cases in which Nike’s
grass-roots stars sign with Nikesponsored college teams and top Adidas grass-roots stars sign
with Adidas-sponsored college teams.
Reference 6 - 1.50% Coverage
With members of the panel seated on either side, Rice called on every stakeholder in college
basketball — coaches, athletic directors, university presidents, boards of trustees, the NCAA,
apparel companies, athletes and their parents — to “accept their culpability in getting us to where
we are today.” And where we are, Rice made plain at the outset, is a “crisis.”
Reference 7 - 1.55% Coverage
Rice explained Wednesday that the goal in calling on the NBA to end its “one-and-done” rule
and make 18year-olds eligible for the NBA draft was to separate athletes who are on the “college
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track” from those elite players who aspire only to an NBA career. The downside of essentially
“forcing” the latter group to enroll in college for one year or less, she said, outweighed the good.
Reference 8 - 0.51% Coverage
If the NBA declines to abandon one-and-done, Rice said, the panel will reconvene and consider
ending freshman eligibility.
Reference 9 - 0.97% Coverage
The panel also called on the NCAA to let underclassmen test their chances in the NBA draft
without losing their college eligibility. If they’re not drafted, they would be able to return to
school and continue playing college basketball.
Reference 10 - 1.03% Coverage
It further recommended the NCAA allow certified agents to talk with players during their high
school years to give them a realistic sense of their professional prospects before they made the
decision to enroll in college. Such contact is prohibited.
Reference 11 - 0.36% Coverage
But the panel consistently rejected remedies that would “professionalize” the sport.
Reference 12 - 1.63% Coverage
To that end, the panel called on the NCAA to require universities to pay for the cost for any
scholarship athletes to complete their degrees if they earned at least two years of academic credit
before leaving school. Some schools already do this; others don’t and would find it costly. But
covering the expense, Rice’s panel concluded, would “restore credibility to the phrase ‘studentathlete.’ ”
Reference 13 - 1.90% Coverage
ESPN analyst Jay Bilas said he believes the commission “got a lot right” — particularly in
calling for athletes to be able to confer with licensed agents and declare for the draft without
losing their college eligibility. Bilas also favors the idea of an independent entity to investigate
NCAA infractions, as well as the addition of outside professionals to the NCAA governing board
to get away from the college sports “echo chamber” in which nothing ever changes.
Reference 14 - 1.59% Coverage
But he was disappointed that the report didn’t tackle college basketball’s commercialization head
on. College basketball is a multibillion dollar industry in which coaches and schools make
millions from shoe companies, Bilas noted, but paying players — or providing them anything
more than a cost-of-living stipend and chance at an education — is cast by the report as “morally
wrong.”
Reference 15 - 0.27% Coverage
In many respects, the panel found NCAA rules enforcement lacking.
Reference 16 - 0.50% Coverage
The panel also recommended the NCAA create independent entities to investigate “high-stakes”
cases of rule-breaking.
Reference 17 - 0.90% Coverage
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In response, the panel urges the NCAA to certify specific youth basketball events that college
coaches may attend, demanding that financial transparency of the youth programs be among the
criteria for certification.
Reference 18 - 0.50% Coverage
It called for full disclosure of spending on youth basketball by apparel companies, such as
Adidas, Nike and Under Armour.
Reference 19 - 1.04% Coverage
And it called for the NCAA to join with the NBA and USA Basketball to create a new youth
basketball program by 2019 that would have as its centerpiece tournaments and events each July
that would be the sole events college basketball recruiters could attend.
Reference 20 - 0.77% Coverage
Turning to the NCAA, Rice noted that its current structure “isn’t working” and called for five
independent, public members with voting rights to be added to the NCAA’s board of directors.
Reference 21 - 1.30% Coverage
The 14-member commission included former Georgetown coach John Thompson III, former
NBA stars Grant Hill and David Robinson, former Stanford coach Mike Montgomery, Ohio
State Athletic Director Gene Smith, former Florida AD Jeremy Foley and retired U.S. Army
Gen. Martin Dempsey, who is chairman of USA Basketball.
Reference 22 - 0.80% Coverage
While Emmert and the NCAA lauded the commission’s work, the National College Players
Association — a nonprofit that represents the interests of college athletes — panned the results
as a failure
Files\\WP3 - Breaking down the NCAA basketball report - The key word is
‘recommendations’ - § 12 references coded [ 22.89% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.44% Coverage
On Wednesday morning, the College Basketball Commission chaired by former Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice unveiled its recommendations for how to fix college basketball. The
panel provided suggestions for everything from ending the NBA’s one-and-done rule to
reforming youth programs such as AAU basketball.
Reference 2 - 1.91% Coverage
It’s important to remember that the commission’s recommendations are just that:
recommendations of an independent group. When and how any rule changes will be adopted or
implemented is up to the NCAA member schools. As the report read, “the NCAA is not really
Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions.” For the NCAA to implement any
change, even those it can control, its member schools have to be on board.
Reference 3 - 0.98% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? No. That’s up to the NBA and its players’ union, which require that
players be at least 19 years old or at least one year removed from the graduation of their high
school class before entering the draft.
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Reference 4 - 1.50% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, with a caveat. Under current NCAA rules, there are multiple ways
players could lose their eligibility when entering the NBA draft, the most common of which is by
hiring an agent. Rice’s commission recommended the NCAA lets players who enter the draft but
are not drafted change their minds and go back to school.
Reference 5 - 2.28% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, with some help. The idea behind this recommendation is that high
school and college players seeking professional advice — including whether to declare for the
draft — often do so illicitly because NCAA rules don’t allow players to openly speak with paid
advisers. Rice’s commission recommended the NCAA appoint a vice president-level executive
to develop standards for certifying agents, and to administer a program that enforces rules for
contact between agents and players.
Reference 6 - 1.81% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, if its members are willing to share a bigger portion of their
revenue. Under current rules, NCAA member schools can decided on their own whether to
provide degree-completion programs. Rice’s commission recommended making the programs
mandatory, perhaps using revenue from the NCAA basketball tournaments to help fun such
programs at “relatively disadvantaged schools.”
Reference 7 - 2.41% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, but it will take big changes. The commission concluded that “the
NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are inadequate to effectively investigate and
address serious violations of NCAA rules in consequential situations” and called for “a complete
overhaul” of how infractions are handled. It recommended the creation of independent bodies to
investigate and impose punishment on member schools to commit violations, and that penalties
be given for schools that do not cooperate with investigator.
Reference 8 - 2.30% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes. The commission recommended that in the case of Level I
violations, which are the most serious, member schools could be subjected to a five-year
postseason ban. It also recommended that financial penalties for Level I violations allow for loss
of revenue sharing in postseason play — including the NCAA tournament — for the duration of
the ban.
Of course, the NCAA has come under criticism in many instances for failing to make full use of
its power under current rules to punish violators.
Reference 9 - 2.76% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Definitely not on its own. The commission made three
recommendations meant to clean up college recruiting: certifying non-scholastic basketball
events attended by coaches of its member schools (for example, summer AAU tournaments);
calling for increased financial transparency from the apparel companies, who in addition to
sponsoring AAU tournaments and teams and have extensive relationships with colleges and
individual coaches; and finally, suggesting the NCAA administer its own youth basketball
programs and recruiting events, with support from the NBA and USA Basketball.
Reference 10 - 1.96% Coverage
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Those recommendations would require the cooperation of USA Basketball, the NBA, NBPA and
WNBA, as well as apparel companies such as Nike, Under Armour and Adidas. The NCAA
would also have to coordinate with tournament owners, event operators and sponsors to keep
these events above board. The hurdle, of course, is that the NCAA holds no power over any of
those bodies, and it’s unclear what incentive they would have to work with the NCAA.
Reference 11 - 1.30% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, since coaches are employees of member schools. The commission
recommended a few things here, including allowing coaches to attend two weeks of scholasticsponsored events in June and three weekends of NCAA-sponsored events (once they’re
established) in July.
Reference 12 - 2.24% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes. The current board of governors comprises 16 college presidents or
chancellors, the chairs of the Division I Council and the Division II and III Management
Councils, and the NCAA president. The commission argued that it is difficult for the members to
remain objective about decisions affecting the NCAA as a whole while representing their
college, conference or NCAA division, and thus public boardmembers would provide greater
objectivity and “fresh perspectives.”
Files\\WP4 - Whites oppose — and blacks support — paying NCAA athletes, especially when
they’re thinking about race - § 16 references coded [ 36.11% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.88% Coverage
Last Monday, Kylia Carter, the mother of former Duke basketball star Wendell Carter, gave a
passionate speech arguing that today’s college basketball system is equivalent to slavery. Carter
was reacting to the April 25 release of the Commission on College Basketball’s long-awaited
report on corruption in the NCAA. Created after bribery scandals involving highly prized
basketball recruits, the commission offered a host of recommendations, including imposing harsh
penalties on athletic programs that knowingly violate NCAA rules.
Reference 2 - 1.65% Coverage
Conspicuously absent, however, was any suggestion that college athletes should be paid a salary.
As former secretary of state and commission chair Condoleezza Rice explained, “Our focus has
been to strengthen the collegiate model — not to move toward one that brings aspects of
professionalism into the game.”
Reference 3 - 1.86% Coverage
That infuriated more people than Kylia Carter. “Pay for play,” as it’s called, is championed by an
increasingly vocal group of journalists, broadcasters, economists, former players and their
families. They argue that because the NCAA brings in billions of dollars in annual revenue from
college athletics, college athletes should receive a share.
Reference 4 - 2.29% Coverage
The NCAA has refused, claiming that “pay for play” will lead college sports fans to stay home
and tune out. NCAA President Mark Emmert argues that “one of the biggest reasons fans like
college sports is that they believe the athletes are really students who play for a love of the sport.
… To convert college sports into professional sports would [lead to a product that is not]
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successful either for fan support or for the fan experience.”
Reference 5 - 0.97% Coverage
Most Americans are skeptical about paying college athletes. But public opinion on this divides
sharply by race. Most whites oppose “pay for play”; most African Americans support it.
Reference 6 - 1.73% Coverage
Why is opinion on this issue so polarized by race? Because a disproportionately large percentage
of college basketball and football players are African American. As with welfare, health care and
criminal justice reform, that means that, for most Americans, debates over NCAA compensation
are implicitly debates about race.
Reference 7 - 3.10% Coverage
Studies of intergroup relations show that people have “deep-seated psychological predispositions
that partition the world into in-groups and out-groups — into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ ” Decades of
research on the influence of these group attachments suggests that even the most “minimal”
group identities can lead people to exhibit favoritism toward in-group members and bias toward
out-group members. In earlier research, we showed that the “racialization” of “pay for play”
leads racially resentful whites to oppose changes to the NCAA’s current policy. But that’s only
half the story.
Reference 8 - 1.65% Coverage
The other, much less discussed, half of the story is how African Americans think about
compensating college athletes. Given the power of racial identity in structuring black opinion,
we looked into whether African Americans support “pay for play” primarily because it benefits
other members of their in-group
Reference 9 - 2.36% Coverage
Using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we conducted a survey
experiment on a nationally representative sample of 1,013 Americans. Of those respondents, 164
identified as African American. We presented each African American respondent with a list of
fictional college athletes and asked them to “indicate which of the college athletes you are
familiar with and which of the college athletes you are unfamiliar with.”
Reference 10 - 2.30% Coverage
One group of respondents saw a list of stereotypically white names (e.g., Connor Woods, Brady
White and Cody Myers). Another group saw a list of stereotypically African American names
(e.g., Darnell Booker, D’Andre Walker and Donte Jackson). This technique, used in numerous
studies of discrimination, primed respondents to think about the racial identities of the college
athletes who might benefit from a change to “pay for play.”
Reference 11 - 5.65% Coverage
Immediately after reading this experimental treatment, respondents were asked:
Some people believe that college athletes should receive salaries in addition to their scholarships.
Others disagree with this position and believe that college athletes should only receive
scholarships. Do you agree or disagree that college athletes should receive a salary in addition to
their scholarships?
To see whether African Americans who felt especially strongly attached to their racial group
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responded differently from those who didn’t, we also asked a number of questions designed to
measure what social scientists call “linked fate” and “ethnocentrism.”
We assessed their perceptions of “linked fate” with the question, “Do you think what happens
generally to African Americans in this country will have something to do with what happens in
your life?” In line with previous work on ethnocentrism, we classified African American
respondents as ethnocentric when they scored African Americans more positively on a “feeling
thermometer” than they scored whites.
Reference 12 - 1.28% Coverage
Specifically, African Americans who were exposed to stereotypically black names were 13
percent more likely to support “pay for play” than African Americans who were exposed to
stereotypically white names, by 59.1 percent to 45.9 percent.
Reference 13 - 1.35% Coverage
When African Americans were presented with hypothetical white athletes, their opposition to
“pay for play” spiked by nearly 16 percentage points when compared to African Americans who
saw a list of African American names, by 31.6 percent to 15.2 percent.
Reference 14 - 3.24% Coverage
Here’s what did not matter: We expected that our findings would be most pronounced among
African Americans who exhibit out-group bias toward whites or among African Americans who
have a strong attachment to the African American community. However, those who viewed their
fate as linked with other African Americans and those who did not responded in the same fashion
to stereotypically African American or stereotypically white names. Similarly, among African
Americans who hold ethnocentric views and those that do not, we find no significant differences
in their response to our experimental treatments.
Reference 15 - 1.69% Coverage
It’s important to note that our study was relatively small, involving just 164 African American
respondents. That’s a perennial challenge in diving into nationally representative samples to
study subgroups of racial minorities. So, we should be cautious in drawing too firm a conclusion
until more studies are done.
Reference 16 - 2.11% Coverage
But the findings are consistent with the large body of literature showing that group dynamics —
often characterized as “us vs. them” — strongly influence attitudes among racially resentful
whites and African Americans. If the debate about compensating college athletes continues to
implicitly and explicitly invoke race, our research suggests that the black-white divide is likely to
persist.
Files\\WP5 - College sports programs aren’t victims of fraud. They’re participants - § 16
references coded [ 36.86% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.91% Coverage
If federal prosecutors really want to clean up the muck in college basketball, then they should do
it right and bring a racketeering case against a major university. One that sweeps up the entire
operation: the big-donor trustee, the head coach, the athletic director, the college president and
any others who are complicit in a corrupt enterprise. But if the feds don’t care to target those
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white collars for their fraudulent behavior, then they shouldn’t be bringing cases at all.
Reference 2 - 3.45% Coverage
That kind of prosecution would have real impact. Think about it: The next time a high-dollar
donor uses his influence to hijack a university and run it like a mafia town, when cash is
laundryfunneled to blue-chip recruits in order to grab at prestige and a bigger share of $1 billion
in NCAA tournament revenue, slap a RICO case on him. And on the chancellor and coach who
tolerate academic frauds, and the athletic director who makes the backscratching, multimilliondollar financial deal with a sneaker company. That would fix the NCAA with one fell swoop of
indictments.
Reference 3 - 2.19% Coverage
But what’s happening in a Manhattan courtroom at the moment is a weak inversion of justice.
Federal prosecutors for the Southern District of New York are aiming low, not high. They are
arguing a nonsensical case that claims major colleges are somehow the defrauded victims of the
elaborate black-market recruiting economy that the schools themselves created.
Reference 4 - 3.21% Coverage
Invoking organized crime is not a stretch here. U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan did it the
other day during the trial of Adidas executives Jim Gatto and Merl Code and aspiring agent
Christian Dawkins for wire fraud. Kaplan, quite rightly, forbade defense
attorneys from arguing their clients should be acquitted because “everyone is doing it.” Such
arguments don’t hold up in cases of insider trading or mafia cases, either, Kaplan pointed out.
“The guys in the Five Families are just doing their jobs, too, I suppose,” he said.
Reference 5 - 2.99% Coverage
With that statement, Kaplan questioned the underlying premise of the entire trial.
At the heart of the matter is this: If coaches and school officials were aware that sneaker execs
and other middlemen were making illicit payments to secure five-star recruits on their behalf,
then they are hardly the dupes or injured parties in a fraud. They are participants in one.
This is a fundamental flaw in the Southern District’s case: It has failed utterly to identify the real
perpetrators or victims.
Reference 6 - 2.15% Coverage
A year ago, the feds boasted that this investigation, which included arrests of 10 minor figures,
would roll up the corruption in college athletics. “We have your playbook,” FBI assistant
director William Sweeney Jr. boasted to all those engaging in corrupt practices.
But in fact, they don’t have the playbook at all. That, or they are hopelessly naive.
Reference 7 - 1.20% Coverage
If prosecutors want to bring a case in which they know conviction is difficult or uncertain, but
feel it’s important to fire a warning shot across the bow of wrongdoers, that’s fine. But make it
count.
Reference 8 - 1.07% Coverage
So far, the proceedings are a small, petty show trial that seem unlikely to deter the truly guilty
power brokers from proceeding with business as usual once the gavel comes down.
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Reference 9 - 2.63% Coverage
Instead of headline-hunting, prosecutors could have charted the real structure of illegal activity.
Just as they do with any other racket, they would build a triangle. They’d start low and move
upward to indictments of the kingpins. That hasn’t happened here. On Monday, T.J. Gassnola,
the former Adidas bagman, continued his testimony, in which he has done a fine job of
undercutting the prosecutors’ case that schools are victims.
Reference 10 - 2.20% Coverage
Defense attorneys presented text messages between Gassnola and Kansas Coach Bill Self that
showed the coach was well aware of Adidas’s efforts to steer recruits to him, if not the method.
Gassnola assured Self that Adidas was “here to help” in getting players for the school, which was
finalizing a 12-year, $191 million sponsorship deal with the sneaker company.
Reference 11 - 1.21% Coverage
Gassnola also testified that he agreed to pay $20,000 to Fenny Falmagne, the guardian of power
forward Silvio De Sousa, to get the big kid out from under an alleged cash deal with a large
Maryland donor.
Reference 12 - 2.05% Coverage
What Gassnola is describing is a conspiracy. A racket.
And let’s be perfectly clear on who the real victims and perpetrators of it are. The real victims
are not school officials who lunged at huge financial arrangements with shoe companies and
boosters, then tried to isolate themselves from shady dealings with implausible deniability.
Reference 13 - 2.75% Coverage
The primary victims are those collegiate athletes who are being defrauded from the legitimate
educational value of their scholarship agreements, by the illicit financial forces that create
academic fraud, pressure them into unwanted lesser majors, make it harder to graduate and
corrode their collective reputations. Secondary victims are the 97 million viewers of the NCAA
tournament who expect a reasonably fair and transparent playing field.
Reference 14 - 1.42% Coverage
Six months ago, a report issued by the Condoleezza Rice-led NCAA Commission on College
Basketball did a better job of delineating this conspiracy than professional prosecutors. The Rice
report
contained two important statements.
Reference 15 - 2.58% Coverage
First of all, Rice averred, “Everybody knows.” The commission was told time and again that all
parties, from the top down, were aware of these financial arrangements. Rice also stated this:
“Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise; athletes play for their school and receive a
realistic chance to complete a college degree in return.” The continual violations of that trust and
the promise are the real crimes.
Reference 16 - 2.87% Coverage
The cases that the Southern District should be bringing, if any, are RICO cases against
universities. In RICO language, athletic
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departments, shoe companies and high-dollar donors have had an “association in fact.” They
have operated as loosely joined enterprises, engaged in a common purpose with an underlying
pattern of fraud.
If prosecutors want to call recruiting schemes criminal, then roll up the whole networks. Go after
the Five Families of college athletics.
Grandstanding
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 1 reference coded [ 1.77% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.77% Coverage
Appointment/Terms of Ofﬁce. a. Appointments. The commission chair and members are
appointed by the NCAA president. b. Term. Members will serve an initial six-month term.
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 27 references
coded [ 20.67% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.82% Coverage
This morning, the independent Commission on College Basketball led by Dr. Condoleezza Rice
presented its recommendations to address the issues facing men’s collegiate basketball. Dr. Rice
and members of the Commission presented their findings to the NCAA’s Board of Governors,
Division I Board and Presidential Forum, and Division II and III Presidents’ Councils of the
NCAA.
Reference 2 - 0.58% Coverage
It is time for coaches, athletic directors, University Presidents, Boards of Trustees, the NCAA
leadership and staff, apparel companies, agents, pre-collegiate coaches – and yes – parents and
athletes -- to accept their culpability in getting us to where we are today.
Reference 3 - 0.42% Coverage
The Commission has made a number of recommendations that are intended to revive and
strengthen the collegiate model and give young men the opportunity to pursue both athletic and
academic success.
Reference 4 - 0.45% Coverage
We are also recommending several steps to address the actual root cause of the problem –
governance and leadership lapses among many who were charged with protecting the best
interests of collegiate athletes.
Reference 5 - 0.40% Coverage
These are the people who are most responsible for giving them a chance to achieve a college
education and a college degree – and have instead given in to the incentives to “win at all cost.”
Reference 6 - 0.54% Coverage
The vast majority of people in college basketball – athletes, coaches, administrators and others play fair and do the right thing. We applaud them and hope that our recommendations can help to
level the playing field for those who do observe the rules.
Reference 7 - 0.96% Coverage
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It has been a pleasure to work with the members of this Commission, and I want to thank each of
you for your fine service. I can tell you that the hours and hours of work and travel have been,
for all of us, a labor of love. Each and every one of us loves the game. We love the dedication
and the effort of the young men who play it. We marvel at their talents and skill – their
perseverance and their commitment. We believe in the educational value of college sports.
Reference 8 - 1.08% Coverage
The members of this commission come from a wide variety of backgrounds. Some among us
played the game at the highest levels; others coached or led programs; others come from the
realm of public service; and some of us are educators --- dedicated to teaching and learning as a
way of life. That is why it has been painful for us to hear the testimony from multiple
constituencies stating that the trust that is intercollegiate athletics in general – and college
basketball in particular – has often been violated.
Reference 9 - 0.79% Coverage
Given that only 1.2% of college basketball players go on to play in the NBA and that the average
NBA career is 4.5 years – the college degree is the real ticket to financial security for most
student-athletes. For the exceptionally talented – a professional track may be the best choice –
and the choice is always there for those who are fortunate enough to succeed in the NBA.
Reference 10 - 1.24% Coverage
But the uniqueness of the opportunity that college basketball offers should not be underestimated
or undervalued. One only has to think of the non-athlete whose family made tremendous
sacrifices to send him to college and who works 20 hours a week and takes on loans that will
need to be repaid over years and even decades in order to earn a college degree. The student
athlete who fully takes advantage of this privilege will get a head start in life. And the college or
university that truly provides that opportunity will fulfill its mission and its charge to educate and
empower.
Reference 11 - 0.72% Coverage
Our recommendations are detailed because the problems in college basketball are complex and
the resolution of them requires precise remedies. This Commission has worked hard to devise
these recommendations. You can be sure that we will continue to be involved as key regulatory
bodies undertake their work to implement these changes.
Reference 12 - 0.75% Coverage
The current sad state of college basketball did not appear overnight and it will not be repaired
quickly. We know that there are many who argue that the problems facing college basketball are
just too hard to solve. We strongly disagree. College basketball is too precious – and the fate of
the young men who play it is too important --to not get it right.
Reference 13 - 0.60% Coverage
Elite high school players with NBA prospects and no interest in a college degree should not be
“forced” to attend college, often for less than a year. The one-and-done regime may have
provided some benefits for the NBA and NCAA in the past, but the downsides now outweigh the
benefits.
Reference 14 - 0.24% Coverage
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If these players are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the collegiate model
will be reduced.
Reference 15 - 0.65% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their professional prospects.
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should deprive studentathletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue in college while playing
basketball.
Reference 16 - 0.89% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA and its member institutions develop strict standards for
certifying agents and allow only those NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at
an appropriate point in their high school careers as determined by the NCAA. The NCAA should
appoint a Vice-President level executive who, among other responsibilities, would develop these
standards and administer this program.
Reference 17 - 1.19% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and commit to paying
for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave member
institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Many member institutions
already provide degree completion programs, but the NCAA rules should standardize this
offering, and the NCAA must provide the necessary funds to schools that cannot afford this. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 18 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Reference 19 - 1.50% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual accountability for
rules violations for coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents. We recommend that the
NCAA amend its rules to require colleges to include in the employment contracts of
administrators and coaches’ individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA
investigations, including financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA
enforcement proceedings, decisions and discipline – up to and including discharge. A failure to
cooperate should trigger penalties – up to and including a five-year ban on participation in the
tournament and loss of revenue.
Reference 20 - 0.68% Coverage
In the short term, we recommend the NCAA promptly adopt and enforce rigorous criteria for
certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches attend. To certify a nonscholastic
basketball event, the owners, event operators, sponsors and coaches for the event must agree to
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financial transparency.
Reference 21 - 1.02% Coverage
The Commission today calls on the apparel companies to significantly increase their
transparency and accountability efforts. These are public companies. It appears to us, however,
that apparel companies may not have effective controls in place for their spending in nonscholastic basketball. These public companies should be concerned about how their money is
being used. I have served on quite a few public boards, and I can tell you, this should be an area
of concern.
Reference 22 - 0.69% Coverage
Today the Commission is sending letters to the boards of directors of the major apparel
companies calling on their boards to publicly support and implement financial transparency and
accountability for all of their employees – and those who seek to act on behalf of the apparel
companies in non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 23 - 0.45% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that, with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to establish and administer
new youth basketball programs.
Reference 24 - 1.27% Coverage
But the NCAA and NCAA coaches should no longer associate with non-scholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. The Commission also endorses and recommends adoption of a
number of rule changes recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches and
other organizations to reduce the influence of third parties and increase the ability of college
coaches to interact with recruits and current players. These rule changes can we found in the full
report we are releasing today.
Reference 25 - 0.59% Coverage
When we assembled as a Commission, we knew our work would not be easy. But we also knew
this work was too important not to get it right. The problems facing college basketball can’t and
won’t be solved overnight. But future generations of student-athletes are counting on us all.
Reference 26 - 0.25% Coverage
The people who can truly solve these problems are right here in this room. And we, as a
Commission, call upon you to do so.
Reference 27 - 0.43% Coverage
On behalf of the Commission, let us all remember why we became educators. Let us all
remember why we became coaches and administrators. And let us never forget our duty to the
students we are here to serve.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 95 references coded [ 17.93% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage
In brief, it is the overwhelming assessment of the Commission that the state of
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men’s college basketball is deeply troubled. The levels of corruption and deception are now at a
point that they threaten the very survival of the college game as we know it. It has taken some
time to get here, and it will take time to change course.
Reference 2 - 0.04% Coverage
The Commission offers its recommendations knowing that the road ahead is long – but that the
first steps must be taken – and they must be bold.
Reference 3 - 0.07% Coverage
The indictments handed down by the Justice Department and the ongoing FBI investigation
spurred the NCAA to ask for this report. Whatever the outcome of the legal process, radical
changes are long overdue.
Reference 4 - 0.08% Coverage
We the commissioners believe that this is a final opportunity to turn the course of college
basketball in the right direction. Every stakeholder will have to accept responsibility for what has
happened in the past and commit to a new future if we are to succeed.
Reference 5 - 0.03% Coverage
Of course, student-athletes must earn that degree to receive these benefits.
Reference 6 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission believes that the answer to many of college basketball’s
problems lies in a renewed commitment to the college degree as the centerpiece of intercollegiate
athletics. Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise: athletes play for their schools and
receive a realistic chance to complete a college degree in return. Any policy or action that
violates that trust is morally wrong.
Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage
To this end, the Commission makes a number of recommendations set forth
below. To ensure that we take advantage of the current momentum for change, the Commission
further calls on the NCAA to draw up its plan to implement the Commission’s recommendations,
including draft legislation, by early August 2018. The Commission will promptly reconvene and
review the NCAA’s plans to provide its input for the NCAA’s concrete measures to renew
college basketball.
Reference 8 - 0.15% Coverage
Elite high school players with NBA prospects and no interest in a college degree should not be
“forced” to attend college, often for less than a year. These uniquely talented players are the
focus of agents, apparel companies, investment advisors, college coaches and others seeking to
profit from their skills and offering them cash and other benefits in hope of future gain. If they
are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the collegiate model will be reduced.
Reference 9 - 0.19% Coverage
requiring students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their
education, the baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn
degrees. However, it would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against
their will, where they will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the
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undermining of the collegiate model. Players with professional earning power should be able to
choose a professional path. The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier
for them to return and complete their degrees.
Reference 10 - 0.12% Coverage
We fear that, should the NBA and the NBPA make 18 the minimum age for entry into the NBA,
the growing trend of reclassification will accelerate, creating a new generation of 17-year-old
one-and-done players. The Commission urges the NCAA to monitor this situation and to enact
appropriate rule changes if that potential abuse occurs with the end of one-and-done.
Reference 11 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission also recommends imposing two additional conditions on this retention of
eligibility: The player must return to the same school, and the player must request an evaluation
from the NBA’s Undergraduate Advisory Committee before entering the draft. The NBA has
unique credibility with elite players who should have the benefit of the NBA evaluation in
deciding whether to enter the draft.
Reference 12 - 0.11% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their
professional prospects. Players who think they are surefire professionals are often mistaken. The
numbers tell this story: Only a very small percentage of NCAA men’s basketball players make it
to the NBA (around 1.2%), let alone have successful careers.2
Reference 13 - 0.12% Coverage
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind
of misjudgment that should deprive student-athletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college
or to continue in college while playing basketball. While this rule change may inconvenience
coaches seeking to set their rosters for the following season, we conclude that the studentathletes’ interest should govern here.
Reference 14 - 0.09% Coverage
Elite high school and college players need earlier professional advice, including
whether to declare for the draft or whether college basketball offers a superior pathway. If
NCAA rules do not allow them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 15 - 0.10% Coverage
A student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter into an
agreement, with a non-certified agent will lose his eligibility. In addition, the NCAA and the
NBPA should report to each other agents’ violations of their respective rules, increasing the
potential costs of violating NCAA rules.
Reference 16 - 0.15% Coverage
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic basketball, the
Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players about their professional
and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health and more. Student-athletes must
have the information they need to understand their real choices and be better positioned to take
advantage of either the collegiate or the professional path they choose.
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Reference 17 - 0.21% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who
leave member institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Colleges and
universities must fulfill their commitments to student-athletes to provide not just a venue for
athletic competition, but also an education. They must promise student-athletes that the option to
receive an education will be there, even after the athlete is finished with his athletic career. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 18 - 0.13% Coverage
Many NCAA member institutions already provide Degree Completion Programs. NCAA rules
should standardize this offering. The NCAA must also define a category of relatively
disadvantaged schools for which this requirement would impose a substantial burden, and create
a fund to provide the benefit for students at those institutions, using the revenues of the NCAA
Basketball tournament.
Reference 19 - 0.11% Coverage
One significant counter to that argument is that many Division I student-athletes benefit
enormously from engaging in intercollegiate sports. In addition to receiving full scholarships up
to the cost of attendance (ranging from $13,392 to $71,585 for in-state students and from
$18,125$71,585 for out-of-state students depending on the institution),
Reference 20 - 0.15% Coverage
receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career advice and
more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars annually.10
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11
As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced Again, the Commission
agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to assist
student-athletes in earning their degrees.
Reference 21 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 22 - 0.05% Coverage
significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must receive an
education that is valuable, not a pretense.
Reference 23 - 0.12% Coverage
In addition, these and all NCAA investigators must exercise reasonable prosecutorial discretion
and common sense so that resources are focused on serious infractions and punishment is
appropriately calibrated and consistently administered. There are multiple examples of minor
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infractions that are not worth the time and effort that the NCAA now spends on them.
Reference 24 - 0.21% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue
sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire period of the ban;
(iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv) increase the
penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than one season; and (v) increase the
penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans.
Reference 25 - 0.08% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA
Reference 26 - 0.19% Coverage
These individuals will find it much easier to do so if they enact comprehensive
compliance programs at their institutions. The costs of compliance may be significant, but they
should be small by comparison to the costs of being found in violation of NCAA rules. The
NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals if they knew or should
have known of violations and did not address them, up to and including termination. These
penalties should be mitigated or enhanced depending up the presence and effectiveness of the
institution’s compliance program.
Reference 27 - 0.26% Coverage
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
Reference 28 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 29 - 0.34% Coverage
In the near term, the Commission recommends that the NCAA promptly adopt
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and enforce rigorous criteria for certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches
attend. In order for the NCAA to certify a non-scholastic basketball event, the owners, event
operators, sponsors, and coaches for the event must agree to financial transparency about all
events they run, including those that are not certified by the NCAA. This requirement includes
agreement (i) to be subject to audit and to provide all required IRS and other tax filings upon
request; (ii) to disclose all sources of financing and other payments and the recipients of all funds
provided for or collected in relation to the event; and (iii) to disclose any financial relationship
between the event sponsors and coaches with any administrator, coach or booster at any NCAA
school. The money flowing from apparel companies and other third parties into non-scholastic
basketball must be disclosed and accounted for, in order to address the corruption arising from
non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 30 - 0.19% Coverage
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have educational
components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that requirement more
effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families, including travel, meals,
accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must be disclosed to the NCAA, along
with the source of their provision. The NCAA must enforce the requirement that such benefits be
reasonable and appropriate and assure that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying
the timing or providing the benefits to another.
Reference 31 - 0.30% Coverage
Currently, non-scholastic basketball is an ungoverned space with coaches, players and their
families, agents and sponsors exchanging money and goods in the hope of future benefits and
without accountability. Of particular importance to the Commission are the cases in which nonscholastic basketball event operators and coaches seek benefits from colleges and college
coaches in exchange for influencing their players’ college choices. To recruit effectively, many
NCAA coaches need to attend non-scholastic basketball events in which large numbers of elite
players participate. In turn, these events, leagues and teams attract high school players by giving
them the opportunity to be seen and evaluated annually by college coaches. Thus, using its
certification requirement, the NCAA has some leverage to impose the financial transparency
requirements and other reforms that the Commission recommends above.
Reference 32 - 0.23% Coverage
It appears, however, that they do not have effective controls in place in their spending in nonscholastic basketball. The Commission calls on the boards of these companies to publicly
support and implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own
investments in non-scholastic basketball. Particularly in light of the facts uncovered in the recent
FBI investigation, these public companies should be concerned about how their money is used in
non-scholastic basketball. We expect that these companies will insist that all employees provide
detailed accountability about such expenditures and cooperate with new NCAA rules about
financial transparency and accountability.
Reference 33 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
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resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 34 - 0.22% Coverage
In sum, the NCAA and NCAA coaches may no longer associate with nonscholastic basketball
events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant with NCAA requirements
regardless of when they are held. Moreover, in light of the recommendation that players be
permitted to choose a professional pathway at an earlier time, the NCAA and others should
devote significant resources to earlier development, including education, for players in youth
basketball. The corruption we observe in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. The
reforms recommended by the Commission will be fruitless unless the NCAA gives serious
attention to regulating summer programs.
Reference 35 - 0.40% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA restructure its highest governance
body, the Board of Governors, to include at least five public members with the experience,
stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA in re-establishing itself as an effective and respected
leader and regulator of college sports. One of these public members should also serve on the
NCAA’s Executive Board. The current Board of Governors includes 16 institutional presidents
or chancellors, the chairs of the Division I Council and the Division II and III Management
Councils, and the NCAA president. NCAA Constitution 4.1.1 (Composition). Like public
companies, major non-profit associations usually include outside board members to provide
objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom. Board members with those qualities
will provide valuable insight to the NCAA generally, and as it works towards the restoration of
college basketball. The NCAA should promptly identify candidates with the appropriate stature
and characteristics, and change its rules to require public voting members on its highest
governing body. The Commission will make independent board member recommendations to the
NCAA to assist it in assembling a first-rate list of candidates.
Reference 36 - 0.28% Coverage
The NCAA has often failed to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). But, the NCAA is
not really Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions. When those institutions and
those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and norms in order to achieve oncourt success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these individuals hide behind the NCAA
when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded state of intercollegiate athletics, in
general, and college basketball in particular. The Commission makes these recommendations to
support fulfillment of the NCAA’s purposes and to impose accountability on institutions and
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individuals undermining their achievement.
Reference 37 - 0.45% Coverage
After the announcement of these charges, the NCAA’s President, Mark Emmert, stated that it is
“very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so
quickly.” Statement from Pres. Mark Emmert, Oct. 11, 2017. He continued: “[w]hile I believe
the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the culture of silence in college basketball enables
bad actors, and we need them out of the game. We must take decisive action. This is not a time
for half-measures or incremental change.” As a first step, he announced that the NCAA Board of
Governors, the Division I Board of Directors and the NCAA President had established an
independent Commission on College Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. The
Commission was to “examin[e] critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working” and focus
on three areas:
•
The relationship between the NCAA national office, its members, their studentathletes and
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, nonscholastic basketball and athlete
agents and advisors.
•
The relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the challenging effect of the
NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one-and-done phenomenon in men’s college
basketball.
•
The creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and its national
office to promote transparency and accountability.
Reference 38 - 0.26% Coverage
Before going further, however, the Commission believes it is important to
confront the uncomfortable fact that the challenges identified in this report have been part of the
landscape of pre-professional basketball for many years, and that others have previously made
serious efforts to address them with only limited success. To be sure, these challenges have
become more prominent in the past decade as elite basketball – pre-college, in-college and postcollege – has become exponentially more lucrative. The fact remains, however, that today’s
issues have been around a long time, and their existence is widely acknowledged. Virtually all
stakeholders and others providing information to the Commission at some point uttered the
discouraging phrase: “Everyone knows what’s been going on.”
Reference 39 - 0.16% Coverage
However, the Commission recognizes that some humility is required in light of past failures and
the size of the challenge. Stakeholders do not agree about either the causes or the potential
solutions to the current challenges that face pre-professional basketball. The Commission
believes that these challenges will persist unless all stakeholders accept responsibility for the
credibility of the game, the reputations of the schools who field teams and the integrity of the
athletes who compete.
Reference 40 - 0.29% Coverage
Both Division I men’s basketball and the NBA are multi-billion dollar enterprises. Many
individuals and entities earn a living and more by direct and indirect association with these
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entities. Thus, the financial stakes are high for elite players, 14
coaches, athletic
directors, colleges and universities, apparel companies, agents and athlete advisors of all stripes.
Where this much money is at stake, the incentives to break rules are high. To identify issues and
craft potential recommended responses, the Commission was asked to focus on three categories
of relationships in college basketball: (1) the relationships between college basketball and the
NBA and NBPA; (2) the relationships between the NCAA and its member institutions; and (3)
the relationships between college basketball and apparel companies, non-scholastic basketball
(coaches and leagues), agents and other third parties.
Reference 41 - 0.19% Coverage
a small group of elite players who would prefer to bypass college and play in the NBA after high
school and who would be drafted, were it permitted under the NBA’s and NBPA’s collectively
bargained rules. These players often do not find the alternative professional options – such as the
G League or non-U.S. leagues – as desirable as making a name for themselves in Division I
men’s basketball. Thus, these players, colloquially referred to as one-and-done players, attend
college for a single year – and sometimes only until the day their schools are eliminated from the
NCAA tournament.
Reference 42 - 0.23% Coverage
The one-and-done phenomenon has provided some benefits to colleges and universities and to
elite high school basketball players. Schools achieve national notice and prominence with
athletic success and championships due to the presence of these players, with associated financial
and reputational benefits. As for players, many believe that they will have the opportunity to play
professional basketball if they can draw the attention of professional coaches and scouts. Playing
Division I men’s basketball allows players to make a name for themselves among professional
leagues and teams. Further, these players receive some of the educational and other benefits
associated with a year in college.
Reference 43 - 0.22% Coverage
In addition, elite high school players currently understand that in order to play Division I
basketball, they must meet the eligibility requirements to attend a Division I school. See NCAA
Division I Bylaw 14.3 (Freshman Academic Requirements). Because numerous players who will
not play professional basketball nonetheless believe that they will, these players gain the benefit
of educational levels and opportunities that they might otherwise have forgone. The Commission
takes these benefits seriously and, in particular, does not underestimate the transformative
possibilities in attaining academic eligibility for college or in spending a year or more in college.
Reference 44 - 0.11% Coverage
Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are limited and often appear
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations. The Commission did not hear from a single stakeholder who supported
the current system in addressing high-stakes infractions.
Reference 45 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
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the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 46 - 0.19% Coverage
Virtually all stakeholders, including NCAA staff, expressed the view that the current model for
adjudication of NCAA rules violations should not continue. Representatives of member
institutions that have crosscutting and potentially self-interested incentives with respect to
punishment administer the NCAA’s current adjudication process. While many stakeholders
expressed gratitude and respect for the hard work of the volunteers who administer the current
infractions process, all expressed the belief that the current system is not working in cases
involving serious violations.
Reference 47 - 0.33% Coverage
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules
regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams qualify as
“amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years. Although there are
exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to receive compensation in any
form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a contract or commitment to play
professional athletics, to receive consideration from a professional sports organization, to
compete on a professional team and to enter into an agreement with an agent. In addition, a
student-athlete cannot receive preferential treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic
reputation or skill, unless specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws
12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or
Competition), 12.1.2 (Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
Reference 48 - 0.18% Coverage
Others recognize the validity of some of these points, but contend the studentathletes receive significant benefits from their college experiences, including the value of the
scholarship (the full cost of a college education), the associated training, coaching and benefits of
being on a collegiate team, and the lifelong incremental increase in earning power resulting from
a college degree. See ES Section 1.D. Many believe that paying players is not financially or
legally feasible and that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the collegiate game.
Reference 49 - 0.24% Coverage
Still others believe that the NCAA rules are so focused on pre-professional sports that the NCAA
has failed to create a system that makes sense for the majority of studentathletes who will not
make a living at their sports. Under these rules, stakeholders assert, student-athletes who accept
any “benefit,” no matter how small, risk losing their eligibility to compete. The NCAA’s
administration of the “no benefit” rule, see NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2 (Nonpermissible), was
criticized as penalizing student-athletes and preventing them from engaging in normal
interactions with friends and mentors. Those holding this view suggest that the NCAA should
engage in common sense calibration of the “no benefit” rule for particular contexts.
Reference 50 - 0.28% Coverage
Agents. NCAA rules further forbid collegiate athletes to enter into any agreement (oral or
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written) with agents for purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial
gain, even if that agreement is limited to future representation. Prohibited marketing includes
negotiations with professional teams, seeking product endorsements and efforts to place an
athlete at a particular school. The rules likewise forbid family members or other representatives
to enter into such an agreement on behalf of an athlete. In addition, athletes may not accept
benefits from agents even if those benefits do not have strings visibly attached. NCAA Division I
Bylaws 12.3.1 (General Rule); 12.3.1.2 (Representation for Future Negotiations); 12.02.1
(Agent); 12.3.3 (Athletics Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1.3 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).18
Reference 51 - 0.07% Coverage
It would be better, stakeholders argue, if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by
restricting contact to specific times and places.
Reference 52 - 0.34% Coverage
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to impose
harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents) who violate the
rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate with NCAA
investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the ability to impose loss
of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of revenue from post-season play
on those who commit serious infractions and those who decline to cooperate with NCAA
investigations. They believe that the availability – and utilization – of these penalties would get
presidential and board-level attention at colleges. These persons further note that administrators,
athletic directors and coaches who violate the rules often move on to other member institutions,
and do not pay a significant price for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the
institutions that hire individuals who have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking
the risk of hiring past offenders.
Reference 53 - 0.15% Coverage
A number of stakeholders expressed the view that one way to lessen the negative influence of
non-scholastic basketball event operators and coaches would be for the NCAA to administer its
own regional non-scholastic basketball camps in July and to restrict NCAA coaches to those
NCAA camps for July. Coaches would be able to see numerous elite high school players in one
location, in theory without the need for an advance blessing from a non-scholastic basketball
coach.
Reference 54 - 0.16% Coverage
In the context described above, however, a player may be strongly tempted to break NCAA rules
and enter into a relationship with an agent or attend a particular college in order to be paid.
Similarly, coaches and other college representatives may be strongly tempted to pay players,
family members and others who can influence players to attend particular schools. As illustrated
by the recent charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, this possibility is not merely
theoretical.
Reference 55 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
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support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 56 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling
their intercollegiate athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the
NCAA. NCAA Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s
activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its members’
acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
Reference 57 - 0.12% Coverage
The issues currently confronting the NCAA and Division I men’s college basketball
are long standing and complex. The Commission believes, however, that implementing the
recommendations below will support the integrity of the collegiate game and the NCAA’s
member institutions without unduly limiting the individual opportunities of student-athletes.
Reference 58 - 0.20% Coverage
opportunity for individuals and significantly reduces the incentives for improper payments, and
is thus one important part of an overall effort to limit corruption in college basketball and to
support the collegiate model. The Commission recognizes that this change will be most effective
in combination with the other recommendations it is making, including reformed and improved
NCAA investigative and adjudicative processes, higher penalties for infractions, and new
requirements for financial transparency and accountability in member institutions’ athletic
programs and in non-scholastic basketball.
Reference 59 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is optimistic that the NBA and the NBPA will agree with its
assessment. If the NBA and the NBPA are unable to negotiate an end to one-and-done by the end
of 2018, however, the Commission will reconvene and reassess the viability of some of these
alternative tools. The current situation is unacceptable.
Reference 60 - 0.14% Coverage
We recognize that this regime has some downsides. Under current collectively
bargained rules, a player who declares for the draft, but is not drafted, is a free agent and may
sign with any NBA team at any time, including the middle of the next college season. To address
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this problem, the Commission requests that the NBA and the NBPA agree that players who are
not drafted become ineligible for the NBA until they enter the draft again.
Reference 61 - 0.31% Coverage
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a season before
returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.1 (Residence
Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious disadvantages in
completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this issue, over the last few years,
hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is upward.22
Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be in a better
“basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover, third parties influence
many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best interests of the player in mind.
Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence requirement” of the transfer rule remain
in place, whatever other changes are made in the NCAA’s transfer rules.
Reference 62 - 0.07% Coverage
he Commission believes that this and other rule changes will provide studentathletes with better
information about their likely professional careers and a greater likelihood of ultimately
achieving a college degree.
Reference 63 - 0.20% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for the certification of agents, and authorize and make opportunities for those
certified agents to engage with student-athletes at school at specific times during the calendar
year. To implement this requirement, the NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive
to develop detailed standards for NCAA certification and administer the program. The NCAA’s
program should also educate elite student-athletes at member institutions about NCAA eligibility
rules and requirements and professional prospects.
Reference 64 - 0.20% Coverage
The NCAA’s rules already allow student-athletes to retain lawyers and advisors to
provide professional advice at market value, provided the lawyer or advisor does not engage in
the representational activities of agents. NCAA-certified agents should also be permitted to
provide such advice. Further, high school players considering entering the draft should be
allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors just as high school baseball players may
engage agents for advice about the draft. Cf. NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.3.1 (Exception –
Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey – Prior to Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment).
Reference 65 - 0.33% Coverage
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA rules
define as “agents”24
Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met or their employees. However, the
Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid, either
directly or indirectly.25
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advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into agreements
with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought that this would
simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age. Instead, agents
recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with high school and collegiate
players and make their cases so that players would have all available options before they enter
the professional market. The Commission intends NCAA-certification to provide these
opportunities for “good” agents.
Reference 66 - 0.11% Coverage
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with agents,
sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA should bring these
conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their prospects with agents whom it
certifies under NCAA-approved standards.
Reference 67 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission also recommends that the NCAA work with the NBA and the
NBPA to establish additional venues for representatives of those entities to meet with collegiate
players and provide information about professional status and opportunities. The NBA and the
NBPA have unique credibility with collegiate athletes. Players would make more informed
choices about college if they had additional opportunities to hear from the NBA and its players.
Reference 68 - 0.28% Coverage
One aspect of this debate is particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate. Paying modest
salaries to Division I basketball players will not address the particular corruption the
Commission confronts; nor will providing student-athletes a modest post-graduation trust fund
based on licensing of names, images and likenesses. None of the contemplated payments would
be sufficient to reduce the corrupt incentives of third parties who pay certain uniquely talented
players in the hope of latching onto their professional futures, of coaches and boosters seeking to
secure the success of their programs, or of colleges willing to undermine their education mission
to ensure the eligibility of players. One would have to adopt a full-scale professional model to
forestall that corruption or, as the Commission recommends, try instead to revitalize the college
model.
Reference 69 - 0.23% Coverage
But, in the current legal circumstances, the Commission decided to address the charge of
exploitation by providing individual student-athletes with access to professional opportunities,
and ensuring that the student portion of student-athlete is real. Specifically, the Commission
recommends allowing student-athletes with a professional pathway to make the choice to leave
college every year, creating resources so that they can make an informed choice whether to do
so, welcoming back student-athletes whom the NBA does not draft, making a serious financial
commitment to degree completion and severely punishing those who undermine the premise that
student-athletes must receive a valuable – not a sham – education.
Reference 70 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
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the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 71 - 0.29% Coverage
Most significantly, the Commission recommends that the Committee on Infractions appoint a
panel of paid independent decision makers, such as lawyers, arbitrators and retired judges. These
decision makers would form a pool from which three adjudicators would be randomly selected to
resolve each complex case. Members of the panel would serve for a term of five years (with
some shorter and longer terms initially so that the entire panel does not turn over
simultaneously). The panel would operate under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association or analogous rules; its decisions would be final and binding, subject to review only
under the Federal Arbitration Act. Volunteers and members should not decide whether fellow
member institutions have violated NCAA rules, nor the appropriate punishment for those
violations. It is time for independent adjudication of the NCAA’s complex cases.
Reference 72 - 0.44% Coverage
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes to cooperate in
NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can consider in assessing penalties. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The
NCAA also must adopt rules that require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate
with NCAA investigations, with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing
significant consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically, to
participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents, administrators, and
coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including by providing documents
and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators. In addition, while the NCAA does not have
subpoena power, it can adopt rules requiring as a condition of membership, that member
institutions enter into contractual agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member
institutions contractually impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents,
administrators and coaches. NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report
and provide evidence of violations.
Reference 73 - 0.16% Coverage
The Commission recommends significant changes in the penalty structure and the
nature of penalties imposed on NCAA member institutions for certain violations. The
Commission considers non-cooperation a separate serious offense that should receive substantial
penalties, including the loss of participation in and revenues from the NCAA tournament for up
to five years. In addition, the Commission believes that serious repeated violations of NCAA
rules must be subject to these same severe penalties.
Reference 74 - 0.23% Coverage
Current core penalties for violations of NCAA rules are set out in the Division I Manual, Article
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19, Figure 19.1. The NCAA adopted these penalties in October 2012, effective August 2013.
Due to the length of the NCAA’s adjudication process, the first cases in which the current
penalty matrix applies have only recently been resolved. (The penalty matrix in effect at the time
of a violation applies to that violation without regard to subsequent amendments.) The matrix
provides appropriate types of penalties for violations by institutions – i.e., probation, fines,
suspensions, scholarship reductions, forfeitures, post-season bans, head-coach restrictions,
recruiting visit restrictions.
Reference 75 - 0.19% Coverage
The NCAA is certainly not blameless for its failure to address the corruption in college
basketball that led to the recent prosecutions, but the primary failures belong to the individuals at
colleges and universities who allowed their programs to be corrupted, averting their eyes to keep
the money flowing. With enhanced individual accountability, the Commission believes that more
college presidents and athletic directors will find it beneficial to adopt and enforce
comprehensive compliance programs. See also NCAA Constitution 2.1 (Principle of Institutional
Control and Responsibility).
Reference 76 - 0.34% Coverage
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified nonscholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 77 - 0.25% Coverage
Finally, the Commission is aware of the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“RUAAA”)
developed by the Uniform Law Commission, in response to an NCAA request that state law
address agents’ provision of cash and other economic benefits to studentathletes. Forty-two
states, DC, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act and eight have adopted the RUAAA. The Uniform Law Commission provided useful input
to the Commission and sought its support in encouraging states to adopt the RUAAA.
Unfortunately, while a number of states have enacted state laws regulating sports agents, the
Commission is not aware of any significant number of enforcement actions. The Commission
encourages States to both enact and enforce state laws regulating sports agents.
Reference 78 - 0.20% Coverage
The NCAA must adopt rules that will reform non-scholastic basketball or disassociate college
basketball from the corrupt aspects of non-scholastic basketball. The Commission recommends
that the NCAA take both short and long-term action. In the short term, the NCAA must adopt
rigorous certification criteria for non-scholastic basketball events its coaches may attend,
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including significant measures to ensure financial transparency and accountability. In the long
term, the NCAA should administer its own regional camps for high school players in the group
subject to college recruiting in July of each year.
Reference 79 - 0.13% Coverage
non-scholastic basketball needs NCAA coaches, and NCAA coaches need non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission’s guiding principle in this area is that the NCAA should not certify,
and NCAA coaches should not participate in, non-scholastic basketball events involving
coaches, leagues or sponsors who are not fully transparent about the sources and amounts of their
financial support.
Reference 80 - 0.10% Coverage
More specifically, while NCAA coaches are forbidden to attend non-scholastic basketball events
not certified by the NCAA, the NCAA’s current criteria for certification are plainly insufficient.
The new criteria for certification must include detailed requirements for financial transparency.
Reference 81 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 82 - 0.44% Coverage
In this section, the Commission recommends significant changes to the resources
and programs available for the development of young, pre-collegiate players, ideally by the
summer of 2019. Allowing players to enter the professional ranks earlier brings with it the
responsibility to provide appropriate resources for earlier development. We acknowledge that
institutional influence—by USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA and the NBPA—has been
largely missing in this space for the past 20 years and that nonscholastic basketball has been
largely ungoverned. We strongly recommend that the named institutions lend their expertise and,
wherever possible, work together to provide an alternative to the individual and corporate
influences which currently dominate precollegiate youth basketball particularly in the summer.
In the Commission’s view, the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA all have
significant institutional interests in developing prominent roles in non-scholastic basketball,
particularly in the areas of player identification, development and evaluation. There is a great
deal of work to be done in the development of pre-collegiate players, and the three institutions
should also welcome partners and sponsors willing to work within the standards, disciplines, and
accountability these institutions will bring to youth development.
Reference 83 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission makes distinctions among three levels of players in addressing
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pre-collegiate youth development: Level 1 for those players across the four high school years
with identified National Team Potential, Level 2 for those players across the four high school
years with identified Highest Collegiate Potential, and Level 3 for those players across the four
high school years with identified Collegiate Potential.
Reference 84 - 0.10% Coverage
It is important to note that the Commission believes developing players at each
level will require a collaboration among USA Basketball, the NCAA, the NBA and the NBPA.
The absence of any one of these stakeholders in the youth development space will exacerbate the
current problems with recruiting and development.
Reference 85 - 0.27% Coverage
Player identification. USA Basketball will be primarily responsible for the identification of those
players with the highest potential for Level 1 (Junior National Teams). The NCAA will be
primarily responsible for identification of those players with the highest potential for Levels 2
and 3. The Commission understands that college coaches annually identify the prospects they
seek to recruit using electronic databases and recruiting services. Based on these systems, players
can be assigned to an appropriate level based on the interest shown in them. As a further step to
ensure that players are properly identified, the Commission recommends that USA Basketball,
the NCAA, and the NBA and NBPA establish a “collaborative advisory group” to annually
review and validate the player identification and player evaluation processes.
Reference 86 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission recommends that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional
camps each summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during that
time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted to account for these
events.
Reference 87 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 88 - 0.14% Coverage
Player evaluation. The most important outcome of player evaluation is a realistic assessment of a
player’s potential. The Commission recommends that a “collaborative advisory group” among
the NCAA, USA Basketball and the NBA and NBPA be established to provide a realistic
assessment of professional potential to players in Levels 1 and 2. Importantly, the Commission
believes these evaluations must be transparent and accessible.
Reference 89 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
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from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 90 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission believes that additional recommendations of the NABC and
others are worthy of NCAA study. It also supports the NABC’s intent to reinvigorate its Code of
Ethics and disciplinary rules and enforcement.
Reference 91 - 0.12% Coverage
The NCAA administers what is effectively a public trust in the United States — athletic
competition among college athletes. Public members of boards serve important functions. They
provide objectivity, fresh perspectives and independent viewpoints and judgments. Many nonprofit associations utilize public board members for precisely these reasons.
Reference 92 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission calls on the NCAA to draw up draft legislation and plans to
implement its recommendations for Commission review by early August 2018. The Commission
will promptly reconvene and provide its input.
Reference 93 - 0.02% Coverage
The Commission has made a number of important recommendations.
Reference 94 - 0.15% Coverage
Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not in execution — such
as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems. Others should be easy to execute
— specific changes in the available punishments under Article 19 and in the recruiting rules.
Some do not require rules changes, but instead the devotion of financial and administrative
resource to planning, for example, the creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps.
Reference 95 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\ESPN5 - Why the NCAA hoops scandal will likely spread as trial starts - § 1 reference
coded [ 1.60% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.60% Coverage
ESPN reported in February that defendant Christian Dawkins and Arizona coach Sean Miller had
discussions about a $100,000 payment to ensure that star center DeAndre Ayton, the No. 1 pick
in June’s NBA draft, signed with the Wildcats. Arizona’s outside counsel, Paul Kelly of Boston,
said Ayton denied receiving money to influence his decision in multiple interviews with the FBI
and NCAA.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 9 references coded [
11.19% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.79% Coverage
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With two of the NCAA’s highest-ranking committees committing to take swift action to correct
issues facing college basketball, NCAA leaders called upon their members Thursday to own the
challenges facing them and to set college sports on a path guided by its long-held values.
Reference 2 - 0.42% Coverage
promised this week to take quick action on those recommendations
Reference 3 - 1.18% Coverage
The Board of Governors on Wednesday committed $10 million this year and an additional $2.5
million annually starting in 2019-20 to help implement the commission’s recommendations.
Reference 4 - 0.86% Coverage
In addition, the Board of Directors on Thursday promised to act on the recommendations by the
start of the 2018-19 basketball season.
Reference 5 - 0.61% Coverage
So Emmert pointed to the work being done to update the NCAA’s Association-wide strategic
plan
Reference 6 - 0.95% Coverage
Emmert stressed that while those words can be dismissed as a bureaucratic exercise, the NCAA
already has seen positive results from past efforts.
Reference 7 - 1.48% Coverage
The strategic plan was last updated in 2004 to focus on academic reform, leading to improved
tracking of graduation rates and the academic performance of athletes, and led to penalties for
programs that failed to meet standards.
Reference 8 - 0.69% Coverage
Today, student-athletes are performing at an all-time high academically and graduating at record
rates.
Reference 9 - 3.21% Coverage
“I’d like to use this process as a time to reestablish how we think, how we feel about this thing
we call the NCAA, to elevate the conversation around it,” Jones said. “If you look at the issues
of the day, they didn’t exist 14 years ago. All these things have come on the horizon, and they’ve
resulted in putting the NCAA on the defensive. I’d like to use this process to propel us into a role
of a leader. I think it’s a great opportunity. I think society is looking for a leader, and I think
that’s what we do best.”
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 3 references coded
[ 4.02% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.45% Coverage
By the time the 2018-19 season tips off, the NCAA will adopt a series of bold legislative, policy
and structures changes that will profoundly alter the college basketball landscape.
Reference 2 - 0.91% Coverage
Dr. Rice and the members of the commission were clear. The collegiate model should be
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strengthened and preserved.
Reference 3 - 1.65% Coverage
The NCAA will work with other organizations – including USA Basketball, apparel companies,
the NBA and the NBPA – to make meaningful and lasting changes that will support the
commission’s recommendations.
Files\\NCAA5 - NCAA to Help Certify June Basketball Events - § 5 references coded [
11.04% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.16% Coverage
Acting on recommendations from the Commission on College Basketball, the NCAA on
Tuesday announced it will certify scholastic boys’ basketball events this June for high schools
that are not members of state high school associations afﬁliated with the National Federation of
State High School Associations.
Reference 2 - 2.49% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball, following counsel provided by the National Association
of Basketball Coaches, recommended the events last year as part of its outline to reform college
basketball by enhancing the recruiting environment and further engaging the high school
coaching community in the development and recruitment of young players.
Reference 3 - 0.85% Coverage
The NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Oversight Committee approved the criteria, which will
be used to certify the events.
Reference 4 - 1.81% Coverage
Dave Archer, the senior director of basketball operations for the National High School
Basketball Coaches Association, said the collaboration between the high school coaches, the
NCAA and the NFHS will improve the recruiting environment for young players
Reference 5 - 3.72% Coverage
“The National High School Basketball Coaches Association is pleased with the action the NCAA
is taking to allow an alternative path for approval of June Division I men’s basketball scholastic
recruiting events,” Archer said. “This will allow hundreds and hundreds of additional high
school players with the potential to play college basketball to be evaluated by college coaches in
an educational environment. This is another important step as we continue to move forward to
improve the recruiting culture throughout the nation.”
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 7 references coded [ 19.81% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage
This week, we delivered on a promise made just months ago to make profound and meaningful
changes to college basketball.
Reference 2 - 1.68% Coverage
Ultimately, these decisions will support the success of student-athletes both on and off the court.
Reference 3 - 3.36% Coverage
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The NCAA Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors adopted a series of signiﬁcant
policy and legislative changes, setting in motion actions to change the structure of the NCAA
fundamentally.
Reference 4 - 2.55% Coverage
These changes will promote integrity in the game, strengthen accountability and prioritize the
interests of studentathletes over every other factor.
Reference 5 - 2.37% Coverage
We remain committed to promoting fairness in college sports and creating an environment that
will champion the success of student-athletes.
Reference 6 - 3.26% Coverage
The NCAA and its member schools are part of the broader higher education community, and
today’s actions renew our commitment to our core purpose — preparing students for a lifetime
of opportunity.
Reference 7 - 4.59% Coverage
If they are unwilling or unable to act, we will consider additional changes that will support the
success of student-athletes. It’s on us to restore the integrity of college basketball and continue to
improve the interests of all student-athletes. They deserve nothing less.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 3 references coded [ 4.80% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.39% Coverage
We must take decisive action.
Reference 2 - 0.77% Coverage
This is not a time for half-measures or incremental change.
Reference 3 - 3.64% Coverage
Therefore, I have secured endorsement from the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I
Board of Directors to form a Commission on College Basketball, which Dr. Condoleezza Rice
has agreed to chair, to work with me in examining critical aspects of a system that clearly is not
working
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 3 references coded [
5.20% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.77% Coverage
Basketball student-athletes have more freedom and ﬂexibility to decide about going pro or
getting a college education, and they can receive ﬁnancial assistance if they leave school early
and wish to return later to ﬁnish their degree.
Reference 2 - 1.61% Coverage
Since 2016, college athletes who are interested in going pro have been able to declare for the
draft and attend the NBA combine but have been required to withdraw no more than 10 days
after the combine to stay eligible.
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Reference 3 - 1.82% Coverage
Now, students who wish to enter the draft also must request an evaluation from the NBA
Undergraduate Advisory Committee, which will provide valuable information to assist studentathletes in making the decision to turn pro or stay in school.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 1 reference coded [ 1.12%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.12% Coverage
The rule promotes increased transparency between NCAA schools and outside entities
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 2 references coded [
8.56% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.11% Coverage
This independent investigations group will include both external investigators with no school or
conference afﬁliations and select NCAA enforcement staff. Independent investigators are a key
part of the new process. Once a case is referred, unit members will decide whether further
investigation of the facts is needed and, if it is, conduct the investigation and shepherd the case
through its review by the Independent Resolution Panel.
Reference 2 - 2.45% Coverage
This committee will have the ability to expand upon allegations presented by the Complex Case
Unit if deemed appropriate. This is a change from the current infractions process.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 1 reference coded [ 6.42%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.42% Coverage
People charged with investigating and resolving NCAA cases can accept information established
by another administrative body, including a court of law, government agency, accrediting body
or a commission authorized by a school. This will save time and resources previously used to
conﬁrm information already adjudicated by another group.
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 5.44% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.44% Coverage
Public members not afﬁliated with the NCAA or member schools will join the NCAA Board of
Governors to bring fresh perspectives and independent judgment.
Files\\TDG1 - Drake Group Blames Outdated NCAA Amateur Status Rules for Criminalizing
Outside Athlete Compensation - § 1 reference coded [ 3.63% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 3.63% Coverage
Although the latest scandal that has enveloped college sports is not surprising, it was stunning to
see the federal government getting involved in policing college sports. Despite everything
reported in the last week being only allegations, The Drake Group believes it is only right for the
FBI to pursue any allegation concerning those who do not declare compensation for criminal tax
evasion and to go after public companies that conceal payments to college athletes and avoid
paying payroll and other taxes.
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Files\\TDG2 - The Drake Group Finds that the Independent Commission on College
Basketball Missed an Opportunity to Recommend Comprehensive Reform - § 7 references
coded [ 11.62% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.45% Coverage
TDG and other groups have long critiqued the insular and limited NCAA enforcement and
adjudication process as a facade of governance rather than a process in which unbiased
investigators and adjudicators execute real enforcement and
effective penalties. TDG has long supported the overhauling of this area.
Reference 2 - 1.25% Coverage
For example, current Drake Group president B. David Ridpath recommended these independent
investigator/adjudicator changes to a congressional subcommittee in 2004 and TDG released a
position paper on this very topic outlining exactly how these changes could be
Reference 3 - 0.56% Coverage
We urge the NCAA to immediately adopt an independent form of enforcement and infractions
for serious rules violations.
Reference 4 - 1.26% Coverage
TDG also believes for any substantive college sports reform in the educational context any
oversight body should have faculty representation. That did not exist on this Commission and we
consider that a signiﬁcant, but hopefully not purposeful, omission by the NCAA.
Reference 5 - 1.45% Coverage
TDG believes failing to allow athletes to exploit their own NILs with strict controls was a missed
opportunity. Courts decide cases based on
speciﬁc and relatively narrow sets of facts and we believe the courts are not the proper place to
make meaningful and appropriate decisions generally about amateurism.
Reference 6 - 2.90% Coverage
We say, “Why wait?” The Drake Group has proposed a very speciﬁc framework for how to
handle NILs in its position paper on that issue including calling for athlete reporting,
conformance with marketplace value, no involvement of institutional representatives and other
controls. To restrict athletes’ outside income while enriching coaches and athletic directors and
allowing institutions to build lavish facilities that aid recruiting, but lack
educational value, yet failing to meet athletes’ basic medical and insurance needs invites
accusations of exploitation and perpetuates under-the-table payments.
Reference 7 - 2.74% Coverage
Lastly, The Drake Group believes the Commission missed the opportunity to identify and
address other signiﬁcant
athlete beneﬁt problems. With few exceptions, athletes or their families must pay for their own
athletic injury insurance. There are no long-term medical guarantees except for catastrophic
injuries. It is this imbalance of who is actually
beneﬁtting from the athletics revenues largesse that produces public sympathy for even illegal
athlete compensation. It is this system that must be addressed and we believe the Commission
should continue its work to try to do so.
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Files\\TDG3 - The Drake Group Questions NCAA Division I Basketball Rules Changes - § 6
references coded [ 14.13% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.78% Coverage
In the Drake Group’s view, the NCAA’s lack of leadership is reﬂected in its failure to make rules
that promote athlete welfare and academic integrity. Instead, it uses a ﬂawed academic metric
(the Graduation Success Rate or GSR) designed to hide the underperformance of football and
basketball players and refuses to remedy the academic fraud that its member institutions commit
to keep athletes eligible.
Reference 2 - 1.17% Coverage
Thus, the Drake Group believes that the present NCAA leadership is unwilling to clean out the
rot in commercialized college sport and fulﬁll its primary responsibility to ensure the welfare of
college athletes and protect the academic integrity of higher education.
Reference 3 - 2.40% Coverage
TDG Concern: The current rule limiting athletes to ﬁve paid visits is sufﬁcient and far in excess
of beneﬁts provided to non-athlete students. All NCAA athletic programs are operating at a
deﬁcit except for 20-25 Division I FBS programs and most athletic programs are supported by
institutional general funds or mandatory student fees. The Drake Group believes that ﬁve visits
before college enrollment and ﬁve visits after college enrollment are sufﬁcient. Any additional
visits will add to the recruiting arms race and its associated expenses.
Reference 4 - 3.19% Coverage
TDG Concern: All NCAA member institutions should be required to do so for all athletic
scholarship athletes, not just the so-called revenue sports. Basketball and football in particular
are currently exploiting underprepared college athletes, many of whom are athletes of color, by
waiving regular academic admission standards and compounding their academic difﬁculties by
imposing unreasonable sport time demands. The message sent by this rule is, “Don’t worry about
performing academically. We have your back if you want to return to school.” The Drake Group
believes this beneﬁt would be acceptable only if the athlete leaves in good academic standing
and if the beneﬁt were not limited to sports that generate revenues.
Reference 5 - 3.83% Coverage
Three fairly simple oversight rules previously proposed by The Drake Group could control
improprieties. The member institution should be required to review written terms of any NIL
agreement to ensure conformance with the following stipulations or conditions: (1) use does not
include the name, marks, institutional colors, or afﬁliation, implied or otherwise, of the student’s
institution or the use of institutional facilities or properties for such engagement; (2) the
institution’s employees or others engaged by the institution are not involved (i.e., identiﬁcation
of possible employment opportunities, introductions, etc.) in obtaining the employment; and (3)
the employer attests that the remuneration is commensurate with the going rate in that locality
for services and the athlete is paid only for work speciﬁcally described and actually performed.”
Reference 6 - 1.77% Coverage
Drake Group is particularly concerned that the NCAA continues to ignore its responsibility to
ﬁnd member institutions guilty of academic fraud committed for the purpose of maintaining
athlete eligibility. Expecting institutions to self-police in this area is unrealistic and a serious
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dereliction of duty with regard to the basic responsibilities of a national athletic governance
organization.”
Files\\TKC1 - Knight Commission Sees Integrity of College Sports at Risk - § 3 references
coded [ 6.86% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.58% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics said today that recent college sports
scandals have threatened not only the integrity of intercollegiate athletics but raised basic
questions about the NCAA’s ability to prevent abuses, protect the rights of athletes, and clean up
corruption
Reference 2 - 2.63% Coverage
The Commission meeting highlighted several broad areas of Division I basketball in need of
farreaching reform: Exploitation of college athletes by shoe companies and agents; the largely
unregulated structure of non-scholastic youth basketball and its recruiting culture; and changes to
the NCAA’s compliance and enforcement powers. Among other changes the Knight
Commission will explore are expanding the range of practices and tools for NCAA
investigations, including subpoena power.
Reference 3 - 2.65% Coverage
The Commission commended the NCAA for creating an independent Commission on College
Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former Stanford University provost and U.S.
Secretary of State. The Knight Commission, which has a long history of providing
recommendations that have improved the integrity of college sports, will seek to meet with the
basketball commission to outline reforms to protect the educational mission of college sports and
reduce the exploitation of student athletes.
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 8 references coded [ 30.43% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage
Over our more than 25-year history, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics has
established a legacy of promoting reforms that support and strengthen the educational mission of
college sports.
Reference 2 - 1.74% Coverage
Early efforts called on presidents themselves to govern college sports with tougher academic
standards that ultimately helped lead to improved graduation success for athletes.
Reference 3 - 5.63% Coverage
Over the past decade, several recommendations to align financial and athletic incentives with
educational values and to treat athletes like students helped propel the following policy changes:
Requiring teams to be on track to graduate at least 50 percent of their players to be eligible for
March Madness and other postseason championships and bowl games; adding substantial
academic incentives in the NCAA’s revenue distribution plan (and decreasing the amounts
awarded for success in the men’s basketball tournament); and reducing athletics time demands
on college athletes.
Reference 4 - 3.58% Coverage
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In many cases, our recommendations were met with cynicism and initial resistance. To cite one
example, when Arne, as Secretary of Education, embraced the Knight Commission’s
recommendation that teams be on track to graduate half of their players to be eligible for
postseason play, a prominent college basketball coach told USA TODAY that the idea was
“completely nuts.”
Reference 5 - 3.13% Coverage
Collectively, these reforms made significant improvements to Division I intercollegiate athletics
by placing greater value on the “college” in college sports. However, further change still is
needed and men’s college basketball, in particular, needs a far more radical overhaul than what
has taken place in recent years.
Reference 6 - 3.28% Coverage
These recommendations grew out of research conducted for the Knight Commission with
university presidents and higher education leaders in 2009 and again in 2012, and from the many
public meetings the Commission has held over the years with university presidents, faculty,
athletics administrators, coaches, athletes and other experts.
Reference 7 - 6.17% Coverage
First, the Knight Commission has recommended that independent directors be added to the
NCAA governing boards. This recommendation was initially made, but not accepted, when the
NCAA restructured in 2013. We think at least one of these independent directors should be a
former men’s basketball player, given the role that March Madness plays in funding the NCAA
and its member conferences and institutions, and in holding the NCAA together. There could be
another spot among the independent directors for a former female athlete in any sport. Other
independent directors could be experts in fields like athlete health, safety and wellness.
Reference 8 - 4.90% Coverage
Thank you for considering these suggestions and the additional recommendations from the
Commission’s October 30, 2017 meeting outlined by Knight Commission CEO Amy Perko in
her November 9, 2017 letter to you.
We reiterate our strong support for far-reaching reforms to men’s college basketball. We look
forward to hearing your commission’s recommendations and to working collaboratively with
you as well as with others to advance the changes needed.
Please let us know if we can be of any further assistance.
Files\\TKC3 - Statements in Response to the Report by the Commission on College Basketball
- § 1 reference coded [ 5.64% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.64% Coverage
“We are pleased to see the Rice Commission endorse a longstanding goal of the Knight
Commission, to add independent directors to the NCAA governing board. The addition of at
least ﬁve independent public members to the NCAA Board of Governors will improve
governance for all of college sports, not just college basketball.”
Files\\TKC4 - Knight Commission Urges Tougher NCAA Reforms to Regain Public
Confidence in College Sports - § 9 references coded [ 8.95% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.79% Coverage
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The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics today urged university presidents to seize a
rare moment of opportunity to reform not only men’s basketball but the NCAA organization
itself to restore public faith in the governing body’s ability to oversee major revenue-producing
college sports.
Reference 2 - 0.95% Coverage
The Knight Commission called on the NCAA to make additional far-ranging changes to its
governance beyond those recommended by the Commission on College Basketball, and to enact
a series of strict requirements on college basketball coaches and their schools to bolster ﬁnancial
transparency, particularly for income received from shoe and apparel companies.
Reference 3 - 1.04% Coverage
The Knight Commission suggested the NCAA shift its model from a membership association,
with inherent conﬂicts of interest, to being more of a leadership organization capable of
propelling real change. That shift requires more independent leadership of the NCAA, including
independent directors who can play an objective role in safeguarding college athletics, especially
for revenue sports.
Reference 4 - 1.23% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball, led by Condoleezza Rice, adopted a longstanding
recommendation of the Knight Commission to add independent directors to the NCAA Board of
Governors, the organization’s highest-ranking governing body. The Knight Commission also
urged that the NCAA add at least six independent members to the Division I Board of Directors,
because that board controls policies that shape the richest and most powerful college sports
programs.
Reference 5 - 1.01% Coverage
As a matter of principle, the Knight Commission recommended that independent directors
should ultimately comprise majorities of both boards. Similarly, to underscore the importance of
impartial oversight, the Commission expressed its support for Rice Commission
recommendations to provide for an independent infractions and enforcement process in cases of
serious violations.
Reference 6 - 0.36% Coverage
“We urge university presidents to adopt the complementary reforms we are advancing as part of
a more comprehensive package of measures,”
Reference 7 - 0.52% Coverage
The Rice Commission adopted a longstanding recommendation of the Knight Commission to
add independent directors to the NCAA Board of Governors, the organization’s highestranking
governing body.
Reference 8 - 1.49% Coverage
“Adding independent directors will improve governance for all of college sports, not just college
basketball,” said Knight Commission co-chair Carol Cartwright. “As we ﬁrst suggested in 2013,
we also want to see independent directors added to the NCAA Division I Board of Directors. In
the long run, we’d like to see independent directors comprise a majority of both boards. Too
often, board members are expected to represent their conferences’ competitive and ﬁnancial
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interests ﬁrst, instead of what may be best for student-athletes and college sports as a whole.”
Reference 9 - 1.56% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball concluded that “NCAA schools are not doing enough to
develop the next generation of coaches.” The Knight Commission agrees with that conclusion
and recommends the development of minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches must
meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles in the education and development of studentathletes. Such standards could require the completion of diﬀerent levels of coaching licenses or
professional certiﬁcates to redress the profession’s lax — and in some cases nonexistent —
certiﬁcation and licensure standards.
Files\\TKC5 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations - § 5 references coded [ 12.97%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.74% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics met on May 7, 2018 and proposed the
following recommendations for the NCAA to consider as complementary reforms to those
advanced by the Commission on College Basketball. The roster of Knight Commission members
involved in these deliberations is attached.
Reference 2 - 1.11% Coverage
The Rice Commission adopted a longstanding recommendation of the Knight Commission to
add independent directors to the NCAA Board of Governors, the organization’s highestranking
governing body.
Reference 3 - 3.99% Coverage
Reinstate the requirement for coaches and other administrators to receive approval from the
university CEO to receive any athletically-related outside income (e.g., income from shoe,
equipment and apparel companies). Further, strengthen this requirement by specifying that the
amount of income approved must be given in writing and prior to the receipt of such income.
[Note: This requirement would bring back and strengthen a requirement first adopted in 1992 at
the Knight Commission’s urging but rescinded in 2016.] In addition, university presidents should
be required to annually report to their governing boards the amounts and sources of athleticallyrelated outside income received by employees.
Reference 4 - 2.73% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new financial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
affiliated with the NCAA.
Reference 5 - 3.41% Coverage
The Knight Commission is concerned about the implications of the National Association of
Basketball Coaches’ proposal to allow non-coaching personnel, such as basketball video
analysts, to engage in coaching activities. While the Knight Commission supports professional
development efforts, it cautions against any changes that will lead to further proliferation of
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coaching staff members and the inability to enforce reasonable personnel limits. The ratio of
money spent on coaching and noncoaching personnel, compared to other program areas and
student-athlete support, is already badly skewed.
Files\\TKC6 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations Cover Letter - § 3 references coded [
19.49% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 8.56% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics met on May 7, 2018 to consider the
Commission on College Basketball report and related issues. At the conclusion of our meeting,
we shared a series of recommendations that in a number of instances go beyond those proposed
by the Commission on College Basketball. The attached document provides additional
information.
Reference 2 - 5.55% Coverage
As we have stated previously, we believe this is a rare moment of opportunity to reform not only
men’s basketball but the NCAA itself to restore public faith in the organization’s ability to be an
effective steward of big-money college sports.
Reference 3 - 5.39% Coverage
We are glad to answer any questions you or members of the working groups might have. Knight
Commission CEO Amy Perko can arrange any follow-up conversation with us. She can be
reached at 910-551-6809 or at perko@knightcommission.org.
Checks and Balances
Files\\ESPN1 - Why the college basketball scandal won’t get fixed until the NCAA pays
athletes - § 14 references coded [ 10.99% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.52% Coverage
Instead, we should endeavor to change the rules to make them fair, reasonable and moral. Right
now, they are none of those things.
Reference 2 - 1.07% Coverage
The current NCAA system and rules are largely responsible for creating the underground blackmarket economy for players. There are contradictions everywhere, to the point of hypocrisy, and
business relationships with third parties that strain the imagination.
Reference 3 - 0.46% Coverage
There is no way that the NCAA will adopt rules limiting the commercial opportunities of its
members or its partners.
Reference 4 - 1.13% Coverage
Players will continue to play, and tournament operators will continue to make money off the
players and college recruiters who come to watch the players. If the NCAA attempted to affect
the grassroots culture, it would open itself up to legal action for anticompetitive practices.
Reference 5 - 1.30% Coverage
Do you believe that the NCAA will stop the influence of agents? No way. Because of NCAA

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

347

rules that disallow a player from having an agreement with an agent, the ethical agents are on the
sideline while the unethical and lesserqualified agents have full access and open-field running to
unpaid, amateur players and prospects.
Reference 6 - 0.50% Coverage
Unintentionally, but predictably, the NCAA’s amateurism rules have helped create the blackmarket economy for players.
Reference 7 - 0.69% Coverage
When you use a person to make money while at the same time limiting that person from making
money, you exploit. Players are certainly not mistreated, but they are exploited.
Reference 8 - 0.66% Coverage
Prohibition did not stop people from drinking; it just drove it underground and created a blackmarket economy. That is exactly what the NCAA is doing with players.
Reference 9 - 0.76% Coverage
These players are worth a ton of money, to schools, to agents and to shoe companies. And these
players are worth far more than a scholarship. In fact, a scholarship is the LEAST they are worth.
Reference 10 - 0.85% Coverage
Schools do not have to offer scholarships, but do. They do not have to offer stipends, but do. If
they didn’t, they would be hurt in the marketplace, even though there is a unilaterally imposed
wage cap on athletes.
Reference 11 - 0.64% Coverage
That pesky free market works incredibly well and efficiently for everyone else; it is foolish to
assert that it would not work just as well for college athletes.
Reference 12 - 0.53% Coverage
After all, these schools know exactly whom to recruit and whom to play the most minutes in the
games. They know whom to pay and how much.
Reference 13 - 1.67% Coverage
But in the absence of meaningful change regarding amateurism, there will be no meaningful
change at all. We will all shake our heads and our fingers at the current scandal, give our fullthroated speeches, and the NCAA will say "threat to integrity" and "antithetical to what college
sports is about" and act righteously indignant. Then, we will all go on to the next game, and the
NCAA will go on to the next big contract.
Reference 14 - 0.21% Coverage
Money will find a way. In NCAA sports, it always does.
Files\\ESPN2 - NCAA announces new college basketball policy, including agents for players
and longer postseason bans - § 2 references coded [ 1.05% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.49% Coverage
A USA Basketball official told ESPN that his group hadn’t yet approved some of the changes
announced by the NCAA on Wednesday.
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Reference 2 - 0.56% Coverage
Several NBA officials have also told ESPN that they didn’t think the league’s age requirement
would be lowered to 18 until 2021 at the earliest.
Files\\ESPN3 - NCAA’s new proposed rules blindside NBA, USA Basketball officials - § 5
references coded [ 9.78% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.48% Coverage
Top officials with the NBA and USA Basketball were blindsided by the NCAA’s announcement
of future rules changes regarding pro basketball prospects, as well as the timing of it, sources
told ESPN.
Reference 2 - 3.22% Coverage
The NCAA launched a commission and set of subcommittees to address the fallout from the
recent FBI investigation into the college basketball industry, resulting in several policy shifts,
including the assigning of responsibility to USA Basketball for something the organization had
already told the NCAA it wanted no part of: selecting elite senior high school prospects who will
be allowed to sign with registered agents.
Reference 3 - 2.11% Coverage
USA Basketball doesn’t have the infrastructure or interest in accepting the role of evaluating the
nation’s top prospects for selecting a yet-to-be-determined number of players who will annually
be allowed to sign with agents at the end of their junior years, sources told ESPN.
Reference 4 - 1.71% Coverage
Several NBA officials were surprised over the presumptive and premature nature of the NCAA’s
rules changes, which assumed that the NBA and National Basketball Players Association will
abandon the one-and-done college rule
Reference 5 - 1.26% Coverage
While that appears to be the direction the league and union are headed, discussions are centered
on the 2022 draft as the earliest date for that change to go into effect.
Files\\ESPN4 - Commission on College Basketball calls for sweeping reforms by NCAA - § 5
references coded [ 2.24% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage
The endorsement isn’t an immediate change.
Reference 2 - 0.89% Coverage
now begin the hard work of changing rules, crafting legislation and building consensus among
351 Division I members on how best to make all this work. NCAA’s Division I Council,
comprised mostly of athletic directors, had already begun working on some of the areas where
the commission recommended reforms.
Reference 3 - 0.37% Coverage
Ending one-and-done is the biggest change suggested by the commission, even though it’s an
NBA rule -- which Rice pointed out.
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Reference 4 - 0.22% Coverage
It’s not yet clear how the governing body would pay for some of the proposals.
Reference 5 - 0.63% Coverage
The commission did not make any recommendations in the area of paying collegiate athletes or
enabling them to earn money off their names or likenesses. Rice did address the issue, but
acquiesced to the courts for now.
Files\\ESPN5 - Why the NCAA hoops scandal will likely spread as trial starts - § 5 references
coded [ 6.09% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.39% Coverage
Arizona officials have denied multiple openrecords requests from ESPN for any subpoenas the
university received from the federal government for information and grand jury testimony related
to the investigation. They repeatedly cited "the balancing test established by the Arizona courts
to protect the best interests of the state."
Reference 2 - 0.24% Coverage
It’s not yet clear how the NCAA will react toward any schools
Reference 3 - 0.66% Coverage
In March, Cal State Northridge hired Mark Gottfried, who was NC State’s coach when Dennis
Smith Jr., whose father is said to have received $40,000, played there.
Reference 4 - 1.84% Coverage
change that took effect immediately was allowing people investigating NCAA cases to accept
information established by another administrative body, including a court of law, government
agency, accrediting body or a commission authorized by a school. For example, the NCAA could
accept evidence and findings from the federal government’s investigation and punish those found
guilty of wrongdoing -- without conducting its own investigation.
Reference 5 - 1.96% Coverage
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTORS ARE taking some action to limit schools’ exposure in this
trial.
They have asked U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan to limit what defense attorneys can say
about the four victim schools’ past infractions, including the stripper parties that occurred inside
Louisville’s athletics dormitory and the actions of Ponzi schemer Nevin Shapiro, who alleged he
provided impermissible benefits to more than 70 Miami student-athletes between 2002 and 2010.
Files\\NYT1 - In College Basketball Scandal, Follow the Money ... and the Shoes - § 6
references coded [ 7.50% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.34% Coverage
The three companies have their own leagues — Nike’s E.Y.B.L., Adidas’s Gauntlet, Under
Armour Association — each with dozens of teams. The companies shower teams with money,
swag and perks. Parents of top prospects are commonly involved with the teams.
Reference 2 - 0.68% Coverage
During summer break, high school players compete in league tournaments that are honey pots
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for college coaches and recruiters.
Reference 3 - 1.63% Coverage
The companies ﬁercely compete with one another to have the best 16-year-old prospects playing
in their leagues. Two years ago, for instance, Nike auspiciously scheduled an impromptu trip to
the Bahamas for the best players in its league at the same time as a celebrated Under Armour
tournament in New York City.
Reference 4 - 0.70% Coverage
It is not out of the question that Pitino will ﬁnd another college coaching job; he has survived
several major scandals in his career.
Reference 5 - 1.67% Coverage
In 2009, he confessed that he had an affair with the wife of the team’s equipment manager and
paid for her to have an abortion. In 2015, a former director of basketball operations was found to
have provided strippers and prostitutes to the Louisville team’s players and recruits in a campus
dormitory over several years.
Reference 6 - 1.48% Coverage
But for many in Kentucky, he will remain a coaching legend. Long before winning a title with
Louisville, he resurrected Kentucky’s storied program and led the Wildcats to the 1996 national
title. That team, regarded as one of the best in college basketball history, wore Converse.
Files\\NYT2 - The Corruption at the Heart of March Madness - § 6 references coded [ 20.54%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.24% Coverage
Coaches, the very people whom prized young athletes should be able to trust, were found to be
proﬁting from them and helping others — agents, ﬁnancial advisers, the Adidas shoe company
— proﬁt, too.
Reference 2 - 4.33% Coverage
The criminal complaints were rare in an area too often relegated to self-policing by universities
and the N.C.A.A. — the watchdog of college sports and the umbrella organization that runs the
popular, immensely proﬁtable basketball championship tournament dubbed March Madness,
where college stars compete before some of them go on to professional careers as millionaires.
Reference 3 - 3.28% Coverage
One complaint, while not actually naming Louisville or Mr. Pitino, implied that someone in the
basketball program directed money from Adidas to two high school prospects. The university
signed a 10-year, $160 million contract this summer with Adidas for the men’s basketball
program.
Reference 4 - 3.09% Coverage
But the coach, the nation’s highest paid, at $7.7 million a year, has a reputation for cutting
ethical corners. He was suspended and his program were put on N.C.A.A. probation in June after
investigators found prostitutes were provided for players and teenage recruits.
Reference 5 - 4.27% Coverage
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This situation arose after the National Basketball Association and its players’ union agreed to bar
players before they have turned 19 or until a year after high school graduation. Previously, high
school players could sign on and earn full professional salaries — safe from the no-income
college rules and ﬁctions that invite the sort of abuses laid bare in the complaints.
Reference 6 - 3.33% Coverage
College basketball programs unscrupulously compete for top players to earn more from the
immense pot of proﬁt from television. The complaints cast a spotlight on that greed and
hypocrisy, which is infesting what is supposed to be, but hasn’t been for some time, an innocent
and amateur sport.
Files\\NYT3 - Amid Scandal, N.C.A.A. Forms Commission to Reform Men’s Basketball - § 3
references coded [ 4.59% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.17% Coverage
But he drew the line at changes to the amateur model, which prevents colleges from
compensating athletes beyond scholarships and related costs.
Reference 2 - 1.63% Coverage
While he declined to speak for the commission, its members do not include any public critics of
amateurism, and some — such as the Rev. John I. Jenkins, the president of Notre Dame — are
outspoken supporters
Reference 3 - 1.79% Coverage
Emmert conﬁrmed that he and the rest of the N.C.A.A. ofﬁce in Indianapolis learned about the
yearslong federal probe from news media reports. But if the criminal investigation surprised him,
not all of the allegations did.
Files\\NYT4 - N.C.A.A. Panel Proposes Reforms, Including End to ‘One and Done’ - § 13
references coded [ 16.84% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.17% Coverage
But while the proposed changes would alter the texture of the sport, they stopped well short of
challenging the longtime requirement that the college athletes remain amateurs, uncompensated
beyond a scholarship and a stipend for their talents and efforts.
Reference 2 - 0.31% Coverage
It also noted the widespread public support for plans to pay players.
Reference 3 - 0.74% Coverage
But Ramogi Huma, the president of the College Athletes Players Association, an advocate for
more rights for athletes, said the commission dodged the main issues.
Reference 4 - 1.83% Coverage
The federal charges, which were followed by indictments, introduced the risk of criminal
prosecution into a well-known part of college basketball. The allegations made a mockery of
N.C.A.A. amateurism rules and painted a black mark on several of the most prominent basketball
programs. Documents obtained by Yahoo Sports in February seemed to implicate players at a
dozen other blue-chip programs.
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Reference 5 - 0.69% Coverage
In a joint statement, the N.B.A. and the players’ union pledged only to continue assessing the
rules, but no changes are expected before the 2020 draft.
Reference 6 - 2.44% Coverage
The commission, which included former players (Grant Hill, David Robinson), former coaches,
university presidents, the heads of the Association of American Universities and U.S.A.
Basketball, and others, called on the N.C.A.A. to establish a new system for summer basketball,
so central to the recruitment process, that could diminish the inﬂuence of the three main apparel
companies. Adidas, Nike and Under Armour sponsor not only summer basketball but also most
of the college teams that high school prospects aspire to play for.
Reference 7 - 1.74% Coverage
Speciﬁcally, the commission envisioned allowing coaches as soon as next year to attend only
N.C.A.A.-administered regional events during the crucial July evaluation period. It was not clear
what role the three main sneaker companies would or would not have at those events. Each of
them currently sponsors gigantic events in July that are unmissable for top prospects and
coaches.
Reference 8 - 2.12% Coverage
Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York have said that an Adidas executive and several
others with ties to the sneaker giant were central to schemes to bribe players’ families and
college basketball coaches to coax top prospects to commit to colleges that Adidas sponsored,
like Louisville, Miami and Kansas, and later sign with Adidas. Narratives outlined by
prosecutors strongly suggest that similar behavior is conducted in the name of Adidas’s rivals.
Reference 9 - 1.66% Coverage
And yet throughout the report the commission performed a delicate dance — acknowledging that
the very corruption it sought to eliminate arose in part because players generate substantial sums
for high school teams, agents, money managers, college teams, coaches and shoe companies but
can’t take money beyond a scholarship and related costs of attending school.
Reference 10 - 0.61% Coverage
In fact, many of the commissioners endorsed providing athletes with a cut of the revenue they
helped generate, according to Ms. Rice.
Reference 11 - 1.55% Coverage
She said the commission declined to address this topic because of pending litigation. Plaintiffs in
the so-called Jenkins case want a federal court to strike down the N.C.A.A. ban on player
compensation on antitrust grounds.
A lawyer representing the Jenkins plaintiffs, Jeffrey Kessler, said that his case concerned a
different nuance.
Reference 12 - 0.80% Coverage
Seasoned observers dismissed both the notion that the proposals would solve all of college
basketball’s problems and the notion they would accomplish essentially nothing.
Reference 13 - 1.18% Coverage
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Gabe Feldman, director of Tulane’s sports law program, said allowing contact with agents was
provocative. “That was completely taboo for a very, very long time,” he said, adding that any
major changes to N.C.A.A. rules would take time. “It’s a big ship to move.”
Files\\NYT5 - N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corruption
Scandal - § 5 references coded [ 11.41% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.01% Coverage
But the governing body stopped short of making the more fundamental changes to the amateur
model that some have long sought.
Reference 2 - 3.17% Coverage
In a stark departure from the N.C.A.A.’s longtime ban on agents’ involvement, the reforms
would permit college players who declare for the draft to employ agents, and they would extend
the same exception to certain high school seniors whom U.S.A. Basketball deems elite — but
only if the N.B.A. changes draft rules that currently bar players from going directly from high
school to the pros.
Reference 3 - 4.10% Coverage
That group’s most eye-catching suggestion was the elimination of the so-called “oneand-done”
rule, the requirement that N.B.A. draftees be 19 years old or a year removed from high school.
That rule, created for the 2006 draft, birthed a system in which the most talented college players
competed in college during their freshman seasons and then left to play professionally. Change
on that front will have to wait for action from the N.B.A. and its players’ union; it is not expected
before at least 2020.
Reference 4 - 1.26% Coverage
The accusations also raised anew the question of whether to allow some athletes to collect
compensation beyond a scholarship and an educational stipend.
Reference 5 - 1.86% Coverage
While Rice’s group, and Rice personally, suggested such fundamental reform made sense, it
declined to make any suggestions in this area, citing pending antitrust cases targeting the
N.C.A.A.’s restrictions on compensation.
Files\\SI1 - Commission on College Basketball Recommends End to One-and-Done, Increased
NCAA Penalties - § 1 reference coded [ 1.67% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.67% Coverage
The group was tasked with reforming rules, including looking at the NCAA’s relationship with
the NBA.
Files\\SI2 - NCAA Announces Undrafted Players May Return To School, Relaxed Agent
Rules - § 3 references coded [ 4.96% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.53% Coverage
The NCAA clarified that this rule would only apply after the NBA and NBPA begin allowing
players to be drafted out of high school, meaning 2021 at the earliest.
Reference 2 - 2.44% Coverage
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USA Basketball has not had any substantive conversations with the NCAA or given their
approval for these changes yet, ESPN’s Jonathan Givony reports. It is unclear how this decision
will impact high school players who are not USA Basketball eligible.
Reference 3 - 0.98% Coverage
The new policies were put in place to prevent further corruption and dissuade future rulebreakers.
Files\\SI3 - A Bust, and No Boom - One Year After the College Hoops Scandal Broke, What’s
Truly Changed~ - § 10 references coded [ 19.69% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.11% Coverage
Many expected Arizona coach Sean Miller to be dismissed after a February ESPN report alleged
that he had been recorded in 2016 discussing a payment for forward Deandre Ayton, but Miller’s
contract was merely amended to dock him $1 million if he is criminally charged.
Reference 2 - 1.33% Coverage
Yet changes to the system that birthed all of this—one that can turn paying a teenager to play
basketball into a potential federal crime—have been merely incremental.
Reference 3 - 2.12% Coverage
But those eligible for this benefit are limited to 1) incoming freshmen who have been designated
“elite senior prospects” by USA Basketball and 2) underclassmen who declare for the draft and
get invited to the NBA’s combine but are not selected, which rarely happens.
Reference 4 - 2.34% Coverage
In the process, the NCAA excluded those not ticketed for the NBA but who want to gauge pro
opportunities overseas, as well as those not part of USA Basketball—a body reportedly rankled
by not having been consulted in the NCAA’s decision to bestow on it the power to determine
who is agent-eligible.
Reference 5 - 0.94% Coverage
And so we sit on the verge of a season with a game largely unchanged from the one that was
supposedly imploding a year ago.
Reference 6 - 2.75% Coverage
Still unaddressed are the core economic realities and motivations fueling the black market, so
simple any student-athlete being compensated with Economics 101 credits could explain it: The
players have a value to schools, coaches, boosters, communities and shoe companies that is
drastically out of line with what they can receive in return.
Reference 7 - 1.38% Coverage
Perhaps each of these changes is just a step in the inevitable march toward larger reform—a
continuation of the past decade’s gradual easing of various arcane restrictions.
Reference 8 - 2.13% Coverage
Alston and Hartman contend that the NCAA’s capping of scholarship value is equivalent to
suppressing market competition. There is a chance the outcome in this case will have more direct
and wide-ranging results than the headline-grabbing results from the FBI sting.
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Reference 9 - 2.45% Coverage
As much as the NCAA has lobbied for the NBA to abolish its age minimum of 19 for draft
eligibility, the change would likely have less effect on illicit payments than many hope: The
suitors for elite high school prospects would then include the NBA, increasing colleges’ needs to
offer financial benefits as well.
Reference 10 - 2.15% Coverage
Of course, it is worth keeping in mind that a year ago there was no inkling that college basketball
was on the brink of significant change. We may soon learn we’re not so much a year past one
bombshell than a short time away from another. Maybe that will be the true wake-up call.
Files\\SI4 - Despite the Judge’s View, the College Hoops Trial Was Always About the
NCAA’s Archaic Rules - § 13 references coded [ 22.92% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.82% Coverage
Time and time again Kaplan made clear that the case’s central question was not whether the
individuals standing trial had violated these regulations, but if they had undertaken criminal
actions in doing so and hiding it from the colleges these recruits planned to attend.
Reference 2 - 0.52% Coverage
It is important not to lose sight of this scene’s root cause: the NCAA’s rules.
Reference 3 - 1.90% Coverage
The defendants then schemed to shield these transactions from university compliance offices and
NCAA overseers— which the government contended amounted to defrauding these schools of
their ability to award athletic scholarships to players who would be eligible under the NCAA’s
Reference 4 - 0.79% Coverage
Which is why, regardless of Kaplan’s instructions to the jury, this case was indeed about the
NCAA rulebook all along.
Reference 5 - 1.38% Coverage
That standard has yet again been shown to be completely detached from the realities of a market
that the NCAA and its member institutions are otherwise gladly willing to let freely seep into
their every pore.
Reference 6 - 1.25% Coverage
Blaming rules for rule-breaking is often seen as a bad-faith tactic for absolving blame, and
understandably so. But in this case it is the rules themselves that have been made in bad faith.
Reference 7 - 1.40% Coverage
Seven-figure coaching salaries, nine-figure apparel sponsorships, 11-figure TV deals—for
decades the college sports industrial complex has continually and exponentially engorged itself
at every turn.
Reference 8 - 1.58% Coverage
Still as the size of its financial pie has been stretched and stretched, it has steadfastly fought to
deny anything more than a scholarship-and-stipend-sized slice to the labor that performs its
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essential product by playing the games.
Reference 9 - 0.92% Coverage
Yet the NCAA’s rules force the market for these players’ services into the shadows—the place
where the defendants and their ilk operate.
Reference 10 - 3.82% Coverage
The trial’s illumination of this marketplace was as unseemly as it was telling, with testimony
referencing shady invoices, deceitful cover stories and clandestine “Bat phones.” Still, it was not
a complete reveal, as the defense’s attempts to admit evidence of similar dealmaking beyond the
charges —in order to portray their clients as simply players of a dirty game in which the
university’s basketball coaches were knowing participants—were denied by Judge Kaplan,
pointing jurors toward evaluating the defendants in isolation instead of their larger context.
Reference 11 - 3.66% Coverage
These denials may set the stage for the defense’s case in appeals court, where it could find more
sympathetic ears. But in the meantime three men face potential prison time because they
included players and their families into the mutually beneficial financial relationship enjoyed by
the schools and companies that relies on said players’ talents— and the body in charge of the
sport decided it cannot stand as much, elevating what otherwise seems like natural market forces
into something the government could convince a jury is a federal crime.
Reference 12 - 1.75% Coverage
Beyond the courtroom’s walls, the prosecution’s contention that the universities were the victims
of a scheme by those convicted can be a harder sell; do not hold your breath waiting for these
schools to take action against their apparel-company benefactors.
Reference 13 - 2.15% Coverage
In their minds this trial, which was ostensibly not about NCAA rules, had sufficiently proven the
defendants’ guilt. To those not bound by the confines of a judge’s instructions and a trial’s scope,
a truer blame lay elsewhere, in the very rules whose violation were this crime’s original sin—and
constitute the NCAA’s too
Files\\SI5 - Why the Prosecution Won in the College Hoops Corruption Trial and What’s Next
- § 4 references coded [ 5.65% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.92% Coverage
In a decisive victory for federal prosecutors and a frightening warning to those involved in the
payment of college recruits, a New York jury has convicted Adidas director of global marketing
James Gatto, Adidas consultant basketball organizer Merl Code and client recruiter (a.k.a.
runner) Christian Dawkins of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud charges. U.S.
District Judge Lewis Kaplan will sentence the defendants on March 5, 2019. While a presentencing report will influence Judge Kaplan in determining appropriate prison sentences, it’s
expected that the three men will likely be sentenced to somewhere between two to five years in
prison.
Reference 2 - 0.74% Coverage
This deduction may seem illogical since those universities enrolled players who would helped
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their basketball programs win games and generate accompanying revenue.
Reference 3 - 1.52% Coverage
This is why Wednesday’s convictions should worry anyone in college basketball who has
partaken in NCAA-violating payments to recruits and who are in any way connected to those
still facing trial: their names and wrongdoing could soon become bargaining chips in plea deals.
The government’s net of basketball corruption, then, could grow wider.
Reference 4 - 0.48% Coverage
While the NCAA was not a party in this trial, its ability to enforce compliance of rules stands to
gain from it.
Files\\TDG1 - Drake Group Blames Outdated NCAA Amateur Status Rules for Criminalizing
Outside Athlete Compensation - § 5 references coded [ 15.62% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.60% Coverage
Following the announcement of FBI indictments for under-the-table athlete payments, B. David
Ridpath, President of The Drake Group, issued the following statement highly critical of the
NCAA and its member institutions:
Reference 2 - 1.72% Coverage
However, the media and the public are missing the larger point. The NCAA and its member
institutions have virtually forced the commission of these crimes by imposing compensation
restrictions on athletes under the guise of “amateur status.”
Reference 3 - 2.94% Coverage
Institutions of higher education have used this deﬁnition of “amateur” combined with rules that
keep young athletes captive (such as onerous transfer restrictions) and the selﬁsh motives of
professional sports leagues that do not have to fund minor leagues in football and basketball to
unreasonably limit the compensation that can be earned by collegiate athletes under the rubric of
“athletic scholarship.”
Reference 4 - 2.74% Coverage
Amateur” is nothing more than an NCAA overly broad mechanism that allows multi-milliondollar coaches and extraordinarily well-compensated athletic directors to earn lavish salaries and
perks while institutions of higher education receive tax deductible donations from exploiting the
value of collegiate athletes they refuse to allow the same earning rights as other students.
Reference 5 - 6.62% Coverage
In other words, there are simple changes for the association to make that positions the athlete as a
student rather than an employee. The inability to separate the two has largely driven this
underground economy in college sports. While the NCAA also has the right to prohibit
professional athletes from participating in college sports, it shouldn’t have the right to prohibit
college athletes from working outside the university, contracting with an agent and using their
names, images and likenesses for private gain as long as the athlete does not use of the name or
afﬁliation with the institution. Athletes should be allowed to earn whatever the marketplace
dictates from endorsements (including the use of shoes, gloves or other items of personal sports
equipment), modeling, conducting a sports camp business or giving sports lessons to others as
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long as the athlete does not enter into a contract to play professional sports.
Files\\TDG2 - The Drake Group Finds that the Independent Commission on College
Basketball Missed an Opportunity to Recommend Comprehensive Reform - § 11 references
coded [ 16.88% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
The Drake Group (TDG), whose mission is to defend academic integrity in higher education
from the corrosive aspects of commercialized college sports, found, in response to the recently
released report by the Independent Commission on College Basketball chaired by Dr.
Condoleezza Rice, that the Commission got some things right, but missed the mark on several
key issues regarding reform in college sports.
Reference 2 - 2.19% Coverage
TDG strongly believes that elite development opportunities should exist outside of
intercollegiate athletics and that professional leagues have an
obligation not to impede that effort. Should athletes be good enough to go professional, they
should be allowed to do so at a time that is best for them. Also, if athletes want to attend college
they should be allowed to do that for as long or short a time as they desire just as other nonathlete students have such options.
Reference 3 - 1.25% Coverage
For example, current Drake Group president B. David Ridpath recommended these independent
investigator/adjudicator changes to a congressional subcommittee in 2004 and TDG released a
position paper on this very topic outlining exactly how these changes could be
Reference 4 - 0.56% Coverage
We urge the NCAA to immediately adopt an independent form of enforcement and infractions
for serious rules violations.
Reference 5 - 0.96% Coverage
Other positives of the Commission report include requiring the certiﬁcation of agents and
reforming the sordid world of non-scholastic youth basketball. However, the Commission has
not gone far enough.
Reference 6 - 1.26% Coverage
TDG also believes for any substantive college sports reform in the educational context any
oversight body should have faculty representation. That did not exist on this Commission and we
consider that a signiﬁcant, but hopefully not purposeful, omission by the NCAA.
Reference 7 - 2.06% Coverage
The biggest miss was the Commission’s failure to make a recommendation on allowing athletes
to earn money outside their participation in intercollegiate athletics via being allowed to market
their own names, images and likenesses
(NILs) and how such freedom might address some of the corruption and scandal at issue. The
Commission avoided this opportunity because it believed it needs ﬁrst the “legal parameters [to]
become clearer.”
Reference 8 - 1.16% Coverage
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Courts decide cases on speciﬁc, relatively narrow sets of facts. As a result, absent an overarching
Supreme Court decision, which is by no means assured, a clear judicial resolution of the athletic
compensation issue could be a decade or more away.
Reference 9 - 0.70% Coverage
The NCAA needs to do its job which is to establish broad amateurism policy based on a
thoughtful analysis and
considering all stakeholder interests.
Reference 10 - 2.08% Coverage
Quizzically Dr. Rice, in her remarks accompanying the Report’s release, did not shy away from
discussing the NIL and compensation matter issues, saying that “for the life of me I don’t
understand
the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars–and what
can’t be allowed . . . .” She pointed out that most Commissioners believe that the NIL rules
should be taken up as soon as the legal
framework is established.
Reference 11 - 2.74% Coverage
Lastly, The Drake Group believes the Commission missed the opportunity to identify and
address other signiﬁcant
athlete beneﬁt problems. With few exceptions, athletes or their families must pay for their own
athletic injury insurance. There are no long-term medical guarantees except for catastrophic
injuries. It is this imbalance of who is actually
beneﬁtting from the athletics revenues largesse that produces public sympathy for even illegal
athlete compensation. It is this system that must be addressed and we believe the Commission
should continue its work to try to do so.
Files\\TDG3 - The Drake Group Questions NCAA Division I Basketball Rules Changes - § 12
references coded [ 24.20% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.45% Coverage
Despite its recent reforms to Division I basketball, the NCAA continues to react to events instead
of leading college athletics to a more educationally sound future. The changes it has made to
Division I basketball misled the public into thinking that the corruption recently unearthed in that
sport has been addressed. It hasn’t.
Reference 2 - 1.78% Coverage
In the Drake Group’s view, the NCAA’s lack of leadership is reﬂected in its failure to make rules
that promote athlete welfare and academic integrity. Instead, it uses a ﬂawed academic metric
(the Graduation Success Rate or GSR) designed to hide the underperformance of football and
basketball players and refuses to remedy the academic fraud that its member institutions commit
to keep athletes eligible.
Reference 3 - 1.92% Coverage
It also permits ﬁnancially wasteful special treatment for athletes – particularly lavish athletes’only facilities that isolate the athletes – to satisfy coaches’ insatiable appetite for a recruiting
advantage, while hoping to hide the costs from the public. Real leadership on these issues would
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put in place practices that enhance athletes’ educational experiences and protect them from
injury, abuse, and academic exploitation.
Reference 4 - 1.17% Coverage
Thus, the Drake Group believes that the present NCAA leadership is unwilling to clean out the
rot in commercialized college sport and fulﬁll its primary responsibility to ensure the welfare of
college athletes and protect the academic integrity of higher education.
Reference 5 - 2.04% Coverage
TDG Concern: No process has been deﬁned to determine “elite” status, which may invite
antitrust or equal protection litigation regarding an arbitrary evaluation and labeling system.
Athletes in all sports should be permitted to hire agents. It is reasonable for the NCAA to control
expense reimbursement by agents, but the NCAA must also control certiﬁcation of agents to
ensure that an agent does not represent both athletes and the coaches who are recruiting them.
Reference 6 - 1.87% Coverage
TDG Concern: All athletes should have the right to participate in a professional draft with no
penalty unless they actually accept an offer of employment. Athletes should not be considered
“professionals” and declared ineligible for college sport unless they sign a professional contract.
If an athlete is “selected” in the draft and then decides not to turn professional, the athlete should
remain eligible for college play.
Reference 7 - 1.47% Coverage
TDG Concern: How these institutional leaders will be held accountable is undeﬁned, except for
the suggestion that they may be ineligible to serve on the NCAA Board of Governors. The
NCAA refuses to use enforcement mechanisms that would be more effective, such as
ineligibility for national championships or suspension of membership.
Reference 8 - 3.19% Coverage
TDG Concern: All NCAA member institutions should be required to do so for all athletic
scholarship athletes, not just the so-called revenue sports. Basketball and football in particular
are currently exploiting underprepared college athletes, many of whom are athletes of color, by
waiving regular academic admission standards and compounding their academic difﬁculties by
imposing unreasonable sport time demands. The message sent by this rule is, “Don’t worry about
performing academically. We have your back if you want to return to school.” The Drake Group
believes this beneﬁt would be acceptable only if the athlete leaves in good academic standing
and if the beneﬁt were not limited to sports that generate revenues.
Reference 9 - 1.86% Coverage
TDG Concern: It is unclear how an athlete will prove that he or she has exhausted all other
funding options. There are numerous local, national and institutional scholarships available from
multiple sources for which these students might be able to qualify. It seems unlikely that the
NCAA will or could maintain a list of such sources that the athletes need to try in order to
determine whether the search has been “exhaustive”.
Reference 10 - 1.85% Coverage
Polite added, “The Drake Group is disappointed that the NCAA continues to ignore the athlete
employment issue, which was the primary underlying issue in the FBI investigation of the
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NCAA basketball debacle and which the Rice Commission Report also ignored. Athletes should
be allowed to earn money outside of school by exploiting their names, images, and likenesses
(NILs) just as any other student with a special talent.”
Reference 11 - 3.83% Coverage
Three fairly simple oversight rules previously proposed by The Drake Group could control
improprieties. The member institution should be required to review written terms of any NIL
agreement to ensure conformance with the following stipulations or conditions: (1) use does not
include the name, marks, institutional colors, or afﬁliation, implied or otherwise, of the student’s
institution or the use of institutional facilities or properties for such engagement; (2) the
institution’s employees or others engaged by the institution are not involved (i.e., identiﬁcation
of possible employment opportunities, introductions, etc.) in obtaining the employment; and (3)
the employer attests that the remuneration is commensurate with the going rate in that locality
for services and the athlete is paid only for work speciﬁcally described and actually performed.”
Reference 12 - 1.77% Coverage
Drake Group is particularly concerned that the NCAA continues to ignore its responsibility to
ﬁnd member institutions guilty of academic fraud committed for the purpose of maintaining
athlete eligibility. Expecting institutions to self-police in this area is unrealistic and a serious
dereliction of duty with regard to the basic responsibilities of a national athletic governance
organization.”
Files\\TKC1 - Knight Commission Sees Integrity of College Sports at Risk - § 7 references
coded [ 14.80% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.58% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics said today that recent college sports
scandals have threatened not only the integrity of intercollegiate athletics but raised basic
questions about the NCAA’s ability to prevent abuses, protect the rights of athletes, and clean up
corruption
Reference 2 - 1.49% Coverage
Federal bribery and fraud charges were brought last month against 10 men, including four
assistant coaches and an Adidas oﬃcial. The Commission believes that the basketball scandals
are symptomatic of broader, systemic problems in men’s Division I basketball and FBS football.
Reference 3 - 1.71% Coverage
NCAA enforcement and compliance tools and practices have consistently failed to uncover the
type of behaviors exposed in the federal investigation. Yet these alleged illegal acts have been
rumored for years, fostering a recruiting culture in Division I men’s basketball that too often
crosses the line into corruption.
Reference 4 - 1.92% Coverage
“The Commission is deeply troubled by mounting evidence that the NCAA is unable to ensure a
level of integrity that must be a priority in the education and treatment of college athletes,” said
Commission co-chair Arne Duncan, former U.S. Secretary of Education, “These threats to the
integrity of college sports are an urgent call to reform, if ever there was one.”
Reference 5 - 2.63% Coverage
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The Commission meeting highlighted several broad areas of Division I basketball in need of
farreaching reform: Exploitation of college athletes by shoe companies and agents; the largely
unregulated structure of non-scholastic youth basketball and its recruiting culture; and changes to
the NCAA’s compliance and enforcement powers. Among other changes the Knight
Commission will explore are expanding the range of practices and tools for NCAA
investigations, including subpoena power.
Reference 6 - 2.65% Coverage
The Commission commended the NCAA for creating an independent Commission on College
Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former Stanford University provost and U.S.
Secretary of State. The Knight Commission, which has a long history of providing
recommendations that have improved the integrity of college sports, will seek to meet with the
basketball commission to outline reforms to protect the educational mission of college sports and
reduce the exploitation of student athletes.
Reference 7 - 2.81% Coverage
The Commission plans to continue its exploration of other reform ideas – including how a
limited antitrust exemption for the NCAA, with restrictions, might address current problems, and
whether ﬁnancial beneﬁts could be provided to players for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses. These issues have been studied and discussed in prior Commission meetings, such as
those in May 2015 and May 2016. The Commission will also be studying and monitoring
reforms to improve the integrity and fairness of the transfer process.
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 7 references coded [ 26.68% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.74% Coverage
Early efforts called on presidents themselves to govern college sports with tougher academic
standards that ultimately helped lead to improved graduation success for athletes.
Reference 2 - 5.63% Coverage
Over the past decade, several recommendations to align financial and athletic incentives with
educational values and to treat athletes like students helped propel the following policy changes:
Requiring teams to be on track to graduate at least 50 percent of their players to be eligible for
March Madness and other postseason championships and bowl games; adding substantial
academic incentives in the NCAA’s revenue distribution plan (and decreasing the amounts
awarded for success in the men’s basketball tournament); and reducing athletics time demands
on college athletes.
Reference 3 - 3.13% Coverage
Collectively, these reforms made significant improvements to Division I intercollegiate athletics
by placing greater value on the “college” in college sports. However, further change still is
needed and men’s college basketball, in particular, needs a far more radical overhaul than what
has taken place in recent years.
Reference 4 - 2.05% Coverage
Unfortunately, in the past, change and improvements have taken years to accomplish. We think
the ground is more fertile now for far-reaching reforms that the Commission on College
Basketball may be considering.
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Reference 5 - 2.66% Coverage
Like the Commission on College Basketball, our group recognizes that basketball-specific
changes should move forward in coming months. In response to your request for additional
input, we offer two broad suggestions on NCAA governance and the responsibilities of coaches.
Reference 6 - 6.17% Coverage
First, the Knight Commission has recommended that independent directors be added to the
NCAA governing boards. This recommendation was initially made, but not accepted, when the
NCAA restructured in 2013. We think at least one of these independent directors should be a
former men’s basketball player, given the role that March Madness plays in funding the NCAA
and its member conferences and institutions, and in holding the NCAA together. There could be
another spot among the independent directors for a former female athlete in any sport. Other
independent directors could be experts in fields like athlete health, safety and wellness.
Reference 7 - 5.30% Coverage
A few coaches’ associations have implemented successful programs for coaches to achieve
various levels of coaching licenses but the associations for men’s basketball and football have
not. It is telling, we think, that the only competency or training requirement for any NCAA
Division I coach is passing an open-book NCAA recruiting rules test. Some institutions and
conferences are doing more in this area than others, but college sports would be helped with
incentives or requirements that place a greater emphasis on coaches’ roles as educators.
Files\\TKC3 - Statements in Response to the Report by the Commission on College Basketball
- § 2 references coded [ 10.83% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.64% Coverage
“We are pleased to see the Rice Commission endorse a longstanding goal of the Knight
Commission, to add independent directors to the NCAA governing board. The addition of at
least ﬁve independent public members to the NCAA Board of Governors will improve
governance for all of college sports, not just college basketball.”
Reference 2 - 5.19% Coverage
“We still don’t know yet that the NCAA is capable of truly protecting and supporting the
education, health, safety, and well-being of student-athletes — and big challenges to the integrity
of college basketball persist. We look forward to addressing these challenges at our meeting next
month.”
Files\\TKC4 - Knight Commission Urges Tougher NCAA Reforms to Regain Public
Confidence in College Sports - § 14 references coded [ 12.10% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.79% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics today urged university presidents to seize a
rare moment of opportunity to reform not only men’s basketball but the NCAA organization
itself to restore public faith in the governing body’s ability to oversee major revenue-producing
college sports.
Reference 2 - 0.52% Coverage
question if the NCAA can restore public conﬁdence in its ability to be stewards of bigmoney

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

364

college sports. To do so, it will need to embrace far more sweeping and deep-seated reform than
ever before.”
Reference 3 - 0.95% Coverage
The Knight Commission called on the NCAA to make additional far-ranging changes to its
governance beyond those recommended by the Commission on College Basketball, and to enact
a series of strict requirements on college basketball coaches and their schools to bolster ﬁnancial
transparency, particularly for income received from shoe and apparel companies.
Reference 4 - 1.04% Coverage
The Knight Commission suggested the NCAA shift its model from a membership association,
with inherent conﬂicts of interest, to being more of a leadership organization capable of
propelling real change. That shift requires more independent leadership of the NCAA, including
independent directors who can play an objective role in safeguarding college athletics, especially
for revenue sports.
Reference 5 - 1.23% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball, led by Condoleezza Rice, adopted a longstanding
recommendation of the Knight Commission to add independent directors to the NCAA Board of
Governors, the organization’s highest-ranking governing body. The Knight Commission also
urged that the NCAA add at least six independent members to the Division I Board of Directors,
because that board controls policies that shape the richest and most powerful college sports
programs.
Reference 6 - 1.01% Coverage
As a matter of principle, the Knight Commission recommended that independent directors
should ultimately comprise majorities of both boards. Similarly, to underscore the importance of
impartial oversight, the Commission expressed its support for Rice Commission
recommendations to provide for an independent infractions and enforcement process in cases of
serious violations.
Reference 7 - 0.36% Coverage
“We urge university presidents to adopt the complementary reforms we are advancing as part of
a more comprehensive package of measures,”
Reference 8 - 0.61% Coverage
Governance. As a ﬁrst step, add at least six independent directors to the 24-member Division I
Board of Directors, now comprised solely of institutional representatives, with an ultimate goal
of a majority of independent directors.
Reference 9 - 0.69% Coverage
Integrity and Financial Transparency. Adopt new and more stringent approvals, terms of
conditions, and ﬁnancial disclosures for income that NCAA institutions and their employees —
particularly coaches — receive from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies.
Reference 10 - 0.52% Coverage
The Rice Commission adopted a longstanding recommendation of the Knight Commission to
add independent directors to the NCAA Board of Governors, the organization’s highestranking

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

365

governing body.
Reference 11 - 1.49% Coverage
“Adding independent directors will improve governance for all of college sports, not just college
basketball,” said Knight Commission co-chair Carol Cartwright. “As we ﬁrst suggested in 2013,
we also want to see independent directors added to the NCAA Division I Board of Directors. In
the long run, we’d like to see independent directors comprise a majority of both boards. Too
often, board members are expected to represent their conferences’ competitive and ﬁnancial
interests ﬁrst, instead of what may be best for student-athletes and college sports as a whole.”
Reference 12 - 0.72% Coverage
No university can give the right to any employee to have a contract with shoe, equipment, and
apparel companies that are expressly or indirectly contingent on players wearing or using the
companies’ equipment or products. Such contracts must be made only with the university.
Reference 13 - 0.61% Coverage
Adopting new restrictions and imposing ﬁnancial disclosures on athletically-related outside
income received by employees, and making a failure to comply with these new requirements
subject to signiﬁcant infractions penalties.
Reference 14 - 1.56% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball concluded that “NCAA schools are not doing enough to
develop the next generation of coaches.” The Knight Commission agrees with that conclusion
and recommends the development of minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches must
meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles in the education and development of studentathletes. Such standards could require the completion of diﬀerent levels of coaching licenses or
professional certiﬁcates to redress the profession’s lax — and in some cases nonexistent —
certiﬁcation and licensure standards.
Files\\TKC5 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations - § 15 references coded [ 32.48%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.74% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics met on May 7, 2018 and proposed the
following recommendations for the NCAA to consider as complementary reforms to those
advanced by the Commission on College Basketball. The roster of Knight Commission members
involved in these deliberations is attached.
Reference 2 - 1.68% Coverage
In addition to adding at least five independent directors to the NCAA Board of Governors as
recommended by the Commission on College Basketball, add at least six independent members
to the NCAA Division I Board of Directors, and move towards making independent appointees
the majority on both boards.
Reference 3 - 1.50% Coverage
We believe the NCAA can only fulfill its responsibility to administer this “public trust,” if its
governing board and the Division I Board of Directors are controlled by a majority of
independent appointees, much as is the case with many corporate and nonprofit boards.
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Reference 4 - 1.24% Coverage
The Knight Commission also urges the NCAA to add at least six independent members to the
Division I Board of Directors, because that board controls policies that shape the richest and
most powerful college sports programs.
Reference 5 - 0.63% Coverage
As a matter of guiding principle, independent directors should ultimately comprise majorities of
both boards.
Reference 6 - 3.37% Coverage
This change will shift the NCAA’s governance model from solely being a membership
association, with inherent conflicts of interest, to being more of a leadership organization capable
of propelling real change. In the current model, board members are often expected to represent
their conferences’ competitive and financial interests first, instead of what may be best for
student-athletes and college sports as a whole. More independent leadership of the NCAA will
provide greater objectivity, unhindered by institutional self-interest, to better safeguard the
integrity of college athletics.
Reference 7 - 1.03% Coverage
Adopt new and more stringent approvals, terms of conditions, and financial disclosures for
income that institutions and coaches receive from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies.
Reference 8 - 1.53% Coverage
No university can give the right to any employee to have a contract with shoe, equipment, and
apparel companies that is expressly or indirectly contingent on players wearing or using the
companies’ equipment or products. Such contracts must be made only with the university.
Reference 9 - 2.25% Coverage
For any school where student-athletes are required or asked to wear or use apparel or equipment
displaying a company logo, mandate public disclosure of outside income that school employees,
including coaches, receive directly from the company or from the school with designated funds
from the company. This required public disclosure would extend to any private university that
competes in the NCAA.
Reference 10 - 3.99% Coverage
Reinstate the requirement for coaches and other administrators to receive approval from the
university CEO to receive any athletically-related outside income (e.g., income from shoe,
equipment and apparel companies). Further, strengthen this requirement by specifying that the
amount of income approved must be given in writing and prior to the receipt of such income.
[Note: This requirement would bring back and strengthen a requirement first adopted in 1992 at
the Knight Commission’s urging but rescinded in 2016.] In addition, university presidents should
be required to annually report to their governing boards the amounts and sources of athleticallyrelated outside income received by employees.
Reference 11 - 0.70% Coverage
Require the reporting of all athleticallyrelated outside income for coaches and administrators in
NCAA financial reports.
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Reference 12 - 2.73% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new financial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
affiliated with the NCAA.
Reference 13 - 2.32% Coverage
Develop minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches will be required to meet to ensure
they are prepared for their roles as educators and leaders in the development of student-athletes.
Such standards could require the completion of different levels of coaching licenses or
professional certificates to redress the profession’s lax—and in some cases nonexistent—
certification and licensure standards.
Reference 14 - 4.38% Coverage
Concerning basketball, USA Basketball currently provides a coaching certification program for
youth basketball coaches. Coaches of youth teams playing in NCAA-certified basketball events
for recruiting purposes are required to have a USA Basketball coaching license, which requires a
background check and completion of a “SafeSport” course. More than 23,000 youth basketball
coaches were certified by USA Basketball last year and 19,000 of those certifications were
connected to coaches who completed the certification to have their teams play in NCAAcertified events. While USA Basketball has a similar requirement for the 10 or so college
coaches annually who coach their national teams, the NCAA does not require any minimal
standard for coaches of NCAA basketball teams
Reference 15 - 3.41% Coverage
The Knight Commission is concerned about the implications of the National Association of
Basketball Coaches’ proposal to allow non-coaching personnel, such as basketball video
analysts, to engage in coaching activities. While the Knight Commission supports professional
development efforts, it cautions against any changes that will lead to further proliferation of
coaching staff members and the inability to enforce reasonable personnel limits. The ratio of
money spent on coaching and noncoaching personnel, compared to other program areas and
student-athlete support, is already badly skewed.
Files\\TKC6 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations Cover Letter - § 3 references coded [
22.94% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 8.56% Coverage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics met on May 7, 2018 to consider the
Commission on College Basketball report and related issues. At the conclusion of our meeting,
we shared a series of recommendations that in a number of instances go beyond those proposed
by the Commission on College Basketball. The attached document provides additional
information.
Reference 2 - 8.31% Coverage
Governance. In addition to adopting the Commission on College Basketball proposal to add at
least five independent members to the NCAA Board of Governors, we recommend adding at
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least six independent directors to the Division I Board of Directors. As a matter of guiding
principle, independent directors should ultimately comprise majorities of both boards.
Reference 3 - 6.07% Coverage
Integrity and Financial Transparency. Adopt new and more stringent approvals, terms of
conditions, and financial disclosures for income that NCAA institutions and their employees—
particularly coaches—receive from shoe, equipment, and apparel companies.
Files\\WP1 - After another NCAA basketball scandal, let’s be honest - This is how college
sports works - § 6 references coded [ 17.42% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 3.00% Coverage
But we have to understand, by now, that this is how college sports works. If you are a fan of a
certain program, and you read these reports and scanned for violations by your precious Lions or
Tigers or Bears, and — finding none — breathed a sigh of relief or, worse, felt the least bit
sanctimonious, well, then, you’re in denial, and not a small bit of it.
Reference 2 - 2.43% Coverage
Yet outright shock here? Really, there can’t be. The coaches arrested weren’t the head coaches at
those programs, not Auburn’s Bruce Pearl or Arizona’s Sean Miller, not USC’s Andy Enfield or
Oklahoma State’s Mike Boynton — or, the biggest among them all, Rick Pitino of Louisville
Reference 3 - 1.85% Coverage
Yet whatever the feds announced Tuesday, Pitino won’t be on the Cardinals’ sideline for the first
five games of the ACC season. Suspended, he is, for this previous isolated incident about which
he had no knowledge.
Reference 4 - 4.27% Coverage
The four assistant coaches arrested aren’t victims, for sure, because they surely knew what they
were doing was against rules, if not laws. But they are part of a machine that is powered by the
basic structure of college sports. When a system has billions of dollars flowing into it — and the
NCAA’s contract with CBS and Turner Sports for the NCAA tournament alone is worth $8.8
billion through 2032 — and yet has a major part of the workforce that is unpaid, well, then, how
is this not the end result?
Reference 5 - 2.42% Coverage
There’s so much money involved, someone’s going to get it. And unless and until players
receive some sort of compensation that’s commensurate with their value to the school, there is
going to be corruption. Sometimes it will violate NCAA rules. Sometimes it will violate the law.
Reference 6 - 3.44% Coverage
Either way, given the current structure of college sports, we’re only minutes away from the next
violation — whether it’s exposed or not. There is drama on Tuesday, for sure, and the more
details we learn, the more damning it will feel to those individual coaches, to those individual
programs. And yet, we know — despite the inevitable upcoming denials from all sorts of sources
— it’s not just them.
Files\\WP2 - College basketball commission calls for rules changes, but sticks with
amateurism - § 5 references coded [ 5.67% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 0.81% Coverage
But the panel did not recommend that athletes be paid, staunchly affirming the values of
amateurism and
an education for the 98.8 percent of college basketball players who do not go on to NBA careers.
Reference 2 - 2.10% Coverage
The relationship between shoe companies and college basketball has long bedeviled NCAA and
college officials. In their quests to gain advantages on signing NBA prospects, Nike, Adidas and
Under Armour all sponsor extensive grass-roots leagues for teenagers across the country. And
observers of the game have wondered whether there is a quid-pro-quo in cases in which Nike’s
grass-roots stars sign with Nikesponsored college teams and top Adidas grass-roots stars sign
with Adidas-sponsored college teams.
Reference 3 - 0.36% Coverage
But the panel consistently rejected remedies that would “professionalize” the sport.
Reference 4 - 1.59% Coverage
But he was disappointed that the report didn’t tackle college basketball’s commercialization head
on. College basketball is a multibillion dollar industry in which coaches and schools make
millions from shoe companies, Bilas noted, but paying players — or providing them anything
more than a cost-of-living stipend and chance at an education — is cast by the report as “morally
wrong.”
Reference 5 - 0.80% Coverage
While Emmert and the NCAA lauded the commission’s work, the National College Players
Association — a nonprofit that represents the interests of college athletes — panned the results
as a failure
Files\\WP3 - Breaking down the NCAA basketball report - The key word is
‘recommendations’ - § 11 references coded [ 21.46% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.91% Coverage
It’s important to remember that the commission’s recommendations are just that:
recommendations of an independent group. When and how any rule changes will be adopted or
implemented is up to the NCAA member schools. As the report read, “the NCAA is not really
Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions.” For the NCAA to implement any
change, even those it can control, its member schools have to be on board.
Reference 2 - 0.98% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? No. That’s up to the NBA and its players’ union, which require that
players be at least 19 years old or at least one year removed from the graduation of their high
school class before entering the draft.
Reference 3 - 1.50% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, with a caveat. Under current NCAA rules, there are multiple ways
players could lose their eligibility when entering the NBA draft, the most common of which is by
hiring an agent. Rice’s commission recommended the NCAA lets players who enter the draft but
are not drafted change their minds and go back to school.
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Reference 4 - 2.28% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, with some help. The idea behind this recommendation is that high
school and college players seeking professional advice — including whether to declare for the
draft — often do so illicitly because NCAA rules don’t allow players to openly speak with paid
advisers. Rice’s commission recommended the NCAA appoint a vice president-level executive
to develop standards for certifying agents, and to administer a program that enforces rules for
contact between agents and players.
Reference 5 - 1.81% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, if its members are willing to share a bigger portion of their
revenue. Under current rules, NCAA member schools can decided on their own whether to
provide degree-completion programs. Rice’s commission recommended making the programs
mandatory, perhaps using revenue from the NCAA basketball tournaments to help fun such
programs at “relatively disadvantaged schools.”
Reference 6 - 2.41% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, but it will take big changes. The commission concluded that “the
NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are inadequate to effectively investigate and
address serious violations of NCAA rules in consequential situations” and called for “a complete
overhaul” of how infractions are handled. It recommended the creation of independent bodies to
investigate and impose punishment on member schools to commit violations, and that penalties
be given for schools that do not cooperate with investigator.
Reference 7 - 2.30% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes. The commission recommended that in the case of Level I
violations, which are the most serious, member schools could be subjected to a five-year
postseason ban. It also recommended that financial penalties for Level I violations allow for loss
of revenue sharing in postseason play — including the NCAA tournament — for the duration of
the ban.
Of course, the NCAA has come under criticism in many instances for failing to make full use of
its power under current rules to punish violators.
Reference 8 - 2.76% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Definitely not on its own. The commission made three
recommendations meant to clean up college recruiting: certifying non-scholastic basketball
events attended by coaches of its member schools (for example, summer AAU tournaments);
calling for increased financial transparency from the apparel companies, who in addition to
sponsoring AAU tournaments and teams and have extensive relationships with colleges and
individual coaches; and finally, suggesting the NCAA administer its own youth basketball
programs and recruiting events, with support from the NBA and USA Basketball.
Reference 9 - 1.96% Coverage
Those recommendations would require the cooperation of USA Basketball, the NBA, NBPA and
WNBA, as well as apparel companies such as Nike, Under Armour and Adidas. The NCAA
would also have to coordinate with tournament owners, event operators and sponsors to keep
these events above board. The hurdle, of course, is that the NCAA holds no power over any of
those bodies, and it’s unclear what incentive they would have to work with the NCAA.
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Reference 10 - 1.30% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes, since coaches are employees of member schools. The commission
recommended a few things here, including allowing coaches to attend two weeks of scholasticsponsored events in June and three weekends of NCAA-sponsored events (once they’re
established) in July.
Reference 11 - 2.24% Coverage
Can the NCAA do that? Yes. The current board of governors comprises 16 college presidents or
chancellors, the chairs of the Division I Council and the Division II and III Management
Councils, and the NCAA president. The commission argued that it is difficult for the members to
remain objective about decisions affecting the NCAA as a whole while representing their
college, conference or NCAA division, and thus public boardmembers would provide greater
objectivity and “fresh perspectives.”
Files\\WP4 - Whites oppose — and blacks support — paying NCAA athletes, especially when
they’re thinking about race - § 7 references coded [ 13.48% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.88% Coverage
Last Monday, Kylia Carter, the mother of former Duke basketball star Wendell Carter, gave a
passionate speech arguing that today’s college basketball system is equivalent to slavery. Carter
was reacting to the April 25 release of the Commission on College Basketball’s long-awaited
report on corruption in the NCAA. Created after bribery scandals involving highly prized
basketball recruits, the commission offered a host of recommendations, including imposing harsh
penalties on athletic programs that knowingly violate NCAA rules.
Reference 2 - 1.65% Coverage
Conspicuously absent, however, was any suggestion that college athletes should be paid a salary.
As former secretary of state and commission chair Condoleezza Rice explained, “Our focus has
been to strengthen the collegiate model — not to move toward one that brings aspects of
professionalism into the game.”
Reference 3 - 1.86% Coverage
That infuriated more people than Kylia Carter. “Pay for play,” as it’s called, is championed by an
increasingly vocal group of journalists, broadcasters, economists, former players and their
families. They argue that because the NCAA brings in billions of dollars in annual revenue from
college athletics, college athletes should receive a share.
Reference 4 - 2.29% Coverage
The NCAA has refused, claiming that “pay for play” will lead college sports fans to stay home
and tune out. NCAA President Mark Emmert argues that “one of the biggest reasons fans like
college sports is that they believe the athletes are really students who play for a love of the sport.
… To convert college sports into professional sports would [lead to a product that is not]
successful either for fan support or for the fan experience.”
Reference 5 - 1.73% Coverage
Why is opinion on this issue so polarized by race? Because a disproportionately large percentage
of college basketball and football players are African American. As with welfare, health care and
criminal justice reform, that means that, for most Americans, debates over NCAA compensation
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are implicitly debates about race.
Reference 6 - 0.97% Coverage
A number of recent commentators have tried to make this explicit, with arguments such as, “The
NCAA isn’t just perpetuating a financial injustice. It’s also committing a racial one.”
Reference 7 - 2.11% Coverage
But the findings are consistent with the large body of literature showing that group dynamics —
often characterized as “us vs. them” — strongly influence attitudes among racially resentful
whites and African Americans. If the debate about compensating college athletes continues to
implicitly and explicitly invoke race, our research suggests that the black-white divide is likely to
persist.
Files\\WP5 - College sports programs aren’t victims of fraud. They’re participants - § 12
references coded [ 29.05% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.91% Coverage
If federal prosecutors really want to clean up the muck in college basketball, then they should do
it right and bring a racketeering case against a major university. One that sweeps up the entire
operation: the big-donor trustee, the head coach, the athletic director, the college president and
any others who are complicit in a corrupt enterprise. But if the feds don’t care to target those
white collars for their fraudulent behavior, then they shouldn’t be bringing cases at all.
Reference 2 - 3.45% Coverage
That kind of prosecution would have real impact. Think about it: The next time a high-dollar
donor uses his influence to hijack a university and run it like a mafia town, when cash is
laundryfunneled to blue-chip recruits in order to grab at prestige and a bigger share of $1 billion
in NCAA tournament revenue, slap a RICO case on him. And on the chancellor and coach who
tolerate academic frauds, and the athletic director who makes the backscratching, multimilliondollar financial deal with a sneaker company. That would fix the NCAA with one fell swoop of
indictments.
Reference 3 - 2.19% Coverage
But what’s happening in a Manhattan courtroom at the moment is a weak inversion of justice.
Federal prosecutors for the Southern District of New York are aiming low, not high. They are
arguing a nonsensical case that claims major colleges are somehow the defrauded victims of the
elaborate black-market recruiting economy that the schools themselves created.
Reference 4 - 3.21% Coverage
Invoking organized crime is not a stretch here. U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan did it the
other day during the trial of Adidas executives Jim Gatto and Merl Code and aspiring agent
Christian Dawkins for wire fraud. Kaplan, quite rightly, forbade defense
attorneys from arguing their clients should be acquitted because “everyone is doing it.” Such
arguments don’t hold up in cases of insider trading or mafia cases, either, Kaplan pointed out.
“The guys in the Five Families are just doing their jobs, too, I suppose,” he said.
Reference 5 - 2.15% Coverage
A year ago, the feds boasted that this investigation, which included arrests of 10 minor figures,
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would roll up the corruption in college athletics. “We have your playbook,” FBI assistant
director William Sweeney Jr. boasted to all those engaging in corrupt practices.
But in fact, they don’t have the playbook at all. That, or they are hopelessly naive.
Reference 6 - 1.20% Coverage
If prosecutors want to bring a case in which they know conviction is difficult or uncertain, but
feel it’s important to fire a warning shot across the bow of wrongdoers, that’s fine. But make it
count.
Reference 7 - 1.07% Coverage
So far, the proceedings are a small, petty show trial that seem unlikely to deter the truly guilty
power brokers from proceeding with business as usual once the gavel comes down.
Reference 8 - 2.63% Coverage
Instead of headline-hunting, prosecutors could have charted the real structure of illegal activity.
Just as they do with any other racket, they would build a triangle. They’d start low and move
upward to indictments of the kingpins. That hasn’t happened here. On Monday, T.J. Gassnola,
the former Adidas bagman, continued his testimony, in which he has done a fine job of
undercutting the prosecutors’ case that schools are victims.
Reference 9 - 2.05% Coverage
What Gassnola is describing is a conspiracy. A racket.
And let’s be perfectly clear on who the real victims and perpetrators of it are. The real victims
are not school officials who lunged at huge financial arrangements with shoe companies and
boosters, then tried to isolate themselves from shady dealings with implausible deniability.
Reference 10 - 2.75% Coverage
The primary victims are those collegiate athletes who are being defrauded from the legitimate
educational value of their scholarship agreements, by the illicit financial forces that create
academic fraud, pressure them into unwanted lesser majors, make it harder to graduate and
corrode their collective reputations. Secondary victims are the 97 million viewers of the NCAA
tournament who expect a reasonably fair and transparent playing field.
Reference 11 - 2.58% Coverage
First of all, Rice averred, “Everybody knows.” The commission was told time and again that all
parties, from the top down, were aware of these financial arrangements. Rice also stated this:
“Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise; athletes play for their school and receive a
realistic chance to complete a college degree in return.” The continual violations of that trust and
the promise are the real crimes.
Reference 12 - 2.87% Coverage
The cases that the Southern District should be bringing, if any, are RICO cases against
universities. In RICO language, athletic
departments, shoe companies and high-dollar donors have had an “association in fact.” They
have operated as loosely joined enterprises, engaged in a common purpose with an underlying
pattern of fraud.
If prosecutors want to call recruiting schemes criminal, then roll up the whole networks. Go after
the Five Families of college athletics.
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Escalation of Commitment
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 2 references coded [ 6.72% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.83% Coverage
Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 2 - 4.89% Coverage
Creating the right relationship between the universities and colleges of the NCAA and its
national ofﬁce to promote transparency and accountability. The commission will be asked to
evaluate whether the appropriate degree of authority is vested in the current enforcement and
eligibility processes, and if the collaborative model provides the investigative tools, cultural
incentives and structures to ensure exploitation and corruption cannot hide in college sports.
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 25 references
coded [ 22.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.54% Coverage
The vast majority of people in college basketball – athletes, coaches, administrators and others play fair and do the right thing. We applaud them and hope that our recommendations can help to
level the playing field for those who do observe the rules.
Reference 2 - 0.96% Coverage
It has been a pleasure to work with the members of this Commission, and I want to thank each of
you for your fine service. I can tell you that the hours and hours of work and travel have been,
for all of us, a labor of love. Each and every one of us loves the game. We love the dedication
and the effort of the young men who play it. We marvel at their talents and skill – their
perseverance and their commitment. We believe in the educational value of college sports.
Reference 3 - 1.08% Coverage
The members of this commission come from a wide variety of backgrounds. Some among us
played the game at the highest levels; others coached or led programs; others come from the
realm of public service; and some of us are educators --- dedicated to teaching and learning as a
way of life. That is why it has been painful for us to hear the testimony from multiple
constituencies stating that the trust that is intercollegiate athletics in general – and college
basketball in particular – has often been violated.
Reference 4 - 0.49% Coverage
We start from the belief that a young man whose talents allow him to play college basketball can
benefit greatly from the experience. He has a chance to receive that prized possession in our
economy and our society – a college degree.
Reference 5 - 0.79% Coverage
Given that only 1.2% of college basketball players go on to play in the NBA and that the average
NBA career is 4.5 years – the college degree is the real ticket to financial security for most
student-athletes. For the exceptionally talented – a professional track may be the best choice –
and the choice is always there for those who are fortunate enough to succeed in the NBA.
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Reference 6 - 1.24% Coverage
But the uniqueness of the opportunity that college basketball offers should not be underestimated
or undervalued. One only has to think of the non-athlete whose family made tremendous
sacrifices to send him to college and who works 20 hours a week and takes on loans that will
need to be repaid over years and even decades in order to earn a college degree. The student
athlete who fully takes advantage of this privilege will get a head start in life. And the college or
university that truly provides that opportunity will fulfill its mission and its charge to educate and
empower.
Reference 7 - 0.72% Coverage
Our recommendations are detailed because the problems in college basketball are complex and
the resolution of them requires precise remedies. This Commission has worked hard to devise
these recommendations. You can be sure that we will continue to be involved as key regulatory
bodies undertake their work to implement these changes.
Reference 8 - 0.75% Coverage
The current sad state of college basketball did not appear overnight and it will not be repaired
quickly. We know that there are many who argue that the problems facing college basketball are
just too hard to solve. We strongly disagree. College basketball is too precious – and the fate of
the young men who play it is too important --to not get it right.
Reference 9 - 0.41% Coverage
This work will not be easy, but we need to make a start – and a bold one -- to turn the ship in the
right direction. For the good of all involved, we need to put the “college” back in college
basketball.
Reference 10 - 1.08% Coverage
First, we must separate the collegiate track from the professional track by ending oneand-done.
We call on the NBA and the NBPA, who exclusively have the power here, to once again make
18-year-olds eligible for the NBA draft so that high school players who are drafted may proceed
directly to the NBA. Should the NBA and NBPA decide not to do so – the Commission will
reconvene and consider other measures, including freshman ineligibility and/or the “lock-up” of
scholarships for a specified period of time.
Reference 11 - 0.65% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their professional prospects.
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should deprive studentathletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue in college while playing
basketball.
Reference 12 - 1.86% Coverage
I want to note that the Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s
and NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make studentathletes who
attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years. By requiring
students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their education, the
baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn degrees. However, it
would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against their will, where they
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will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the undermining of the collegiate
model. Players with professional earning power should be able to choose a professional path.
The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier for them to return and
complete their degrees.
Reference 13 - 0.89% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA and its member institutions develop strict standards for
certifying agents and allow only those NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at
an appropriate point in their high school careers as determined by the NCAA. The NCAA should
appoint a Vice-President level executive who, among other responsibilities, would develop these
standards and administer this program.
Reference 14 - 0.54% Coverage
We further recommend that the NCAA incentivize better behavior from agents by decertifying
any agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation and also deeming any student-athlete
who enters into an agreement with a non-certified agent ineligible.
Reference 15 - 0.23% Coverage
The Commission also believes in the provision of resources to make the promise of a college
education real.
Reference 16 - 1.19% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and commit to paying
for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave member
institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Many member institutions
already provide degree completion programs, but the NCAA rules should standardize this
offering, and the NCAA must provide the necessary funds to schools that cannot afford this. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 17 - 1.05% Coverage
I want to take a moment to address the issue of allowing student athletes to earn some financial
benefit from the marketing of their name, image, and likeness. I know this is an issue on the
minds of many, and the Commission thought long and hard about this. In the end, we respected
the fact that the legal ramifications of NCAA action on name, image, and likeness are currently
before the courts. We don’t believe that the NCAA can legislate in this area until the legal
parameters become clearer.
Reference 18 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
Reference 19 - 1.25% Coverage
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First, the NCAA should create independent investigative and adjudicative arms to address and
resolve complex and serious cases involving violation of NCAA rules. As of now, volunteers
who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions resolve these cases, and during our
Commission testimony not a single stakeholder supported the current system for handling highstakes infractions. Today’s current state where an entire community knows of significant rule
breaking and yet the governance body lacks the power or will to investigate and act breeds
cynicism and contempt.
Reference 20 - 1.50% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual accountability for
rules violations for coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents. We recommend that the
NCAA amend its rules to require colleges to include in the employment contracts of
administrators and coaches’ individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA
investigations, including financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA
enforcement proceedings, decisions and discipline – up to and including discharge. A failure to
cooperate should trigger penalties – up to and including a five-year ban on participation in the
tournament and loss of revenue.
Reference 21 - 0.71% Coverage
The NCAA must have jurisdiction to address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent that it
affects student-athletes’ eligibility. Member institutions can no longer be permitted to defend a
fraud or misconduct case on the ground that all students, not just athletes, were permitted to
“benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Reference 22 - 0.78% Coverage
The Commission recommends the NCAA take short and long-term actions to reform
nonscholastic basketball and disassociate itself and its member institutions from the aspects of
non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical behavior cannot be assured. We believe
non-scholastic basketball must be reformed by making its finances transparent.
Reference 23 - 0.68% Coverage
In the short term, we recommend the NCAA promptly adopt and enforce rigorous criteria for
certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches attend. To certify a nonscholastic
basketball event, the owners, event operators, sponsors and coaches for the event must agree to
financial transparency.
Reference 24 - 0.45% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that, with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to establish and administer
new youth basketball programs.
Reference 25 - 0.80% Coverage
When those institutions and those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and
norms in order to achieve on-court success, they alone are responsible. Too often, these
individuals hide behind “Indianapolis” when they are the ones most responsible for the degraded
state of intercollegiate athletics, in general, and college basketball in particular.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 83 references coded [ 14.94% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage
In brief, it is the overwhelming assessment of the Commission that the state of
men’s college basketball is deeply troubled. The levels of corruption and deception are now at a
point that they threaten the very survival of the college game as we know it. It has taken some
time to get here, and it will take time to change course.
Reference 2 - 0.03% Coverage
Of course, student-athletes must earn that degree to receive these benefits.
Reference 3 - 0.04% Coverage
Lost in the talk of big money and corruption is colleges’ central mission to provide higher
education to students.
Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage
There is debate about how to measure the graduation rate for college students, including studentathletes. There is, however, general agreement that the graduation rate for men’s Division I
basketball players lags behind that of other student-athletes, perhaps significantly.1
NCAA schools must take seriously
the obligation to help all student-athletes obtain the education they are promised.
Reference 5 - 0.13% Coverage
The Commission believes that the answer to many of college basketball’s
problems lies in a renewed commitment to the college degree as the centerpiece of intercollegiate
athletics. Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise: athletes play for their schools and
receive a realistic chance to complete a college degree in return. Any policy or action that
violates that trust is morally wrong.
Reference 6 - 0.05% Coverage
College basketball, like college sports generally, is to be played by studentathletes who are members of the collegiate community, not paid professionals.
Reference 7 - 0.16% Coverage
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement functions were designed for a simpler time, when
rule violations did not put so much at stake. As a result, the NCAA, as an enforcement entity, has
little credibility with the public and its members, and what it has continues to dwindle. There are
multiple cases of compromised academic standards and institutional integrity to keep the money
and talent flowing. The NCAA and its member institutions have been unable to adequately deter
or punish bad behavior.
Reference 8 - 0.10% Coverage
Given the undeniable impact of “big money” on the college game, it is fair to ask whether the
ideal of college basketball played by student-athletes who are part of the academic community –
not hired guns for a season or two – is still viable. The answer is yes, and the effort is worth
making. Transformative changes are necessary,
Reference 9 - 0.13% Coverage
The one-and-done regime may have provided some benefits for the NBA and the NCAA in the

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

379

past, but all stakeholders agree that the downsides now outweigh any benefits. One-and-done has
played a significant role in corrupting and destabilizing college basketball, restricting the
freedom of choice of players, and undermining the relationship of college basketball to the
mission of higher education.
Reference 10 - 0.13% Coverage
In that circumstance, the Commission will reconvene and consider the other tools at its disposal.
These could range from the baseball rule, to freshman ineligibility, to “locking up” scholarships
for three or four years if the recipient leaves the program for the NBA after a single year. That
would be a disincentive to recruit an athlete for a one-year run at the title. In short, the current
situation is untenable.
Reference 11 - 0.12% Coverage
A player chagrined to discover that he lacks an NBA future may grow into his collegiate
experience and adopt a different plan for the future. This change, along with several others
recommended, will demonstrate that the NCAA is serious about the value and importance of
college for student-athletes, and committed to helping them attend and work towards a degree.
Reference 12 - 0.11% Coverage
Players who transfer are less likely to complete their
Third parties often influence transfer decisions for their own purposes and without thought to the
impact of transfer on the student-athlete. The detrimental effect of transfer on a student-athlete’s
education means that transferring should not be made easier for basketball’s sake.
Reference 13 - 0.09% Coverage
Elite high school and college players need earlier professional advice, including
whether to declare for the draft or whether college basketball offers a superior pathway. If
NCAA rules do not allow them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 14 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA incentivize better behavior
from agents. This can be done through making clear the benefits of certification and the cost of
the loss of certification. An agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation must lose his or
her certification.
Reference 15 - 0.10% Coverage
A student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter into an
agreement, with a non-certified agent will lose his eligibility. In addition, the NCAA and the
NBPA should report to each other agents’ violations of their respective rules, increasing the
potential costs of violating NCAA rules.
Reference 16 - 0.15% Coverage
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic basketball, the
Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players about their professional
and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health and more. Student-athletes must
have the information they need to understand their real choices and be better positioned to take
advantage of either the collegiate or the professional path they choose.
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Reference 17 - 0.21% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial fund and
commit to paying for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who
leave member institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree. Colleges and
universities must fulfill their commitments to student-athletes to provide not just a venue for
athletic competition, but also an education. They must promise student-athletes that the option to
receive an education will be there, even after the athlete is finished with his athletic career. This
will be expensive, but it is necessary to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 18 - 0.11% Coverage
One significant counter to that argument is that many Division I student-athletes benefit
enormously from engaging in intercollegiate sports. In addition to receiving full scholarships up
to the cost of attendance (ranging from $13,392 to $71,585 for in-state students and from
$18,125$71,585 for out-of-state students depending on the institution),
Reference 19 - 0.15% Coverage
receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career advice and
more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars annually.10
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11
As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced Again, the Commission
agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to assist
student-athletes in earning their degrees.
Reference 20 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 21 - 0.05% Coverage
significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must receive an
education that is valuable, not a pretense.
Reference 22 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA create independent investigative
and adjudicative arms to address and resolve complex and serious cases (hereafter “complex
cases”) involving violations of NCAA rules.
Reference 23 - 0.12% Coverage
Stakeholders informed the Commission that when the stakes are high, colleges
are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles and NCAA
rules often are not enforced. Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations.
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Reference 24 - 0.14% Coverage
No stakeholder supported the current system for handling high-stakes infractions. Many
informed us that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that led to this
Commission, the reaction was that “everyone knows” that these payments occur. That state of
affairs – where the entire community knows of significant rule breaking and yet the governance
body lacks the power or will to investigate and act – breeds cynicism and contempt.
Reference 25 - 0.03% Coverage
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement processes require a complete overhaul.
Reference 26 - 0.15% Coverage
Complex cases must be thoroughly investigated, and resolved by neutral professional
adjudicators, with authority to impose punishment that will have a significant deterrent effect.
The investigative arm must be independent and empowered to require the cooperation of
witnesses and the production of documents, including financial information, from NCAA
member institutions and their employees and contractors, with significant penalties for noncooperation.
Reference 27 - 0.11% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA enact significant increases in the penalties
imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of NCAA rules. Currently, the rewards for
violating the rules far outweigh the risks. To reverse this calculation, the Commission
recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
Reference 28 - 0.21% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue
sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire period of the ban;
(iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv) increase the
penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than one season; and (v) increase the
penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans.
Reference 29 - 0.17% Coverage
In addition, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a coach or
athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA rules be subject to
significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program reoffends, up to and including a ban
of up to five years from post-season tournaments, including the NCAA tournament, and a loss of
revenues from those tournaments for that same period. There must be significant risk associated
with employing an individual who is under a show cause order.
Reference 30 - 0.08% Coverage
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they have conducted
due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA
Reference 31 - 0.26% Coverage
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Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
Reference 32 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 33 - 0.19% Coverage
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have educational
components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that requirement more
effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families, including travel, meals,
accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must be disclosed to the NCAA, along
with the source of their provision. The NCAA must enforce the requirement that such benefits be
reasonable and appropriate and assure that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying
the timing or providing the benefits to another.
Reference 34 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 35 - 0.45% Coverage
After the announcement of these charges, the NCAA’s President, Mark Emmert, stated that it is
“very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so
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quickly.” Statement from Pres. Mark Emmert, Oct. 11, 2017. He continued: “[w]hile I believe
the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the culture of silence in college basketball enables
bad actors, and we need them out of the game. We must take decisive action. This is not a time
for half-measures or incremental change.” As a first step, he announced that the NCAA Board of
Governors, the Division I Board of Directors and the NCAA President had established an
independent Commission on College Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. The
Commission was to “examin[e] critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working” and focus
on three areas:
•
The relationship between the NCAA national office, its members, their studentathletes and
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, nonscholastic basketball and athlete
agents and advisors.
•
The relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the challenging effect of the
NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one-and-done phenomenon in men’s college
basketball.
•
The creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and its national
office to promote transparency and accountability.
Reference 36 - 0.23% Coverage
The one-and-done phenomenon has provided some benefits to colleges and universities and to
elite high school basketball players. Schools achieve national notice and prominence with
athletic success and championships due to the presence of these players, with associated financial
and reputational benefits. As for players, many believe that they will have the opportunity to play
professional basketball if they can draw the attention of professional coaches and scouts. Playing
Division I men’s basketball allows players to make a name for themselves among professional
leagues and teams. Further, these players receive some of the educational and other benefits
associated with a year in college.
Reference 37 - 0.22% Coverage
In addition, elite high school players currently understand that in order to play Division I
basketball, they must meet the eligibility requirements to attend a Division I school. See NCAA
Division I Bylaw 14.3 (Freshman Academic Requirements). Because numerous players who will
not play professional basketball nonetheless believe that they will, these players gain the benefit
of educational levels and opportunities that they might otherwise have forgone. The Commission
takes these benefits seriously and, in particular, does not underestimate the transformative
possibilities in attaining academic eligibility for college or in spending a year or more in college.
Reference 38 - 0.10% Coverage
There appears to be a strong consensus that when the stakes are high – i.e.,
when violations are serious and the potential penalties are substantial – the NCAA’s member
institutions are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles
and NCAA rules are not being effectively enforced.
Reference 39 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
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stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 40 - 0.33% Coverage
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules
regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams qualify as
“amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years. Although there are
exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to receive compensation in any
form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a contract or commitment to play
professional athletics, to receive consideration from a professional sports organization, to
compete on a professional team and to enter into an agreement with an agent. In addition, a
student-athlete cannot receive preferential treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic
reputation or skill, unless specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws
12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or
Competition), 12.1.2 (Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
Reference 41 - 0.18% Coverage
Others recognize the validity of some of these points, but contend the studentathletes receive significant benefits from their college experiences, including the value of the
scholarship (the full cost of a college education), the associated training, coaching and benefits of
being on a collegiate team, and the lifelong incremental increase in earning power resulting from
a college degree. See ES Section 1.D. Many believe that paying players is not financially or
legally feasible and that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the collegiate game.
Reference 42 - 0.24% Coverage
Still others believe that the NCAA rules are so focused on pre-professional sports that the NCAA
has failed to create a system that makes sense for the majority of studentathletes who will not
make a living at their sports. Under these rules, stakeholders assert, student-athletes who accept
any “benefit,” no matter how small, risk losing their eligibility to compete. The NCAA’s
administration of the “no benefit” rule, see NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2 (Nonpermissible), was
criticized as penalizing student-athletes and preventing them from engaging in normal
interactions with friends and mentors. Those holding this view suggest that the NCAA should
engage in common sense calibration of the “no benefit” rule for particular contexts.
Reference 43 - 0.28% Coverage
Agents. NCAA rules further forbid collegiate athletes to enter into any agreement (oral or
written) with agents for purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial
gain, even if that agreement is limited to future representation. Prohibited marketing includes
negotiations with professional teams, seeking product endorsements and efforts to place an
athlete at a particular school. The rules likewise forbid family members or other representatives
to enter into such an agreement on behalf of an athlete. In addition, athletes may not accept
benefits from agents even if those benefits do not have strings visibly attached. NCAA Division I
Bylaws 12.3.1 (General Rule); 12.3.1.2 (Representation for Future Negotiations); 12.02.1
(Agent); 12.3.3 (Athletics Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1.3 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).18
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Reference 44 - 0.07% Coverage
It would be better, stakeholders argue, if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by
restricting contact to specific times and places.
Reference 45 - 0.34% Coverage
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to impose
harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents) who violate the
rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate with NCAA
investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the ability to impose loss
of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of revenue from post-season play
on those who commit serious infractions and those who decline to cooperate with NCAA
investigations. They believe that the availability – and utilization – of these penalties would get
presidential and board-level attention at colleges. These persons further note that administrators,
athletic directors and coaches who violate the rules often move on to other member institutions,
and do not pay a significant price for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the
institutions that hire individuals who have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking
the risk of hiring past offenders.
Reference 46 - 0.15% Coverage
A number of stakeholders expressed the view that one way to lessen the negative influence of
non-scholastic basketball event operators and coaches would be for the NCAA to administer its
own regional non-scholastic basketball camps in July and to restrict NCAA coaches to those
NCAA camps for July. Coaches would be able to see numerous elite high school players in one
location, in theory without the need for an advance blessing from a non-scholastic basketball
coach.
Reference 47 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 48 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling
their intercollegiate athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the
NCAA. NCAA Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s
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activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its members’
acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
Reference 49 - 0.11% Coverage
Eliminating one-and-done players from college basketball will remove the group
of most likely future professionals, and the associated potential for corrupt payments from
agents. Allowing collegiate players who become clear professional prospects to depart when they
choose to do so should similarly lessen the temptation to cheat while in college.
Reference 50 - 0.19% Coverage
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can also corrupt
the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special benefits to these
athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all students. Finally, the
matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short time primarily to play
Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain student-athletes will not, as a
practical matter, be college students.
Reference 51 - 0.20% Coverage
If the NBA and the NBPA were to adopt the “baseball rule,” we believe that the
challenges created by the presence of one-and-done players would simply migrate to older future
NBA players unhappily captive in their second and third collegiate years. Holding players with
NBA opportunities hostage also feeds the narrative of collegiate player exploitation, putting
pressure on the NCAA’s commitment to the collegiate model. Players with professional earning
power should have the freedom to choose a professional path. The Commission believes that
student-athletes should be encouraged but not forced to remain in college.
Reference 52 - 0.31% Coverage
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a season before
returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.1 (Residence
Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious disadvantages in
completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this issue, over the last few years,
hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is upward.22
Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be in a better
“basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover, third parties influence
many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best interests of the player in mind.
Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence requirement” of the transfer rule remain
in place, whatever other changes are made in the NCAA’s transfer rules.
Reference 53 - 0.20% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for the certification of agents, and authorize and make opportunities for those
certified agents to engage with student-athletes at school at specific times during the calendar
year. To implement this requirement, the NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

387

to develop detailed standards for NCAA certification and administer the program. The NCAA’s
program should also educate elite student-athletes at member institutions about NCAA eligibility
rules and requirements and professional prospects.
Reference 54 - 0.33% Coverage
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA rules
define as “agents”24
Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met or their employees. However, the
Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid, either
directly or indirectly.25
advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into agreements
with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought that this would
simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age. Instead, agents
recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with high school and collegiate
players and make their cases so that players would have all available options before they enter
the professional market. The Commission intends NCAA-certification to provide these
opportunities for “good” agents.
Reference 55 - 0.11% Coverage
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with agents,
sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA should bring these
conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their prospects with agents whom it
certifies under NCAA-approved standards.
Reference 56 - 0.12% Coverage
As described above, the Commission starts from the premise that students
who are athletes – not paid professionals – play college sports. It is worth noting that studentathletes choose the collegiate path, and we want to enhance their ability to decide whether to do
so. But they are making a choice; if it is not the right choice and a professional path is more
desirable, they should take it.
Reference 57 - 0.32% Coverage
Opponents of pay-for-play strongly believe that college basketball should remain a game played
by student-athletes that has unique value and appeal. They also strongly resist the argument that
student-athletes do not benefit from attending college and participating in intercollegiate
basketball. Their counter is simple. Student-athletes in fact benefit enormously. They receive full
scholarships up to the cost of attendance, see ES Section 1.D. Students with demonstrated
financial need are also eligible for Pell grants of $5,800 annually. Student-athletes often receive
benefits such as meals, special academic support, travel expenses, coaching, training and
nutritional advice, career guidance and more, worth tens of thousands of dollars annually.
Obviously, studentathletes who remain in school for four years receive four times this value,
along with the increased earning power of a college degree, which is roughly $1 million over a
lifetime. See ES Section 1.D.
Reference 58 - 0.28% Coverage
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One aspect of this debate is particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate. Paying modest
salaries to Division I basketball players will not address the particular corruption the
Commission confronts; nor will providing student-athletes a modest post-graduation trust fund
based on licensing of names, images and likenesses. None of the contemplated payments would
be sufficient to reduce the corrupt incentives of third parties who pay certain uniquely talented
players in the hope of latching onto their professional futures, of coaches and boosters seeking to
secure the success of their programs, or of colleges willing to undermine their education mission
to ensure the eligibility of players. One would have to adopt a full-scale professional model to
forestall that corruption or, as the Commission recommends, try instead to revitalize the college
model.
Reference 59 - 0.12% Coverage
The court stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is
a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
Reference 60 - 0.23% Coverage
But, in the current legal circumstances, the Commission decided to address the charge of
exploitation by providing individual student-athletes with access to professional opportunities,
and ensuring that the student portion of student-athlete is real. Specifically, the Commission
recommends allowing student-athletes with a professional pathway to make the choice to leave
college every year, creating resources so that they can make an informed choice whether to do
so, welcoming back student-athletes whom the NBA does not draft, making a serious financial
commitment to degree completion and severely punishing those who undermine the premise that
student-athletes must receive a valuable – not a sham – education.
Reference 61 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 62 - 0.44% Coverage
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes to cooperate in
NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can consider in assessing penalties. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The
NCAA also must adopt rules that require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate
with NCAA investigations, with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing
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significant consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically, to
participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents, administrators, and
coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including by providing documents
and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators. In addition, while the NCAA does not have
subpoena power, it can adopt rules requiring as a condition of membership, that member
institutions enter into contractual agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member
institutions contractually impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents,
administrators and coaches. NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report
and provide evidence of violations.
Reference 63 - 0.16% Coverage
The Commission recommends significant changes in the penalty structure and the
nature of penalties imposed on NCAA member institutions for certain violations. The
Commission considers non-cooperation a separate serious offense that should receive substantial
penalties, including the loss of participation in and revenues from the NCAA tournament for up
to five years. In addition, the Commission believes that serious repeated violations of NCAA
rules must be subject to these same severe penalties.
Reference 64 - 0.12% Coverage
Third, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a
coach, athletic director or other administrator under a show cause order for a previous violation
of NCAA rules must receive enhanced penalties if that individual’s program reoffends.
Institutions that hire an individual under a show cause order must be aware that
they are taking a significant risk.
Reference 65 - 0.10% Coverage
In its current enforcement structure, the NCAA addresses individuals who participate in rules
violations through punishments imposed on member institutions. The Commission recommends
a significant expansion in individual accountability for rules violations for presidents,
administrators and coaches:
Reference 66 - 0.07% Coverage
The NCAA must require member institutions’ contracts with these individuals to include
agreement to be subject to NCAA enforcement investigations and infractions decisions and
discipline, up to and including discharge.
Reference 67 - 0.19% Coverage
The NCAA is certainly not blameless for its failure to address the corruption in college
basketball that led to the recent prosecutions, but the primary failures belong to the individuals at
colleges and universities who allowed their programs to be corrupted, averting their eyes to keep
the money flowing. With enhanced individual accountability, the Commission believes that more
college presidents and athletic directors will find it beneficial to adopt and enforce
comprehensive compliance programs. See also NCAA Constitution 2.1 (Principle of Institutional
Control and Responsibility).
Reference 68 - 0.36% Coverage
In terms of substantive rules changes, the NCAA’s jurisdiction with respect to academic issues
must be clarified, stated in amended rules and communicated to member institutions. The rules

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

390

must be amended to allow the NCAA to address all academic fraud and cheating to the extent it
is used to corrupt athletic eligibility. Member institutions should not be able to shield academic
fraud to ensure athletic eligibility by extending that fraud to the entire student body. In addition,
the NCAA’s imposition of discipline for academic fraud and misconduct has been inconsistent
and untimely. The relationship between punishment and the school’s involvement, including its
self-reporting, is unclear. Member institutions do not fulfill their commitment to student-athletes
when they allow them to maintain eligibility through academic fraud or misconduct. The NCAA
must also amend its rules to clarify the standard for academic fraud and misconduct and to
establish consistent punishments for the violations of these rules. Going forward, the NCAA
must apply a revised standard consistently across member institutions.
Reference 69 - 0.34% Coverage
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified nonscholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 70 - 0.13% Coverage
non-scholastic basketball needs NCAA coaches, and NCAA coaches need non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission’s guiding principle in this area is that the NCAA should not certify,
and NCAA coaches should not participate in, non-scholastic basketball events involving
coaches, leagues or sponsors who are not fully transparent about the sources and amounts of their
financial support.
Reference 71 - 0.24% Coverage
Any person or entity that sponsors a summer league, team or event must disclose any payments
made to or received from any coach, event operator, owner or any other entity associated with
that league, team or event. Any coach, event operator, owner or other entity associated with that
summer league, team or event must disclose any payment received that is related to the event and
how the payments will be expended. The Commission leaves to the NCAA the design of the
disclosure forms and the details of the requirements, but it must require the provision of any nonprofit organization’s financial filings with the government and full financial transparency – going
both ways – for non-scholastic basketball sponsors, event operators and coaches.
Reference 72 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
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enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 73 - 0.44% Coverage
In this section, the Commission recommends significant changes to the resources
and programs available for the development of young, pre-collegiate players, ideally by the
summer of 2019. Allowing players to enter the professional ranks earlier brings with it the
responsibility to provide appropriate resources for earlier development. We acknowledge that
institutional influence—by USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA and the NBPA—has been
largely missing in this space for the past 20 years and that nonscholastic basketball has been
largely ungoverned. We strongly recommend that the named institutions lend their expertise and,
wherever possible, work together to provide an alternative to the individual and corporate
influences which currently dominate precollegiate youth basketball particularly in the summer.
In the Commission’s view, the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA all have
significant institutional interests in developing prominent roles in non-scholastic basketball,
particularly in the areas of player identification, development and evaluation. There is a great
deal of work to be done in the development of pre-collegiate players, and the three institutions
should also welcome partners and sponsors willing to work within the standards, disciplines, and
accountability these institutions will bring to youth development.
Reference 74 - 0.27% Coverage
Player identification. USA Basketball will be primarily responsible for the identification of those
players with the highest potential for Level 1 (Junior National Teams). The NCAA will be
primarily responsible for identification of those players with the highest potential for Levels 2
and 3. The Commission understands that college coaches annually identify the prospects they
seek to recruit using electronic databases and recruiting services. Based on these systems, players
can be assigned to an appropriate level based on the interest shown in them. As a further step to
ensure that players are properly identified, the Commission recommends that USA Basketball,
the NCAA, and the NBA and NBPA establish a “collaborative advisory group” to annually
review and validate the player identification and player evaluation processes.
Reference 75 - 0.09% Coverage
Player development must expand well beyond basketball to include academic, health, wellness,
and life skills. The Commission recommends four physical interactions with pre-collegiate
players at each level annually (camps, clinics and tournaments) with continuing on-line
Reference 76 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission recommends that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional
camps each summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during that
time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted to account for these
events.
Reference 77 - 0.06% Coverage
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Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 78 - 0.14% Coverage
Player evaluation. The most important outcome of player evaluation is a realistic assessment of a
player’s potential. The Commission recommends that a “collaborative advisory group” among
the NCAA, USA Basketball and the NBA and NBPA be established to provide a realistic
assessment of professional potential to players in Levels 1 and 2. Importantly, the Commission
believes these evaluations must be transparent and accessible.
Reference 79 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 80 - 0.19% Coverage
First, the Commission supports the NABC’s recommendation that the summer
recruiting calendar for evaluating college prospects be modified to allow college coaches to
attend two weekends of scholastic-sponsored events in June and to attend three weekends of
NCAA-sponsored events in July (once established). The Commission further supports the
requirement that once NCAA-sponsored events for July are established, NCAA coaches be
limited to recruiting at those events during that time. Many of the problems associated with nonscholastic basketball occur in the summer.
Reference 81 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission believes that additional recommendations of the NABC and
others are worthy of NCAA study. It also supports the NABC’s intent to reinvigorate its Code of
Ethics and disciplinary rules and enforcement.
Reference 82 - 0.15% Coverage
Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not in execution — such
as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems. Others should be easy to execute
— specific changes in the available punishments under Article 19 and in the recruiting rules.
Some do not require rules changes, but instead the devotion of financial and administrative
resource to planning, for example, the creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps.
Reference 83 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
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Files\\CCB4 - Recruiting and College Choice Study - § 1 reference coded [ 0.73% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.73% Coverage
Three-quarters of elite players indicated that the rules regarding “testing the waters” while
remaining eligible are clear to them, as compared to 59% of non-elite players.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 6 references coded [
10.83% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.79% Coverage
With two of the NCAA’s highest-ranking committees committing to take swift action to correct
issues facing college basketball, NCAA leaders called upon their members Thursday to own the
challenges facing them and to set college sports on a path guided by its long-held values.
Reference 2 - 1.73% Coverage
Standing behind college sports’ stated values should not be looked at as being out of touch with
modern-day realities, he said. Rather, it’s about leading college sports ahead through the
foundation that has provided its respected position within higher education.
Reference 3 - 0.93% Coverage
to create new opportunities to express the Association’s values, and to establish college sports as
a leader in the day’s most pressing issues.
Reference 4 - 3.21% Coverage
“I’d like to use this process as a time to reestablish how we think, how we feel about this thing
we call the NCAA, to elevate the conversation around it,” Jones said. “If you look at the issues
of the day, they didn’t exist 14 years ago. All these things have come on the horizon, and they’ve
resulted in putting the NCAA on the defensive. I’d like to use this process to propel us into a role
of a leader. I think it’s a great opportunity. I think society is looking for a leader, and I think
that’s what we do best.”
Reference 5 - 1.54% Coverage
But as Emmert agreed with the vision Jones displayed, he also stressed that the work points back
to the values upon which college sports is built and illustrates the positive outcomes that result
from making decisions based on those values.
Reference 6 - 1.62% Coverage
“People don’t want words; they want to see action,” Emmert said. “We’ve got to ﬁx it together.
Nobody thinks it’s going to be easy. In fact, I think it’s going to be really hard. But we’ve got to
get on with it. We’ve got to put our actions where our words are.”
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 11 references
coded [ 21.72% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.70% Coverage
Today, the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors unanimously endorsed
a series of recommendations from the Commission on College Basketball. These
recommendations will ensure integrity in the game, strengthen accountability in college sports
and demonstrate a commitment to the well-being of student-athletes.
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Reference 2 - 0.91% Coverage
Dr. Rice and the members of the commission were clear. The collegiate model should be
strengthened and preserved.
Reference 3 - 1.47% Coverage
To achieve that, we must recommit to our core purpose as a higher education association and
renew our commitment to the college degree as the centerpiece of intercollegiate athletics.
Reference 4 - 1.65% Coverage
The NCAA will work with other organizations – including USA Basketball, apparel companies,
the NBA and the NBPA – to make meaningful and lasting changes that will support the
commission’s recommendations.
Reference 5 - 0.75% Coverage
End One-and-Done. Separate the collegiate track from professional by ending one-and-done.
Reference 6 - 1.50% Coverage
Greater Draft Flexibility for Student-Athletes. Allow student-athletes to test their pro prospects
and maintain their college eligibility if they do not sign a professional contract.
Reference 7 - 1.66% Coverage
NCAA-Certiﬁed Agents to Provide Student-Athletes with Assessment of Professional Prospects.
Permit students to receive meaningful assessment of their professional prospects earlier, with
assistance
Reference 8 - 2.04% Coverage
Provide Resources to Make the Promise of a College Education Real. NCAA to establish fund to
pay for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave member
institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree.
Reference 9 - 3.34% Coverage
Enact and Impose Core Punishments with Signiﬁcant Deterrent Effect. Core penalties should be
increased to allow 1) 5-yr postseason ban for Level I violations; 2) loss of all revenue sharing in
postseason play for the entire ban; 3) lifetime bans for a show-cause order; 4) allow bans of more
than one season for head coach violations; 5) increase penalties to allow full-year visit bans for
recruiting visit violations.
Reference 10 - 2.90% Coverage
Reform Non-Scholastic Basketball and Make its Finances Transparent. NCAA should enforce
rigorous certiﬁcation criteria for non-scholastic basketball events that coaches attend. Events
should be subject to ﬁnancial disclosure, an audit of all ﬁnancial relationships and payments,
IRS, and other tax ﬁlings. Events must also have educational components.
Reference 11 - 2.79% Coverage
Enact Changes in Rules Governing Recruiting and Coaches’ Interaction with Recruits and
Student-Athletes. Reduce the inﬂuence of third parties and increase the ability of college coaches
to interact with recruits and current players. We endorse adoption of a number of rule changes
recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches.
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Files\\NCAA3 - NCAA Provides Reinstatement Decision for Kansas’ Silvio De Sousa - § 4
references coded [ 25.02% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.60% Coverage
University of Kansas men’s basketball student-athlete Silvio De Sousa must sit out the remainder
of the 2018-19 season and the 2019-20 season because his guardian received payment from a
university booster and agent and agreed to receive additional funds from the same person.
Reference 2 - 6.18% Coverage
According to the facts provided for purposes of the reinstatement request, De Sousa’s guardian
received payment of $2,500 from an agent and booster of the school. He agreed to accept
additional payment of $20,000 from the same individual and an Adidas employee for securing
De Sousa’s enrollment at Kansas.
Reference 3 - 4.33% Coverage
Membership guidelines state the starting point for these violations is permanent ineligibility, but
the NCAA staff recognized mitigation based on the speciﬁc circumstances of this case when
making its decision.
Reference 4 - 8.91% Coverage
When a school discovers an NCAA rules violation has occurred, it must declare the studentathlete ineligible and may request the student-athlete’s eligibility be reinstated. The NCAA staff
reviews each student-athlete reinstatement request individually based on its own speciﬁc facts.
This decision may be appealed to the Division I Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee,
which is comprised of representatives from NCAA schools.
Files\\NCAA4 - NCAA Statement from Mark Emmert on Federal Investigation - § 2
references coded [ 16.31% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 7.13% Coverage
"The nature of the charges brought by the federal government are deeply disturbing. We have no
tolerance whatsoever for this alleged behavior.
Reference 2 - 9.19% Coverage
Coaches hold a unique position of trust with student-athletes and their families and these bribery
allegations, if true, suggest an extraordinary and despicable breach of that trust.
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 2 references coded [ 4.45% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.55% Coverage
These changes will promote integrity in the game, strengthen accountability and prioritize the
interests of studentathletes over every other factor.
Reference 2 - 1.90% Coverage
Strengthen accountability and deter future rule-breaking with harsher penalties for those who
break the rules.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 5 references coded [ 13.17% Coverage]
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Reference 1 - 2.99% Coverage
Apparel companies and other commercial entities, to establish an environment where they can
support programs in a transparent way, but not become an inappropriate or distorting inﬂuence
on the game, recruits or their families.
Reference 2 - 1.35% Coverage
Nonscholastic basketball, with a focus on the appropriate involvement of college coaches and
others.
Reference 3 - 2.32% Coverage
Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 4 - 2.87% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA, and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Reference 5 - 3.64% Coverage
I believe we can — and we must — ﬁnd a way to protect the integrity of college sports by
addressing both sides of the coin: fairness and opportunity for college athletes, coupled with the
enforcement capability to hold accountable those who undermine the standards of our
community.
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 4 references coded [
11.10% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.41% Coverage
Depending upon future action by the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association to
permit high school students to enter the draft, high school basketball players can be represented
by an agent beginning July 1 before their senior year in high school, provided they have been
identiﬁed as an elite senior prospect.
Reference 2 - 1.92% Coverage
All agreements between agents and high school or college student-athletes must be:
In writing. Terminated when the student enrolls in or returns to college. Disclosed to the NCAA
(for high school students) or the school (for students already in college).
Reference 3 - 1.96% Coverage
College basketball players who request an Undergraduate Advisory Committee evaluation,
participate in the NBA combine and aren’t drafted can return to school as long as they notify
their athletics director of their intent by 5 p.m. the Monday after the draft.
Reference 4 - 4.81% Coverage
Division I schools will be required to pay for tuition, fees and books for basketball players who
leave school and return later to the same school to earn their degree. Former student-athletes will
be eligible for ﬁnancial assistance to complete their ﬁrst degree if they were on scholarship and
fewer than 10 years have passed since they left school. Additionally, students must have been in
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school for two years before leaving. Former student-athletes also must meet all the school’s
admissions and ﬁnancial aid requirements and must have exhausted all other funding options to
be eligible, as well as meet all NCAA academic requirements.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 2 references coded [ 13.35%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.46% Coverage
Basketball-related events for high school students will be subject to more rigorous certiﬁcation
requirements to ensure transparency in operations and ﬁnances. This will address issues of
corruption and help support student-athletes as they make decisions about their future. The
certiﬁcation criteria will be overseen by the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Oversight
Committee, and the NCAA Enforcement Certiﬁcation and Approvals Group will administer the
certiﬁcation program.
Reference 2 - 6.88% Coverage
The NCAA is pursuing agreements with apparel companies on expectations for accountability
and transparency regarding their involvement in youth basketball. The NCAA Board of
Governors seeks to develop agreements that require apparel companies to make annual
disclosures, obtain NCAA certiﬁcation for all youth basketball activities and report potential
NCAA rule violations. Additionally, parties should formalize relationships in areas where
interests overlap, such as playing rules and equipment standards.
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 3 references coded [
16.77% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 7.80% Coverage
Changes to the investigations and infractions process create independent groups to prevent
conﬂicts of interest. Cases deemed complex will be eligible for this independent process.
Examples of complex cases include alleged violations of core NCAA values, such as prioritizing
academics and the well-being of studentathletes; the possibility of major penalties; or adversarial
behavior. Multiple parties will be able to request a case be deemed complex: school
representatives, NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions members or NCAA enforcement
staff.
Reference 2 - 6.52% Coverage
When a school, the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions or NCAA enforcement staff
requests a case enter the new independent process, this committee reviews and makes decisions
on those requests. The committee’s ﬁve members will include one Independent Resolution Panel
member (see below), one Division I Committee on Infractions member, one Division I
Infractions Appeals Committee member, the Division I Council chair and the NCAA vice
president of enforcement.
Reference 3 - 2.45% Coverage
This committee will have the ability to expand upon allegations presented by the Complex Case
Unit if deemed appropriate. This is a change from the current infractions process.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 3 references coded [
13.63% Coverage]

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

398

Reference 1 - 1.75% Coverage
New responsibilities and obligations solidify effective and fair enforcement of NCAA rules
Reference 2 - 5.93% Coverage
The chair of the Division I Committee on Infractions or the Independent College Sports
Adjudication Panel can impose immediate penalties when schools or individuals do not
cooperate (including loss of revenue or postseason opportunities). These bodies can consider
lack of cooperation as admission of a violation.
Reference 3 - 5.95% Coverage
When schools and NCAA staff agree on the facts of a case, they can work together on a
resolution, including appropriate penalties, if any. This change will reduce legal fees and
minimize drawn-out adversarial situations. Agreed-upon resolutions are subject to approval by
the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions.
Files\\Reforms5 - Stronger Accountability, Penalties - § 2 references coded [ 16.02%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.59% Coverage
To deter future violations, presidents, coaches and staff have stronger, clearer accountability
expectations and face increased penalties if they break the rules.
Reference 2 - 11.43% Coverage
Those who break the rules face stronger penalties, including longer postseason bans (up to ﬁve
years), longer head coach suspensions (could extend beyond one season), longer employment
limitations for coaches and staff who violate rules (potential for lifetime show-cause orders),
increased recruiting restrictions and the loss of all revenue associated with the Division I NCAA
Men’s Basketball Championship
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 21.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 21.12% Coverage
Pending adoption at the NCAA Convention in January, ﬁve independent members will be added
to the NCAA Board of Governors, which is responsible for oversight of the entire Association.
Each member will be nominated by the Board of Governors Executive Committee, approved by
the full board and serve a threeyear term, which can be renewed once. The terms of the
independent board members are longer than those served by school representatives. One
member, voted on annually by all the independent members, will serve as a lead independent
member and can serve in that role for no more than three years.
Files\\TDG1 - Drake Group Blames Outdated NCAA Amateur Status Rules for Criminalizing
Outside Athlete Compensation - § 4 references coded [ 15.29% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.74% Coverage
Such action should include exposing those who conspire with coaches or athletes to commit
fraud by encouraging athletes to conceal income from their institutions and receive more
government or institutional aid to which they are not entitled.
Reference 2 - 2.90% Coverage
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The NCAA has the right and the obligation as an educational non-proﬁt institution to limit
institutional compensation of athletes to the cost of education. College sports should not be “pay
for play” professional sports, but continuing to treat college athletes as employees and
commodities for ﬁnancial gain and entertainment instead of as students, makes it a very tough
argument to continue to justify.
Reference 3 - 6.62% Coverage
In other words, there are simple changes for the association to make that positions the athlete as a
student rather than an employee. The inability to separate the two has largely driven this
underground economy in college sports. While the NCAA also has the right to prohibit
professional athletes from participating in college sports, it shouldn’t have the right to prohibit
college athletes from working outside the university, contracting with an agent and using their
names, images and likenesses for private gain as long as the athlete does not use of the name or
afﬁliation with the institution. Athletes should be allowed to earn whatever the marketplace
dictates from endorsements (including the use of shoes, gloves or other items of personal sports
equipment), modeling, conducting a sports camp business or giving sports lessons to others as
long as the athlete does not enter into a contract to play professional sports.
Reference 4 - 4.03% Coverage
The NCAA should throw out its ingenuous use of “amateur” which really has not represented
reality since the association’s beginnings in 1905, remove restrictions on agents and outside
employment and treat athletes like other students. It is time for higher education to get back to its
business of education by making sure athletic scholarships are guaranteed four-to-ﬁve-year
grants for a college education rather than treating athletes as indentured servants so that others
can get rich while denying college athletes basic rights afforded all other students.
Files\\TDG2 - The Drake Group Finds that the Independent Commission on College
Basketball Missed an Opportunity to Recommend Comprehensive Reform - § 6 references
coded [ 12.04% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
The Drake Group (TDG), whose mission is to defend academic integrity in higher education
from the corrosive aspects of commercialized college sports, found, in response to the recently
released report by the Independent Commission on College Basketball chaired by Dr.
Condoleezza Rice, that the Commission got some things right, but missed the mark on several
key issues regarding reform in college sports.
Reference 2 - 1.48% Coverage
An important caveat is that colleges should enable athletes to be real students with access to a
quality education
rather delivering a sham alternative solely designed to maintain athletics eligibility and imposing
excessive athletics time demands that make it virtually impossible to fulﬁll academic demands.
Reference 3 - 3.59% Coverage
Although the Report correctly emphasizes the value of a college education and the necessity of it
remaining the priority, the Commission only addressed academic integrity in the context of
fraudulent coursework and the illconceived notion of institutional self-policing. It did not acknowledge the far more widespread
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practice of institutions turning a blind eye to normal athletic departments practices designed to
keep athletes eligible through selection of less-demanding majors, easy (or fake) courses, and
friendly professors, rather than provide a real education.
Transparency and oversight by every institution’s faculty senate in this area would go a long way
toward showing that institutions are committed to providing a legitimate education.
Reference 4 - 1.45% Coverage
TDG believes failing to allow athletes to exploit their own NILs with strict controls was a missed
opportunity. Courts decide cases based on
speciﬁc and relatively narrow sets of facts and we believe the courts are not the proper place to
make meaningful and appropriate decisions generally about amateurism.
Reference 5 - 0.70% Coverage
The NCAA needs to do its job which is to establish broad amateurism policy based on a
thoughtful analysis and
considering all stakeholder interests.
Reference 6 - 2.90% Coverage
We say, “Why wait?” The Drake Group has proposed a very speciﬁc framework for how to
handle NILs in its position paper on that issue including calling for athlete reporting,
conformance with marketplace value, no involvement of institutional representatives and other
controls. To restrict athletes’ outside income while enriching coaches and athletic directors and
allowing institutions to build lavish facilities that aid recruiting, but lack
educational value, yet failing to meet athletes’ basic medical and insurance needs invites
accusations of exploitation and perpetuates under-the-table payments.
Files\\TDG3 - The Drake Group Questions NCAA Division I Basketball Rules Changes - § 7
references coded [ 16.15% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
It also permits ﬁnancially wasteful special treatment for athletes – particularly lavish athletes’only facilities that isolate the athletes – to satisfy coaches’ insatiable appetite for a recruiting
advantage, while hoping to hide the costs from the public. Real leadership on these issues would
put in place practices that enhance athletes’ educational experiences and protect them from
injury, abuse, and academic exploitation.
Reference 2 - 1.17% Coverage
Thus, the Drake Group believes that the present NCAA leadership is unwilling to clean out the
rot in commercialized college sport and fulﬁll its primary responsibility to ensure the welfare of
college athletes and protect the academic integrity of higher education.
Reference 3 - 1.87% Coverage
TDG Concern: All athletes should have the right to participate in a professional draft with no
penalty unless they actually accept an offer of employment. Athletes should not be considered
“professionals” and declared ineligible for college sport unless they sign a professional contract.
If an athlete is “selected” in the draft and then decides not to turn professional, the athlete should
remain eligible for college play.
Reference 4 - 2.40% Coverage
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TDG Concern: The current rule limiting athletes to ﬁve paid visits is sufﬁcient and far in excess
of beneﬁts provided to non-athlete students. All NCAA athletic programs are operating at a
deﬁcit except for 20-25 Division I FBS programs and most athletic programs are supported by
institutional general funds or mandatory student fees. The Drake Group believes that ﬁve visits
before college enrollment and ﬁve visits after college enrollment are sufﬁcient. Any additional
visits will add to the recruiting arms race and its associated expenses.
Reference 5 - 3.19% Coverage
TDG Concern: All NCAA member institutions should be required to do so for all athletic
scholarship athletes, not just the so-called revenue sports. Basketball and football in particular
are currently exploiting underprepared college athletes, many of whom are athletes of color, by
waiving regular academic admission standards and compounding their academic difﬁculties by
imposing unreasonable sport time demands. The message sent by this rule is, “Don’t worry about
performing academically. We have your back if you want to return to school.” The Drake Group
believes this beneﬁt would be acceptable only if the athlete leaves in good academic standing
and if the beneﬁt were not limited to sports that generate revenues.
Reference 6 - 3.83% Coverage
Three fairly simple oversight rules previously proposed by The Drake Group could control
improprieties. The member institution should be required to review written terms of any NIL
agreement to ensure conformance with the following stipulations or conditions: (1) use does not
include the name, marks, institutional colors, or afﬁliation, implied or otherwise, of the student’s
institution or the use of institutional facilities or properties for such engagement; (2) the
institution’s employees or others engaged by the institution are not involved (i.e., identiﬁcation
of possible employment opportunities, introductions, etc.) in obtaining the employment; and (3)
the employer attests that the remuneration is commensurate with the going rate in that locality
for services and the athlete is paid only for work speciﬁcally described and actually performed.”
Reference 7 - 1.77% Coverage
Drake Group is particularly concerned that the NCAA continues to ignore its responsibility to
ﬁnd member institutions guilty of academic fraud committed for the purpose of maintaining
athlete eligibility. Expecting institutions to self-police in this area is unrealistic and a serious
dereliction of duty with regard to the basic responsibilities of a national athletic governance
organization.”
Files\\TKC1 - Knight Commission Sees Integrity of College Sports at Risk - § 4 references
coded [ 8.42% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
“The Commission is deeply troubled by mounting evidence that the NCAA is unable to ensure a
level of integrity that must be a priority in the education and treatment of college athletes,” said
Commission co-chair Arne Duncan, former U.S. Secretary of Education, “These threats to the
integrity of college sports are an urgent call to reform, if ever there was one.”
Reference 2 - 2.65% Coverage
The Commission commended the NCAA for creating an independent Commission on College
Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former Stanford University provost and U.S.
Secretary of State. The Knight Commission, which has a long history of providing
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recommendations that have improved the integrity of college sports, will seek to meet with the
basketball commission to outline reforms to protect the educational mission of college sports and
reduce the exploitation of student athletes.
Reference 3 - 2.91% Coverage
The Commission called on the NCAA to modify a rule that now eﬀectively allows an institution
under investigation to make its own determination about the academic legitimacy of its courses.
The NCAA should not be handcuﬀed in its authority to consider independent assessments of
academic fraud, such as those made by accrediting agencies and state licensing bodies. Other
loopholes in NCAA rules governing academic integrity, including the determination of what
constitutes impermissible academic beneﬁts for athletes, also need to be closed.
Reference 4 - 0.93% Coverage
“It’s clear that we need a new approach that can provide more fairness to student-athletes, while
giving more teeth to the NCAA to ensure academic integrity in college sports,”
Files\\TKC2 - Letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 2 references coded [ 7.71% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.17% Coverage
First, the Knight Commission has recommended that independent directors be added to the
NCAA governing boards. This recommendation was initially made, but not accepted, when the
NCAA restructured in 2013. We think at least one of these independent directors should be a
former men’s basketball player, given the role that March Madness plays in funding the NCAA
and its member conferences and institutions, and in holding the NCAA together. There could be
another spot among the independent directors for a former female athlete in any sport. Other
independent directors could be experts in fields like athlete health, safety and wellness.
Reference 2 - 1.54% Coverage
The second broad recommendation is for the NCAA, conferences and/or institutions to develop
standards to emphasize coaches’ responsibilities as educators.
Files\\TKC4 - Knight Commission Urges Tougher NCAA Reforms to Regain Public
Confidence in College Sports - § 4 references coded [ 4.20% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.62% Coverage
Student-Athlete Education and Development. Develop minimal professional standards that
NCAA coaches will be required to meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles as educators
and leaders in the development of student-athletes.
Reference 2 - 1.27% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new ﬁnancial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement ﬁnancial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
aﬃliated with the NCAA.
Reference 3 - 1.56% Coverage
The Commission on College Basketball concluded that “NCAA schools are not doing enough to
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develop the next generation of coaches.” The Knight Commission agrees with that conclusion
and recommends the development of minimal professional standards that NCAA coaches must
meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles in the education and development of studentathletes. Such standards could require the completion of diﬀerent levels of coaching licenses or
professional certiﬁcates to redress the profession’s lax — and in some cases nonexistent —
certiﬁcation and licensure standards.
Reference 4 - 0.75% Coverage
In a separate discussion related to NCAA transfer rules, the Knight Commission supported the
NCAA’s eﬀorts to eliminate the requirement that student-athletes must seek permission to
transfer from their institution to receive an athletics scholarship from their second institution.
Files\\TKC5 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations - § 5 references coded [ 13.37%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.53% Coverage
No university can give the right to any employee to have a contract with shoe, equipment, and
apparel companies that is expressly or indirectly contingent on players wearing or using the
companies’ equipment or products. Such contracts must be made only with the university.
Reference 2 - 3.99% Coverage
Reinstate the requirement for coaches and other administrators to receive approval from the
university CEO to receive any athletically-related outside income (e.g., income from shoe,
equipment and apparel companies). Further, strengthen this requirement by specifying that the
amount of income approved must be given in writing and prior to the receipt of such income.
[Note: This requirement would bring back and strengthen a requirement first adopted in 1992 at
the Knight Commission’s urging but rescinded in 2016.] In addition, university presidents should
be required to annually report to their governing boards the amounts and sources of athleticallyrelated outside income received by employees.
Reference 3 - 2.73% Coverage
The Rice Commission report recommended new financial requirements for non-scholastic
basketball events attended by NCAA coaches, and called on shoe and apparel companies to
“implement financial transparency and accountability with respect to their own investments in
non-scholastic basketball.” The Knight Commission supports these measures but believes that
standards must be set higher for NCAA schools and college coaches than for those not directly
affiliated with the NCAA.
Reference 4 - 3.41% Coverage
The Knight Commission is concerned about the implications of the National Association of
Basketball Coaches’ proposal to allow non-coaching personnel, such as basketball video
analysts, to engage in coaching activities. While the Knight Commission supports professional
development efforts, it cautions against any changes that will lead to further proliferation of
coaching staff members and the inability to enforce reasonable personnel limits. The ratio of
money spent on coaching and noncoaching personnel, compared to other program areas and
student-athlete support, is already badly skewed.
Reference 5 - 1.72% Coverage
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The Knight Commission supports the Commission on College Basketball suggestion for the
NBA and its players association to change the NBA draft eligibility rule but cautions that
allowing students to turn pro without a high school diploma could undermine educational
attainment among high school players.
Files\\TKC6 - NCAA Consider CCB Recommendations Cover Letter - § 2 references coded [
11.04% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.49% Coverage
Student-Athlete Education and Development. Develop minimal professional standards that
NCAA coaches will be required to meet to ensure they are prepared for their roles as educators
and leaders in the development of student-athletes.
Reference 2 - 5.55% Coverage
As we have stated previously, we believe this is a rare moment of opportunity to reform not only
men’s basketball but the NCAA itself to restore public faith in the organization’s ability to be an
effective steward of big-money college sports.
Interest Convergence
Files\\CCB1 - Charter - § 4 references coded [ 11.31% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.34% Coverage
Apparel companies and other commercial entities, to establish an environment where they can
support programs in a transparent way but not become an inappropriate or distorting inﬂuence on
the game, recruits or their families.
Reference 2 - 1.83% Coverage
Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 3 - 2.24% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Reference 4 - 4.90% Coverage
Duties and Responsibilities of the Commission. The commission will gather information and
expert opinions for making transformative recommendations to the DI Board of Directors and
NCAA Board of Governors on the needed legislation, policies, actions and structure(s) to protect
the integrity of college sports, with a focus on Division I men’s basketball. The goal is for the
commission to complete its work with a report to the boards for action at their April 2018
meetings.
Files\\CCB2 - Commission Remarks (As Prepared) by Dr. Condoleezza Rice - § 15 references
coded [ 14.91% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.08% Coverage
First, we must separate the collegiate track from the professional track by ending oneand-done.
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We call on the NBA and the NBPA, who exclusively have the power here, to once again make
18-year-olds eligible for the NBA draft so that high school players who are drafted may proceed
directly to the NBA. Should the NBA and NBPA decide not to do so – the Commission will
reconvene and consider other measures, including freshman ineligibility and/or the “lock-up” of
scholarships for a specified period of time.
Reference 2 - 0.65% Coverage
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their professional prospects.
Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should deprive studentathletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue in college while playing
basketball.
Reference 3 - 1.86% Coverage
I want to note that the Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s
and NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make studentathletes who
attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years. By requiring
students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment to their education, the
baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who ultimately earn degrees. However, it
would also keep collegiate players ready for the NBA in school against their will, where they
will be potentially disgruntled magnets for corrupt money and the undermining of the collegiate
model. Players with professional earning power should be able to choose a professional path.
The Commission’s additional recommendations will make it easier for them to return and
complete their degrees.
Reference 4 - 0.95% Coverage
The Commission believes student-athletes must have the information they need to understand
their real choices and be better positioned to take advantage of either the collegiate or
professional path they choose. Players should be able to receive meaningful assessment of
professional prospects earlier with assistance from certified agents. If NCAA rules do not allow
them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 5 - 0.89% Coverage
We recommend that the NCAA and its member institutions develop strict standards for
certifying agents and allow only those NCAA-certified agents to engage with studentathletes at
an appropriate point in their high school careers as determined by the NCAA. The NCAA should
appoint a Vice-President level executive who, among other responsibilities, would develop these
standards and administer this program.
Reference 6 - 1.47% Coverage
That said, most Commissioners believe that the rules on name, image, and likeness should be
taken up as soon as the legal framework is established. It is hard for the public, and frankly for
me, to understand what can be allowed within the college model – for the life of me I don’t
understand the difference between Olympic payments and participation in Dancing with the Stars
– and what can’t be allowed without opening the door to professionalizing college basketball.
Personally, I hope that there will be more room in the college model today for this kind of
benefit to students without endangering the college model itself. And let me just say that I hope
Arike wins Dancing with the Stars.
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Reference 7 - 1.25% Coverage
First, the NCAA should create independent investigative and adjudicative arms to address and
resolve complex and serious cases involving violation of NCAA rules. As of now, volunteers
who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions resolve these cases, and during our
Commission testimony not a single stakeholder supported the current system for handling highstakes infractions. Today’s current state where an entire community knows of significant rule
breaking and yet the governance body lacks the power or will to investigate and act breeds
cynicism and contempt.
Reference 8 - 0.90% Coverage
To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement and resolution of high stakes
cases must be placed in the hands of independent professionals. A panel of professional
adjudicators, appointed for a term of years, must make final and binding decisions and must have
the authority to impose substantial punishments, including the loss of post-season play and the
revenues from post-season play.
Reference 9 - 1.50% Coverage
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual accountability for
rules violations for coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents. We recommend that the
NCAA amend its rules to require colleges to include in the employment contracts of
administrators and coaches’ individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA
investigations, including financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission to NCAA
enforcement proceedings, decisions and discipline – up to and including discharge. A failure to
cooperate should trigger penalties – up to and including a five-year ban on participation in the
tournament and loss of revenue.
Reference 10 - 0.71% Coverage
The NCAA must have jurisdiction to address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent that it
affects student-athletes’ eligibility. Member institutions can no longer be permitted to defend a
fraud or misconduct case on the ground that all students, not just athletes, were permitted to
“benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Reference 11 - 0.78% Coverage
The Commission recommends the NCAA take short and long-term actions to reform
nonscholastic basketball and disassociate itself and its member institutions from the aspects of
non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical behavior cannot be assured. We believe
non-scholastic basketball must be reformed by making its finances transparent.
Reference 12 - 0.68% Coverage
In the short term, we recommend the NCAA promptly adopt and enforce rigorous criteria for
certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its coaches attend. To certify a nonscholastic
basketball event, the owners, event operators, sponsors and coaches for the event must agree to
financial transparency.
Reference 13 - 0.45% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that, with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to establish and administer
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new youth basketball programs.
Reference 14 - 0.69% Coverage
That development would include not only basketball, but also academic and life skills, health and
collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program would be NCAAadministered regional
non-scholastic basketball events in July that would be the only ones that NCAA coaches attend
in that crucial recruiting month.
Reference 15 - 1.05% Coverage
It is clear for all to see that current structure and system simply isn’t working. The Commission
recommends that the NCAA restructure its highest governance body, the Board of Governors, to
include at least five independent public members with voting rights, and who have the
experience, stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA in reestablishing itself as an effective
leader and regulator of college sports. One of these public members should also serve on the
NCAA’s Executive Board.
Files\\CCB3 - Official Report - § 55 references coded [ 10.44% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage
The indictments handed down by the Justice Department and the ongoing FBI investigation
spurred the NCAA to ask for this report. Whatever the outcome of the legal process, radical
changes are long overdue.
Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage
The one-and-done regime may have provided some benefits for the NBA and the NCAA in the
past, but all stakeholders agree that the downsides now outweigh any benefits. One-and-done has
played a significant role in corrupting and destabilizing college basketball, restricting the
freedom of choice of players, and undermining the relationship of college basketball to the
mission of higher education.
Reference 3 - 0.12% Coverage
We fear that, should the NBA and the NBPA make 18 the minimum age for entry into the NBA,
the growing trend of reclassification will accelerate, creating a new generation of 17-year-old
one-and-done players. The Commission urges the NCAA to monitor this situation and to enact
appropriate rule changes if that potential abuse occurs with the end of one-and-done.
Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage
In that circumstance, the Commission will reconvene and consider the other tools at its disposal.
These could range from the baseball rule, to freshman ineligibility, to “locking up” scholarships
for three or four years if the recipient leaves the program for the NBA after a single year. That
would be a disincentive to recruit an athlete for a one-year run at the title. In short, the current
situation is untenable.
Reference 5 - 0.11% Coverage
Players who transfer are less likely to complete their
Third parties often influence transfer decisions for their own purposes and without thought to the
impact of transfer on the student-athlete. The detrimental effect of transfer on a student-athlete’s
education means that transferring should not be made easier for basketball’s sake.
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Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage
Elite high school and college players need earlier professional advice, including
whether to declare for the draft or whether college basketball offers a superior pathway. If
NCAA rules do not allow them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it illicitly.
Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic basketball, the
Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players about their professional
and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health and more. Student-athletes must
have the information they need to understand their real choices and be better positioned to take
advantage of either the collegiate or the professional path they choose.
Reference 8 - 0.15% Coverage
receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career advice and
more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars annually.10
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11
As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced Again, the Commission
agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to assist
student-athletes in earning their degrees.
Reference 9 - 0.14% Coverage
If a college or university is using a student-athlete’s NIL for commercial purposes, the school
must ask that student-athlete for consent, which must be voluntarily given. See also NCAA
Bylaw 12.5 (Promotional Activities) (describing permissible and nonpermissible uses). When the
legal parameters relevant to this issue are clearer,12
the
Commission also believes that the NCAA should reconsider its treatment of studentathletes’
NIL.
Reference 10 - 0.15% Coverage
In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has decided to focus its
recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to address the charge of player
exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and keeping open a player’s professional
pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted players, by funding degree completion by
athletes who return to school, by providing benefits that allow student-athletes to be both
students and athletes
Reference 11 - 0.05% Coverage
significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must receive an
education that is valuable, not a pretense.
Reference 12 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA create independent investigative
and adjudicative arms to address and resolve complex and serious cases (hereafter “complex
cases”) involving violations of NCAA rules.
Reference 13 - 0.12% Coverage
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Stakeholders informed the Commission that when the stakes are high, colleges
are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles and NCAA
rules often are not enforced. Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are
inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations of NCAA rules in
consequential situations.
Reference 14 - 0.14% Coverage
No stakeholder supported the current system for handling high-stakes infractions. Many
informed us that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that led to this
Commission, the reaction was that “everyone knows” that these payments occur. That state of
affairs – where the entire community knows of significant rule breaking and yet the governance
body lacks the power or will to investigate and act – breeds cynicism and contempt.
Reference 15 - 0.03% Coverage
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement processes require a complete overhaul.
Reference 16 - 0.15% Coverage
Complex cases must be thoroughly investigated, and resolved by neutral professional
adjudicators, with authority to impose punishment that will have a significant deterrent effect.
The investigative arm must be independent and empowered to require the cooperation of
witnesses and the production of documents, including financial information, from NCAA
member institutions and their employees and contractors, with significant penalties for noncooperation.
Reference 17 - 0.11% Coverage
The Commission recommends that the NCAA enact significant increases in the penalties
imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of NCAA rules. Currently, the rewards for
violating the rules far outweigh the risks. To reverse this calculation, the Commission
recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
Reference 18 - 0.21% Coverage
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year postseason ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of all revenue
sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire period of the ban;
(iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv) increase the
penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than one season; and (v) increase the
penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year visit bans.
Reference 19 - 0.26% Coverage
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends
that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by member
institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must have jurisdiction to
address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects student-athletes’ eligibility.
Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud or misconduct case on the ground that
all students, not just athletes, were permitted to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct.
Coaches, athletic directors and university presidents must be held accountable for academic
fraud about which they knew or should have known. The standards and punishment for academic
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fraud must be clarified and then enforced consistently.
Reference 20 - 0.23% Coverage
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and its
member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency and ethical
behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission recommends that the NCAA
partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others to create and administer new
resources and programs for youth basketball development, including substantial regional camps
for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA coaches would evaluate players.
Reference 21 - 0.38% Coverage
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal of 2019, the
NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to establish and
administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA to devote significant
resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission proposes that youth
basketball players be identified and developed at three levels: Level 1, players with National
Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate potential; and Level 3, players with
Collegiate potential. At each level, players would have to be identified, developed and evaluated
by appropriate stakeholders. Critically, that development would include not only basketball, but
also academic and life skills, health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program
would be NCAAadministered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA
coaches would exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in
collaboration with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA –
consider similar initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
Reference 22 - 0.16% Coverage
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient, many
stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that prompted
the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant community expressed surprise
and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds of payments occur. Where an entire
community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the governance body fails to act, the result
is cynicism and contempt.
Reference 23 - 0.33% Coverage
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules
regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams qualify as
“amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years. Although there are
exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to receive compensation in any
form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a contract or commitment to play
professional athletics, to receive consideration from a professional sports organization, to
compete on a professional team and to enter into an agreement with an agent. In addition, a
student-athlete cannot receive preferential treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic
reputation or skill, unless specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws
12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or
Competition), 12.1.2 (Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
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Reference 24 - 0.07% Coverage
It would be better, stakeholders argue, if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the
NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by
restricting contact to specific times and places.
Reference 25 - 0.34% Coverage
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to impose
harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents) who violate the
rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate with NCAA
investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the ability to impose loss
of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of revenue from post-season play
on those who commit serious infractions and those who decline to cooperate with NCAA
investigations. They believe that the availability – and utilization – of these penalties would get
presidential and board-level attention at colleges. These persons further note that administrators,
athletic directors and coaches who violate the rules often move on to other member institutions,
and do not pay a significant price for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the
institutions that hire individuals who have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking
the risk of hiring past offenders.
Reference 26 - 0.15% Coverage
A number of stakeholders expressed the view that one way to lessen the negative influence of
non-scholastic basketball event operators and coaches would be for the NCAA to administer its
own regional non-scholastic basketball camps in July and to restrict NCAA coaches to those
NCAA camps for July. Coaches would be able to see numerous elite high school players in one
location, in theory without the need for an advance blessing from a non-scholastic basketball
coach.
Reference 27 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of financial
support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may be in challenging
financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving financial support and
benefits even before attending a college or university. Studentathletes are currently restricted in
their ability to earn income related to their status as student-athletes while matriculating. See,
e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). Thus, players or their families may be
offered and receive money the NCAA rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others
associated with NCAA member institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves
take payments to influence players in a variety of ways.
Reference 28 - 0.31% Coverage
The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling
their intercollegiate athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the
NCAA. NCAA Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s
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activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its members’
acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
Reference 29 - 0.11% Coverage
Eliminating one-and-done players from college basketball will remove the group
of most likely future professionals, and the associated potential for corrupt payments from
agents. Allowing collegiate players who become clear professional prospects to depart when they
choose to do so should similarly lessen the temptation to cheat while in college.
Reference 30 - 0.19% Coverage
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can also corrupt
the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special benefits to these
athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all students. Finally, the
matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short time primarily to play
Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain student-athletes will not, as a
practical matter, be college students.
Reference 31 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is optimistic that the NBA and the NBPA will agree with its
assessment. If the NBA and the NBPA are unable to negotiate an end to one-and-done by the end
of 2018, however, the Commission will reconvene and reassess the viability of some of these
alternative tools. The current situation is unacceptable.
Reference 32 - 0.31% Coverage
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a season before
returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.5.1 (Residence
Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious disadvantages in
completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this issue, over the last few years,
hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is upward.22
Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be in a better
“basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover, third parties influence
many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best interests of the player in mind.
Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence requirement” of the transfer rule remain
in place, whatever other changes are made in the NCAA’s transfer rules.
Reference 33 - 0.33% Coverage
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA rules
define as “agents”24
Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met or their employees. However, the
Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid, either
directly or indirectly.25
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advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into agreements
with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought that this would
simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age. Instead, agents
recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with high school and collegiate
players and make their cases so that players would have all available options before they enter
the professional market. The Commission intends NCAA-certification to provide these
opportunities for “good” agents.
Reference 34 - 0.11% Coverage
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with agents,
sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA should bring these
conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their prospects with agents whom it
certifies under NCAA-approved standards.
Reference 35 - 0.28% Coverage
One aspect of this debate is particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate. Paying modest
salaries to Division I basketball players will not address the particular corruption the
Commission confronts; nor will providing student-athletes a modest post-graduation trust fund
based on licensing of names, images and likenesses. None of the contemplated payments would
be sufficient to reduce the corrupt incentives of third parties who pay certain uniquely talented
players in the hope of latching onto their professional futures, of coaches and boosters seeking to
secure the success of their programs, or of colleges willing to undermine their education mission
to ensure the eligibility of players. One would have to adopt a full-scale professional model to
forestall that corruption or, as the Commission recommends, try instead to revitalize the college
model.
Reference 36 - 0.12% Coverage
The court stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is
a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
Reference 37 - 0.23% Coverage
But, in the current legal circumstances, the Commission decided to address the charge of
exploitation by providing individual student-athletes with access to professional opportunities,
and ensuring that the student portion of student-athlete is real. Specifically, the Commission
recommends allowing student-athletes with a professional pathway to make the choice to leave
college every year, creating resources so that they can make an informed choice whether to do
so, welcoming back student-athletes whom the NBA does not draft, making a serious financial
commitment to degree completion and severely punishing those who undermine the premise that
student-athletes must receive a valuable – not a sham – education.
Reference 38 - 0.29% Coverage
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I basketball makes its
task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends changes intended to expand
the professional opportunities of high school athletes who do not wish to attend college, to blunt
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the incentives to corrupt major college sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches
and administrators participating in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes
receive the college education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must
establish a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs. This
recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide meaning to
the phrase student-athlete.
Reference 39 - 0.44% Coverage
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes to cooperate in
NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can consider in assessing penalties. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The
NCAA also must adopt rules that require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate
with NCAA investigations, with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing
significant consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically, to
participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents, administrators, and
coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations, including by providing documents
and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators. In addition, while the NCAA does not have
subpoena power, it can adopt rules requiring as a condition of membership, that member
institutions enter into contractual agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member
institutions contractually impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents,
administrators and coaches. NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report
and provide evidence of violations.
Reference 40 - 0.19% Coverage
The NCAA is certainly not blameless for its failure to address the corruption in college
basketball that led to the recent prosecutions, but the primary failures belong to the individuals at
colleges and universities who allowed their programs to be corrupted, averting their eyes to keep
the money flowing. With enhanced individual accountability, the Commission believes that more
college presidents and athletic directors will find it beneficial to adopt and enforce
comprehensive compliance programs. See also NCAA Constitution 2.1 (Principle of Institutional
Control and Responsibility).
Reference 41 - 0.36% Coverage
In terms of substantive rules changes, the NCAA’s jurisdiction with respect to academic issues
must be clarified, stated in amended rules and communicated to member institutions. The rules
must be amended to allow the NCAA to address all academic fraud and cheating to the extent it
is used to corrupt athletic eligibility. Member institutions should not be able to shield academic
fraud to ensure athletic eligibility by extending that fraud to the entire student body. In addition,
the NCAA’s imposition of discipline for academic fraud and misconduct has been inconsistent
and untimely. The relationship between punishment and the school’s involvement, including its
self-reporting, is unclear. Member institutions do not fulfill their commitment to student-athletes
when they allow them to maintain eligibility through academic fraud or misconduct. The NCAA
must also amend its rules to clarify the standard for academic fraud and misconduct and to
establish consistent punishments for the violations of these rules. Going forward, the NCAA
must apply a revised standard consistently across member institutions.
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Reference 42 - 0.34% Coverage
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned on-campus
meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to ensure that agents
who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents who participate in
violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned from NCAA-certified nonscholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass along their student-athlete clients to
others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission recommends that the NCAA report any
agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the NBPA. The Commission believes that the
NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially decertify agents who participate in violations
of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently focused on improving the quality and ethics of
the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for
certification and in regulating agents will be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the
influence of corrupt agents.
Reference 43 - 0.24% Coverage
Any person or entity that sponsors a summer league, team or event must disclose any payments
made to or received from any coach, event operator, owner or any other entity associated with
that league, team or event. Any coach, event operator, owner or other entity associated with that
summer league, team or event must disclose any payment received that is related to the event and
how the payments will be expended. The Commission leaves to the NCAA the design of the
disclosure forms and the details of the requirements, but it must require the provision of any nonprofit organization’s financial filings with the government and full financial transparency – going
both ways – for non-scholastic basketball sponsors, event operators and coaches.
Reference 44 - 0.30% Coverage
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing
requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic basketball
events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that nonscholastic basketball
events contain an educational component. That requirement is not effectively administered and
enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA should enforce limits on the paid travel
and other benefits associated with the events, and require commercially standard charges for
admission (where allowed) and programs (rather than allowing individualized expensive
arrangements for college coaches). Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA
enforcement personnel have unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the
venue and the ability to inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
Reference 45 - 0.44% Coverage
In this section, the Commission recommends significant changes to the resources
and programs available for the development of young, pre-collegiate players, ideally by the
summer of 2019. Allowing players to enter the professional ranks earlier brings with it the
responsibility to provide appropriate resources for earlier development. We acknowledge that
institutional influence—by USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA and the NBPA—has been
largely missing in this space for the past 20 years and that nonscholastic basketball has been
largely ungoverned. We strongly recommend that the named institutions lend their expertise and,
wherever possible, work together to provide an alternative to the individual and corporate
influences which currently dominate precollegiate youth basketball particularly in the summer.
In the Commission’s view, the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA all have

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

416

significant institutional interests in developing prominent roles in non-scholastic basketball,
particularly in the areas of player identification, development and evaluation. There is a great
deal of work to be done in the development of pre-collegiate players, and the three institutions
should also welcome partners and sponsors willing to work within the standards, disciplines, and
accountability these institutions will bring to youth development.
Reference 46 - 0.14% Coverage
The Commission makes distinctions among three levels of players in addressing
pre-collegiate youth development: Level 1 for those players across the four high school years
with identified National Team Potential, Level 2 for those players across the four high school
years with identified Highest Collegiate Potential, and Level 3 for those players across the four
high school years with identified Collegiate Potential.
Reference 47 - 0.14% Coverage
At Level 1, USA Basketball with the NBA should take the lead in organizing and implementing
a program targeting this tier of players. USA Basketball with the NCAA should take the lead in
organizing and implementing Level 2, and the NCAA should take the lead in organizing and
implementing Level 3. Each of the stakeholders will need to bring commitment, experience,
financial resources, and the necessary authorities to this shared effort.
Reference 48 - 0.27% Coverage
Player identification. USA Basketball will be primarily responsible for the identification of those
players with the highest potential for Level 1 (Junior National Teams). The NCAA will be
primarily responsible for identification of those players with the highest potential for Levels 2
and 3. The Commission understands that college coaches annually identify the prospects they
seek to recruit using electronic databases and recruiting services. Based on these systems, players
can be assigned to an appropriate level based on the interest shown in them. As a further step to
ensure that players are properly identified, the Commission recommends that USA Basketball,
the NCAA, and the NBA and NBPA establish a “collaborative advisory group” to annually
review and validate the player identification and player evaluation processes.
Reference 49 - 0.09% Coverage
The Commission recommends that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional
camps each summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during that
time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted to account for these
events.
Reference 50 - 0.06% Coverage
Finally, the Committee recommends that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to
students making appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
Reference 51 - 0.14% Coverage
Player evaluation. The most important outcome of player evaluation is a realistic assessment of a
player’s potential. The Commission recommends that a “collaborative advisory group” among
the NCAA, USA Basketball and the NBA and NBPA be established to provide a realistic
assessment of professional potential to players in Levels 1 and 2. Importantly, the Commission
believes these evaluations must be transparent and accessible.
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Reference 52 - 0.27% Coverage
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the
corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic setting. We
believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may not be working in
the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial transparency and
accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development programs and provide
regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and their families. Individually, none of
these reforms is sufficient, but taken together the Commission hopes they will improve the
corrosive culture of youth basketball. Protecting, educating and developing youthful players –
from the time they first enter high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and
important tasks ahead.
Reference 53 - 0.07% Coverage
The Commission believes that additional recommendations of the NABC and
others are worthy of NCAA study. It also supports the NABC’s intent to reinvigorate its Code of
Ethics and disciplinary rules and enforcement.
Reference 54 - 0.15% Coverage
Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not in execution — such
as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems. Others should be easy to execute
— specific changes in the available punishments under Article 19 and in the recruiting rules.
Some do not require rules changes, but instead the devotion of financial and administrative
resource to planning, for example, the creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps.
Reference 55 - 0.10% Coverage
The Commission is committed to completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must
have a chance to review the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint
and, hopefully, its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important
effort to renew college basketball.
Files\\NCAA1 - Emmert Challenges Members to Confront Issues - § 8 references coded [
10.74% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.02% Coverage
The direct and, at times, blunt statements came at a time when members of several college
basketball programs are being investigated by the FBI for corruption
Reference 2 - 0.85% Coverage
Those charges led the NCAA to establish a Commission on College Basketball to explore the
issues and recommend necessary changes.
Reference 3 - 1.18% Coverage
The Board of Governors on Wednesday committed $10 million this year and an additional $2.5
million annually starting in 2019-20 to help implement the commission’s recommendations.
Reference 4 - 0.86% Coverage
In addition, the Board of Directors on Thursday promised to act on the recommendations by the
start of the 2018-19 basketball season.
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Reference 5 - 0.77% Coverage
“We can’t run away from change,” Emmert said. “We need to be the leaders in managing
change, not getting whipsawed by it.
Reference 6 - 1.37% Coverage
That committee, composed of members of some of the key NCAA committees and each
division’s Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, was formed to help better connect studentathletes with national policymaking.
Reference 7 - 1.48% Coverage
The strategic plan was last updated in 2004 to focus on academic reform, leading to improved
tracking of graduation rates and the academic performance of athletes, and led to penalties for
programs that failed to meet standards.
Reference 8 - 3.21% Coverage
“I’d like to use this process as a time to reestablish how we think, how we feel about this thing
we call the NCAA, to elevate the conversation around it,” Jones said. “If you look at the issues
of the day, they didn’t exist 14 years ago. All these things have come on the horizon, and they’ve
resulted in putting the NCAA on the defensive. I’d like to use this process to propel us into a role
of a leader. I think it’s a great opportunity. I think society is looking for a leader, and I think
that’s what we do best.”
Files\\NCAA2 - Joint Statement on Commission on College Basketball - § 8 references coded
[ 14.03% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.91% Coverage
Dr. Rice and the members of the commission were clear. The collegiate model should be
strengthened and preserved.
Reference 2 - 1.47% Coverage
To achieve that, we must recommit to our core purpose as a higher education association and
renew our commitment to the college degree as the centerpiece of intercollegiate athletics.
Reference 3 - 0.75% Coverage
End One-and-Done. Separate the collegiate track from professional by ending one-and-done.
Reference 4 - 1.50% Coverage
Greater Draft Flexibility for Student-Athletes. Allow student-athletes to test their pro prospects
and maintain their college eligibility if they do not sign a professional contract.
Reference 5 - 1.66% Coverage
NCAA-Certiﬁed Agents to Provide Student-Athletes with Assessment of Professional Prospects.
Permit students to receive meaningful assessment of their professional prospects earlier, with
assistance
Reference 6 - 2.04% Coverage
Provide Resources to Make the Promise of a College Education Real. NCAA to establish fund to
pay for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic scholarships who leave member
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institutions after progress of at least two years towards a degree.
Reference 7 - 2.90% Coverage
Reform Non-Scholastic Basketball and Make its Finances Transparent. NCAA should enforce
rigorous certiﬁcation criteria for non-scholastic basketball events that coaches attend. Events
should be subject to ﬁnancial disclosure, an audit of all ﬁnancial relationships and payments,
IRS, and other tax ﬁlings. Events must also have educational components.
Reference 8 - 2.79% Coverage
Enact Changes in Rules Governing Recruiting and Coaches’ Interaction with Recruits and
Student-Athletes. Reduce the inﬂuence of third parties and increase the ability of college coaches
to interact with recruits and current players. We endorse adoption of a number of rule changes
recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches.
Files\\NCAA3 - NCAA Provides Reinstatement Decision for Kansas’ Silvio De Sousa - § 1
reference coded [ 8.91% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 8.91% Coverage
When a school discovers an NCAA rules violation has occurred, it must declare the studentathlete ineligible and may request the student-athlete’s eligibility be reinstated. The NCAA staff
reviews each student-athlete reinstatement request individually based on its own speciﬁc facts.
This decision may be appealed to the Division I Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee,
which is comprised of representatives from NCAA schools.
Files\\NCAA4 - NCAA Statement from Mark Emmert on Federal Investigation - § 2
references coded [ 14.84% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 9.19% Coverage
Coaches hold a unique position of trust with student-athletes and their families and these bribery
allegations, if true, suggest an extraordinary and despicable breach of that trust.
Reference 2 - 5.65% Coverage
We learned of these charges this morning and of course will support the ongoing criminal federal
investigation.”
Files\\NCAA5 - NCAA to Help Certify June Basketball Events - § 7 references coded [
18.68% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.54% Coverage
The announcement clears a path for more schools to play an increased role in developing young
basketball players in the summer and providing them with additional opportunities to be seen and
recruited by college coaches.
Reference 2 - 4.94% Coverage
“The new June scholastic events initiative is an important and ambitious effort to support the
increased engagement of high school coaches with college coaches in the recruiting experience
for young players and their families,” said Dan Gavitt, NCAA senior vice president of
basketball. “Our members made clear that this needed to be an inclusive process so that
eventually as many players and schools as possible have the opportunity to participate. This step

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

420

opens that door wider and provides the foundation to grow June over time into a beneﬁcial
period to help the next generation of college basketball players develop their skills and be
recognized by coaches in a positive, educational environment.”
Reference 3 - 1.69% Coverage
The NCAA criteria announced Tuesday will be used to certify schools not afﬁliated with NFHSmember state organizations that are interested in hosting the events, ensuring that June events are
accessible to as many participants as possible.
Reference 4 - 1.97% Coverage
“We so appreciate the time and effort that has been put in by the National Federation of State
High School Associations, the National High School Basketball Coaches Association and the
NCAA for taking the time to address, in a short time period, the launch of June scholastic
events,”
Reference 5 - 3.00% Coverage
“It’s a big undertaking, but an important undertaking. We want every respective student-athlete
in our sport to have the opportunity to participate in these events. We appreciate the work that’s
being done to broaden that access and believe, as time allows people to adapt to these
opportunities, that we’ll see greater and greater participation from high school prospects, as well
as junior college prospects, in these events.”
Reference 6 - 1.82% Coverage
Dave Archer, the senior director of basketball operations for the National High School
Basketball Coaches Association, said the collaboration between the high school coaches, the
NCAA and the NFHS will improve the recruiting environment for young players.
Reference 7 - 3.72% Coverage
“The National High School Basketball Coaches Association is pleased with the action the NCAA
is taking to allow an alternative path for approval of June Division I men’s basketball scholastic
recruiting events,” Archer said. “This will allow hundreds and hundreds of additional high
school players with the potential to play college basketball to be evaluated by college coaches in
an educational environment. This is another important step as we continue to move forward to
improve the recruiting culture throughout the nation.”
Files\\NCAA6 - Statement from NCAA leaders on college basketball reforms ~ NCAA.org The Official Site of the NCAA - § 2 references coded [ 4.03% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.55% Coverage
These changes will promote integrity in the game, strengthen accountability and prioritize the
interests of studentathletes over every other factor.
Reference 2 - 1.48% Coverage
Provide college basketball players more freedom and ﬂexibility to decide their future.
Files\\NCAA7 - Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission
on College Basketball - § 3 references coded [ 8.82% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 2.32% Coverage
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Agents or advisors, with an emphasis on how students and their families can get legitimate
advice without being taken advantage of, defrauded or risking their NCAA eligibility.
Reference 2 - 2.87% Coverage
The NCAA’s relationship with the NBA, and the challenging effect the NBA’s so-called “one
and done” rule has had on college basketball, including how the NCAA can change its own
eligibility rules to address that dynamic.
Reference 3 - 3.63% Coverage
I believe we can — and we must — ﬁnd a way to protect the integrity of college sports by
addressing both sides of the coin: fairness and opportunity for college athletes, coupled with the
enforcement capability to hold accountable those who undermine the standards of our
community
Files\\Reforms1 - Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree - § 10 references coded [
16.92% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.53% Coverage
Basketball student-athletes can make more frequent campus visits paid for by colleges (referred
to as ofﬁcial visits), which can begin as soon as Aug. 1 the summer before their junior year in
high school.
Reference 2 - 0.92% Coverage
Schools now can pay for 28 ofﬁcial visits for recruits (34 for national service academies) over a
rolling, twoyear period.
Reference 3 - 2.41% Coverage
Depending upon future action by the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association to
permit high school students to enter the draft, high school basketball players can be represented
by an agent beginning July 1 before their senior year in high school, provided they have been
identiﬁed as an elite senior prospect.
Reference 4 - 1.32% Coverage
College basketball players can be represented by an agent beginning after any basketball season
if they request an evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee.
Reference 5 - 0.81% Coverage
Agents can pay for meals and transportation for players and their families if the expenses are
related to the
Reference 6 - 1.94% Coverage
Additionally, once an agreement is signed with an agent, high school and college student-athletes
and their families can have meals, transportation and lodging paid for by the agent if those
expenses are associated with meetings with the agent or a pro team.
Reference 7 - 1.92% Coverage
All agreements between agents and high school or college student-athletes must be:
In writing. Terminated when the student enrolls in or returns to college. Disclosed to the NCAA
(for high school students) or the school (for students already in college).
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Reference 8 - 2.29% Coverage
To work with a high school or college athlete, agents must be certiﬁed by an NCAA program
with standards for behavior and consequences for violations. Family members of the high school
recruit or college athlete or those who act solely on behalf of a professional sports team aren’t
required to be certiﬁed.
Reference 9 - 1.82% Coverage
Now, students who wish to enter the draft also must request an evaluation from the NBA
Undergraduate Advisory Committee, which will provide valuable information to assist studentathletes in making the decision to turn pro or stay in school.
Reference 10 - 1.96% Coverage
College basketball players who request an Undergraduate Advisory Committee evaluation,
participate in the NBA combine and aren’t drafted can return to school as long as they notify
their athletics director of their intent by 5 p.m. the Monday after the draft.
Files\\Reforms2 - Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences - § 2 references coded [ 8.66%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 6.46% Coverage
Basketball-related events for high school students will be subject to more rigorous certiﬁcation
requirements to ensure transparency in operations and ﬁnances. This will address issues of
corruption and help support student-athletes as they make decisions about their future. The
certiﬁcation criteria will be overseen by the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Oversight
Committee, and the NCAA Enforcement Certiﬁcation and Approvals Group will administer the
certiﬁcation program.
Reference 2 - 2.20% Coverage
Coaches and athletics staff must report to the university’s president or chancellor athleticsrelated income of more than $600 from any source outside their school.
Files\\Reforms3 - Independent Investigators and Decision-Makers - § 1 reference coded [
7.80% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 7.80% Coverage
Changes to the investigations and infractions process create independent groups to prevent
conﬂicts of interest. Cases deemed complex will be eligible for this independent process.
Examples of complex cases include alleged violations of core NCAA values, such as prioritizing
academics and the well-being of studentathletes; the possibility of major penalties; or adversarial
behavior. Multiple parties will be able to request a case be deemed complex: school
representatives, NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions members or NCAA enforcement
staff.
Files\\Reforms4 - More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System - § 1 reference coded [ 5.95%
Coverage]
Reference 1 - 5.95% Coverage
When schools and NCAA staff agree on the facts of a case, they can work together on a
resolution, including appropriate penalties, if any. This change will reduce legal fees and

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the NCAA

423

minimize drawn-out adversarial situations. Agreed-upon resolutions are subject to approval by
the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions.
Files\\Reforms5 - Stronger Accountability, Penalties - § 1 reference coded [ 4.59% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 4.59% Coverage
To deter future violations, presidents, coaches and staff have stronger, clearer accountability
expectations and face increased penalties if they break the rules.
Files\\Reforms6 - Adding Public Voices - § 1 reference coded [ 21.12% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 21.12% Coverage
Pending adoption at the NCAA Convention in January, ﬁve independent members will be added
to the NCAA Board of Governors, which is responsible for oversight of the entire Association.
Each member will be nominated by the Board of Governors Executive Committee, approved by
the full board and serve a threeyear term, which can be renewed once. The terms of the
independent board members are longer than those served by school representatives. One
member, voted on annually by all the independent members, will serve as a lead independent
member and can serve in that role for no more than three years.
Files\\TKC1 - Knight Commission Sees Integrity of College Sports at Risk - § 2 references
coded [ 2.86% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 1.92% Coverage
“The Commission is deeply troubled by mounting evidence that the NCAA is unable to ensure a
level of integrity that must be a priority in the education and treatment of college athletes,” said
Commission co-chair Arne Duncan, former U.S. Secretary of Education, “These threats to the
integrity of college sports are an urgent call to reform, if ever there was one.”
Reference 2 - 0.93% Coverage
“It’s clear that we need a new approach that can provide more fairness to student-athletes, while
giving more teeth to the NCAA to ensure academic integrity in college sports,”
Files\\TKC4 - Knight Commission Urges Tougher NCAA Reforms to Regain Public
Confidence in College Sports - § 1 reference coded [ 0.72% Coverage]
Reference 1 - 0.72% Coverage
No university can give the right to any employee to have a contract with shoe, equipment, and
apparel companies that are expressly or indirectly contingent on players wearing or using the
companies’ equipment or products. Such contracts must be made only with the university.

